The Court of Appeals entered stays of mandate preventing
enforcement of a certain regulation of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, pending this Court's disposition of petitions
for certiorari by respondents, 3 commodity options dealers
association and several of its members. The Commission's
application to vacate the stays is denied, since it appears that
the risk of harm from deferring enforcement of the regulation for a
few more months is outweighed by the potential injury to
respondents if the regulation were allowed to go into effect, and
since four Justices conceivably will vote to grant certiorari.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, Circuit Justice.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission and its members, has applied to me as Circuit
Justice to vacate stays of mandate entered by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pending applications for
certiorari by the respondents herein. The stays have the
consequence, for their limited duration, of preventing a Commission
regulation that has yet to be enforced, Rule 32.6, 17 CFR § 32.6
(1977), from going into effect. The regulation, promulgated under
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (CFTA), 88
Stat. 1389, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), would require
commodity options dealers to segregate in special bank accounts 90%
of the payments made by each of their customers until such time as
the customer's rights under his options are exercised or expire.
Having examined the written submissions of the Solicitor General
and the responses thereto, I have concluded that this case does not
present the exceptional circumstances required to justify vacation
of the stays.
Page 434 U. S. 1317
I
Prior to the enactment of CFTA, trading in options on certain
agricultural commodities was prohibited under § 4c of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1494, 7 U.S.C. § 6c, but options
transactions in other commodities were wholly unregulated. Unsound
and fraudulent business practices developed with respect to the
unregulated options, and at least one major dealer went bankrupt,
causing substantial losses to investors. In order to prevent such
abuses in the future, CFTA created the Commission as an independent
regulatory body and gave it the power to prohibit or regulate
options transactions in the previously unregulated commodities.
See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
Pursuant to this authority, the Commission immediately adopted
an antifraud rule, and on November 24, 1976, after informal
rulemaking proceedings, the Commission promulgated a comprehensive
set of regulations that included the segregation requirement at
issue in this application. The latter set of regulations also
included provisions requiring options dealers (1) to be registered
with the Commission; (2) to maintain certain minimum amounts of
working capital; and (3) to provide customers with disclosure
statements setting forth information about commissions and fees and
explaining the circumstances under which customers would be able to
make a profit. The segregation requirement was to go into effect on
December 27, 1976; the other regulations were to take effect
variously on December 9, 1976, and January 17, 1977.
Respondents, the National Association of Commodity Options
Dealers (NASCOD) and a number of its members, brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
seeking preenforcement review of the November 24 regulations. The
Commission defended the segregation requirement as a reasonable
means of protecting investors in the event that a dealer
holding
Page 434 U. S. 1318
options on their behalf becomes insolvent or otherwise unable to
execute the options; presumably, the investors could at least
recoup most of their initial outlay from the segregated fund. But
respondents argued that the rule would drive them out of business;
* was unnecessary
in light of other existing safeguards; and might not even be
effective in facilitating return of customers' investments should a
dealer go bankrupt. The District Court concluded that the
segregation rule threatened respondents with irreparable harm, and
that respondents had a reasonable likelihood of success in having
it overturned as arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, on December
21, 1976, six days before the rule was to go into effect, the
District Court preliminarily enjoined its enforcement. At the same
time it granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission as to
the remainder of respondents' claims, and the other regulations
went into effect as scheduled. On cross-appeals, the Court of
Appeals reversed the order insofar as it granted a preliminary
injunction, holding "that the Commission's decision to impose a
segregation requirement was a reasonable exercise of its discretion
in an effort to protect the public," and affirmed the District
Court in all other respects.
British American Commodity Options
Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 490-491 (1977). This decision
was
Page 434 U. S. 1319
announced on April 4, 1977, and rehearing was denied on June 6,
1977. Respondents then moved the Court of Appeals, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2101(f) and Fed.Rule App.Proc. 41(b), to stay its mandate pending
applications to this Court for certiorari. On June 14, 1977, the
members of the panel that had decided the case granted stays to
respondents NASCOD, British American Commodity Options Corp.
(British American), and Lloyd, Carr & Co. (Lloyd, Carr),
conditional in the cases of British American and Lloyd, Carr on the
posting of bonds in the amounts suggested in their motion --
$250,000 for British American and $100,000 for Lloyd, Carr. On June
15, the Commission moved the Court of Appeals to reconsider the
amounts of the bonds set in the June 14 order, but this motion was
denied by the panel on June 24. On July 8, the panel granted stays
of mandate to four additional NASCOD members, again conditional on
posting of security, and this time the court ordered amounts
greater than had been suggested with respect to three of the four
firms. The instant application to vacate the stays entered on June
14 and July 8 was filed on July 25.
II
There is no question as to the power of a Circuit Justice to
dissolve a stay entered by a court of appeals.
See, e.g., New
York v. Kleppe, 429 U.S. 1307, 1310 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., in
chambers);
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.
