Newit Vick made the following devises,
viz.:
"2dly. I will and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Elizabeth Vick,
one equal share of all my personal estate, as is to be divided
between her and all of my children, as her own right, and at her
own disposal during her natural life, and also, for the term of her
life on earth, the tract of land at the Open Woods on which I now
reside, or the tracts near the river, as she may choose, reserving
two hundred acres however, on the upper part of the uppermost tract
to be laid off in town lots at the discretion of my executrix and
executors."
"3dly. I will and dispose to each of my daughters, one equal
proportion with my sons and wife of all my personal estate as they
come of age or marry, and to my sons one equal part of said
personal estate as they come of age, together with all of my lands,
all of which lands I wish to be appraised, valued, and divided when
my son Westley arrives at the age of twenty-one years, the said
Westley having one part, and my son William having the other part
of the tracts unclaimed by my wife Elizabeth, and I bequeath to my
son Newit, at the death of my said wife, that tract which she may
prefer to occupy. I wish it to be distinctly understood that that
part of my estate which my son Hartwell has received shall be
valued, considered as his, and as a part of his portion of my
estate."
"I wish my executors, furthermore, to remember that the town
lots now laid off and hereafter to be laid off on the
aforementioned two hundred acres of land should be sold to pay my
just debts or other engagements, in preference to any other of my
property, for the use and benefit of all my heirs."
From the provisions of the will, it appears not to have been the
intention of the testator to include the town lots in the devise of
his lands to his sons.
But these town lots must be sold, after the payment of debts,
for the use and benefit of all the heirs of the testator.
The mere construction of a will by a state court does not, as
the construction of a statute of the state, constitute a rule of
decision for the courts of the United States. If such construction
by a state court had been long acquiesced in, so as to become a
rule of property, this Court would follow it.
The case was this.
In 1819, Newit Vick, a citizen of the State of Mississippi, died
leaving a wife and the following children:
Sons -- Hartwell Vick, John Westley Vick, William Vick,
Newit H. Vick.
Daughters -- Nancy, Sarah, Mary, Eliza, Lucy, Matilda,
Amanda, Martha, Emily.
The wife, however, died in a few minutes after her husband.
In October, 1819, the will of the deceased was admitted to
probate in the Orphan's Court of Warren County, and was as
follows:
"In the name of God, Amen! I, Newit Vick, of Warren County, and
State of Mississippi, being of perfect mind and memory, and
Page 44 U. S. 465
calling to mind the mortality of life and knowing that it was
appointed for all men once to die, do make and ordain this my last
will and testament, in the manner and form following, to-wit: "
"Primarily and first of all, I give and dispose my soul into the
hands of Almighty God, who gave it, and my body I recommend to be
buried in a Christian-like and decent manner, according to the
discretion of my executors."
"2dly. I will and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Elizabeth Vick,
one equal share of all my personal estate, as is to be divided
between her and all of my children, as her own right, and at her
own disposal during her natural life, and also, for the term of her
life on earth, the tract of land at the Open Woods on which I now
reside, or the tracts near the river, as she may choose, reserving
two hundred acres, however, on the upper part of the uppermost
tract, to be laid off in town lots at the discretion of my
executrix and executors."
"3dly. I will and dispose to each of my daughters one equal
proportion with my sons and wife of all my personal estate as they
come of age or marry, and to my sons one equal part of said
personal estate as they come of age, together with all of my lands,
all of which lands I wish to be appraised, valued, and divided when
my son Westley arrives at the age of twenty-one years, the said
Westley having one part and my son William having the other part of
the tracts unclaimed by my wife Elizabeth, and I bequeath to my son
Newit, at the death of my said wife, that tract which she may
prefer to occupy. I wish it to be distinctly understood that that
part of my estate which my son Hartwell has received shall be
valued, considered as his, and as a part of his portion of my
estate."
"4thly and lastly. I hereby nominate and appoint my beloved wife
Elizabeth, my son Hartwell, and my nephew Willis B. Vick, my sole
and only executrix and executors of this my last will and
testament. It is, however, furthermore my wish that the aforesaid
Elizabeth should keep together the whole of my property, both real
and personal, reserving the provisions before made, for the
raising, educating, and benefit of the before-mentioned
children."
"It must be remembered that the lot of two acres on the bank of
the river on which a saw mill house is erected belongs to myself,
son Hartwell, and James H. Center, when the said Center pays his
proportional part."
