The Illinois Driver Licensing Law authorizes the Secretary of
State of Illinois to suspend or revoke a driver's license without
preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or other
sufficient evidence that the driver's conduct falls into any of 18
enumerated categories, one of which is that the driver has been
repeatedly convicted of offenses against traffic laws to a degree
indicating
"lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
safe operation of a motor vehicle or disrespect for the traffic
laws and the safety of other persons upon the highway."
(§ 6-206(a)(3)). Pursuant to this provision, the Secretary
issued a regulation requiring revocation in the event a driver's
license is otherwise suspended three times within a 10-year period.
Under the statutory scheme the Secretary must provide immediate
written notice of a discretionary suspension or revocation and,
within 20 days of his receiving a written request from the
licensee, must schedule a full evidentiary hearing for a date "as
early as practical," and his final decision is subject to judicial
review. After the license of appellee, a truck driver, became
subject to suspension under another section of the statute, the
Secretary ordered the license revoked under § 6-206(a)(3) and the
corresponding rule. Without requesting an administrative hearing,
appellee brought this action challenging the constitutionality of §
6-206(a)(3). A three-judge District Court, relying on
Bell v.
Burson, 402 U. S. 535,
granted appellee relief on the ground that a license cannot
constitutionally be revoked under the challenged statute until
after a hearing is held to determine whether the licensee meets the
statutory criteria.
Held: The Illinois statute, as implemented by the
Secretary's regulations, is constitutionally adequate under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as analyzed in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319,
424 U. S. 333.
Pp.
431 U. S.
112-116.
(a) The nature of the private interest involved here (the
granted license to operate a motor vehicle) is not so great as to
require a departure from "the ordinary principle . . . that
something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action,"
Eldridge, supra at
424 U. S. 343,
particularly in light of statutory provisions for
Page 431 U. S. 106
hardship and for holders of commercial licenses, who are those
most likely to be affected by the deprival of driving privileges.
P.
431 U. S.
113.
(b) The risk of an erroneous deprivation absent a prior hearing
is not great and additional procedures would not significantly
reduce the number of erroneous deprivations. Here the Secretary's
regulations make suspension and revocation decisions largely
automatic, and appellee is asserting the right to appear at a
prerevocation hearing merely to argue for leniency. Pp.
431 U. S.
113-114.
(c) The requirement of a pretermination hearing in every case
would impede the public interests of administrative efficiency, as
well as highway safety, which is promoted by the prompt removal of
hazardous drivers.
Bell v. Burson, supra, distinguished.
Pp.
431 U. S.
114-115.
Reversed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
MARSHALL, J., joined,
post, p.
431 U. S. 116.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result,
post, p.
431 U. S. 117.
REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether Illinois has provided
constitutionally adequate procedures for suspending or revoking the
license of a driver who repeatedly has been convicted of traffic
offenses. The statute and administrative regulations provide for an
initial summary decision based on official records, with a full
administrative hearing available only after the suspension or
revocation has taken effect.
Page 431 U. S. 107
I
The case centers on § 206 of the Illinois Driver Licensing Law
(c. 6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code). The section is entitled
"Discretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit."
It empowers the Secretary of State to act "without preliminary
hearing upon a showing by his records or other sufficient evidence"
that a driver's conduct falls into any one of 18 enumerated
categories. Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 95 1/2, § 206(a) (1975). Pursuant to
his rulemaking authority under this law, § 211(a), [
Footnote 1] the Secretary has adopted
administrative regulations that further define the bases and
procedures for discretionary suspensions. These regulations
generally provide for an initial summary determination based on the
individual's driving record. [
Footnote 2] The Secretary has established a comprehensive
system of assigning "points" for various kinds of traffic offenses,
depending on severity, to provide an objective means of evaluating
driving records.
One of the statutorily enumerated circumstances justifying
Page 431 U. S. 108
license suspension or revocation is conviction of three moving
traffic offenses within a 12-month period. § 206(a)(2). [
Footnote 3] This is one of the
instances where the Secretary, by regulation, has provided a method
for determining the sanction according to the driver's accumulated
"points." [
Footnote 4]
Another circumstance, specified in the statute, supporting
suspension or revocation is where a licensee
"[h]as been repeatedly involved as a driver in motor vehicle
collisions or has been repeatedly convicted of
Page 431 U. S. 109
offenses against laws and ordinances regulating the movement of
traffic, to a degree which indicates lack of ability to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor
vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of other
persons upon the highway."
