Provision of § 22 of the 1950 Organic Act of Guam that the
District Court of Guam "shall have such appellate jurisdiction as
the [Guam] legislature may determine"
held not to
authorize the Guam Legislature to divest the District Court's
appellate jurisdiction under the Act to hear appeals from local
Guam courts, and to transfer that jurisdiction to the newly created
Guam Supreme Court, but to empower the legislature to "determine"
that jurisdiction only in the sense of the selection of what should
constitute appealable causes. This conclusion is supported not only
by the text of § 22, which expressly authorizes only a "transfer"
of the District Court's original local jurisdiction, but also by
the absence of any clear signal from Congress that it intended to
allow the Guam Legislature to foreclose appellate review by Art.
III courts, including this Court, of territorial courts' decisions
in federal question cases; by the Act's legislative history; and by
the fact that, if the word "determine" were read as giving Guam the
power to transfer the District Court's appellate jurisdiction to
the Guam Supreme Court and at the same time to authorize Guam to
deny review of the District Court's decisions by any Art. III
tribunal, Congress would have given Guam a power not granted to any
other Territory. Pp.
431 U. S.
199-204.
540 F.2d 1011, affirmed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART,
REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p.
431 U. S.
204.
Page 431 U. S. 196
MR JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision in this case is whether the provision
of § 22 of the 1950 Organic Act of Guam that the District Court of
Guam "shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the [Guam]
legislature may determine" authorizes the Legislature of Guam to
divest the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court under the
Act to hear appeals from local Guam courts, and to transfer that
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Guam, newly created by the
Guam Legislature.
I
Section 22(a) of the Organic Act, 64 Stat. 389, before an
amendment not relevant here, provided:
"There is hereby created a court of record to be designated the
'District Court of Guam,' and the judicial authority of Guam shall
be vested in the District Court of Guam and in such court or courts
as may have been or may hereafter be established by the laws of
Guam. The District Court of Guam shall have, in all causes arising
under the laws of the United States, the jurisdiction of a district
court of the United States as such court is defined in section 451
of title 28, United States Code,
and shall have original
jurisdiction in all other causes in Guam, jurisdiction over which
has not been transferred by the legislature to other court or
courts established by it, and shall have such appellate
jurisdiction as the legislature may determine. The
jurisdiction of and the procedure in the courts of Guam other than
the District Court of Guam shall be prescribed by the laws of Guam.
[
Footnote 1]"
(Emphasis supplied.)
Page 431 U. S. 197
In 1951, under the authority of the Organic Act, the Guam
Legislature created three local courts for local matters and
defined cases appealable from those courts to the District Court.
[
Footnote 2] That structure
continued without substantial change for 23 years until 1974, when
the Guam Legislature adopted the Court Reorganization Act of 1974.
Guam Pub.L. 12-85. The former Island, Police, and Commissioners'
Courts were replaced by a Guam Superior Court with
"original jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of
Guam, civil or criminal, in law or equity, regardless of the amount
in controversy, except for causes arising under the Constitution,
treaties, laws of the United States and any matter involving the
Guam Territorial Income Tax. [
Footnote 3]"
The Act also repealed the provisions of the Guam Code of Civil
Procedure governing appeals to the District Court, [
Footnote 4] and created the Supreme Court
of
Page 431 U. S. 198
Guam. The Act transferred to the Supreme Court essentially the
same appellate jurisdiction as had previously been exercised by the
District Court, providing that the Supreme Court "shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from the judgments, orders and decrees of
the Superior Court in criminal cases . . . and in civil causes."
Pub.L. 12-85, § 3. Other provisions of the Reorganization Act
amended various territorial laws to change the references to the
Supreme Court of Guam from the Appellate Division of the District
Court as the appellate court. Respondent was convicted of criminal
charges in the Superior Court, and appealed to the District Court
of Guam. The District Court dismissed the appeal on the authority
of a divided panel decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit holding that the 1974 Court Reorganization Act validly
divested the District Court of its appellate jurisdiction and
transferred that jurisdiction to the newly created Supreme Court.
