Respondents, Mexican-Americans, brought suit against
petitioners, their unions and their employer, a common carrier that
employs city and over-the-road ("line") drivers, claiming that
their rejection for line driver jobs under the company's
"no-transfer" policy in conjunction with the discriminatory effect
of the seniority system applicable under collective bargaining
agreements between the company and the unions was racially and
ethnically discriminatory, and violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Although respondents alleged that the case was
a class action brought on behalf of the named plaintiffs and all
Negroes and Mexican-Americans who had been denied equal employment
opportunities with the company because of their race or national
origin, they did not make a pretrial motion pursuant to Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 23 to have the action certified as a class action, and
the District Court made no such certification. Respondents had
stipulated before trial that they had not been discriminated
against when they were first hired, and that the only issue before
the court was whether the company's failure to consider
respondents' line driver applications violated Title VII, and their
evidence and arguments at trial were confined to respondents'
individual claims, with petitioners' defense showing that
respondents were not qualified to be line drivers. The District
Court following trial dismissed the class action allegations
(stressing respondents' failure to move for class certification,
their focus on individual claims, the lack of evidence, the
stipulation, and the fact that a large majority of the union
membership had recently rejected a proposal for the merger of
Page 431 U. S. 396
city driver and line driver seniority lists with free transfer
between jobs), and the individual claims (ruling that the
challenged policies were neutrally applied, were proper business
policies, and that respondents lacked line driver qualifications).
The Court of Appeals reversed, discounting respondents' failure to
move for certification ("a responsibility [that] falls to the
court"), and the court itself certifying the class, after which it
found classwide company and union liability on the basis of the
proof adduced at trial. The trial court "lack of qualification"
finding was not disturbed, the Court of Appeals ruling only that it
was "premature" because each plaintiff as a member of the class
would be entitled to have his application considered on the merits
when future line driver vacancies arose.
Held: The Court of Appeals plainly erred in certifying
a class action and in imposing classwide liability on petitioners.
Pp.
431 U. S.
403-406.
(a) The trial court proceedings made clear that respondents were
not members of the class of discriminatees that they purported to
represent, since there was abundant evidence that they were
unqualified to be line drivers, which, in addition to the
stipulation of each named plaintiff that he had not been
discriminated against with respect to his initial employment, made
them ineligible to represent a class of persons who did allegedly
suffer injury or to attack the no-transfer rule and seniority
system on the ground that these practices perpetuated past
discrimination and locked minorities into the less desirable jobs
to which they had been discriminatorily assigned. Pp.
431 U. S.
403-404.
(b) The named plaintiffs' failure to protect the interest of
class members by moving for certification strongly implies the
inadequacy of the representation class members might receive. P.
431 U. S.
405.
(c) The union vote against merging city driver and line driver
seniority lists was at odds with respondents' demand for such a
merger. P.
431 U. S.
405.
505 F.2d 40 (Nos. 75-718, 75-651, and 75-715); 505 F.2d 66 and
69 (Nos. 75-651 and 75-715), vacated and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 431 U. S. 397
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, like
Teamsters v. United States, ante p.
431 U. S. 324,
involve alleged employment discrimination on the part of an
employer and unions in the trucking industry. The employer, East
Texas Motor Freight System, Inc., is a common carrier that employs
city and over-the-road, or "line," truckdrivers. The company has a
"no-transfer" policy, prohibiting drivers from transferring between
terminals or from city driver to line driver jobs. [
Footnote 1] In addition, under the applicable
collective bargaining agreements between the company and the
unions, competitive seniority runs only from the date an employee
enters a particular bargaining unit, so that a line driver's
Page 431 U. S. 398
competitive seniority does not take into account any time he may
have spent in other jobs with the company. [
Footnote 2]
The respondents brought this suit against the company and the
unions in a Federal District Court, challenging the above
practices. Although their complaint denominated the cause as a
class action, they did not move for class certification in the
trial court. After a two-day hearing, the court dismissed the class
allegations of the complaint and decided against the individual
respondents on the merits. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed, after itself certifying what it considered an
appropriate class and holding that the no-transfer rule and the
seniority system violated the statutory rights of that class under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (1970 ed.
and Supp. V). 505 F.2d 40. This Court granted certiorari to review
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 425 U.S. 990.
