Where the Arizona Supreme Court reversed applicant's convictions
on murder and assault counts because of erroneous jury instructions
but affirmed his convictions on related drug counts, his
application for stay, pending disposition of his pending petition
for certiorari to review the drug convictions, of his second trial
on the murder and assault counts, based on claims that illegally
obtained evidence will be admitted at the second trial, is denied,
since such claims must be asserted through normal post-trial review
procedures.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, Circuit Justice.
Applicant was convicted of murder, assault, and related drug
offenses growing out of an incident which occurred at an apartment
leased by him in Tucson, Ariz. The Supreme Court of Arizona
reversed the murder and assault convictions because of erroneous
jury instructions, but affirmed the judgments of conviction on the
drug counts. Applicant now requests a stay of his second trial on
the murder and assault counts, presently scheduled to take place on
November 4, for the reason that evidence which he claims was
obtained in violation of his rights under the United States
Constitution will be admitted at that trial. The evidence in
question was found by the Supreme Court of Arizona to have been
properly admitted in his first trial, but applicant is seeking
review of that determination in a petition for certiorari presently
pending before this Court. He asks that the stay of his retrial be
effective until his petition for certiorari is finally disposed of
here.
The petition for certiorari is less than precise as to how much
of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona applicant wishes
this Court to review. I think his constitutional claims with
respect to the admission of evidence at his trial can be reviewed
here only insofar as they pertain to those convictions
Page 434 U. S. 1344
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arizona (the drug counts).
Indeed, the application does not seek a stay of the judgments
affirming those convictions, but refers only to the murder and
assault counts. Since the judgments of conviction on those counts
have been reversed by the Supreme Court of Arizona, they are not
final under 28 U.S.C. ยง 1257. But the constitutional claims which
applicant seeks to assert in his petition for certiorari are, so
far as I can tell, common to all counts. I assume for purposes of
this motion that reversal by this Court of applicant's convictions
on the drug counts would require reversal of a conviction obtained
on the retrial of the murder count if the same evidence were
admitted in that proceeding.
I find it unnecessary to engage in the usual speculation as to
whether the petition will commend itself to four Justices of this
Court, because I think that, even if the petition is granted, the
present application should be denied. The federal constitutional
right asserted by applicant is not one such as is conferred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment where the protection
extends not only to incarceration following trial in violation of
the prohibition, but to the subjection of the defendant to a second
trial at all. Applicant's constitutional claims are based on
constitutional prohibitions against the admission of certain
evidence at trial, and will be sufficiently vindicated if he be
freed from incarceration as a result of a conviction had in
reliance on such evidence. Such claims must be asserted through
normal post-trial avenues of review.
Cf. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971);
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.
S. 117 (1951).
I therefore conclude that, even though this Court were to grant
the petition for certiorari to review applicant's conviction on the
drug counts, he would not be entitled to have his presently
scheduled trial in the Arizona court stayed pending our
determination of the merits of the claims made in the petition. I
accordingly deny his motion to stay the trial