Claiming that petitioner United Airlines had violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by requiring stewardesses, though
not stewards, to remain unmarried as an employment condition, one
Romasanta, a stewardess who had been discharged by petitioner
because of her marriage, brought this Title VII suit as a class
action on behalf of herself and all other United stewardesses
discharged because of the no-marriage rule. The District Court
ruled that only those stewardesses who, upon discharge because of
marriage, had filed charges under either a fair employment statute
or United's collective bargaining agreement constituted the class,
and because that class was too small to satisfy the numerosity
requirement of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23(a)(1), the court granted
United's motion to strike the complaint's class allegations, but
allowed 12 married stewardesses who had protested their discharge
to intervene as additional parties plaintiff. The District Court
certified for appeal its order striking the class allegations, but
the Court of Appeals declined to accept the interlocutory appeal.
The litigation proceeded as a joint suit on behalf of the original
and intervening plaintiffs, and the District Court ultimately
determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to reinstatement and
backpay and, following agreement by the parties on the amounts to
be awarded each plaintiff, the court entered a judgment of
dismissal. After learning of the
Romasanta judgment and
that, despite their earlier attempt to do so, the plaintiffs in
that case did not plan to appeal the order denying class
certification, respondent, a former United stewardess who had been
discharged on account of the no-marriage rule and was thus a
putative member of the
Romasanta class and who had not
filed charges or a grievance, filed, 18 days after the judgment
(and therefore within the applicable appeal period) a motion to
intervene for the purpose of appealing the adverse class
determination order. The District Court denied intervention, from
which denial as well as the denial of class certification
respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed on the
intervention denial as well as on the refusal to certify the class
described in
Romasanta's complaint -- a class consisting
of all United stewardesses discharged
Page 432 U. S. 386
because of the no-marriage rule, whether or not they had
formally protested their discharge. Petitioner challenges the Court
of Appeals' ruling that respondent's post-judgment intervention was
timely under this Court's ruling in
American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
which held that
"the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running
of the statute [of limitations] for all purported members of the
class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has
found the suit inappropriate for class action status."
Petitioner argues that, under
American Pipe, the
relevant statute of limitations began to run after the denial of
certification in
Romasanta.
Held: Respondent's motion to intervene was "timely"
filed under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24, and should have been granted.
Respondent sought to intervene not to litigate her individual claim
based on the illegality of United's no-marriage rule (which would
have put her in the same position as the
American Pipe
intervenors), but to obtain appellate review of the District
Court's denial of the class action status in
Romasanta.
The critical question is whether respondent as intervenor acted
promptly after entry of the final judgment in
Romasanta.
The District Court's refusal to certify the class was subject to
appellate review after final judgment, and since the named
plaintiffs had tried to take an interlocutory appeal, respondent
had no reason to suppose that they would not later take an appeal
until she was advised to the contrary after the trial court had
entered its final judgment. Thus, as soon as it became clear that
the interests of the unnamed class members would no longer be
protected by the named class representatives, and within the
applicable appeal period, respondent moved to protect those
interests. Pp.
432 U. S.
391-396.
537 F.2d 915, affirmed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE,
J., joined,
post, p.
432 U. S. 396.
STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 432 U. S. 387
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule Civ.Proc. 24 requires that an application to
intervene in federal litigation must be "timely." In this case a
motion to intervene was filed promptly after the final judgment of
a District Court, for the purpose of appealing the court's earlier
denial of class action certification. The question presented is
whether this motion was "timely" under Rule 24.
Until November 7, 1968, United Airlines required its female
stewardesses to remain unmarried as a condition of employment; no
parallel restriction was imposed on any male employees, including
male stewards and cabin flight attendants. [
Footnote 1] This "no-marriage rule" resulted in the
termination of the employment of a large number of stewardesses,
and in turn spawned a good deal of litigation.