"I wish my executors, furthermore, to remember that the town
lots now laid off and hereafter to be laid off on the
aforementioned two hundred acres of land should be sold to pay my
just debts or other engagements, in preference to any other of my
property, for the use and benefit of all my heirs, and that James
H. Center have a title made to him for one lot already laid off of
half an acre in said two hundred acres, and on which he has built,
when he pays to my executors the sum of three hundred dollars.
"
Page 44 U. S. 466
"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal,
this 22 August, in the year of our Lord 1819."
"The words interlined, 'for the use and benefit of all my
heirs,' before signed."
"NEWIT VICK [SEAL]"
"FOSTER COOK"
"EDWIN COOK"
"B. VICK"
The wife being dead, Hartwell, one of the executors, virtually
renounced the executorship, and Willis, the other executor, gave
the necessary bond and took out letters testamentary; but being in
bad health, he was, with his own consent, removed. John Lane, one
of the complainants, who had married Sarah, one of the daughters of
the testator, then took out letters of administration with the will
annexed, and filed accounts, from time to time, until the year
1829, when he filed his final account and was discharged. He
reported the sale of sixty-seven town lots at various prices and to
various persons. The debts of the testator were all paid.
In 1831, John Westley Vick sold a portion of his interest, which
was subdivided by sundry mesne conveyances, and came into the
possession of several holders.
In 1838, the plaintiffs, being residents of Louisiana and
Tennessee, filed their bill against all the other descendants of
the testator, and claimants under them. It recited the facts above
set forth, and proceeded thus:
"Your orators would further allege, that some years since the
said Willis B. Vick departed this life, and that for some years all
the executors of the last will and testament of said Newit Vick
have been dead. Your orators allege, that only a few lots had been
laid off and sold by Newit Vick, in his lifetime, and that your
orator, John Lane, as administrator, with the will annexed, laid
off by actual survey the said Town of Vicksburg, off of the upper
end of the uppermost tract, referred to in said will, which will,
as your honors will perceive, directed the same to be done. Lots
and parts of lots have been sold from time to time by the said
administrator, and the amounts of the sales applied to the payment
and liquidation of the debts of the said Newit Vick, until all the
debts which he, the said Newit Vick, owed, so far as are known,
have been paid off and discharged."
"They would further state, that there yet remain lots and parts
of lots, and parcels of ground in said town, and on said two
hundred acres, which are unsold, and more especially, that part of
said town known by the name of 'Commons,' and 'Levee street,' which
have descended to the heirs of said Newit Vick, hereinafter
mentioned. They would further represent, that the powers of said
Lane, administrator, to sell the unsold lots, parcels of ground, as
above stated aforesaid, have been doubted and brought into
question, which renders it to him a matter of prudence and sound
discretion to
Page 44 U. S. 467
stop the sales, since the debts of Newit Vick have been paid,
and ask the advice of this Honorable Court, sitting in chancery,
who have the burden, and whose duty it is to explain the nature of
all trusts, and decree the performance of the same, to say what
shall be done with the residue of the unsold lots, and parts of
lots, commons, Levee street &c., in said town, and on said two
hundred acres."
It concluded thus:
"Your orators pray your honors, upon a final hearing of this
cause, to decree a division and partition of the aforesaid lots,
parts of lots, commons, and Levee Street, to be made between them
and the other heirs of Newit Vick, and that said claimants shall be
put into possession of the part allotted to her or them, and that
the defendants shall account for the rents and profits which they
have respectively received. Or if a partition and division of the
ground aforesaid, as above asked for, is not, in the opinion of
this Honorable Court, carrying the will of the testator, Newit
Vick, into full and complete effect according to the true intent
and meaning thereof, then may your honors decree and order the said
John Lane, administrator with the will annexed, to proceed to sell
said grounds upon such terms and credits as you may deem proper,
and then distribute the money among the several claimants according
to their respective interests, and grant all such other relief as
to justice may belong."
Some of the defendants answered the bill, admitting the truth of
its statements, and concurring in the prayer for a division, "among
the several claimants, according to the nature and extent of them
as heirs, and also under the will of Newit Vick;" others concurred
generally and prayed that their parts might be allotted to
them.
The parties made defendants, as vendees &c., to-wit,
Prentiss &c., demurred to the bill, and the cause being set
down for hearing on this state of preparation, the court, in June,
1842, sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the bill.