Agana Bay Dev. Co. (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Supreme Court of
Guam, 529 F.2d 952 (1976). In this case, however, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, overruled en banc [
Footnote 5] the panel decision in
Agana
Bay and reversed the dismissal of respondent's appeal. 540
F.2d 1011 (1976). The Court of Appeals held that
"the appellate jurisdiction of the district court may not be
transferred without congressional authorization and pursuant to
such provisions and safeguards as Congress may provide."
Id. at 1012. Certain judgments of the appellate
division of the District Court were made appealable to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and to this Court, by § 23 of the
Organic Act of Guam of 1950, as
Page 431 U. S. 199
amended, 65 Stat. 726, [
Footnote
6] but Congress has not similarly provided for appeals from
judgments of the Supreme Court of Guam. In that circumstance, the
Court of Appeals held that § 22(a) did not authorize the transfer
of the District Court's appellate Jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
of Guam because, under existing statutes,
"litigation in the territorial court [that] may involve
substantial federal questions . . . cannot be reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court or by any other Article III court. . .
."
540 F.2d at 1012. We granted certiorari, 429 U.S. 959 (1976). We
affirm.
II
We emphasize at the outset that the 1974 Court Reorganization
Act in no respect affects the exclusive [
Footnote 7] original federal
Page 431 U. S. 200
question jurisdiction of the District Court granted by the first
clause of the second sentence of § 22(a), which now provides that
the
"District Court of Gum shall have the jurisdiction of a district
court of the United States in all causes arising under the
constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. . . ."
48 U.S.C. § 1424(a). Decisions in such cases brought in the
District Court are appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit or to this Court. [
Footnote
8] The question presented for decision here rather concerns
appeals to the District Court from decisions of local courts in
cases arising under local law. The language we must construe
immediately follows in the same sentence, providing that the
District Court
"shall have original jurisdiction in all other causes in Guam,
jurisdiction over which has not been
transferred by the
legislature to other court or courts established by it, and
shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the legislature may
determine."
(Emphasis supplied.)
We first observe that Congress used different language in its
grant of power to the Guam Legislature over the District Court's
original jurisdiction from its grant of power over that court's
appellate jurisdiction. The Act expressly provides that original
jurisdiction might be "
transferred" to "other court or
courts" created by the legislature. As to appellate jurisdiction,
however, the wording is that the District Court "shall have such
appellate jurisdiction as the legislature may
determine."
The question immediately arises why, if Congress contemplated
authority to eliminate the District Court's appellate jurisdiction
by transferring it to a local court, Congress did not, as in the
case of "original jurisdiction," explicitly provide that appellate
jurisdiction too might be "
transferred." Moreover, if
Congress contemplated such a broad grant of authority, it might be
expected that it would have referred, as in the case of original
jurisdiction, to "other court or courts" that would be established
to assume the appellate jurisdiction
Page 431 U. S. 201
transferred from the District Court. Clearly, the word
"determine" is not used as a synonym for "transfer," and it is not
obvious that the power to "determine" the appellate jurisdiction of
the District Court includes the power to abolish it by "transfer"
to another court. We fully agree with Judge Kennedy, dissenting in
Agana Bay, 529 F.2d at 959, that Congress used "determine"
because Congress "more likely intended to permit the local
legislature to decide what cases were serious enough to be
appealable," and we note that the Guam Legislature found no broader
authority in the term for the 23 years from 1951 to 1974. We
therefore conclude that Congress expressly authorized a "transfer"
of the District Court's original jurisdiction, but withheld a like
power respecting the court's appellate jurisdiction, empowering
Guam to "determine" the District Court's appellate jurisdiction
only in the sense of the selection of what should constitute
appealable causes. [
Footnote
9]
Other considerations besides our reading of the bare text
support the conclusion that the power to "determine" should not be
construed to include the power to "transfer" without more
persuasive indicia of a congressional purpose to clothe the Guam
Legislature with this authority.