§ 206(a)(3). Here again the Secretary has limited his broad
statutory discretion by an administrative regulation. This
regulation allows suspension or revocation, where sufficient points
have been accumulated to warrant a second suspension within a
5-year period. [
Footnote 5] The
regulation concludes flatly: "A person who has been suspended
thrice within a 10-year period shall be revoked."
Section 6-206(c)(1) [
Footnote
6] requires the Secretary "immediately" to provide written
notice of a discretionary suspension or revocation under this
statute, but no prior hearing is required. Within 20 days of his
receiving a written request from the licensee, the Secretary must
schedule a full evidentiary hearing
Page 431 U. S. 110
for a date "as early as practical" in either Sangamon County or
Cook County, as the licensee may specify. § 2118(a). The final
decision of the Secretary after such hearing is subject to judicial
review in the Illinois courts. § 2-118(e). In addition, a person
whose license is suspended or revoked may obtain a restricted
permit for commercial use or in case of hardship. §§ 6-206(c)(2)
and (3). [
Footnote 7]
II
Appellee Love, a resident of Chicago, is employed as a truck
driver. His license was suspended in November, 1969, under §
6-206(a)(2), for three convictions within a 12-month period. He was
then convicted of a charge of driving while his license was
suspended, and consequently another suspension was imposed in
March, 1970, pursuant to § 6-303(b). Appellee received no further
citation until August, 1974, when he was arrested twice for
speeding. He was convicted of both charges and then received a
third speeding citation in February, 1975. On March 27, he was
notified by letter that he would lose his driving privileges if
convicted of a third offense. On March 31 appellee was convicted of
the third speeding charge.
Page 431 U. S. 111
On June 3, appellee received a notice that his license was
revoked effective June 6. [
Footnote
8] The stated authority for the revocation was § 6-206(a)(3);
the explanation, following the language of the statute, was:
"his action has been taken as a result of: your having been
repeatedly convicted of offenses against laws and ordinances
regulating the movement of traffic, to a degree which indicates
disrespect for the traffic laws."
App. 13.
Appellee, then aged 25, made no request for an administrative
hearing. Instead, he filed this purported class action [
Footnote 9] on June 5 against the
Illinois Secretary of State in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. His complaint sought a
declaratory judgment that § 6-206(a)(3) was unconstitutional, an
injunction against enforcement of the statute, and damages.
Appellee's application for a temporary restraining order was
granted on condition that he apply for a hardship driving permit.
He applied for that permit on June 10, and it was issued on July
25.
A three-judge District Court was convened to consider appellee's
claim that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that a license
cannot constitutionally be suspended or revoked under § 6-206(a)(3)
until after a hearing is held to determine whether the licensee
meets the statutory criteria of
"lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
safe operation of a motor vehicle or disrespect for the traffic
laws
Page 431 U. S. 112
and the safety of other persons upon the highway."
The court regarded such a prior hearing as mandated by this
Court's decision in
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.
S. 535 (1971). Accordingly, the court granted judgment
for appellee and enjoined the Secretary of State from enforcing §
6-206(a)(3). The Secretary appealed, and we noted probable
jurisdiction
sub nom. Howlett v. Love, 429 U.S. 813
(1976).
III
It is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the
deprivation of a driver's license by the State:
"Suspension of issued licenses . . . involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases,
the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at
402 U. S.
539.
It is equally clear that a licensee in Illinois eventually can
obtain all the safeguards procedural due process could be thought
to require before a discretionary suspension or revocation becomes
final. Appellee does not challenge the adequacy of the
administrative hearing, noted above, available under § 2-118. The
only question is one of timing. This case thus presents an issue
similar to that considered only last Term in
Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319,
424 U. S. 333
(1976), namely,
"the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing
prior to the deprivation of some type of property interest even if
such a hearing is provided thereafter."
We may analyze the present case, too, in terms of the factors
considered in
Eldridge:
"[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first,
the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and
Page 431 U. S. 113
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail."
Id. at
424 U. S.
335.
The private interest affected by the decision here is the
granted license to operate a motor vehicle. Unlike the social
security recipients in
Eldridge, who at least could obtain
retroactive payments if their claims were subsequently sustained, a
licensee is not made entirely whole if his suspension or revocation
is later vacated. On the other hand, a driver's license may not be
so vital and essential as are social insurance payments on which
the recipient may depend for his very subsistence.
See Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
397 U. S. 264
(1970). The Illinois statute includes special provisions for
hardship and for holders of commercial licenses, who are those most
likely to be affected by the deprival of driving privileges.
See n 7,
supra. We therefore conclude that the nature of the
private interest here is not so great as to require us
"to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our
decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is
sufficient prior to adverse administrative action."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 343.
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134
(1974).
Moreover, the risk of an erroneous deprivation in the absence of
a prior hearing is not great. Under the Secretary's regulations,
suspension and revocation decisions are largely automatic. Of
course, there is the possibility of clerical error, but written
objection will bring a matter of that kind to the Secretary's
attention. In this case, appellee had the opportunity for a full
judicial hearing in connection with each of the traffic convictions
on which the Secretary's decision was based. Appellee has not
challenged the validity of those convictions or the adequacy of his
procedural rights at the time they were determined. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 41, 47. Since appellee
Page 431 U. S. 114
does not dispute the factual basis for the Secretary's decision,
he is really asserting the right to appear in person only to argue
that the Secretary should show leniency and depart from his own
regulations. [
Footnote 10]
Such an appearance might make the licensee feel that he has
received more personal attention, but it would not serve to protect
any substantive rights. We conclude that requiring additional
procedures would be unlikely to have significant value in reducing
the number of erroneous deprivations.
Finally, the substantial public interest in administrative
efficiency would be impeded by the availability of a pretermination
hearing in every case. Giving licensees the choice thus
automatically to obtain a delay in the effectiveness of a
suspension or revocation would encourage drivers routinely to
request full administrative hearings.
See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 347. Far more substantial than the
administrative burden, however, is the important public interest in
safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a
safety hazard.
See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.
S. 637,
402 U. S. 657,
402 U. S. 671
(1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
factor fully distinguishes
Bell v. Burson, supra, where
the "only purpose" of the Georgia statute there under consideration
was "to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the
licensee resulting from the accident." 402 U.S. at
402 U. S. 540.
[
Footnote 11] In contrast,
the Illinois statute at
Page 431 U. S. 115
issue in the instant case is designed to keep off the roads
those drivers who are unable or unwilling to respect traffic rules
and the safety of others.
We conclude that the public interests present under the
circumstances of this case are sufficiently visible and weighty for
the State to make its summary initial decision effective without a
predecision administrative hearing.
The present case is a good illustration of the fact that
procedural due process in the administrative setting does not
always require application of the judicial model. When a
governmental official is given the power to make discretionary
decisions under a broad statutory standard, case-by-case
decisionmaking may not be the best way to assure fairness. Here,
the Secretary commendably sought to define the statutory standard
narrowly by the use of his rulemaking authority. [
Footnote 12] The decision to use objective
rules in this case provides drivers with more precise notice of
what conduct will be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment
among similarly situated drivers. The approach taken by the
District Court would have the contrary result of reducing the
fairness of the system, by requiring a necessarily subjective
inquiry in each case as to a driver's "disrespect" or "lack of
ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care."
The second count of appellee's complaint challenged § 6206(a)(3)
on the grounds of vagueness and inadequacy of standards. The
three-judge court did not reach the issue.
Page 431 U. S. 116
App. 22. We regard the claim, in the light of Love's record, as
frivolous.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 211(a):
"The Secretary of State shall administer the provisions of this
Chapter and may make and enforce rules and regulations relating to
its administration."
[
Footnote 2]
Rule 206(a) (1975) provides in part:
"The Secretary of State is authorized to exercise discretionary
authority to suspend or revoke the license or permit of any person
without a preliminary hearing, or to decline to suspend or revoke
such driving privileges. In making a determination of the action to
be taken, the Secretary of State shall take into consideration the
severity of the offense and conviction, the number of offenses and
convictions, and prior suspensions or revocations on the abstract
of the driver's record. The Secretary may also take into
consideration the points accumulated by the driver and noted on his
driving record."
"For the purpose of this Rule and its companion rules, a
conviction is the final adjudication of 'guilty' by a court of
competent jurisdiction, either after a bench trial, trial by jury,
plea of guilty, order of forfeiture, or default, as reported to the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State is not authorized to
consider or inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding
the conviction."