From this decree the complainants appealed.
Page 44 U. S. 471
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is brought here by an appeal from the decree of the
circuit court for the District of Mississippi.
The complainants under the will of Newit Vick, late of the State
of Mississippi, deceased, claim certain interests in a tract of two
hundred acres of land, on which the Town of Vicksburg is laid off.
In the bill various proceedings are stated as to the proof of the
will, the qualification of one of the executors named in it, the
death of the executrix, and the refusal of one of the executors
named to qualify; that the executor who qualified was afterwards
removed, with his consent, and Lane, the complainant, appointed
administrator with the will annexed; that acting under the will,
the administrator laid off the Town of Vicksburg, sold lots, and
paid the debts of the deceased; that there yet remains certain
parts of the above tract undisposed of, and that his power as
administrator to sell the unsold lots is questioned.
The defendants are represented as being interested in the above
tract as devisees and as purchasers, and the complainants pray that
the court would decree a part ion of the lots, commons, and Levee
Street, to be made between them and the other devisees of Newit
Vick, and that said claimants shall be put in possession &c.,
or that said property may be sold &c., as shall best comport
with the intent of the testator.
The defendants favorable to the object of the bill answered; the
others demurred to the bill, which was sustained on the hearing,
and the bill was dismissed, from which decree this appeal was
taken.
The decision of this case depends upon the construction of the
will of Newit Vick. It was proved 25 October, 1819.
Page 44 U. S. 472
Every instrument of writing should be so construed as to
effectuate, if practicable, the intention of the parties to it.
This principle applies with peculiar force to a will. Such an
instrument is generally drawn in the last days of the testator, and
very often under circumstances unfavorable to a calm consideration
of the subject matter of it. The writer, too, is frequently
unskillful in the use of language, and is more or less embarrassed
by the importance and solemnity of the occasion. To expect much
system or precision of language in a writing formed under such
emergencies would seem to be unreasonable. And it is chiefly owing
to these causes that so many controversies arise under wills.
In giving a construction to a will, all the parts of it should
be examined and compared, and the intention of the testator must be
ascertained not from a part, but the whole of the instrument.
By the second paragraph of the will under consideration, the
testator bequeaths to his wife one equal share of his personal
property, to be divided between her and her children. This would
give to his wife one-half of his personal estate. But the
succeeding paragraph qualifies this bequest so as to give to his
wife a share of the personal property equal only to the amount
received by each of his children. This shows a want of precision in
the language of the will, and that one part of it may be explained
and qualified by another.
In the second paragraph, the testator devises to his wife,
during her natural life,
"the tract of land at the Open Woods, on which he then resided,
or the tracts near the river, as she might choose, reserving two
hundred acres on the upper part of the uppermost tract to be laid
off in town lots, at the discretion of his executrix and
executors."
This discretion of his executrix and executors, referred to the
plan of the town, and not to the propriety of laying it off. The
testator had determined that a town should be established, and
reserved for this purpose the above tract of two hundred acres, "to
be laid off in town lots."
The testator next disposes of his personal property to his wife
and children, and he says,
"to my sons one equal part of said personal estate as they come
of age, together with all my lands, all of which lands I wish to be
appraised, valued, and divided when my son Westley arrives at the
age of twenty-one years, the said Westley having one part and my
son William having the other part of the tracts unclaimed by my
wife Elizabeth, and I bequeath to my son Newit, at the death of my
said wife, that tract which she may prefer to occupy. I wish it to
be distinctly understood that that part of my estate which my son
Hartwell has received shall be valued, considered as his, and as a
part of his portion of my estate."
By these devises, Newit, on the death of his mother, was to have
the tract selected by her for her residence. She died, it is
admitted,
Page 44 U. S. 473
in a few minutes after the decease of the testator, so that no
selection of a residence was made by her. But this is not important
as regards the intention of the testator. What lands did he devise
to his sons Westley and William? The answer is the land unclaimed
by the wife of the testator. His words are "Westley having one
part, and my son William having the other part, of the tracts
unclaimed by my wife Elizabeth." But what tracts may be said to
come under the designation of "tracts unclaimed by my wife?" The
land which, under the election given to her in the will, she might
have claimed as a residence but did not.