First, we should be reluctant without a clear signal from
Congress to conclude that it intended to allow the Guam Legislature
to foreclose appellate review by Art. III courts, including this
Court, of decisions of territorial courts in cases that may turn on
questions of federal law. Important federal issues can be presented
in cases which do not fall within the District Court's federal
question jurisdiction, because they do not "arise under" federal
law, but instead fall within the exclusive jurisdiction vested in
the Superior and Supreme Courts by the Reorganization Act. For
example, criminal convictions
Page 431 U. S. 202
returned in the Superior Court and appealable under the Court
Reorganization Act only to the Supreme Court, may be challenged as
violating federal constitutional guarantees. It is no answer that
rejection of a federal constitutional defense by the Guam courts,
though not presently directly reviewable by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit or by this Court, may nevertheless be
reviewable in federal habeas corpus. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. Habeas
corpus review has different historical roots from direct review and
different jurisprudential functions and limitations.
See, e.g.,
Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963). As respects civil cases, though the "arising under"
jurisdiction vested in the District Court by § 22(a) tracks the
general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), clearly --
whatever may be the ambiguities of the phrase "arising under" -- it
does not embrace all civil cases that may present questions of
federal law.
See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank,
299 U. S. 109
(1936); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case
Arise "Directly" under Federal Law, 115 U.Pa.L.Rev. 890 (1967). We
are therefore reluctant to conclude that, merely because power to
"determine" may, as a matter of dictionary definition, include
power to "transfer," Congress intended to confer on the Guam
Legislature the power to eliminate review in Art. III courts of all
federal issues presented in cases brought in the local courts.
Second, nothing in the legislative history of the Organic Act of
1950 even remotely suggests that Congress intended by its use of
the word "determine" to give the Guam Legislature the option of
creating a local Supreme Court having the power of ultimate review
of cases involving local matters. Rather, the legislative history
points the other way. Three bills introduced in the 81st Congress
provided for a judicial system for Guam. Hearings on S. 185, S.
1892, and H.R. 7273 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1-25 (1950)
(hereafter Hearings). All three provided for appellate review by
Art. III
Page 431 U. S. 203
courts of territorial court decisions. The bill that became the
Organic Act, H.R. 7273, originally established a Supreme Court of
Guam whose decisions were to be reviewable by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and by this Court. Hearings 22-23. The
proposal for a congressionally created Supreme Court was rejected
in favor of a Federal District Court. This was done in part to
provide "litigants in the Western Pacific with direct access to the
federal court system."
Agana Bay Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Supreme
Court of Guam, supra at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); S.Rep.
No. 2109, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950). But another concern
accounts for the provision giving the District Court jurisdiction
in local matters. Our independent review of the pertinent
legislative materials confirms, and we therefore adopt, Judge
Kennedy's conclusion expressed in dissent in
Agana Bay,
supra, at 961:
"Because of concern that there would not be sufficient federal
question litigation to justify a separate district court in Guam,
the court was given original jurisdiction in local matters. It was
also envisioned that the district court would serve as an appellate
body once local courts were established. The apparent reason for
eliminating the provision for a local supreme court was to avoid
duplicative judicial machinery, rather than to allow local
authorities to put certain controversies beyond review by the
federal court system."
Third, if the word "determine" is to be read as giving Guam the
power to transfer the District Court's appellate jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court and, by the same stroke, to authorize Guam to
deny review of the court's decisions by any Art. III tribunal,
Congress has given Guam a power not granted any other Territory.
Congress has consistently provided for appellate review by Art. III
courts of decisions of local courts of the other Territories.
[
Footnote 10] What history
there
Page 431 U. S. 204
is points to a purpose to create a similar system for Guam.
Hearings,
supra; S.Rep. No. 2109, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950). We are unwilling to say that Congress made an extraordinary
exception in the case of Guam, at least without some clearer
indication of that purpose than the word "determine" provides.
Moreover, we should hesitate to attribute such a purpose to
Congress since a construction that denied Guam litigants access to
Art. III courts for appellate review of local court decisions might
present constitutional questions.
See generally Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L Rev. 1362 (1953).