One of the first challenges to this rule was brought by Mary
Sprogis, who filed timely charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission in August, 1966, contending that her
discharge constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The EEOC
found reasonable cause to believe that United's policy was illegal,
and issued a "right to sue letter." [
Footnote 2] Sprogis then filed a timely individual action
in a Federal District Court, and the court agreed that the
no-marriage rule violated
Page 432 U. S. 388
Title VII. 308 F Supp. 959 (ND Ill.). United took an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) on the issue of
liability, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the finding of sex discrimination.
Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194.
While the appeal in the
Sprogis case was pending, the
present action was filed in the same District Court by Carole
Romasanta, a United stewardess who had been discharged in 1967
because of her marriage. She, too, had filed charges with the EEOC,
leading to a finding of cause to believe that the no-marriage rule
violated Title VII and the issuance of a right-to-sue letter.
Romasanta then promptly filed the present suit as a class action on
behalf of herself and all other United stewardesses discharged
because of the no-marriage rule. Another United stewardess was
later permitted to intervene as a named plaintiff.
Several months later, the District Court granted United's motion
to strike the complaint's class allegations, ruling that the class
could properly consist of only those stewardesses who, upon the
loss of their employment because of marriage, had filed charges
under either a fair employment statute or United's collective
bargaining agreement. As thus defined, the class numbered not more
than 30, and, in the court's view, did not satisfy the numerosity
requirement of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23(a)(1). [
Footnote 3] As part of its order, however, the
District Court allowed 12 married stewardesses who had protested
the termination of their employment to intervene as additional
parties plaintiff. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the District
Court certified for appeal its order striking the class
allegations, but the Court of Appeals declined to accept this
interlocutory appeal. [
Footnote
4]
Page 432 U. S. 389
The litigation proceeded as a joint suit on behalf of the
original and the intervening plaintiffs, and the court ultimately
determined that those plaintiffs not yet reinstated in their jobs
were entitled to that remedy, and that every plaintiff was entitled
to backpay. To aid in determining the amount of each backpay award,
the court appointed as a Special Master the same person who had
performed a similar task in the
Sprogis litigation.
[
Footnote 5] Following
guidelines adopted in
Sprogis, the parties eventually
agreed upon the amounts to be awarded each plaintiff, and upon
consummation of this agreement the trial court entered a judgment
of dismissal on October 3, 1975.
The specific controversy before us arose only after the entry of
that judgment. The respondent, a former United stewardess, had been
discharged in 1968 on account of the no-marriage rule. She was thus
a putative member of the class as defined in the original
Romasanta complaint. Knowing that other stewardesses had
challenged United's no-marriage rule, she had not filed charges
with the EEOC or a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement. [
Footnote 6]
Page 432 U. S. 390
After learning that a final judgment had been entered in the
Romasanta suit, and that, despite their earlier attempt to
do so, the plaintiffs did not now intend to file a appeal
challenging the District Court's denial of class certification, she
filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the
District Court's adverse class determination order. Her motion was
filed 18 days after the District Court's final judgment, and thus
was well within the 30-day period for an appeal to be taken.
[
Footnote 7] The District Judge
denied the motion, stating:
"Well, in my judgment, gentlemen, this is five years now this
has been in litigation, and this lady has not seen fit to come in
here and seek any relief from this Court in any way during that
period of time, and litigation must end. I must deny this motion.
Of course, that is an appealable order itself, and if I am in
error, then the Court of Appeals can reverse me and we will grant a
hearing, but in my judgment, this is too late to come in."
The respondent promptly appealed the denial of intervention as
well as the denial of class certification to the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed, holding that
the District Court had been wrong in believing that the motion to
intervene was untimely under Rule 24(b), [
Footnote 8] and had also erred in refusing to certify
the class as described in the
Romasanta complaint -- a
class consisting of all United stewardesses discharged because of
the no-marriage rule, whether or not they had formally protested
the termination of their employment.
Romasanta v. United
Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915.
Page 432 U. S. 391
United's petition for certiorari did not seek review of the
determination that its no-marriage rule violated Title VII, nor did
it contest the merits of the Court of Appeals' decision on the
class certification issue. Instead, it challenged only the Court of
Appeals' ruling that the respondent's postjudgment application for
intervention was timely. We granted the petition, 429 U.S. 998, to
consider that single issue.
