An act of Congress imposing a duty upon imports must be
construed to describe the article upon which the duty is imposed,
according to the commercial understanding of the terms used in the
law in our own markets at the time when the law was passed.
The duty, therefore, imposed by the act of 1832 upon cotton
bagging cannot properly be levied upon an article which was not
known in the market as cotton bagging in 1832, although it may
subsequently be called so.
This was an action brought in the court below by Martin and Coe
against Curtis the collector, for return of duties upon certain
importations of gunny cloth, from Dundee, in Scotland, from April
to September, 1841.
Page 44 U. S. 108
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes before the Court upon a writ of error directed
to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The
action was brought by the defendants in error against the
plaintiff, who was the collector of the port of New York, to
recover back $4,500, which had been paid under protest as duties
upon certain goods imported into the port of New York, in April,
1841. The goods in question were gunny cloths, and were charged by
the collector as cotton bagging.
The defendants in error offered evidence to show that in 1832,
when the law passed imposing the duty on cotton bagging, the
article in question was not used or known as cotton bagging; that
it was then only seen in the form of bags for India goods; that the
first importation of gunny cloth to be used as cotton bagging was
in 1834. It is made from the yute grass.
The plaintiff in error proved that these goods, at the time of
the
Page 44 U. S. 109
importation, were known in commerce as cotton bagging, that they
were made of the proper width for that purpose, and for several
years before this importation gunny cloths had been imported and
used for cotton bagging, and that the goods in question were
imported from Dundee, in Scotland.
Upon this evidence, the counsel for the defendant contended that
if the jury found that the article gunny cloth was, in commercial
understanding, known as cotton bagging at the time of its
importation, it was subject to a duty, and that the term cotton
bagging, according to the commercial understanding of the phrase,
signified any fabric, without regard to the material of which it
was made, that was used to bale or cover cotton, and prayed the
court so to charge the jury.
His honor the judge refused so to charge the jury, but, on the
contrary thereof, charged
"That the point upon which this case turns is for the decision
of the jury,
viz., whether the article in question in this
case was known as cotton bagging in the year 1832, when the tariff
act was passed. It has long been a settled rule of construction of
revenue laws, imposing duties on articles of a specified
denomination, to construe the article according to the designation
of such article as understood and known in commerce, and not with
reference to the materials of which they may be made or the use to
which they might be applied. Nor ought such laws to be construed as
embracing all articles which might subsequently be applied to the
same use and purpose as the specific article. If it had been the
intention of Congress to impose the duty upon all articles used for
bagging cotton, the language of the act would have been different,
and in terms prospective, adapted to such purpose. It has been
argued on the part of the United States that the duty was intended
to be laid on all articles used for bagging cotton, because the
duty is laid on cotton bagging 'without regard to weight or
measure.' These terms, 'weight or measure,' were intended to apply
to different materials then in use for bagging cotton, such as
hemp, flax, and sometimes cotton cloth &c., and not to any new
articles that might thereafter be applied to that use. So that the
whole question of fact for the jury is whether gunny cloth was, in
commercial understanding, known as cotton bagging when the law was
passed laying the duty, in 1832. If it was not, they will find for
the plaintiffs; if it was, they will find for the defendant."
To this charge, in every respect, the defendant's counsel
excepted.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for $4,543.17, and
six cents costs.
The question brought up by this exception cannot now be
considered as an open one. In the case of
United
States v. 200 chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 438, the
Court decided that, in imposing duties, Congress must be understood
as describing the article upon which the duty is imposed according
to the commercial understanding of the terms used in the law in our
own markets. This doctrine
Page 44 U. S. 110
was reaffirmed in the case of
United
States v. 112 Casks of Sugar, 8 Pet. 277, and again
in
35 U. S. 10
Pet. 151, in the case of
Elliott v. Swartwout. It follows
that the duty upon cotton bagging must be considered as imposed
upon those articles only which were known and understood as such in
commerce in the year 1832, when the law was passed imposing the
duty.
In the case before us, the circuit court followed the rule of
construction above stated, and it has been followed also in every
circuit where the question has arisen. The judgment is
therefore
Affirmed.