[
Footnote 3]
The statute authorizes suspension or revocation where a
licensee
"[h]as been convicted of not less than 3 offenses against
traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles with the
exception of those offenses excluded under the provisions of
Section 6-204(2), committed within any 12 month period so as to
indicate the disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the
safety of other persons on the highways; conviction upon 3 charges
of violation of Section 11-601 of this Act committed within a
period of 12 months shall be deemed grounds for the revocation or
suspension of a license or permit under this Section, provided that
no such revocation or suspension shall be entered more than 6
months subsequent to the date of conviction of the 3rd
offense."
Ill.Rev.Stat. c. 95 1/2, § 6-206(a)(2) (1975).
[
Footnote 4]
Rule 6-206(a)2 (1975) provides:
"A person who has been convicted of three (3) or more offenses
against traffic regulations, governing the movement of vehicles,
with the exception of those offenses excluded under provisions of
Section 6-204(2) and whose violations have occurred within a
twelve(12) month period may be suspended as follows:"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Number of points Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
20 to 44 Suspension up to 2 months
45 to 74 Suspension up to 3 months
75 to 89 Suspension up to 6 months
90 to 99 Suspension up to 9 months
100 to 109 Suspension up to 12 months
Over 110 Revocation for not less than 12 months.
-----------------------------------------------------------
"A person who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant a
second suspension within a 10-year period may be either suspended
or revoked, depending on the number of points. In the event of a
second suspension in the 10-year period, the length of suspension,
determined by the point total, is doubled to arrive at the type and
duration of action."
[
Footnote 5]
Rule 6-206(a)3 (1975) provides:
"A person repeatedly involved in collisions or convictions to a
degree which indicates the lack of ability to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle, or whose
record indicates disrespect for traffic laws and the safety of
other persons on the highway, and who has accumulated sufficient
points to warrant a second suspension within a 5-year period, may
either be suspended or revoked by the Secretary of State, based
upon the number of points in his record. A person who has been
suspended thrice within a 10-year period shall be revoked."
[
Footnote 6]
Section 6-206(c)(1):
"Upon suspending or revoking the license or permit of any person
as authorized in this Section, the Secretary of State shall
immediately notify such person in writing of the order revoking or
suspending the license or permit. Such notice to be deposited in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the last known address
of such person."
[
Footnote 7]
The statutory provision regarding commercial licenses provides
that a suspension shall not deny
"a person's license to drive a commercial vehicle only as an
occupation . . . unless 5 offenses were committed, at least 2 of
which occurred while operating a commercial vehicle in connection
with his regular occupation."
The statute places the burden on the commercial driver whose
license is suspended to submit an affidavit to the Secretary within
25 days, setting forth facts establishing his eligibility for
relief under this section. A commercial driver may obtain the same
relief by requesting an administrative hearing in lieu of
submitting an affidavit. In any event, the driver must return his
license to the Secretary and in its place is issued a permit to
drive only a commercial vehicle in his regular occupation. §
6-206(c)(2).
Any driver whose license is suspended or revoked, in order to
"relieve undue hardship," may apply for a restricted permit to
drive between his residence and his place of employment "or within
other proper limits." § 6-206(c)(3).
[
Footnote 8]
Appellee's March speeding conviction was his third within a
12-month period, and thus § 6-206(a)(2) authorized suspension of
his license. That suspension, however, would have been appellee's
third within a 10-year period. The Secretary therefore proceeded
directly under Rule 6-206(a)3, which makes revocation mandatory
under such circumstances. The District Court treated this procedure
as functionally equivalent to suspension under § 6-206(a)(2),
followed by mandatory revocation under Rule 6-206(a)3.
See
App. 20 n. 2.
[
Footnote 9]
The class was never certified.
[
Footnote 10]
Appellee also contends that a prior hearing would avoid
erroneous deprivation of a license where the commercial driver or
hardship exceptions are applicable.
See n 7,
supra. It is clear, however,
that these statutory provisions contemplate relief only after the
initial decision to suspend or revoke is made, and the licensee has
the burden of demonstrating his eligibility for the relief. An
initial suspension or revocation, therefore, is not "erroneous"
even if the licensee subsequently qualifies for relief as a
commercial driver or hardship case.
[
Footnote 11]
Since
Bell v. Burson was decided, courts have sustained
suspension or revocation of driving privileges, without prior
hearing, where earlier convictions were on the record.
See,
e.g., Cox v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d
266, 269-270 (N.D.1973);
Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb.