In urging reversal, United relies primarily upon
American
Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.
S. 538. That case involved a private antitrust class
action that had been filed 11 days short of the expiration of the
statutory limitations period. [
Footnote 9] The trial court later denied class
certification because the purported class did not satisfy the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). [
Footnote 10] Neither the named plaintiffs nor any
unnamed member of the class appealed that order, either then or at
any later time. Eight days after entry of the order, a number of
the putative class members moved to intervene as plaintiffs, but
the trial court denied the motions as untimely. This Court
ultimately reversed that decision, ruling that, in those
circumstances,
"the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running
of the statute for all purported members of the class who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status."
414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 553.
Since 11 days remained when the statute of limitations again began
to run after denial of class certification, and the motions to
intervene as plaintiffs were filed only eight days after that
denial, they were timely.
Id. at
414 U. S.
560-561.
It is United's position that, under
American Pipe, the
relevant statute of limitations began to run after the denial of
class certification in the
Romasanta action. United thus
reasons that the respondent's motion to intervene was time-barred,
and in support of this position makes alternative
Page 432 U. S. 392
arguments based on two different statutory periods of
limitations prescribed by Title VII. [
Footnote 11]
This argument might be persuasive if the respondent had sought
to intervene in order to join the named plaintiffs in litigating
her individual claim based on the illegality of United's
no-marriage rule, for she then would have occupied the same
position as the intervenors in
American Pipe. But the
later motion to intervene in this case was for a wholly different
purpose. That purpose was to obtain appellate review of the
District Court's order denying class action status in the
Romasanta lawsuit, [
Footnote 12] and the motion complied with, as it was
required to, the time limitation for lodging an appeal prescribed
by Fed.Rule App.Proc. 4(a). Success in that review would result in
the certification of a class, the named members of which had
complied with the statute of limitations; the respondent is a
member of that class against whom the statute had not run at the
time the class action was commenced.
The lawsuit had been commenced by the timely filing of a
complaint for classwide relief, providing United with "the
essential information necessary to determine both the subject
Page 432 U. S. 393
matter and size of the prospective litigation. . . ."
American Pipe, supra at
414 U. S. 555.
[
Footnote 13] To be sure,
the case was "stripped of its character as a class action" upon
denial of certification by the District Court. Advisory Committee's
Note on 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.App. p. 7767. But "it
does not . . follow that the case must be treated as if there never
was an action brought on behalf of absent class members."
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co.,
43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (ED Pa.). The District Court's refusal to
certify was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs, as United concedes. [
Footnote 14] And since the named
Page 432 U. S. 394
plaintiffs had attempted to take an interlocutory appeal from
the order of denial at the time the order was entered, there was no
reason for the respondent to suppose that they would not later take
an appeal until she was advised to the contrary after the trial
court had entered its final judgment.
The critical fact here is that, once the entry of final judgment
made the adverse class determination appealable, the respondent
quickly sought to enter the litigation. In short, as soon as it
became clear to the respondent that the interests of the unnamed
class members would no longer be protected by the named class
representatives, she promptly moved to intervene to protect those
interests. [
Footnote 15]
United can hardly contend that its ability to litigate the issue
was unfairly prejudiced simply because an appeal on behalf of
putative class members was brought by one of their own, rather than
by one of the original named plaintiffs. And it would be circular
to argue that an unnamed member of the
Page 432 U. S. 395
putative class was not a proper party to appeal, on the ground
that her interests had been adversely determined in the trial
court. United was put on notice by the filing of the
Romasanta complaint of the possibility of classwide
liability, and there is no reason why Mrs. McDonald's pursuit of
that claim should not be considered timely under the circumstances
here presented.
Our conclusion is consistent with several decisions of the
federal courts permitting post-judgment intervention for the
purpose of appeal. [
Footnote
16] The critical inquiry in every such case
Page 432 U. S. 396
is whether in view of all the circumstances the intervenor acted
promptly after the entry of final judgment.