I
The respondents are three Mexican-Americans who initiated this
litigation as the named plaintiffs, Jesse Rodriguez, Sadrach Perez,
and Modesto Herrera. They were employed as city drivers at the
company's San Antonio terminal, and were members of Teamsters Local
Union 657 and of the Southern Conference of Teamsters. There was no
line driver operation at the San Antonio terminal, and the
respondents stipulated that they had not been discriminated against
when they were first hired. In August, 1970, some years after they
were hired, each of them applied in writing for a line driver job.
In accord with its no-transfer policy, the company declined to
consider these applications on their individual merits. The
respondents then filed complaints with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and after receiving
Page 431 U. S. 399
"right to sue" letters from the Commission,
see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), they brought this lawsuit.
According to the complaint, the suit was brought on behalf of
the named plaintiffs and all Negroes and Mexican-Americans who had
been denied equal employment opportunities with the company because
of their race or national origin. The complaint specifically
alleged that the appropriate class should consist of all
"East Texas Motor Freight's Mexican-American and Black in-city
drivers included in the collective bargaining agreement entered
into between East Texas Motor Freight and the Southern Conference
of Teamsters covering the State of Texas. Additionally that such
class should properly be composed of all Mexican-American and Black
applicants for line driver positions with East Texas Motor Freight
. . . from July 2, 1965 [the effective date of Title VII] t
present. [
Footnote 3]"
Despite the class allegations in their complaint, the plaintiffs
did not move prior to trial to have the action certified as a class
action pursuant to Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23, and no such certification
was made by the District Judge. Indeed, the plaintiffs had
stipulated before trial that
"'the only issue presently before the Court pertaining to the
company is whether the failure of the Defendant East Texas
Motor
Page 431 U. S. 400
Freight to consider Plaintiffs' line driver applications
constituted a violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.'"
App. 82. And the plaintiffs confined their evidence and
arguments at trial to their individual claims. The defendants
responded accordingly, with much of their proof devoted to showing
that Rodriguez, Perez, and Herrera were not qualified to be line
drivers.
Following trial, the District Court dismissed the class action
allegations. It stressed the plaintiffs' failure to move for a
prompt determination of the propriety of class certification, their
failure to offer evidence on that question, their concentration at
the trial on their individual claims, their stipulation that the
only issue to be determined concerned the company's failure to act
on their applications, and the fact that, contrary to the relief
the plaintiffs sought,
see n 3,
supra, a large majority of the membership of
Local 657 had recently rejected a proposal calling for the merger
of city driver and line driver seniority lists with free transfer
between jobs. [
Footnote 4]
The District Court also held against the named plaintiffs on
their individual claims. It ruled that the no-transfer policy and
the seniority system were proper business practices, neutrally
applied, and that the company had not discriminated against the
plaintiffs or retaliated against them for filing charges with the
EEOC. The court further found:
"None of the plaintiff employees could satisfy all of the
qualifications for a road driver position according to the company
manual due to age or weight or driving record. . . . The driving,
work, and/or physical records of the plaintiffs are of such nature
that only casual consideration need be given to determine that the
plaintiffs cannot qualify to become road drivers."
App. 64.