This claim by the widow was expected to be made shortly after
the decease of the testator, as by it her future residence was to
be established. If she selected the river land, then the Open Woods
tract was to go, under the will, to Westley and William; but if the
Open Woods tract were selected by the widow, then they were to have
the river land. This devise, being of the land unclaimed by the
widow, presupposes her right to have claimed it in the alternative
under the will. It did not include the town tract, for that was
expressly reserved by the testator from the choice of his wife.
That this is the proper limitation of the devise to Westley and
William seems to be clear of doubt.
To Hartwell was devised the tract on which he lived, and which
was to be valued.
These are the specific devises of his lands by the testator to
his four sons. The tract of two hundred acres reserved for the town
is not affected by them. Did this tract pass to his sons under the
general devise of his lands to them, in the third paragraph of the
will? That point will be now examined. The words of the testator
are
"and to my sons one equal part of said personal estate as they
come of age, together with all of my lands, all of which lands I
wish to be appraised, valued, and divided, when my son Westley
arrives at the age of twenty-one years."
The words "all of my lands," unless restricted by words with
which they stand connected or by some other part of the will, cover
the entire real estate of the testator. But these words are
restricted by the part of the sentence which follows them, and also
in other parts of the will.
"All of which lands I wish to be appraised, valued, and divided,
when my son Westley arrives at the age of twenty-one years" follow
the words "all of my lands," and show that the tract of two hundred
acres was not intended to be included in this general devise. Such
an intention was incompatible with the reservation of this tract
for a town. In the second clause of the will are the words,
"reserving two hundred acres, however, on the upper part of the
uppermost tract, to be laid off in town lots." Now the testator
could not have intended, in the next clause, to direct that this
tract should be valued and divided among his sons. This would be
repugnant to the authority given to his executors to lay off a
Page 44 U. S. 474
town, and would have been an abandonment of what appears, from
the last clause in the will to have been, with him, a favorite
object. Did he intend the tract of two hundred acres should be
valued and divided among his sons, which he directed in another
part of his will to be laid off into town lots and sold by his
executors? So great an inconsistency is not to be inferred. The
general devise to his sons "of all his lands" was limited to the
lands which he directed to be valued and divided among his sons.
This cannot be controverted, for it is in the very words of the
will, and does not depend upon inference or construction. The
special devises to each of his sons, which follow the general
devise, also, in effect limit it. These devises cover all the real
property of the testator except the town tract, and show what he
meant "by all his lands." He intended all his lands which he
subsequently and specially devised, and not the tract which, in the
will, he had previously reserved and afterwards disposed of.
In the next clause of the will, the testator expresses his wish
that the aforesaid Elizabeth should keep together the whole of his
property, both real and personal, reserving the provisions before
made, for the raising, educating, and benefit of the
before-mentioned children.
These exceptions refer to the share of the personal property
which each child was to receive when married, or at full age, and
to the land appropriated for the town.
We have now arrived at the last clause of the will, under which
clause this controversy has arisen. The testator has made provision
for his wife by giving her a life estate in one of two tracts of
land as she might select and an equal share, with each child, of
the personal property. To his sons, in addition to his share in the
personalty, he has given to each a portion of his real estate. He
has made no disposition of the tract reserved for a town, but
proceeds to do so in the following and closing paragraph of the
will.
"I wish my executors furthermore to remember that the town lots
now laid off, and hereafter to be laid off, on the aforementioned
two hundred acres of land, should be sold to pay my just debts or
other engagements in preference to any other of my property for the
use and benefit of all my heirs."
This clause is construed by the appellees to be a charge on the
two hundred acres of land for the payment of the debts of the
testator only. And that the authority to the executors to sell lots
is limited to this object. That as the personal property bequeathed
to his heirs was first liable for the debts of the deceased, the
charge on this tract may well be said, in the language of the will,
to be "for the use and benefit of all his heirs."
That there is plausibility in this construction is admitted. It
may at first generally strike the mind of the reader as reasonable
and just. But a closer investigation of the structure of the
paragraph
Page 44 U. S. 475
and a comparison of it with other parts of the will with the
view to ascertain the intention of the testator must, we think,
lead to a different conclusion.
If the object of the testator had been, as contended, merely to
charge this tract with the payment of his debts, would the words,
"for the use and benefit of all my heirs" have been inserted? The
sentence was complete without them. They add nothing to its
clearness or force. On the contrary, if the intention of the
testator was to pay his debts only by the sale of lots to be laid
off, the words are surplusage. They stand in the sentence
disconnected with other parts of it, and consequently are without
an object.