Cf. NAACP v. New
York, 413 U. S. 345,
413 U. S. 366.
Here, the respondent filed her motion within the time period in
which the named plaintiffs could have taken an appeal. We therefore
conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the
respondent's motion to intervene was timely filed, and should have
been granted.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no pat in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
See generally Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1197-1201 (CA7).
[
Footnote 2]
The relevant statutory provision at that time, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e), stated that, if within 30 days after a charge was filed
with the Commission or within 30 days after expiration of a period
of reference of the charge to a state or local fair employment
agency, the Commission had been unable to secure voluntary
compliance, it "hall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil
action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought" by the
charging party. The period was extended to 90 days in 1972. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
[
Footnote 3]
Rule 23(a)(1) lists as one prerequisite to maintenance of a
class action that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable."
[
Footnote 4]
In the Seventh Circuit, a denial of class certification is an
interlocutory order not reviewable as of right until after entry of
final judgment.
Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F.2d
1364. Even were we to assume,
arguendo, that the Seventh
Circuit is wrong in not recognizing the so-called death-knell
doctrine, which permits immediate appeal of adverse class
determinations where the claims are so small that individual suits
are uneconomical, appeal before final judgment would not have been
available in this lawsuit, for the individual claims were
sufficiently large to permit the action to proceed, as it did, on
an individual basis.
See generally 7A C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1802, pp. 271-277 (1972);
id. at 129-130 (Supp. 1977).
[
Footnote 5]
In
Sprogis, following affirmance by the Court of
Appeals of the District Court's finding of liability, the case was
remanded for further proceedings. The Special Master appointed by
the District Court recommended that the plaintiff be awarded over
$10,000 in damages, the District Court approved that award, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
See Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 389-390, 392 (CA7).
[
Footnote 6]
As the opinion in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U. S. 405,
makes clear, full relief under Title VII "may be awarded on a class
basis . . . without exhaustion of administrative procedures by the
unnamed class members."
Id. at
422 U. S. 414
n. 8.
See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.
S. 747,
424 U. S.
771.
[
Footnote 7]
See Fed.Rule App.Proc. 4(a).
[
Footnote 8]
In relevant part, Rule 24(b) provides:
"Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in
an action . . . when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties."
[
Footnote 9]
See 414 U.S. at
414 U. S.
541-542.
[
Footnote 10]
See n 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
A person complaining of employment discrimination is ordinarily
required to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the
occurrence of the discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970
ed., Supp. V). Once the administrative process has been exhausted
and the EEOC sends the complainant a right-to-sue letter, a civil
action in federal district court must be filed within 90 days of
receipt of the right-to-sue letter. § 2000e 5(f)(1) (1970 ed.,
Supp. V), discussed in
n 2,
supra. Since nearly three years passed after the adverse
class determination before the respondent took any action, under
United's theory, her action is time-barred whichever of the two
limitations periods is thought to be the relevant one.
[
Footnote 12]
Cf. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 721, 727 (1968)
("It is both feasible and desirable to break down the concept of
intervention into a number of litigation rights and to conclude
that a given person has one or some of these rights, but not
all").
[
Footnote 13]
The unlawful discrimination alleged in the complaint --
enforcement of the no-marriage rule -- was plainly part of a
uniform company-wide policy that had been applied to all
stewardesses.
See also S.Rep. No. 92-415, p. 27 (1971)
("[T]itle VII actions are, by their very nature, class
complaints"), cited in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. at
422 U. S. 414
n. 8.
[
Footnote 14]
See, e.g., Share v. Air Properties G., Inc., 538 F.2d
279, 283 (CA9);
Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 530 F.2d 508, 512 (CA3);
Penn v. San Juan Hospital,
Inc., 528 F.2d 1181, 1188-1190 (CA10);
Bailey v. Ryan
Stevedoring Co., 528 F.2d 551, 553-554 (CA5);
Wright v.
Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1061-1063 (CA8);
Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 874-875 (CA3);
Haynes
v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1162-1165 (CA7);
Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1260-1262 (CA2);
Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F.2d 387 (CA6);
Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (CA10).
United argues that it was unfairly surprised when, after having
settled the case with all of the original and intervening
plaintiffs, it nonetheless faced an appeal, and suggests that the
negotiation of settlements will be impeded if postjudgment
intervention like the respondent's is permitted. The
characterization of the resolution of the
Romasanta action
as a "settlement" could be slightly misleading. It is, of course,
true that opposing counsel agreed upon a disposition that resulted
in dismissal of the complaints. But that agreement came only after
the District Judge had granted motions by some plaintiffs for
partial summary judgment, and, there was never any question about
United's liability in view of the
Sprogis decision. All
that remained to be determined was the computation of backpay, and
the guiding principles for that computation had been established in
Sprogis. The "settlement" ultimately reached merely
applied those principles to the claims in this case.
The respondent's motion to intervene was filed less than three
weeks after the "settlement" was incorporated in the District
Court's final judgment, and necessarily "concern[ed] the same
evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the
original class suit."
American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
414 U. S. 562
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). There is no reason to believe that, in
that short period of time, United discarded evidence or was
otherwise prejudiced.
[
Footnote 15]
A rule requiring putative class members who seek only to appeal
from an order denying class certification to move to intervene
shortly after entry of that order would serve no purpose.
Intervention at that time would only have made the respondent a
superfluous spectator in the litigation for nearly three years, for
the denial of class certification was not appealable until after
final judgment,
see n
4,
supra. Moreover, such a rule would induce putative
class members to file protective motions to intervene to guard
against the possibility that the named representatives might not
appeal from the adverse class determination.
Cf. American Pipe,
supra at
414 U. S. 553.
The result would be the very "multiplicity of activity which Rule
23 was designed to avoid." 414 U.S. at
414 U. S. 551.
Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 757
n. 9.
[
Footnote 16]
A case closely in point is
American Brake Shoe & Foundry
Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3 F.R.D. 162 (SDNY).
That case involved a plan for reorganization of the Interborough
Rapid Transit Co. and for its consolidation with the Manhattan
Elevated Railway. Mannheim, an owner of a series of bonds in the
Manhattan Railway, had participated in the District Court not
merely representing his own interests, but also acting as "attorney
in fact" for other owners of the bonds. After the District Court
had approved the plan as fair and equitable, and had subsequently
ordered its implementation, Mannheim filed a notice of appeal. He
then decided to abandon the appeal and to seek to surrender his
bonds pursuant to the terms of the plan. One of the other holders
of the same series of bonds, for whom Mannheim had been acting as
attorney-in-fact, then moved to intervene for the purpose of
prosecuting an appeal on behalf of herself and all other
nonsurrendering bondholders. Noting that it is "essential in the
administration of our system of justice, that litigants should have
their day in court," and that the motion was filed within the time
in which an appeal might have been brought, the District Court
ruled that the motion to intervene was timely.
Id. at
164.
The decision in
Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463
(CA9), is also similar to the case at bar. There, a corporation had
filed an action against corporate officers under § 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), for recovery
of short-swing profits. The District Court entered judgment for the
defendants, and, when the corporation failed to appeal, a
shareholder sought to intervene for the purpose of appealing from
the District Court decision. The Court of Appeals, reversing the
District Court, ruled that the motion was timely and that
intervention should have been permitted. 203 F.2d at 465-466.
Post-judgment intervention for the purpose of appeal has been
found to be timely even in litigation that is not representative in
nature, and in which the intervenor might therefore be thought to
have a less direct interest in participation in the appellate
phase.
See, e.g., Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 153
U.S.App.D.C. 407, 417-419, 473 F.2d 118, 129;
Smuck v.
Hobson, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 378-379, 408 F.2d 175, 181182;
Zuber v. Allen, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 387 F.2d 862,
discussed in
Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 29-30, n. 10
(DC);
Wolpe v. Poretsky, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 141, 144, 144
F.2d 505, 508;
United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d
521, 526-527 (CA4).