Page 431 U. S. 401
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. With
respect to the propriety of the class action, the appellate court
discounted entirely the plaintiffs' failure to move for
certification. Determination of the class nature of a suit, the
court ruled, is a "responsibility [that] falls to the court." 505
F.2d at 50. Although the plaintiffs had acknowledged on appeal that
only their individual claims had been tried, and had requested no
more than that the case be remanded to the trial court for
consideration of the class action allegations, the Court of Appeals
itself certified a class consisting of all of the company's Negro
and Mexican-Ameriean city drivers covered by the applicable
collective bargaining agreements for the State of Texas. Stating
that "the requirements of Rule 23(a) must be read liberally in the
context of suits brought under Title VII and Section 1981,"
ibid., the court found that the named plaintiffs could
"
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.'"
Ibid. The court minimized the antagonism between the
plaintiffs and other city drivers with respect to the complaint's
demand that seniority lists be merged, since
"[t]he disagreement . . . concerned only the proper remedy;
there was no antagonism with regard to the contention that the
defendants practiced discrimination against the plaintiff
class."
Id. at 51. [
Footnote
5]
After certifying the class, the Court of Appeals went on to find
classwide liability against the company and the union on the basis
of the proof adduced at the trial of the individual claims.
Contrary to the understanding of the judge who had tried the case,
the appellate court determined that the trial had proceeded "as in
a class action," with the acquiescence of
Page 431 U. S. 402
the judge and the defendants.
Id. at 52. [
Footnote 6] The parties' stipulation that the
only issue before the trial court concerned the company's failure
to consider the named plaintiffs' applications for line driver jobs
was discounted as no more than "an attempt to eliminate some
confusion in the exposition of evidence at trial."
Ibid.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded, upon the trial
record, that the company had discriminated against Negroes and
Mexican-Americans in hiring line drivers, that the company's
no-transfer rule and seniority system perpetuated the past
discrimination and were not justified by business necessity, that
the company's requirement of three years of immediately prior
line-haul experience was an illegal employment qualification, and
that the unions had violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by
"their role in establishing separate seniority rosters that
failed to make allowance for minority city drivers who had been
discriminatorily relegated to city driver jobs."
505 F.2d at 61. The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial
court's finding that none of the named plaintiffs was qualified to
be a line driver; rather, it held only that that finding had been
"premature," because each plaintiff, as a member of the class,
would be entitled to have his application considered on the merits
when future line driver vacancies arose. [
Footnote 7]
Page 431 U. S. 403
II
It is our conclusion that, on the record before it, the Court of
Appeals plainly erred in declaring a class action and in imposing
upon the petitioners classwide liability. In arriving at this
conclusion, we do not reach the question whether a court of appeals
should ever certify a class in the first instance. For it is
inescapably clear that the Court of Appeals, in any event, erred in
certifying a class in this case for the simple reason that it was
evident by the time the case reached that court that the named
plaintiffs were not proper class representatives under Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 23(a). [
Footnote
8]
In short, the trial court proceedings made clear that Rodriguez,
Perez, and Herrera were not members of the class of discriminatees
they purported to represent. As this Court has repeatedly held, a
class representative must be part of the class and "possess the
same interest and suffer the same injury" as the class members.
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,
418 U. S. 208,
418 U. S. 216.
See, e.g., Kremens v. Bartley, ante at
431 U. S. 131
n. 12;
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393,
419 U. S. 403;
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752,
410 U. S. 759
n. 9;
Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45,
396 U. S. 49;
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31,
369 U. S. 32-33.
The District Court found upon abundant evidence that these
plaintiffs lacked the qualifications to be hired as line drivers.
[
Footnote 9] Thus, they could
have suffered no injury as a
Page 431 U. S. 404
result of the alleged discriminatory practices, and they were,
therefore, simply not eligible to represent a class of persons who
did allegedly suffer injury. Furthermore, each named plaintiff
stipulated that he had not been discriminated against with respect
to his initial hire. In the light of that stipulation, they were
hardly in a position to mount a classwide attack on the no-transfer
rule and seniority system on the ground that these practices
perpetuated past discrimination and locked minorities into the less
desirable jobs to which they had been discriminatorily
assigned.