S. 1304,
414 U. S.
1308 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., in chambers);
Meredith v.
Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10, 9 L Ed.2d 43 (1962) (Black, J., in
chambers).
"But at the same time, the cases make clear that this power
should be exercised with the greatest of caution. and should be
reserved for exceptional circumstances."
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, supra, at
414 U. S.
1308. Since the Court of Appeals was quite familiar with
this case, having rendered a thorough decision on the merits, its
determination that stays were warranted is deserving of great
weight, and should be overturned only if the court can be said to
have abused its discretion.
See, e.g., 414
Page 434 U. S. 1320
U.S. at
414 U. S.
1305;
Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.
S. 159,
262 U. S.
163-164 (1923).
It is well established that the principal factors to be
considered in evaluating the propriety of a stay pending
application for certiorari and, correspondingly, whether to vacate
such a stay granted by a court of appeals, are the "balance of
equities" between the opposing parties, and the probability that
this Court will grant certiorari.
See, e.g., Beame v. Friends
of the Earth, ante p.
434 U. S. 1310 (MARSHALL, J., in chambers);
Holtzman
v. Schlesinger, supra at
414 U. S.
1308-1311;
Meredith v. Fair, supra. The
relative weight of these factors will, of course, vary according to
the facts and circumstances of each case.
As to the equities here, it is important to note that the stays
entered by the Court of Appeals merely preserve the regulatory
status quo pending final action by this Court. Options
dealers were never in the past required to segregate customer
payments, and the rule in question here has yet to be enforced. If
and when the regulation does go into effect, respondents may well
be driven out of business, and on this basis the District Court
expressly found that respondents are threatened with irreparable
harm.
Arrayed against this irreparable harm to respondents is the
contention of the Solicitor General that the segregation
requirement must be placed into effect immediately, in order to
protect customers from loss in the event that respondents become
insolvent or unable to execute their customers' options during the
time before this Court disposes of the case. The Solicitor General
argues, quite correctly of course, that the Commission enacted the
regulation because it felt the public needed the protection, and
the Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's judgment as
reasonable.
But the same panel which sustained the regulation also deemed it
appropriate to enter stays of mandate. Undoubtedly, the court
recognized that during the time in which the
Page 434 U. S. 1321
case is pending before this Court customers will be guarded at
least to some degree by the other Commission regulations, which
were not enjoined and which have already gone into effect. More
importantly, the court secured interim protection for investors by
ordering bonds to be posted by respondents. Although the Solicitor
General now complains that the bonds are not large enough to
guarantee adequate insurance against loss, and that nothing short
of the amounts that would have to be segregated under the terms of
the regulation will suffice, these same arguments were made to, and
rejected by, the Court of Appeals when it granted the stays and
when it denied the Commission's motion to reconsider the amount of
bond which had been set for respondents British American and Lloyd,
Carr. No significant change in circumstances is offered to justify
reevaluation of the Court of Appeals' determination that the posted
sums are adequate.
See Jerome v.
McCarter, 21 Wall. 17,
88 U. S. 28-31
(1874). With the case in this posture, the risk of harm from
putting off enforcement of the regulation for a few more months
certainly appears to be outweighed by the potential injury to
respondents if the regulation were allowed to go into effect.
If I were certain that this Court would not grant certiorari,
the fact that the balance of equities clearly favors respondents
would not be a sufficient justification for leaving the stays in
force. But, without in any way expressing my own view as to the
merits, it is not entirely inconceivable to me that four Justices
of this Court will deem respondents' attack on the segregation
requirement worthy of review. Although the question of whether that
requirement is arbitrary and capricious is rather fact intensive,
and is thus the type of matter that is normally appropriate for
final resolution by the lower courts,
see New York v. Kleppe,
supra, at 1311, it does appear that the regulation would
fundamentally alter the ground rules for doing business in a
substantial industry, with potentially fatal consequences for a
number of the firms currently
Page 434 U. S. 1322
in the trade, and this case presents the first opportunity for
this Court to pass on action taken by the recently created
Commission.
In these circumstances, I cannot say that the Court of Appeals
abused its discretion by staying its mandate. The application to
vacate the stays must accordingly be denied.
It is so ordered.
* Respondents deal in "London options," which are options on
futures contracts traded on various exchanges in London, England.
American customers make cash payments to individual respondents, in
amounts equal to the sum of the "premium" (the price charged for
the option in London) and the respondent's commission and fees. The
respondents then forward the premium to a "clearing member" of the
London exchange, who purchases the option for the account of the
respondents. When the customer wishes to exercise the option, he
informs the respondent dealer, who in turn informs the clearing
member in London.
The customers' cash payments can be segregated or used to pay
the premiums in London, but not both. Since respondents apparently
cannot supply the additional cash from internal sources, they would
have to borrow. They claim that they would be unable to obtain such
loans, and would consequently be forced out of business.