Insofar as the motions to intervene in these cases were made
within the applicable time for filing an appeal, they are
consistent with our opinion and judgment in the present case.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR JUSTICE
WHITE join, dissenting.
The Court's opinion shifts confusingly between the two distinct
questions of timeliness raised by respondent McDonald's attempt to
intervene in this action against petitioner United Airlines, Inc.
[
Footnote 2/1] The first question
involves the effect of the
Page 432 U. S. 397
statute of limitations on respondent's rights against
petitioner. This question is directly relevant to the motion to
intervene because a prerequisite of intervention for any purpose is
that the intervenor have an interest in the litigation. Petitioner
has consistently contended that respondent's interest in this
litigation was barred by the statute of limitations at the time she
sought to intervene. Assuming that respondent's interest was not
time-barred, the second question involves the broader and more
discretionary concept of the timeliness of her motion to intervene
under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24. This was apparently the basis on which
the District Court denied respondent's motion.
In
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
414 U. S. 538
(1974), the Court held that the filing of a class action complaint
"suspended the running of the limitation period
only during the
pendency of the motion to strip the suit of its class action
character."
Id. at
414 U. S. 561
(emphasis added). Time again commenced to run under the limitations
period when the District Court denied class status, and members of
the putative class were allowed to intervene in the nonclass action
only if their motions were filed before the expiration of the
remaining time.
A straightforward reading of
American Pipe leads to the
conclusion that the filing of the class action complaint in
Romasanta v. United Airlines tolled the statute of
limitations for respondent, but "only during the pendency of the
motion to strip the suit of its class action character." Under the
American Pipe rule, the statute of limitations had run
Page 432 U. S. 398
against respondent by the time she attempted to intervene. Thus,
the Court's holding must reflect a decision to supplement the
American Pipe rule with a novel tolling rule applicable
only to intervention for the purpose of appealing the denial of
class status. Under this new rule, the statute apparently is tolled
from the filing of the class action complaint until such time after
final judgment as the intervenor can determine that "the interests
of the unnamed class members [will] no longer be protected by the
named class representatives."
Ante at
432 U. S. 394.
I find no justification for this extension, either in precedent or
policy.
Today's opinion also represents a marked departure from
established law on the question of timeliness under Rule 24. The
Court apparently has ruled that a motion to intervene for the
purpose of appealing the denial of class status is timely under
Rule 24 as a matter of law, so long as it is filed "within the time
period in which the named plaintiffs could have taken an appeal."
Ante at
432 U. S. 396.
The discretionary judgment of the District Court emphasized in
NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345,
413 U. S.
365-366 (1973), is thus eliminated.
The Court purports to distinguish
American Pipe on the
ground that respondent's purpose in intervening was not "to join
the named plaintiffs in litigating her individual claim," but
rather "to obtain appellate review of the District Court's order
denying class action status."
Ante at
432 U. S. 392.
The relevance of this undisputed factual distinction is not
explained, but two major themes can be identified in the Court's
opinion: first, that respondent was justified in relying on the
named plaintiffs to protect her interest by taking an appeal, and
second, that petitioner was not prejudiced by respondent's
intervention at the end of the litigation. These themes have a
common analytical weakness, namely, the Court's unwillingness to
accept the consequences of the District Court's denial of class
status. In the words of the Advisory Committee that drafted the
1966 amendment to Rule 23, the action was
Page 432 U. S. 399
thereby "stripped of its character as a class action." 28
U.S.C.App. p. 7767. After the denial of class status, the action
proceeded as an ordinary nonclass action by the individual
plaintiffs against petitioner. [
Footnote 2/2]
Under the Court's analysis, the "critical fact" in this case is
that, "once the entry of final judgment made the adverse class
determination appealable," respondent moved to intervene
"as soon as it became clear [to her] that the interests of the
unnamed class members would no longer be protected by the named
class representatives."