The testator directed that the town lots should be sold to pay
his just debts, "in preference to any other of his property." This
released his personal property, which he had bequeathed to his
children, from all liability on account of his debts. And on the
hypothesis that he only intended to do this, why should the above
words have been added? They were not carelessly thrown into the
sentence when it was first written. From the will it appears they
were interlined. This shows deliberation and the exercise of
judgment. Without this interlineation, the lots were required to be
sold to pay debts, in preference to other property, in language too
clear to be misunderstood by anyone. It could not have been
misunderstood either by the testator or the writer of the will. But
as the paragraph was first written it did not carry out the
intention of the testator. To effectuate that intent, the
interlineation was made. The words, "for the use and benefit of all
my heirs" were interlined. Does this mean nothing? This
deliberation and judgment? Were these words added to a sentence
perfectly clear, and which charged the land with the payment of the
debts of the testator, without any object? Were they intended to be
words of mere surplusage and without effect? Such an inference is
most unreasonable. It does violence to the words themselves and to
the circumstances under which they were introduced. No court can
disregard these words or the manner of their introduction.
The testator was not satisfied with the direction to his
executors to sell lots for the payment of his debts, but he adds
"for the use and benefit of all my heirs." By this he intended that
the lots should be sold for the payment of his debts, and "for the
use and benefit of all his heirs." The omission of the word and has
given rise to this controversy. Had that word been inserted with
the others, no doubt could have existed on the subject. And its
omission is reasonably accounted for by the fact of the
interlineation. On such occasions, more attention is often paid to
the matter to be introduced than to the word which connects it with
the sentence. That the lots should be sold "for the use and benefit
of all his heirs" after the payment of his debts is most
reasonable, but it cannot with the same propriety of language be
said that the debts
Page 44 U. S. 476
of the testator were to be paid "for the use of all his heirs."
The word use imports a more direct benefit. That the phrase was
used in this sense we cannot doubt.
The clauses in the will preceding the one which is now under
consideration have been examined, and no disposition is found in
any of them of the town tract. And if it be not disposed of in this
last paragraph, after the payment of the debts, the remaining lots
or their proceeds will descend generally to the heirs of the
testator as personal property. The law will not disinherit the heir
on a doubtful devise. But we think the testator intended that the
tract of two hundred acres should be laid out in lots and sold "for
the use and benefit of all his heirs" and "the payment of his debts
and other engagements."
This construction of the will is strengthened by its justice to
all the parties interested. That the testator intended to give to
his sons a much larger part of his property than to his daughters
is evident. He gave to his sons an equal share, with his daughters,
of his personal property. But did he intend to cut off his
daughters from all interest in his real estate? He could not have
had the heart of a dying father to have done so. He did not act
unjustly to his daughters. They, equally with his sons, were
devisees of the proceeds of the town lots after the payment of all
just debts and other engagements.
It is insisted that the construction of this will has been
conclusively settled by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in the
case of
Vick v. Mayor and Aldermen of Vicksburg, 1 How.
379.
The parties in that case were not the same as those now before
this Court, and that decision does not affect the interests of the
complainants here. The question before the Mississippi court was
whether certain grounds within the town plat had been dedicated to
public use. The construction of the will was incidental to the main
object of the suit, and of course was not binding on anyone
claiming under the will. With the greatest respect, it may be
proper to say that this Court do not follow the state courts in
their construction of a will or any other instrument as they do in
the construction of statutes.
Where, as in the case of
Jackson v.
Chew, 12 Wheat. 167, the construction of a will had
been settled by the highest courts of the state and had long been
acquiesced in as a rule of property, this Court would follow it
because it had become a rule of property. The construction of a
statute by the supreme court of a state is followed without
reference to the interests it may affect or the parties to the suit
in which its construction was involved. But the mere construction
of a will by a state court does not, as the construction of a
statute of the state, constitute a rule of decision for the courts
of the United States. In the case of
Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1,
Page 44 U. S. 477
the effect of the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
the construction of instruments by the state courts, are considered
with greater precision than is found in some of the preceding cases
on the same subject.
The decree of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is
remanded to that court for further proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE McKINLEY.