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The "District Court of Guam," rather than "United States
District Court of Guam," was chosen as the court's title, since it
was created under Art. IV, 3, of the Federal Constitution, rather
than under Art. III, and since § 22 vested the court with original
jurisdiction to decide both local and federal question matters.
S.Rep. No. 2109, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1950).
[
Footnote 2]
The local courts were the Commissioners' Courts, the Police
Court, and the Island Court. Guam Code Civ.Proc. § 81-278
(1953).
The District Court was vested with a wide-ranging appellate
jurisdiction respecting criminal and civil decisions of the Island
Court. §§ 62, 63, 82. A single judge constituted the District Court
as a trial court. However, § 65 constituted the appellate division
as a court of three judges. Congress approved this measure in a
1958 amendment to § 22 of the Act, 72 Stat. 178.
See Corn v.
Guam Coral Co., 318 F.2d 622, 627 (CA9 1963); letter of Judge
Albert B. Maris, judicial advisor to Guam, to Chairman, Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Mar. 14,
1957, reproduced in S.Rep. No. 1582, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-9
(1958);
id. at 4-5.
[
Footnote 3]
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
Superior Court's original jurisdiction is exclusive, and not
concurrent with the District Court.
Agana Bay Dev. Co. (Hong
Kong) Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam, 529 F.2d 952, 955 n. 4
(1976). This holding is not contested here.
[
Footnote 4]
The Code of Civil Procedure provisions repealed by the Court
Reorganization Act had provided that the District Court "shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from the judgments, orders and decrees of
the Island Court in criminal causes as provided in the Penal Code,
Part II, Title VIII, and in civil causes. . . ."
Guam Code Civ.Proc. § 63 (1953).
[
Footnote 5]
The Court of Appeals convened en banc after respondent
unsuccessfully sought certiorari before judgment in this Court. 425
U.S. 960 (1976).
[
Footnote 6]
Section 23(a), as enacted in 1950, authorized appeals from final
judgments of the District Court of Guam to the Court of Appeals in
federal question, habeas corpus, and "all other civil cases where
the value in controversy exceed[ed] $5,000. . . ." Congress
repealed this provision in 1951, 65 Stat. 729, but transferred its
coverage to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and thus expanded appealability to
criminal cases raising only issues of local law, and to civil cases
raising only issues of local law with value in controversy of less
than $5,000. 65 Stat. 726. Review of certain interlocutory orders
was also authorized by including the District Court of Guam within
the coverage of 28 U.S.C. § 1292. 65 Stat. 726.
See S.Rep.
No. 1020, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1951).
Under § 23(b) as enacted in 1950, direct appeals from the
District Court to this Court were available in cases to which the
United States was a party and in which the District Court held an
Act of Congress unconstitutional. This provision was continued
without significant change in 1951 by including the District Court
of Guam within the coverage of 28 U.S.C. § 1252. 65 Stat. 726.
[
Footnote 7]
The Organic Act of 1950 does not, on its face, require that the
original jurisdiction of the District Court over questions arising
under federal law be exclusive, but the implementing legislation
passed by Guam in 1951 left federal question jurisdiction
exclusively in the District Court by granting jurisdiction to the
Guam courts only over cases arising under local law. Guam Code
Civ.Proc. §§ 82, 102, 112 (1953). This interpretation in
Agana
Bay Dev. Co. (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam, supra
at 954, is also not contested here.
See n 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 8]
See n 6,
supra.
[
Footnote 9]
This case does not present, and we intimate no view upon, the
question of what categories of cases the Guam Legislature is
authorized to determine are nonappealable under § 22 of the
Act.
[
Footnote 10]
See, e.g., 31 Stat. 141 (§ 86), 36 Stat. 1087, 43 Stat.
936 (Hawaii); 31 Stat. 321 (§§ 504, 507) (Alaska); 31 Stat. 77 (§
35), 38 Stat. 803, 39 Stat. 951 (§§ 42, 43) (Puerto Rico); 76A
Stat. 51 (Canal Zone); 39 Stat. 1132 (§ 2), 43 Stat. 936, 49 Stat.
1807 (§§ 25, 30), 48 U.S.C. § 1612, 90 Stat. 2899 (Virginia
Islands); 90 Stat. 263 (§§ 402, 403) (Northern Mariana
Islands).
