In
General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U. S.
12, it was held that a New Mexico state court, under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, lacked power to enjoin
petitioner from filing and prosecuting
in personam actions
in federal court relating to the subject matter of the state suit
or to interfere with petitioner's efforts to obtain arbitration in
federal forums on the ground that petitioner is not entitled to
arbitration or for any reason whatsoever. Nevertheless, the New
Mexico court, on remand, issued orders staying federal arbitration
proceedings demanded by petitioner on the ground,
inter
alia, that petitioner had waived any right to arbitration
because its demand therefor was untimely.
Held: Under this Court's prior judgment, petitioner has
an absolute right to present its claims to federal forums, and
therefore its motion for leave to file a petition for writ of
mandamus directing the New Mexico court to vacate its orders
staying federal arbitration proceedings is granted because of that
court's refusal or failure to comply with this Court's mandate.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner has filed a motion for leave to file a petition for a
writ of mandamus and requests that a writ of mandamus issue to the
District Court for the First Judicial District, Santa Fe County,
N.M., directing the court to vacate two orders on the ground that
they violated this Court's mandate in
General Atomic Co. v.
Felter, 434 U. S. 12
(1977).
In that opinion, we held that, under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, the Santa Fe court lacked power to
enjoin the General Atomic Co. (GAC) from filing and prosecuting
in personam actions against the United Nuclear Corp. (UNC)
in federal court. Upon remand, the Santa Fe court modified its
injunction
"to exclude from its terms and conditions all
in
personam actions in Federal Courts and all other matters
mandated to be excluded from the operation of said preliminary
injunction by the opinion of
Page 436 U. S. 494
the United States Supreme Court, dated October 31, 1977."
Shortly thereafter, GAC filed a demand for arbitration with UNC
of issues growing out of the 1973 uranium supply agreement around
which the litigation between the parties revolves. This demand,
filed with the American Arbitration Association, relied upon the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. ยง 1
et seq. (1976 ed.),
and the arbitration clause of the 1973 agreement. GAC also filed
demands for arbitration against UNC in the federal arbitration
proceedings involving Duke Power Co. (Duke) and moved for
permission to file a cross-claim against UNC in the arbitration
proceedings involving Commonwealth Edison Co. (Commonwealth).
Finally, GAC requested the Santa Fe court to stay its own trial
proceedings with respect to issues subject to these arbitration
demands. UNC, in addition to opposing this motion, also asked the
court to stay the arbitration proceedings.
On December 16, 1977, the Santa Fe court issued a decision in
which it concluded that GAC had waived any right to arbitration
with UNC which it might have had because it failed to demand
arbitration in a timely manner, and that neither the Duke nor
Commonwealth agreements gave GAC any right to demand arbitration
with UNC. On the basis of these conclusions, Judge Felter filed the
following order staying the arbitration proceedings:
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that United
Nuclear Corporation's Application for Order Staying Arbitrations
and Partial Final Judgment, be and the same hereby is granted."
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that further
arbitration proceedings predicated upon the following demands for
arbitration made by Defendant General Atomic Company against
Plaintiff United Nuclear Corporation in the following arbitration
proceedings, viz:"
"A. The Demand for Arbitration filed by General Atomic
Page 436 U. S. 495
Company on November 29, 1977, with the American Arbitration
Association for arbitration of the disputes arising under the 1973
Supply Agreement, a copy of which is attached to GAC's Motion to
Stay Proceedings,"
"B.
Duke Power Company v. GAC, Case No. 31-10-0009-76,
in Charlotte, North Carolina,"
"C.
Commonwealth Edison Company v. UNC, GAC and Gulf,
Case No. 51-10-0106-74-C in Chicago, Illinois"
"shall be, and each of them hereby are, stayed until the further
order of the Court, Provided, however, that this Partial Final
Judgment shall not, in and of itself, operate to preclude Defendant
General Atomic Company from asserting claimed federal rights in
appropriate judicial proceedings."
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECLARED, DETERMINED AND ADJUDICATED
that Defendant General Atomic Company has no right to arbitrate any
issue in the aforesaid arbitration proceedings or pending herein
against Plaintiff United Nuclear Corporation."
On December 27, 1977, the court formally denied GAC's motion to
stay the trial pending completion of the arbitration
proceedings.