In this case, I differ in opinion with the majority of the Court
not only on the construction of the will, but upon a question of
much greater importance, and that is whether the construction given
to this will by the Supreme Court of Mississippi is not binding on
this Court. I will proceed to the examination of these questions in
the order in which I have stated them, and to bring into our view
all the provisions of the will which dispose of the real estate of
the testator, I will state them in the order in which they stand in
the will, unconnected with other provisions not necessary to aid in
construing those relating to the real estate.
After the introductory part of the will, and providing for his
funeral, the testator proceeds to dispose of his estate thus:
"Secondly, I will and bequeath to my beloved wife Elizabeth Vick
one equal share of all my personal estate, as is to be divided
between her and all my children, as her own right and at her own
disposal during her natural life, and also for the term of her life
on earth, the tract of land at the Open Woods, on which I now
reside, or the tracts near the river, as she may choose, reserving
two hundred acres, however, on the upper part of the uppermost
tract to be laid off in town lots, at the discretion of my
executrix and executors."
"Thirdly, I will and dispose to each of my daughters one equal
proportion with my sons and wife, of all my personal estate, as
they come of age or marry, and to my sons one equal part of said
personal estate, as they come of age, together with all of my
lands, all of which lands I wish to be appraised, valued, and
divided when my son Westley arrives at the age of twenty-one years,
the said Westley having one part and my son William having the
other part of the tracts unclaimed by my wife, Elizabeth; and I
bequeath to my son Newit, at the death of my wife, that tract which
she may prefer to occupy. I wish it to be distinctly understood
that that part of my estate which my son Hartwell has received
shall be valued, considered as his, and as part of his portion of
my estate."
"Fourthly, it is, however, furthermore my wish that the
aforesaid Elizabeth should keep together the whole of my property,
both real and personal, reserving the provisions before made for
the raising, educating, and benefit of the before-mentioned
children. I wish my executors furthermore to remember that the town
lots now laid off and hereafter to be laid off on the
aforementioned two hundred
Page 44 U. S. 478
acres of land, should be sold to pay my just debts, or other
engagements, in preference to any other of my property, for the use
and benefit of all my heirs."
An inquiry which lies at the threshold of this investigation is
what was the meaning and intention of the testator in reserving the
two hundred acres of land, "to be laid off in town lots?"
Did he intend this tract, of two hundred acres, should not pass
by his will, under the general description of "all my lands?" Or
did he mean simply that it should be reserved from the use of his
wife, in the event she selected the river tracts in preference to
the Open Woods tract? Or did he intend, as the majority of the
Court has decided, that it should be reserved to be sold by his
executors for the purposes of paying his just debts and other
engagements, "and" to increase the legacies of his daughters? To
the last construction there is a very material objection. The power
of the executors to sell the lots laid off and to be laid off on
the two hundred acres is not absolute, but contingent. The testator
did not direct that any of his property, real or personal, should
be sold for the purpose of paying his debts or for any other
purpose. But his meaning and intention, as manifested by the
language employed, is that if, in the administration of his estate,
it should become necessary to sell any portion of it for the
payment of his debts or other engagements, he wished his executors
to remember that the town lots then laid off and thereafter to be
laid off should be sold "in preference to any other of [his]
property."
If the debts and other engagements could have been satisfied
without a sale of the lots, the executors would have had no power
to sell them for any purpose whatever, and the words "for the use
and benefit of all my heirs" would have been inoperative for the
purpose to which they have been applied, and the bounty which it is
supposed by the court a father's heart could not withhold from his
daughters would have been entirely defeated, and in that event the
interpolation of the word "and," which has been supplied by the
court, could not have conferred on the daughters the lots, nor the
proceeds of the sale of them. But conceding the power to sell the
lots for the payment of the testator's debts, do the words "for the
use and benefit of all my heirs" give any authority to the
executors to sell the remainder of the lots after paying the debts,
or any right to the heirs to receive the proceeds of such sale?
The Court seems to admit by its reasoning that these words alone
give no right to the heirs to claim the proceeds, nor power to the
executors to sell the remainder of the lots, and therefore it has
supplied the word "and" to unite the power granted to sell for the
payment of debts with the words "for the use and benefit of all my
heirs," which, it says, completes the right to receive the
proceeds. If the Court has the right to alter the will and then
give construction to it, it makes it mean what it pleases.
Page 44 U. S. 479
But I deny the power of the Court in such a case as this to add
the word "and." The rule is understood to be this: where there is a
supposed mistake or omission, all the court has to do is to see
whether it is possible to reconcile that part with the rest, and
whether it is perfectly clear, upon the whole scope of the will,
that the intention cannot stand with the alleged mistake or
omission.
