A defendant in ejectment cannot protect himself by setting up
the record in a prior chancery suit between the same parties by
which the plaintiff in the ejectment had been ordered to convey all
his title to the defendant in the ejectment, but in consequence of
the party's being beyond the jurisdiction of the court, no such
conveyance had been made.
And this is so although the court of chancery, in following up
its decree, had legally issued a
habere facias
possessionem and put the defendant in ejectment in possession
of the land.
By the treaty of 1795, between the United States and Spain,
Spain admitted that she had no title to land north of the
thirty-first degree of latitude, and her previous grants of land,
so situated, were of course void. The country, thus belonging to
Georgia, was ceded to the united states in 1802, with a reservation
that all persons who were actual settlers on 27 October, 1795,
should have their grants confirmed. Congress provided a board of
commissioners to examine these grants, and declared that their
decision should be final.
The Court of Chancery of the State of Mississippi had no
authority to establish one of these grants which had not been
brought within the provisions of the act of Congress. The claim
itself being utterly void, and no power having been conferred by
Congress on that court to take or exercise jurisdiction over it for
the purpose of imparting to it legality, the exercise of
jurisdiction was a mere usurpation of judicial power, and the whole
proceeding of the court void.
The doctrine of this Court in
26 U. S. 1 Pet.
390 reviewed and confirmed,
viz.,
"That the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a
subject may be inquired into in every other court where the
proceedings of the former are relied on, and brought before the
latter by the party claiming the benefit of such proceeding. "
Page 44 U. S. 751
This was an ejectment brought by Hickey's lessee against the
defendants, as the heirs of Robert Starke, for two thousand acres
of land in the State of Mississippi.
The facts in the case are fully set forth in the opinion of the
Court.
The question was whether or not the court below erred in
permitting to be read in evidence on the part of the defendants the
record of a former chancery suit between the same parties in which
the court had decreed that all the title of Hickey
et al.
should be conveyed to the heirs of Starke.
Page 44 U. S. 756
MR. JUSTICE McKINLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment against the
defendants in the court below, and upon the trial, the plaintiffs
read in evidence, to the jury, the copy of a plat and certificate
of survey, signed by Charles Trudeau, Royal Surveyor of the
Province of Louisiana, for two thousand acres of land, French
measure, and a patent, issued by the Spanish governor of that
province, thereupon, to James
Page 44 U. S. 757
Mather, dated 3 April, 1794, and a deed of conveyance from James
Mather to George Mather dated 26 April, 1803, for the same tract of
land, and they also read in evidence a certificate dated 10 April,
1806, signed by the commissioners appointed by the President of the
United States under the Act of Congress of 3 March, 1803, and the
act supplemental thereto of 27 March, 1804, confirming to George
Mather the said tract of land, by virtue of the articles of
agreement and cession between the United States and the State of
Georgia. It was also proved that George Mather died about the year
1812, and that James Mather was his heir, and that James Mather had
died pending the suit, and it was admitted by the defendants that
the plaintiffs were the heirs of James Mather, "and whatever title
he had at his death vested in them or any others, his heirs, to be
shown."
And it was admitted by the plaintiffs
"that the defendants were in possession of the land in
controversy, and were so at the time this suit was brought, under
derivative titles from Robert Starke's heirs, valid so far as
Starke's title was valid."
And the defendants in support of the issue, on their part,
offered to read the record of the proceedings in a suit in chancery
in the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi, in which the
heirs of Robert Starke were complainants and the heirs of James
Mather defendants. And by which record it appeared that the
complainants set up and claimed title to the land here in
controversy under a warrant or order of survey, for two thousand
acres of land, dated about 29 December, 1791, and the survey
thereon, and the defendants claimed title under the survey and
patent of the Spanish government to James Mather. And by the order
and decree of that court, the land in controversy in this suit was
adjudged and decreed to the heirs of Robert Starke.
To the reading of which record and proceedings as evidence to
the jury the plaintiffs objected on these grounds:
"First. That it does not purport to be a record on its face, and
in its context. Secondly. That said record does not disclose nor
contain a final decree, neither the said record, nor the said
decree therein being signed by the judges of the said Supreme Court
of Mississippi. Thirdly. That the pleadings and context of said
record show that the chancery suit was entertained and treated by
said supreme court as a matter of original jurisdiction, whereas
the statutes of Mississippi expressly provide that the opinion of
the supreme court shall be certified to the court below, whose
action and adoption alone can render the opinion of the supreme
court final upon a question of law adjourned for its opinion.