Apart from the named plaintiffs' evident lack of class
membership, the record before the Court of Appeals disclosed at
least two other strong indications that they would not
Page 431 U. S. 405
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
[
Footnote 10] One was their
failure to move for class certification prior to trial. Even
assuming, as a number of courts have held, that a district judge
has an obligation on his own motion to determine whether an action
shall proceed as a class action,
see, e.g., Senter v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520-521 (CA6);
Garrett v. City
of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1243 (CA6);
Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 731 (CA1), the named plaintiffs'
failure to protect the interests of class members by moving for
certification surely bears strongly on the adequacy of the
representation that those class members might expect to receive.
See, e.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718,
722-725 (CA4),
cert. pending, Nos. 76-828, 76-834;
Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 164 (CA5);
Beasley v. Kroehler Mfg. Co., 406 F.
Supp. 926,
931 (ND
Tex.);
Walker v. Columbia University, 62 F.R.D. 63, 64
(SDNY);
Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F.
Supp. 211, 214 (Vt.);
Herbst v. Able, 45 F.R.D. 451,
453 (SDNY). Another factor, apparent on the record, suggesting that
the named plaintiffs were not appropriate class representatives was
the conflict between the vote by members of the class rejecting a
merger of the city and line driver collective bargaining units,
[
Footnote 11] and the demand
in the plaintiffs' complaint for just such a merger.
See, e.g.,
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32,
311 U. S.
44-45
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often, by their very nature, class suits,
involving class-wide wrongs. Common questions of law or fact are
typically present. But careful attention to the requirements of
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere
fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does
not, in itself, ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit
will be an adequate representative
Page 431 U. S. 406
of those who may have been the real victims of that
discrimination.
For the reasons we have discussed, the District Court did not
err in denying individual relief or in dismissing the class
allegations of the respondents' complaint. [
Footnote 12] The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is, accordingly, vacated, and the cases are remanded to
that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[
Footnote 13]
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 75-651,
Teamsters Local Union 657 v.
Rodriguez et al.; Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Herrera et al.;
and
Teamsters Local Union 657 v. Resendis et al.
(
see this Court's Rule 23(5)), and No. 75-715,
Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Rodriguez et al.; Southern
Conference of Teamsters v. Herrera, et al.; and
Southern
Conference of Teamsters v. Resendis, et al. (
see this
Court's Rule 23(5)), also on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
Under this policy, a city driver must resign his job and forfeit
all seniority in order to be eligible for a line driver job. He
get's no priority over other line driver applicants by virtue of
formerly having been with the company, and if he fails to become a
line driver, he is not automatically entitled to be restored to his
city job.
[
Footnote 2]
For a fuller description of a similar seniority system,
see
Teamsters v. United States, ante at
431 U. S.
343-344.
[
Footnote 3]
In addition to attacking the legality of the company's
no-transfer and seniority policies, the complaint charged that the
company excluded Negroes and Mexican-Americans from line driver
jobs, and that it had discharged plaintiff Perez and harassed
plaintiff Rodriguez in retaliation for their having filed charges
with the EEOC. The Southern Conference of Teamsters and Teamsters
Local 657 were charged with participating in the exclusion of
minority persons from line driver jobs, acquiescing in the
company's other discriminatory practices, and entering into
collective bargaining agreements that perpetuated the
discrimination against Mexican-Americans and Negroes and erected
"dual lines of seniority." In addition to other relief, the
plaintiffs demanded that the company
"merge its line driver and city driver seniority lists so as to
provide for a singular seniority system based solely on an
employee's anniversary date with the company."
[
Footnote 4]
The large majority of the members of Local 657 at the meeting
that rejected the proposal were Mexican-American or Negro city
drivers, negating any possibility that the vote was controlled by
white persons or by line drivers.
[
Footnote 5]
The court also stated that possible antagonism could be cured by
tailoring the award of relief, but it did not suggest how such
tailoring could be accomplished short of doing what it in fact did:
awarding retroactive seniority to discriminatees and ignoring the
named plaintiffs' separate demand that the seniority lines be
merged.
