Arlington County, Va., zoning ordinance prohibiting automobile
commuters from parking in designated residential neighborhoods and
providing for free parking permits for residents of such
neighborhoods held not to violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The distinction drawn between residents
and nonresidents of a neighborhood is not invidious, and rationally
promotes the ordinance's stated legitimate objectives of reducing
air pollution and other adverse consequences of automobile
commuting, and of enhancing the quality of life in residential
areas, such as by reducing noise and traffic hazards.
Certiorari granted; 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231, vacated and
remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The motion of D.C. Federation of Civic Associations
et
al. for leave to file a brief as
amici curiae and the
petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
To stem the flow of traffic from commercial and industrial
districts into adjoining residential neighborhoods, Arlington
County, Va., adopted zoning ordinance ยง 29D. The ordinance directs
the County Manager to determine those residential areas especially
crowded with parked cars from outside the neighborhood. [
Footnote 1] Free parking permits are
then issued to residents of the designated areas for their own
vehicles, to persons doing business with residents there, and to
some visitors. To
Page 434 U. S. 6
park an automobile without a permit in a restricted area between
8 am. and 5 p.m. on weekdays is a misdemeanor.
Acting under the ordinance, the County Manager designated a
restricted area in Aurora Highlands, a residential neighborhood
near a large commercial and office complex. Commuters who worked in
this complex and had regularly parked in the area sued in the
Circuit Court of Arlington County to enjoin the enforcement of the
ordinance on state and federal constitutional grounds. The Virginia
Supreme Court ultimately held that the ordinance violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 2]
As stated in its preamble, the Arlington ordinance is
intended
"to reduce hazardous traffic conditions resulting from the use
of streets within areas zoned for residential uses for the parking
of vehicles by persons using districts zoned for commercial or
industrial uses . . . ; to protect those districts from polluted
air, excessive noise, and trash and refuse caused by the entry of
such vehicles; to protect the residents of those districts from
unreasonable burdens in gaining access to their residences; to
preserve the character of those districts as residential districts;
to promote efficiency in the maintenance of those streets in a
clean and safe condition; to preserve the value of the property in
those districts; and to preserve the safety of children and other
pedestrians and traffic safety, and the peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the County."
Conceding the legitimacy of these goals, the Virginia Supreme
Court found that the ordinance's discrimination between residents
and nonresidents "bears no reasonable relation to [the
Page 434 U. S. 7
regulation's] stated objectives," and, therefore, that "the
ordinance, on its face, offends the equal protection guarantee of
the 14th Amendment." 217 Va. 645, 651, 231 S.E.2d 231, 235. We
disagree.
To reduce air pollution and other environmental effects of
automobile commuting, a community reasonably may restrict on-street
parking available to commuters, thus encouraging reliance on car
pools and mass transit. The same goal is served by assuring
convenient parking to residents who leave their cars at home during
the day. A community may also decide that restrictions on the flow
of outside traffic into particular residential areas would enhance
the quality of life there by reducing noise, traffic hazards, and
litter. By definition, discrimination against nonresidents would
inhere in such restrictions. [
Footnote 3]
The Constitution does not outlaw these social and environmental
objectives, nor does it presume distinctions between residents and
nonresidents of a local neighborhood to be invidious. The Equal
Protection Clause requires only that the distinction drawn by an
ordinance like Arlington's rationally promote the regulation's
objectives.
See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.
S. 297,
427 U. S. 303
(1976);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S.
1,
416 U. S. 8
(1974). On its face, the Arlington ordinance meets this test.
Page 434 U. S. 8
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL would grant the petition for certiorari and
set the case for oral argument.
[
Footnote 1]
This condition is met when
"the average number of vehicles [operated by persons whose
destination is a commercial or industrial district] is in excess of
25% of the number of parking spaces on such streets and the total
number of spaces actually occupied by any vehicles exceeds 75% of
the number of spaces on such streets on the weekdays of any month.
. . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Although the state trial court found the ordinance invalid under
the State and Federal Constitutions, the State Supreme Court rested
its decision solely on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 3]
Restrictions on nonresident parking have sparked considerable
litigation.
See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504
F.2d 646, 671-676 (CA1 1974) (restrictions upheld);
Friends of
the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1125 (CA2 1974) (restrictions
upheld);
Commonwealth v. Petralia, ___ Mass. ___,
362
N.E.2d 513 (1977) (restrictions upheld);
State v.
Whisman, 24 Ohio Misc. 59, 263 N.E.2d 411 (Ct.Com.Pleas, 1970)
(restrictions invalidated); Georgetown Assn. of Businessmen v.
District of Columbia, Civ. No. 7242-76 (D.C.Super.Ct., Aug. 9,
1976) (restrictions preliminarily enjoined). The United States as
amicus curiae notes that parking restrictions to
discourage automobile commuting have been recommended by the
Environmental Protection Agency to implement the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970.
See 38 Fed.Reg. 30629 (1973).