Fourthly. That the facts and the law of the case did not give the
chancery court jurisdiction, inasmuch as, after the treaty of 1783,
a Spanish warrant or order was a mere nullity, and could only be
rendered valid by the holder's bringing himself within the first
section of the Act of Congress of 1803, by
Page 44 U. S. 758
residence and cultivation, whereas, as the record shows that
Starke was not within that act, nor, if he had been, could he have
derived any equity against a title, confirmed by the articles of
agreement and cession between Georgia and the United States of 14
April, 1802. Fifthly. That jurisdiction, legal and equitable, was
vested elsewhere by the 6th section of the act of 1803, such
investiture of jurisdiction in an inferior tribunal being exclusive
of that of any other tribunal. Sixthly. That a record or decree out
of chancery is not evidence of a legal, but an equitable title
only, and is therefore not pertinent to the issue joined.
Seventhly. That the decree, if read at all, must be read as an
estoppel by the record, and subject to the rules as to estoppels.
Eighthly. That a decree in chancery must be read on the same
footing as a judgment at law, and unless carried out by a
conveyance, can have no greater effect than a judgment in
ejectment."
The court overruled these objections, and permitted the record
to go to the jury, as evidence of any fact decided by it. To which
opinion of the court the plaintiffs excepted. The plaintiffs, among
other instructions, some of which were refused and some granted,
but which need not be noticed here, moved the court to instruct the
jury,
"That the decree read in evidence, by the defendant's counsel,
does not
per se divest the plaintiffs, or the ancestors of
the plaintiffs, of the legal title, but that said title remains
unaffected at law by said decree, and is still in plaintiffs, if
the jury believe them to be the heirs of said Mather."
There were several instructions moved by the defendants, some of
which were granted and some refused, but as they are either
included in the ruling of the court, already noticed, or
unnecessary to the decision of the points on which we think this
case ought to be decided, they will not be noticed in the
investigation of the subject.
Two questions are distinctly presented by the ruling of the
circuit court. First. Whether the decree in the suit in chancery
was a bar to the action of the plaintiffs. Secondly. Whether the
court of chancery had jurisdiction of the subject matter in
controversy before it in that case. For the plaintiffs in error, it
has been insisted, that the decree is not evidence of a legal
title, even if it were otherwise valid, and therefore no bar to the
action of ejectment, and that the possession of the defendants
under the decree, without a deed of conveyance as directed by it,
whether by the writ of
habere facias possessionem or
otherwise gave no legal title to the defendants, and therefore
opposed no legal bar to the plaintiffs' action. And, secondly, it
was insisted that neither the court of chancery nor the Supreme
Court of the State of Mississippi had jurisdiction of the subject
matter presented by the bill of the complainants. The whole power
to confirm Spanish titles, protected by the contract of cession by
the State of Georgia to the United States, having been conferred,
by act of Congress, on a board of commissioners,
Page 44 U. S. 759
whose decision was by law made final, no other court could
decide upon the validity of those claims.
The converse of these propositions was maintained by the counsel
for the defendants. And it was insisted that the decree operated as
a conveyance and also as a judgment in ejectment, the court of
chancery having the power by statute to award the writ of
habere facias, and therefore the decree and possession
under it are a legal bar to the action of ejectment. And upon the
second point it was insisted that the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the decree could not be inquired into by
the court below, nor by this Court, when brought before either
collaterally. To arrive at the legal effect of the decree, we must
inquire into the object and intention of the complainants in
bringing the suit in chancery. They charge in their bill that James
Mather had obtained from the Spanish government the legal title to
the land in controversy in fraud of the rights of their ancestor,
Robert Starke, and they pray that by decree of the court Mather may
be compelled to surrender to them the full and entire possession of
the land, together with the evidences of title which he has
thereto, and that they may be quieted in their title, "and such
other and further relief in the premises as to the court shall seem
meet."