Mellish v. Mellish, 4 Ves. 49. It appears to me
these words are perfectly consistent with the other parts of the
will, and are by no means repugnant to the main intention of the
testator, but perfectly consistent therewith.
His intention, as manifested by all the provisions of the will,
appears to be to divide his personal estate equally among his sons
and daughters and his wife, and to divide all his real estate, or
lands, equally among his sons. That he intended each son to take an
equal part of his lands is proved by the direction to have each
portion valued. That half of the Open Woods tract was not equal in
value to the two river tracts, excluding the two hundred acres to
be laid off into lots, is clearly proved by the will itself,
because the testator gives his wife her choice of the Open Woods
tract or the two tracts on the river, and whichever she selects is,
at her death, to go to his youngest son, Newit, and the other to be
divided between his sons Westley and William, and he further
directs that the part which his son Hartwell had received should be
valued, considered his, and as part of his portion of the estate.
Here is a clear and unequivocal intention manifested to give to
each son an equal portion of his real estate, and it is as clearly
manifested that the specific portions given are not equal. To
maintain the construction given to the will by the Court, the two
hundred acres are excluded from the devise of all the testator's
lands to his sons. And the question arises, and ought to have been
decided, how are these portions to be equalized? If the two hundred
acres passed to the sons by the devise, subject to the payment of
debts, then a reasonably certain contingent means was afforded for
equalizing the portions by dividing and valuing the lots not sold
to pay debts to make up deficiencies.
This view alone is sufficient to satisfy my mind that all the
lands passed to the sons by the general words, "all of my lands,
all of which lands I wish to be appraised, and valued, and divided,
when my son Westley arrives at the age of twenty-one years." Can
the words "for the use and benefit of all my heirs," which in
themselves contain no positive words of grant, control the
previous, positive, and unconditional, grant of all his lands to
his sons? It appears to me to be impossible to give such
controlling influence to such words upon any of the known and
established rules of construction, and especially when they admit
of a different interpretation, by which they would stand in perfect
harmony with the other provisions of the will.
The accounts settled by the executor, with the orphans'
court,
Page 44 U. S. 480
and which are part of the record exhibited in the bill of
complaint, show that between twenty-five thousand and thirty
thousand dollars of the debts of the estate were paid by the
proceeds of the cotton crops, which proves that a large portion of
the personal estate consisted of slaves. Is it not reasonable,
therefore, to suppose the testator had in his mind the
disadvantages that would result to all his children if he should
leave his slaves liable to be sold for the payment of his debts,
when he ordered the lots, which were unproductive, to be sold for
that purpose "in preference to any other of his property" which was
productive? Acting upon this view of his affairs, is it at all
surprising that he should have inserted in his will, even by
interlining, the words, "for the use and benefit of all my heirs,"
that being the reason which induced him to charge the debts upon
the town lots?
But putting out of view all extraneous considerations, can the
construction given by the Court to this part of the will be
sustained upon principle? Executors have no authority to sell real
estate unless the power to sell and the purpose of the sale are
expressed in the will. Therefore the Court cannot infer from a
power expressly granted to sell the estate for one purpose a power
to sell it for another purpose not granted.
Hill v. Cook,
1 Ves. & B. 175. In the case under consideration, the only
authority given by the will to sell the town lots was for the
payment of debts, and there the power of the executors to sell any
portion of the estate terminated. When they had sold as many of the
lots as were necessary to pay the debts, the remainder fell into
the general devise of all the lands of the testator to his sons,
and the purposes of the testator in relation to his real estate
were accomplished, according to his plain intention, when all the
provisions of the will are taken together.
To reserve the remainder of the lots from the general devise and
to give effect to the interlined words different from their plain
meaning, in the connection in which they stand with the other
provisions of the will, the court revive the exhausted power of
sale and give capacity to all the heirs to take the proceeds of the
sale of the remainder of the lots by inserting the conjunction
"and" between the power to sell the lots for the payment of debts
and the interlined words, thereby changing the meaning of the whole
sentence. This certainly is not construing the will, but it is
making a will and giving this portion of the testator's estate to
his daughters which he plainly intended for and gave to his
sons.