During the course of our opinion in
General Atomic Co.,
we specifically addressed the restrictions placed by the Santa Fe
court's previous injunction upon GAC's attempt to assert what it
believed to be federally guaranteed arbitration rights in other
forums:
"What the New Mexico Supreme Court has described as 'harassment'
is principally GAC's desire to defend itself by impleading UNC in
the federal lawsuits and federal arbitration proceedings brought
against it by the utilities.[11] This, of course, is something
which GAC has every right to attempt to do under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc.
14 and the Federal Arbitration Act. . . . The right to pursue
federal
Page 436 U. S. 496
remedies and take advantage of federal procedures and defenses
in federal actions may no more be restricted by a state court here
than in
Donovan [v. Dallas, 377 U. S.
408 (1964)]. Federal courts are fully capable of
preventing their misuse for purposes of harassment."
434 U.S. at
434 U. S. 119.
Footnote 11 specifically addressed arbitration proceedings which
are the subject of Judge Felter's new stay order:
"The injunction has also prevented GAC from asserting claims
against UNC under the arbitration provision of the 1973 uranium
supply agreement in the pending arbitration proceeding instituted
against GAC and UNC by Commonwealth prior to its issuance, even
though the District Court granted Commonwealth's demand for
arbitration and the Seventh Circuit has affirmed. Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
400 F.
Supp. 888 (ND Ill.1975),
aff'd, 541 F.2d 1263 (1976).
In addition, the Western District of North Carolina federal court
has refused to stay arbitration between Duke and GAC in a
proceeding also instituted prior to the injunction, despite GAC's
contention that UNC was an indispensable party to any such
arbitration proceeding which it was prevented from impleading by
the injunction. The court acknowledged, however, that UNC would be
a proper party to the proceeding.
General Atomic Co. v. Duke
Power Co., 420 F.
Supp. 215 (1976)."
In its order of December 16, 1977, the Santa Fe court has again
done precisely what we held that it lacked the power to do:
interfere with attempts by GAC to assert in federal forums what it
views as its entitlement to arbitration. [
Footnote 1] Clearly, our
Page 436 U. S. 497
prior opinion did not preclude the court from making findings
concerning whether GAC had waived any right to arbitrate or whether
such a right was contained in the relevant agreements. Nor did our
prior decision prevent the Santa Fe court, on the basis of such
findings, from declining to stay its own trial proceedings as
requested by GAC pending arbitration in other forums. But, as
demonstrated
supra, we have held that the Santa Fe court
is without power under the United States Constitution to interfere
with efforts by GAC to obtain arbitration in federal forums on the
ground that GAC is not entitled to arbitration or for any other
reason whatsoever. GAC, as we previously held, has an absolute
right to present its claims to federal forums.
As was recently reaffirmed in
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend
Corp., 434 U. S. 425
(1978), if a lower court
"mistakes or misconstrues the decree of this Court, and does not
give full effect to the mandate, its action may be controlled . . .
by a writ of mandamus to execute the mandate of this Court."
In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.
S. 247,
160 U. S. 255
(1895). A litigant who, like GAC, has obtained judgment in this
Court after a lengthy process of litigation, involving several
layers of courts, should not be required to go through that entire
process again to obtain execution of the judgment of this Court. In
light of the prior proceedings in this matter, it is inconceivable
that, upon remand from this Court, the Santa Fe court was free to
again impede GAC's attempt to assert its arbitration claims in
federal forums. Because the Santa Fe court has refused or failed to
comply with the judgment of this Court, petitioner's motion for
leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus is granted.
Assuming as we do that the Santa Fe court will now conform to our
previous judgment by promptly vacating or modifying its order of
December 16, 1977, to the extent that it places any restriction
whatsoever upon GAC's exercise
Page 436 U. S. 498
of its right to litigate arbitration claims in federal forums,
we do not at present issue a formal writ of mandamus. [
Footnote 2]
See Bucolo v.
Adkins, 424 U. S. 641
(1976);
Deen v. Hickman, 358 U. S. 57
(1958).
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Although the court stated that its order staying the arbitration
proceedings
"shall not in and of itself operate to preclude Defendant
General Atomic Company from asserting its claimed federal rights in
appropriate judicial proceedings,"
the only plausible reading of this provision in light of the
stay order is that the court did not view the proceedings in
question as "appropriate."
[
Footnote 2]
We do not read the December 27, 1977, order as restricting GAC
from pursuing its arbitration claims in other forums. Consequently
there is no occasion to disturb it.