[
Footnote 6]
The Court of Appeals apparently concluded on the basis of a
colloquy appearing in the trial transcript that the parties and the
trial judge understood the trial to concern the class claims as
well as the individual claims. 505 F.2d at 52, and n. 14. This was
contrary to the understanding of the trial judge as reflected in
his findings. Moreover, as the full colloquy reveals, the trial
judge ruled that evidence concerning general company practice would
be admitted not because of the class allegations, but only because
it was probative with respect to the plaintiffs' individual
claims.
[
Footnote 7]
The Court of Appeals ordered that all class members be given an
opportunity to transfer to line driver jobs with retroactive
seniority to be determined under the Fifth Circuit's "qualification
date" principle.
See Teamsters v. United States, ante at
431 U. S.
333.
[
Footnote 8]
Rule 23(a) provides
"(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class."
[
Footnote 9]
Jesse Rodriguez did not have prior over-the-road experience with
a truck line. His record as a city driver included at least three
accidents and at least five personal injuries. Modesto Herrera had
been involved in at least three accidents and seven injuries,
resulting in much time lost from work. He had received four warning
letters from the company, of which three concerned abnormally low
productivity. Sadrach Perez had been fired from his city driver job
by the time of suit. The District Court found that, on occasion,
Perez had claimed to be totally and permanently disabled and had
then returned to work, and that customers had complained of his
disrespect and discourteousness. The company had placed at least
four warning letters in his file before discharging him, referring
to his failure to make deliveries, poor production, absence from
work, and violation of instructions and company policy. More than
10 customers had notified the company that they would refuse
freight if Perez was sent to deliver it, and would refuse to give
up freight if Perez was sent to receive it. An arbitration
committee convened in connection with Perez' discharge had decided
in the company's favor.
In light of this evidence, the District Court's finding that
none of the respondents was qualified to be a line driver was not
clearly erroneous. Nor was this finding in any way "premature." The
trial had concerned the company's failure to consider the
respondents' individual line driver applications, and the
plaintiffs had requested backpay and transfer with carryover
seniority in addition to other relief. Even assuming,
arguendo, that the company's failure even to consider the
applications was discriminatory, the company was entitled to prove
at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they
were not qualified and would not have been hired in any event.
See, e.g.,Teamsters v. United States, ante at
431 U. S. 369
n. 53.
Cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274,
429 U. S.
285-287.
[
Footnote 10]
See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23(a), quoted in
n 8,
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
See supra at
431 U. S.
400.
[
Footnote 12]
Obviously, a different case would be presented if the District
Court had certified a class and only later had it appeared that the
named plaintiffs were not class members or were otherwise
inappropriate class representatives. In such a case, the class
claims would have already been tried, and, provided the initial
certification was proper and decertification not appropriate, the
claims of the class members would not need to be mooted or
destroyed because subsequent events or the proof at trial had
undermined the named plaintiffs' individual claims.
See, e.g.,
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.
S. 747,
424 U. S.
752-757;
Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853,
855-856 (CA4). Where no class has been certified, however, and the
class claims remain to be tried, the decision whether the named
plaintiffs should represent a class is appropriately made on the
full record, including the facts developed at the trial of the
plaintiffs' individual claims. At that point, as the Court of
Appeals recognized in this case, "there [are] involved none of the
imponderables that make the [class action] decision so difficult
early in litigation." 505 F.2d at 51.
See also Co v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15-16 (CA4).
[
Footnote 13]
The union petitioners, in Nos. 75-651 and 75-715, also attack
the judgments entered against them in
Herrera v. Yellow Freight
System, Inc., 505 F.2d 66 (CA5), and
Resendis v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 505 F.2d 69 (CA5). The judgments against
the unions in those related cases are also vacated, and the cases
are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in
light of this opinion and our opinion in
Teamsters v. United
States, ante, p.
431 U. S. 324.