This will was brought in question before the High court of
Errors and Appeals of the State of Mississippi in the case of
Vick v. Mayor and Aldermen of Vicksburg, 1 How. 442. The
question before that court was whether the land in controversy had
been dedicated by Newit Vick in his lifetime to public purposes, or
passed to and was vested in his devisees by his will, and it is a
part of the same land in controversy in the case
Page 44 U. S. 481
before this Court; the court of Mississippi having concurrent
jurisdiction of the subject matter with this Court decided that the
whole of the real estate was devised to the sons of Newit Vick,
deceased, and that his daughters were entitled to no part of the
lots nor any part of the proceeds of the sale of them. According to
the Constitution and laws of the United States and previous
decisions of this Court, I think this Court was bound to follow the
decision of that court upon the construction of the will.
The 2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution of the
United States declares
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to
controversies between two or more states, between citizens of
different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands
under grants of different states, and between a state or the
citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects."
In these three latter classes of cases, the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States is concurrent with the state courts. In
this case, it originated between citizens of different states, and
is therefore concurrent with the courts of Mississippi. Before the
jurisdiction here conferred on the courts of the United States
could be exercised, it was necessary their powers and authority
should be established and defined by law. And accordingly, by the
34th section of the Act of Congress of 24 September, 1789, it is
enacted
"That the laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States
in cases where they apply."
The purposes for which jurisdiction was given to the courts of
the United States between citizens of different states in ordinary
matters of controversy, between citizens of the same state claiming
lands under grants from different states, and between an alien and
a citizen of a state, was to give in each of these cases, at the
option of the plaintiff, a tribunal presumed to be free from any
accidental state prejudice or partiality for the trial of the
cause.
And when Congress defined the powers of the courts of the United
States, they directed that the laws of the several states should be
regarded as the rules of decision in suits at common law in cases
where they apply. And upon these principles, with few if any
exceptions, has this Court acted from the commencement of the
government down to the present term of this Court. That they should
continue so to act is of great importance to the peace and harmony
of the people of the United States. If the state judicial
Page 44 U. S. 482
tribunals establish a rule governing titles to real estate,
whether it arise under statute, deed, or will, and this Court
establishes another and a different rule, which of these two rules
shall prevail? They do not operate like two equal powers in
physics, one neutralizing the other, but they produce a contest for
success, a struggle for victory, and in such a contest it may
easily be foreseen which will prevail.
The state courts have unlimited jurisdiction over all the
persons, and property, real and personal, within the limits of the
state. And as often as the courts of the United States have it in
their power, by their judgments, under their limited jurisdiction,
to turn out of the possession of real estate those who have been
put into it by the judgment of the highest court of appellate
jurisdiction of the state, so often that possession will be
restored by the same judicial state power. To avert such a contest,
and in obedience to the act of Congress before referred to, this
Court has laid it down in many cases as a sound and necessary rule
that they should follow the state decisions establishing rules and
regulating titles to real estate. And in the following cases they
have applied the rule to the construction of wills, devising real
estate. In
Jackson v.
Chew, 12 Wheat. 162, the principle is fully
maintained. In that case, the Court says
"The inquiry is very much narrowed by applying the rule which
has uniformly governed this Court that where any principle of law,
establishing a rule of real property, has been settled in the state
courts, the same rule will be applied by this Court that would be
established by the state tribunals. This is a principle so
obviously just and so indispensably necessary under our system of
government that it cannot be lost sight of."
The question in that case arose upon the construction of a will
devising land in New York. In the case of
Henderson v.
Griffin, 5 Pet. 154, the Court says
"The opinion of the Court in the case of
Kennedy v.
Marsh was an able one; it was the judicial construction of the
will of Mr. Laurens, according to their view of the rules of the
common law in that state, as a rule of property, and comes within
the principle adopted in
Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat.
153,
25 U. S. 167."
These cases are in strict conformity with the 34th section of
the Act of 24 September, 1789, above referred to.
There are many other decisions of this Court applicable to this
case; some of them have followed a single decision of a state court
where it settled a rule of real property. And at the present term
of this Court, in the case of
Carroll v. Safford, it was
held that it was not material whether it had been settled by
frequent decisions or a single case. From these authorities it is
plain the jurisdiction of this Court is not wholly concurrent in
this case with the Supreme Court of Mississippi, but in power of
judgment it is subordinate to that court, and therefore the
construction
Page 44 U. S. 483
given by that court to the will ought to have been the rule of
construction for this Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY concurred in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE
McKINLEY.