Application to stay, pending disposition of an appeal,
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's judgment enjoining applicant
city and city officials from expending funds in support of a
referendum proposal on the November, 1978, state general election
ballot changing the state real property tax system, is granted. It
appears that the balance of equities favors granting the
application and that at least four Members of this Court would vote
to grant plenary review of the question whether the Massachusetts
statute barring municipalities from expending funds to influence
elections is constitutional.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, Circuit Justice.
The city of Boston, its mayor, and several of its elected
officials, have applied to me for a stay of the judgment of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court entered October 4, 1978,
enjoining them,
inter alia, from expending city funds in
support of a referendum proposal on the ballot of the November,
1978, general election. If adopted, the proposal would authorize
the Massachusetts Legislature to supersede the present tax system
of 100% valuation of real property by a system that would,
inter alia, classify real property according to its use in
no more than four classes and assess, rate, and tax such property
differently in the classes so established.
The Supreme Judicial Court held that Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 55
(West Supp. 1978-1979), barred municipalities from engaging in the
expenditure of funds to influence election results. ___ Mass. ___,
380
N.E.2d 628 (1978). Only last Term, this Court struck down a
provision of chapter 55 that imposed a ban on private corporate
financing of advocacy on referendum questions as abridging
expression that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were meant to
protect.
First
Page 439 U. S. 1390
Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.
S. 765 (1978). The Supreme Judicial Court held in the
instant case, however, that even if "constitutionally protected
speech includes the right of a municipality to speak militantly
about a referendum issue of admitted public importance where the
Legislature of the State has said it may not," ___ Mass. at ___,
380 N.E.2d at 637, "there are demonstrated, compelling interests of
the Commonwealth which justify the
restraint' which the
Commonwealth has placed on the city," id. at ___, 380
N.E.2d at 637, namely,
"[t]he Commonwealth has an interest in assuring that a
dissenting minority of taxpayers is not compelled to finance the
expression on an election issue of views with which they
disagree."
Id. at ___, 380 N.E.2d at 639.
In deciding whether to grant a stay pending disposition of the
jurisdictional statement I must consider two factors:
"First, "a Circuit Justice should
balance the equities' . .
. and determine on which side the risk of irreparable injury weighs
most heavily." Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.
S. 1304, 414 U. S.
1308-1309 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., in chambers). Second,
assuming a balance of equities in favor of the applicant, the
Circuit Justice must also determine whether "it is likely that four
Members of this Court would vote to grant a writ of certiorari."
Id. at 414 U. S.
1310. The burden of persuasion as to both of these
issues rests on the applicant. . . ."
Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.
S. 1310,
434 U. S.
1312 (1977) (MARSHALL, J., in chambers).
In my view, the balance of the equities favors the grant of the
application. In light of
Bellotti, corporate industrial
and commercial opponents of the referendum are free to finance
their opposition. On the other hand, unless the stay is granted,
the city is forever denied any opportunity to finance communication
to the statewide electorate of its views in support of the
referendum, as required in the interests of all taxpayers,
including residential property owners.
Page 439 U. S. 1391
I am also of the view that at least four Members of this Court
will vote to grant plenary review of this important constitutional
question.
Accordingly, I grant the application and stay the judgment of
October 4, 1978, pending further action of this Court or myself as
Circuit Justice.