We note that Pub.L. 94-584, enacted in 1976 about a month before
our grant of certiorari in this case, authorizes Guam to adopt a
constitution for its own self-government, but expressly provides
that a provision of the territorial constitution establishing a
system of local courts
"shall become effective no sooner than upon the enactment of
legislation regulating the relationship between the local courts of
Guam with the Federal judicial system."
§ 2(b)(7), 90 Stat. 2899. This suggests that Congress
contemplates that Guam's judiciary should be treated like the
judiciaries of other Territories whose judgments are subject to
review by Art. III courts. The Guam Legislature has already enacted
legislation to provide for a constitutional convention. Act of Dec.
10, 1976, Guam Pub.L. 13-202. Although this may eventually produce
a judicial system complying with § 2(b)(7) of Pub.L. 94-584 and
subject to appellate review in Art. III courts, we perceive nothing
in this prospect that should cause us to abstain from decision of
the issues presented in this case.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
Although this case may at first glance seem unimportant to
anyone but the residents of Guam, the result of the Court's
Page 431 U. S. 205
decision is perhaps unprecedented in our history. The Court
today abolishes the Supreme Court of Guam, a significant part of
the system of self-government established by some 85,000 American
citizens through their freely elected legislature. [
Footnote 2/1]
The Court's error, in my view, lies in its misinterpretation of
the Organic Act of Guam. I do not doubt that Congress has the
authority in the exercise of its plenary power over Territories of
the United States, Art. IV, § 3, to reverse Guam's decision to
reorganize its local court system. In this case, however, Congress
has plainly authorized enactment of the challenged legislation,
while there has been no corresponding delegation to this Court of
the congressional power to veto such laws. Because "our judicial
function" is limited "to apply[ing] statutes on the basis of what
Congress has written, not what Congress might have written,"
United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U.
S. 562,
343 U. S. 575
(1952), I must respectfully dissent.
In reaching its decision, the Court focuses exclusively on the
meaning of the second half of the second sentence of § 22(a) of the
Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 389. [
Footnote 2/2] With all respect, this approach ignores
the horse while concentrating on minute details of the cart's
design. If the sentences of § 22(a)
Page 431 U. S. 206
are simply read in the order in which they are written, their
meaning is plain without resort to complex exegesis.
The first sentence creates the federal "District Court of Guam."
It goes on to provide that
"the judicial authority of Guam shall be vested in the District
Court of Guam and in such court or courts as may have been or may
hereafter be established by the laws of Guam."
This language is strikingly similar to the familiar words of
Art. III, § 1:
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."
Both provisions describe the bodies that will exercise the
judicial power. They name one court and mandate its establishment.
They leave the creation of the remainder of the court system to the
legislature. But there is one key distinction: where Art. III
expressly describes the relationship among the courts, making one
"supreme" and the others "inferior," § 22(a) is silent.
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from this
distinction is that the Organic Act, unlike our Constitution, was
intended to allow the elected representatives of the people
governed by the courts to control the relationship among the
courts. The absence of any indication of a superior-inferior
structure in § 22(a) also indicates that there is no reason to
consider the federal and local courts other than coequal in matters
as to which they share jurisdiction,
i.e., cases that
might be appealed. Rather, the conspicuously incomplete emulation
of the well known Art. III model suggests that the people of Guam
may terminate the District Court's appellate jurisdiction.
The Court ascribes great significance to the different language
used to describe the legislature's power to "transfer" trial
jurisdiction to the local courts, as contrasted with the power to
"determine" appellate jurisdiction. The words, read in context,
seem to me to be no more than alternative expressions for the same
concept, used in the interest of avoiding
Page 431 U. S. 207
repetition. Thus, the first sentence of § 22(a) gives Guam the
authority to establish any courts it deems necessary. The last
sentence of the section, also ignored in the Court's analysis,
gives Guam the power to prescribe the "jurisdiction of and
procedure in" such local courts. "Determine," as used in the
context of the second sentence of § 22(a), is an obvious synonym
for "grant." If the Guam Legislature may grant the District Court
appellate jurisdiction in the first instance, it has the converse
power to withdraw it. Read as a whole, § 22(a) plainly encompasses
the power to give all appellate jurisdiction to a local court.