The court by its decree established the right of the
complainants to the land in controversy, and ordered Mather's
heirs, who were all nonresidents of the State of Mississippi, to
convey the land to the complainants and to deliver to them the
possession, and awarded the writ of
habere facias, which
writ the court of chancery is authorized to order by a statute of
the state. Without the aid of this writ, the court could not have
put the complainants into possession, the defendants being out of
their jurisdiction; nor could they for the same reason compel a
conveyance of the title to the land. The decree is therefore if
otherwise valid, nothing more than an equitable right, ascertained
by the judgment and decree of a court of chancery, and until
executed by a conveyance of the legal title according to the
decree, Starke's heirs, and those claiming under them, have nothing
but an equitable title to the land in controversy.
To enable the defendants in this case to defend their possession
successfully upon their own title, that title must be shown to be a
good and subsisting legal title, and superior in law to that set up
by the plaintiffs; otherwise it opposes no legal bar to the
recovery in the action of ejectment. And conceding what was
contended for in argument -- that the decree and possession under
it, by the writ of
habere facias, is equivalent to a
judgment in ejectment followed by like possession -- it would avail
the defendants nothing in this case, because such a judgment and
possession are no bar to another action of ejectment for the same
premises. The defendant in ejectment can never defend his
possession against the plaintiff upon a
Page 44 U. S. 760
title in himself by which he could not recover the possession if
he were out and the plaintiff in possession. Reversing the
positions of the parties in this case, could the defendants, if
plaintiffs, recover the land in controversy upon this decree, and
evidence of possession under it, against the title of the
plaintiffs? We have no hesitation in saying they could not, and
therefore the decree, if founded upon a valid equitable title,
would be no legal bar to the action of the plaintiffs.
To a correct understanding of the question of jurisdiction
argued at the bar it is necessary to ascertain the character of the
grant set up by Starke's heirs in the suit in chancery. This grant
was obtained from the Spanish governor of Louisiana, prior to the
treaty between the United States and Spain of 27 October, 1795. By
this treaty, Spain admitted she had no right to the territory north
of the thirty-first degree of north latitude. In consequence of
which all the grants made by her authority within that territory
were void. This territory then belonged to the State of Georgia,
but by deed bearing date 24 April, 1802, she ceded it to the United
States. And in that deed it was stipulated
"That all persons who on 27 October, 1795, were actual settlers
within the territory thus ceded, shall be confirmed in all the
grants legally and fully executed prior to that day by the former
British government or the government of Spain,"
&c. The first section of the Act of Congress of 3 March,
1803, chap. 80, 2 Story's Laws 893, enacts
"That any person or persons that were residents in the
Mississippi Territory on 27 October, 1795, and who had prior to
that day obtained, either from the British government of West
Florida or the Spanish government, any warrant or order of survey
for lands lying within said territory, to which the Indian title
had been extinguished, and which, on that day, had been actually
inhabited and cultivated by such person or persons, or for his or
their use, shall be confirmed in their claims to such lands in the
same manner as if their claims had been completed."
This section places those who had obtained a warrant or order of
survey upon the same ground with those who had complete titles. The
5th section of the act declares,
"That every person claiming lands by virtue of British grant, or
of the three first sections of this act, or of the articles of
agreement and cession between the United States and the State of
Georgia, shall, before the last day of March, 1804, deliver to the
register of the land office, within whose district the land may be,
a notice in writing stating the nature and extent of his claims,
together with a plat of the tract or tracts claimed, and shall
also, before that day, deliver to said register for the purpose of
being recorded every grant, order of survey, deed of conveyance, or
other written evidence of his claim, and the same shall be recorded
by the said register in books to be kept for that purpose."
And upon the failure of the claimant to comply with these
requirements,
Page 44 U. S. 761
his claim is declared to be void, and shall never "be received
or admitted as evidence in any court in the United States against
any grant derived from the United States."
The 6th section of the act provides for the appointment of two
boards of commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining the rights
of persons claiming the benefit of the articles of agreement and
cession between the United States and the State of Georgia, and of
the three first sections of the act. Each board was authorized to
hear and decide in a summary manner all matters respecting such
claims within their respective districts, and their determination
was declared to be final.
The record of the chancery suit between Starke's heirs and
Mather's heirs shows that Starke was not resident in the
Mississippi Territory on 27 October, 1795, but had removed
therefrom some years before that period; that no notice of his
claim had been given to the register of the land office, within
whose district it lay, together with a plat of the tract claimed
and delivered to the register, to be recorded as required by law.