105,
195 N.W.2d
218,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 972 (1972);
Horodner v. Fisher, 38 N.Y.2d 680, 345 N.E.2d 571,
appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 802 (1976);
Wright v.
Malloy, 373 F.
Supp. 1011, 1018-1019 (Vt.),
summarily aff'd, 419 U.S.
987 (1974);
Scott v. Hill, 407 F.
Supp. 301, 304 (ED Va. 1076).
[
Footnote 12]
See K. Davis, Discretionary Justice, c. III, 52-96
(1969). The promulgation of rules may be of particular value when
it is necessary for administrative decisions to be made summarily.
See Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies,
40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 44-49 (1972).
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I believe it is important
to point out that the Court has not rejected the constitutional
analysis of the District Court. The District Court held that a
driver's license may not be revoked on the basis of an
ex
parte determination that certain facts "indicate . . .
disrespect for the traffic laws." This Court does not disagree. It
merely holds that the District Court erred in its assumption that
appellee's license was revoked on the authority of the first
sentence of Rule 6-206(a)3 (1975), [
Footnote 2/1] which the District Court construed to
require such a determination. [
Footnote
2/2]
Page 431 U. S. 117
The Court interprets the Secretary's action as resting on the
second sentence of Rule 6-206(a)3, which provides that a person's
license must be revoked if it has been suspended three times in 10
years. Appellee's license had already been suspended twice. A third
suspension would have been required under a different rule because
appellee had three convictions in one year. [
Footnote 2/3] Consequently, appellee's license was
subject to mandatory revocation,
see ante at
431 U. S. 111
n. 8, and no prior hearing was necessary.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Rule 6-206(a) 3 provides:
"A person repeatedly involved in collisions or convictions to a
degree which indicates the lack of ability to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle, or whose
re-cord indicates disrespect for traffic laws and the safety of
other persons on the highway, and who has accumulated sufficient
points to warrant a second suspension within a 5-year period, may
either be suspended or revoked by the Secretary of State, based
upon the number of points in his record. A person who has been
suspended thrice within a 10-year period shall be revoked."
[
Footnote 2/2]
The District Court construed Rule 6-206(a)3 as follows:
"The statute makes suspension or revocation dependent on a
determination of whether the driver's repeated involvement in
collisions or conviction of offenses indicates lack of ability to
use due care or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of
others. The regulation makes suspension or revocation dependent
both on such a determination and the accumulation of a given number
of points, and even then the Secretary 'may,' but is not required
to suspend or revoke the driver's license. only when a driver has
been suspended thrice in a ten-year period is the Secretary's
action made mandatory."
App. 20.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Rule 6-206(a)2 (1975) provides in pertinent part:
"A person who has been convicted of three (3) or more offenses
against traffic regulations, governing the movement of vehicles,
with the exception of those offenses excluded under provisions of
Section 6-204(2) and whose violations have occurred within a
twelve(12) month period may be suspended as follows:"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Number of points Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
20 to 44 Suspension up to 2 months
45 to 74 Suspension up to 3 months
75 to 89 Suspension up to 6 months
90 to 99 Suspension up to 9 months
100 to 109 Suspension up to 12 months
Over 110 Revocation for not less than 12 months.
-----------------------------------------------------------
This rule can be fairly construed to leave the Secretary
substantial discretion concerning only the length of the
suspension. Moreover, this rule implements Ill.Rev.Stat. c. 95 1/2,
§ 6-206(a)(2) (1975), but the complaint does not challenge the
constitutionality of that subsection; only § 206(a)(3) is
attacked.
The District Court noted that appellee had previously been
"notified by letter that a further conviction would result in loss
of his driving privileges." App. 17.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the result.
My Brother STEVENS' concurring opinion makes clear that
appellee's license was revoked under a valid regulation making
Page 431 U. S. 118
revocation mandatory if his license had been suspended three
times within 10 years. Rule 6-206(a)3 (1975). Appellee's license
was properly suspended for a third time within a 10-year period
when he was convicted of a speeding violation on March 31, 1976.
This suspension, and both earlier suspensions, were based on
convictions for traffic offenses which appellee does not contest
here. Under these circumstances, the requirement of a prior hearing
mandated by
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.
S. 535 (1971), is not applicable since, as my Brother
STEVENS demonstrates, a hearing was unnecessary to establish what
was already clear -- that the revocation of appellee's license was
mandatory.