The Court relies on the fact that this interpretation of the
Organic Act might insulate decisions of the local courts that
involve questions of federal constitutional or statutory law from
review in Art. III courts, something which other territorial
charters have apparently not granted. With respect to the latter
point, it is worth noting that Guam is a small and isolated
possession that Congress might well have wished to give unusual
autonomy in local affairs. No doubt, too, Congress' sense of the
proper way to govern far-distant citizens has changed considerably
in recent decades from the expansionist ethic which prevailed when
Hawaii was annexed, the Spanish possessions (including Guam) ceded,
and the Virginia Islands purchased. It is thus not surprising to
find a broad authorization for self-government granted by the
Organic Act passed in 1950. And it speaks well for the good sense
of the people of Guam that they observed the functioning of the
judicial system on their island for 23 years before deciding that a
local appellate court would best serve their needs. This hiatus,
therefore, does not indicate that Guam lacked the power to act, as
the Court assumes,
ante at
431 U. S. 201,
but rather that the people deemed it unwise at that stage in their
development to do so. Moreover, as careful analysis of the relevant
sections of other territorial charters demonstrates,
see Agana
Bay Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam, 529
Page 431 U. S. 208
F.2d 952, 957-958 (CA9 1976), "the Guam Organic Act is unique,
and it delegates the widest powers of any of the territories to the
legislature for the creation of appellate courts."
Id. at
957.
If there are constitutional problems with this interpretation of
the Organic Act,
see ante at
431 U. S.
201-202,
431 U. S. 204,
they do not arise from the action of the Guam Legislature in
creating a local appellate court. Rather, they stem from the
absence of a statute expressly providing for appeals from the Guam
courts to an Art. III tribunal. As petitioner notes, Brief for
Petitioner 15-19, Congress has, in its dealings with Guam,
historically reacted to the developing legal needs of the island,
rather than anticipating them.
See, e.g., Corn v. Guam Coral
Co., 318 F.2d 622, 624-627 (CA9 1963). This is not surprising;
since the Organic Act did not set up a local court structure, it
was impossible for Congress to foresee the manner in which the
system as actually established would mesh with the Art. III courts.
Most recently, Congress authorized Guam to design a local court
system as part of the drafting of a new constitution, recognizing
that it would thereafter be necessary to enact legislation
"regulating the relationship between the local courts of Guam and
the Federal judicial system." Pub.L. No. 94-584, 90 Stat. 2899, §
2(b)(7).
In view of the willingness of Congress to accommodate both the
aspirations of the people of Guam and the requirements of federal
jurisdiction, I think there is no need to search for constitutional
questions where none yet exist. [
Footnote 2/3] In the meantime, we should not eviscerate
the court system carefully devised by the people of Guam in the
exercise of their right of self-government.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 855, 856 (1976); 8 U.S.C. § 1407; Guam Govt.Code §
2056 (1970).
[
Footnote 2/2]
This statute, prior to a 1958 amendment, provided in pertinent
part:
"There is hereby created a court of record to be designated the
'District Court of Guam,' and the judicial authority of Guam shall
be vested in the District Court of Guam and in such court or courts
as may have been or may hereafter be established by the laws of
Guam. The District Court of Guam shall have, in all causes arising
under the laws of the United States, the jurisdiction of a district
court of the United States as such court is defined in section 451
of title 28, United States Code, and shall have original
jurisdiction in all other causes in Guam, jurisdiction over which
has not been transferred by the legislature to other court or
courts established by it, and shall have such appellate
jurisdiction as the legislature may determine. The jurisdiction of
and the procedure in the courts of Guam other than the District
Court of Guam shall be prescribed by the laws of Guam."
[
Footnote 2/3]
Nowhere in respondent's presentation to this Court is there any
claim of federal constitutional or statutory infirmities in his
conviction for violation of the laws of Guam.