Ante at
432 U. S. 394.
Pervading the Court's opinion is the assumption that the class
action somehow continued after the District Court denied class
status. But that assumption is supported neither by the text nor by
the history of Rule 23. To the contrary, those sources, as well as
this Court's decision in
American Pipe, support the view
that the denial of class status converts the litigation to an
ordinary nonclass action. Reliance by respondent on the former
class representatives was therefore misplaced. After the denial of
class status, they were simply individual plaintiffs with no
obligation to the members of the class.
Pearson v. Ecological
Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171 (CA5 1975). In the words of Judge
Pell, dissenting below, the denial of class status is "a critical
point which puts putative class members on notice that they must
act to protect their rights."
Romasanta v. United Airlines,
Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 922 (CA7 1976).
The Court's casual treatment of the prejudice to petitioner also
reflects its assumption that the class action persisted despite the
denial of class status. Petitioner was fully justified
Page 432 U. S. 400
in attempting to resolve the dispute as a nonclass action.
Having achieved a settlement of the case, petitioner was prejudiced
by respondent's attempt to reopen the case. It is true that the
possibility of an appeal of the denial of class status existed, but
the Court's treatment of that possibility misconceives both
petitioner's position and the law. It is suggested that petitioner
concedes that "[t]he District Court's refusal to certify was
subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of
the named plaintiffs. . . ."
Ante at
432 U. S. 393.
But petitioner concedes only that the named plaintiffs could have
appealed the denial of class status
if they had chosen to
litigate the case to a final judgment, rather than to settle
it. It argues with great force that, as a result of the
settlement of their individual claims, the named plaintiffs "could
no longer appeal the denial of class" status that had occurred
years earlier. Brief for Petitioner 15. Although this question has
not been decided by this Court, [
Footnote 2/3] the answer on principle is clear. The
settlement of an individual claim typically moots any issues
associated with it. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, p. 271 (1975). This case is
sharply distinguishable from cases such as
Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U. S. 393
(1975), and
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.
S. 747 (1976), where we allowed named plaintiffs whose
individual claims were moot to continue to represent their classes.
In those cases, the District Courts previously had certified the
classes, thus giving them "a legal status separate from the
interest[s] asserted by [the named plaintiffs]."
Sosna v. Iowa,
supra at
419 U. S. 399.
This case presents precisely the opposite situation: the prior
denial of class status had extinguished any representative
capacity.
Considerations of policy militate strongly against the result
reached by the Court. Our cases reflect a long tradition of respect
for statutes of limitations and the values they serve.
Page 432 U. S. 401
These legislative enactments "are vital to the welfare of
society and are favored in the law," because they "promote repose
by giving security and stability to human affairs" and "stimulate
to activity and punish negligence."
Wood v. Carpenter,
101 U. S. 135,
101 U. S. 139
(1879). When a "plaintiff has slept on his rights," an otherwise
meritorious claim is barred, both to ensure "fairness to
defendants" and to relieve "the burden [on the courts] of trying
stale claims."
Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.,
380 U. S. 424,
380 U. S. 428
(1965). Statutes of limitations thus "make an end to the
possibility of litigation after the lapse of a reasonable time."
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.
S. 126,
304 U. S. 136
(1938). The Court nevertheless has reached a decision that rewards
those who delay asserting their rights. I view the result as an
injustice to petitioner and as a precedent that ill serves the need
for repose.
The Court also ignores the important
"principle that '[s]ettlement agreements are highly favored in
the law and will be upheld whenever possible because they are a
means of amicably resolving doubts . . . and preventing
lawsuits.'"
Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., supra at 176,
quoting
D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213, 1215
(CA5 1971). Settlements particularly serve the public interest
"within the confines of Title VII where
there is great emphasis
. . . on private settlement and the elimination of unfair practices
without litigation.'" Air Lines Stewards v. American Airlines,
Inc., 455 F.2d 101, 109 (CA7 1972), quoting Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (CA5 1968). Today's
decision will deter settlements because of the additional
uncertainty as to whether the agreements will be nullified by the
action of persons who enter the litigation only after final
judgment. [Footnote 2/4]
Page 432 U. S. 402
In support of its decision, the Court suggests that adherence to
the
American Pipe rule might result in precautionary
interventions to guard against the possibility that the named
plaintiffs would fail to appeal the denial of class status, thus
producing the very "
multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was
designed to avoid.'" Ante at 432 U. S. 394
n. 15, quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 553.