Nor does it appear that the claim was ever submitted to the board
of commissioners for their determination. Many years afterwards,
the exact time not appearing by the imperfect record read in
evidence, the court of chancery for the Mississippi Territory,
without any authority's having been conferred on it by act of
Congress for that purpose, took cognizance of Starke's claim, and
established its validity by its own judgment and decree.
In the case of
Henderson v.
Poindexter, 12 Wheat. 543-544, the Court says
"The whole legislation on this subject requires that every title
to lands in the country which had been occupied by Spain, should be
laid before the board of commissioners. The motives for this
regulation are obvious, and as the titles had no intrinsic
validity, it was opposed by no principle. Claimants could not
complain, if the law which gave validity to their claims should
also provide to examine their fairness, and should make the
validity depend upon their being laid before that board. The
plaintiff in error has failed to bring his case before the tribunal
which the legislature had provided for its examination, and has,
therefore, not brought himself within the law. No act of Congress
applies to a grant held by a nonresident of the territory in
October, 1795, which has not been laid before the board of
commissioners. It is true that no act has declared such grants
void, but the legislature has ordered the lands to be sold which
were not appropriated in a manner recognized by law, and the land
in controversy is of that description."
"If this view of the subject be correct, no Spanish grant made
while the country was wrongfully occupied by Spain can be valid
unless it was confirmed by the contract with Georgia or has been
laid before the board of commissioners."
This tribunal was created for the express purpose of deciding
all questions arising under
Page 44 U. S. 762
the deed of cession by Georgia, securing to a particular class
of claimants the lands they occupied and cultivated at the date of
the treaty between the United States and Spain of 27 October, 1795,
and its decision was to be final, and therefore its jurisdiction
was exclusive unless, by express words, Congress had conferred
concurrent jurisdiction on some other judicial tribunal. From these
propositions results the inquiry whether the decree in the chancery
suit was void, the court having no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the decree, or only erroneous and voidable? If the
former, then its validity was inquirable into in the current court,
when offered as evidence, and it ought to have been rejected.
According to the decision in case of
Henderson v.
Poindexter, above referred to, Starke's claim, when submitted
by his heirs to the court of chancery was utterly void, and no
power having been conferred by Congress, on that court, to take or
exercise jurisdiction over it for the purpose of imparting to it
legality, the exercise of jurisdiction was a mere usurpation of
judicial power, and the whole proceeding of the court void.
In the case of
Rose v. Himely, Chief Justice Marshall
said,
"A sentence professing on its face to be the sentence of a
judicial tribunal, if rendered by a self-constituted body or by a
body not empowered by its government to take cognizance of the
subject it had decided, could have no legal effect whatever. The
power of the court then is, of necessity, examinable to a certain
extent by that tribunal, which is compelled to decide whether its
sentence has changed the right of property. The power under which
it acts must be looked into, and its authority to decide questions
which it professes to decide, must be considered. . . . Upon
principle, it would seem that the operation of every judgment must
depend on the power of the court to render that judgment, or in
other words, on its jurisdiction over the subject matter which it
has determined."
In the case of
Elliott v.
Piersol, 1 Pet. 340, it was held by this Court
that
"Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every
question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decisions be
correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as
binding in every other court. But if it acts without authority, its
judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not
voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought,
even prior to a reversal, in opposition to them. They constitute no
justification, and all persons concerned in executing such
judgments or sentences are considered, in law, trespassers. This
distinction runs through all the cases on the subject, and it
proves that the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over
a subject, may be inquired into in every other court when the
proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the
latter by the party claiming the benefit of such proceedings."
The same doctrine was maintained by this Court in the case
of
Page 44 U. S. 763
Wilcox and Johnson, 13 Pet. 511, and the case of
Elliott v. Piersol, referred to, and the decision
approved. These cases being decisive of the question of
jurisdiction, we deem it unnecessary to refer to any other
authority on that point. From the view we have taken of the whole
subject, it is our opinion, the decree of the Supreme Court of
Mississippi would have been no bar to the action of the plaintiffs
in this case if the subject matter of the suit had been within its
jurisdiction. But we are of the opinion that court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, and that the whole proceeding
is a nullity. The circuit court erred, therefore, in permitting the
record to be read to the jury as evidence for any purpose whatever.
Wherefore the judgment of the circuit court is
Reversed.