But, as I have shown, Rule 23 was not designed to eliminate any
multiplicity of activity after class status is denied. [Footnote 2/5]
In my view, the proper analysis of these questions is as
follows: under
American Pipe, the filing of a class action
complaint tolls the statute of limitations until the District Court
makes a decision regarding class status. If class status is denied
in whole or in part, the statute of limitations begins to run again
as to class members excluded from the class. In order to protect
their rights, such individuals must seek to intervene in the
individual action (or possibly file an action of their own) before
the time remaining in the limitations period expires. Assuming that
intervention is sought within the limitations period, the district
court's decision whether
Page 432 U. S. 403
to allow intervention is made according to the discretionary
timeliness concept of Rule 24, as interpreted in
NAACP v. New
York, 413 U. S. 345
(1973). This decision is made in light of all of the circumstances
in the case, and is entitled to substantial deference on appeal.
But delay in seeking intervention should militate against allowing
intervention. Under this approach, a premium is placed on
attempting to intervene as soon as possible after the denial of
class status. When combined with the requirement of Rule 23(c)(1)
that the decision as to class status be made "[a]s soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action," this approach would ensure that the contours of the
nonclass action would be defined early in the litigation. This
would enable the major decisions concerning the case to be made
expeditiously, thus speeding its ultimate resolution. The Court's
decision today encourages the opposite result.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Respondent had been terminated by petitioner in September, 1968,
under its then-existing "no marriage" rule for stewardesses. The
class action complaint in
Romasanta v. United Airlines was
filed in May, 1970. The District Court denied class status in
December, 1972, and a number of the members of the putative class
intervened in the individual action. Discovery and settlement
discussion followed, and the initial and intervening plaintiffs
were able to settle their claims. On October 3, 1975 -- almost
three years after class status was denied -- a final order
dismissing the suit with prejudice was entered, all "matters in
controversy . . . having been settled and resolved." App. 90-92. On
October 21, 1975, respondent moved to intervene for purposes of
appealing the denial of class status. Before this point, she had
filed no grievance under the collective bargaining agreement, no
charge with any state or federal agency, and had taken no part in
the preceding litigation -- although she was fully aware of the
entire situation.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court quotes from
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (ED Pa.1968), for the
proposition that a case need not "
be treated. as if there never
was an action brought on behalf of absent class members.'"
Ante at 432 U. S. 393.
Philadelphia Electric involved the same issue ultimately
resolved by this Court in American Pipe, and is otherwise
irrelevant to the question now before us.
[
Footnote 2/3]
None of the cases cited by the Court,
ante at
432 U. S. 393
n. 14, involves this situation.
[
Footnote 2/4]
As Judge Pell noted, respondent's delay in seeking intervention
was especially costly in this case:
"It is important to note that had she sought intervention
immediately after the denial of class status, and her intervention
had been denied, the intervention issue would have been before this
court three years ago. Furthermore, assuming that her intervention
had been denied because of petitioner's failure to protest the
no-marriage rule -- the requirement which was the basis of the
court's holding that this action lacked the requisite numerosity to
proceed as a class action -- then that issue would have been before
this court and decided three years ago. Instead, petitioner chose
to sit back and allow others to assume the costs and risks in
prosecuting their individual actions, and now she attempts to
revive her dead claim through another suit which after years of
legal argument and negotiation was finally settled to the
satisfaction of all parties."
537 F.2d at 922 (dissenting opinion).
[
Footnote 2/5]
Moreover, precautionary intervention is likely even under the
Court's decision. As in
American Pipe itself, individuals
concerned about their claims will frequently move to intervene as
plaintiffs in the nonclass action, rather than placing all of their
hopes on the possibility that the denial of class status will be
reversed on appeal.