1. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
providing generally for judicial review of actions of federal
administrative agencies by persons aggrieved by such actions, does
not afford an implied grant to district courts of subject matter
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim
for social security benefits. An interpretation in favor of
jurisdiction is suggested by neither the text nor history of the
APA, and would effectively override Congress' recent decision to
expand jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) by eliminating the
amount in controversy requirement as a prerequisite to maintaining
federal question actions against federal agencies or officers or
employees thereof, while retaining § 205(h) of the Social Security
Act as a limitation of such jurisdiction. Pp.
430 U. S.
104-107.
2. Nor does § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, which provides
that any individual, after any "final decision of the Secretary
made after a hearing" to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by
civil action commenced within 60 days, authorize judicial review of
the Secretary's decision, absent a constitutional challenge. A
petition to reopen a prior final decision may be denied without a §
205(b) hearing, whereas judicial review under § 205(g) is limited
to a final decision "made after a hearing"; moreover, to allow
judicial review would frustrate the congressional purpose,
evidenced in § 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon review of
the Secretary's final decision. Pp.
430 U. S.
107-109.
522 F.2d 1167, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C.J.,
joined,
post, p.
430 U. S. 109.
STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 430 U. S. 100
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions for decision are (1) whether § 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, [
Footnote 1] is an
Page 430 U. S. 101
independent grant to district courts of subject matter
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim
for social security benefits and (2), if not, whether § 205(g) of
the Social Security Act [
Footnote
2] authorizes judicial review of the Secretary's decision.
I
Title II of the Social Security Act provides disability benefits
for a claimant who demonstrates that he suffers a physical or
mental disability within the meaning of the Act, and that the
disability arose prior to the expiration of his insured status. 42
U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423. The administrative process is begun when he
files a claim with the Social Security Administration. 20 CFR §§
404.905-404.907 (1976). If the claim is administratively denied,
regulations permit administrative reconsideration within a
six-month period. §§ 404.909-404.915. Should a request for
reconsideration prove unsuccessful, the claimant may, within 60
days, ask for an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law
judge, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V), and a discretionary
appeal from an adverse determination of the law judge lies to the
Appeals Council. 20 CFR §§ 404.945-404.947
Page 430 U. S. 102
(1976). Finally § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
authorizes federal judicial review of "any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which [the claimant] was a party.
. . . "
The Act and regulations thus create an orderly administrative
mechanism, with district court review of the final decision of the
Secretary, to assist in the original processing of the more than
7,600,000 claims filed annually with the Administration.
See Social Security Administration, The Year in Review --
The Administration of Social Security Programs 1975, p. 54 (1976).
By regulation, however, the administrative scheme provides for
additional consideration of the claim. This is in the form of
regulations for reopening of the agency determination within
specified time limits after the date of initial determination: 12
months as a matter of right and four years "upon a finding of good
cause," which exists if new material evidence is provided or
specific errors are discovered. 20 CFR §§ 404.957(a), (b), 404.958
(1976). Moreover, the regulations permit reopening "[a]t any time"
for the purpose of correcting clerical errors or errors on the face
of relevant evidence. § 404.957(c)(8).
On January 30, 1964, respondent filed his initial claim with the
agency for disability payments and disability insurance benefits,
alleging inability to work because of epilepsy and blackout spells.
The claim proceeded through the several steps of the administrative
procedures. An Administrative Law Judge found that respondent was
ineligible for benefits on the ground that he had not demonstrated
a relevant disability of sufficient severity. The Appeals Council,
in June, 1966, sustained this decision, and respondent did not
pursue judicial review of the Secretary's final decision under §
205(g).
Almost seven years later, on March 5, 1973, respondent filed a
second claim alleging the same bases for eligibility. His claim was
again processed through administrative channels under the
Secretary's regulations. The Administrative Law
Page 430 U. S. 103
Judge viewed the new application as barred by
res judicata,
see 20 CFR § 404.937 (1976), but also treated the application
as requiring the determination "whether the claimant is entitled to
have his prior application reopened. . . ." App. 33-34. Concluding
that respondent's evidence was "merely rep[e]titio[u]s and
cumulative,"
id. at 35, and finding no errors on the face
of the evidence,
ibid., the Administrative Law Judge
denied reopening and dismissed the claim.
Respondent thereupon filed this action in the District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana, challenging the Secretary's
decision not to reopen, and resting jurisdiction on § 205(g), 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). The District Court dismissed the complaint on the
ground stated in its unpublished memorandum that "this court is
without jurisdiction to consider the subject matter of this suit."
Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed.
Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1167
(1975). The Court of Appeals agreed that jurisdiction to review a
refusal to reopen a claim proceeding on the ground of abuse of
discretion was not authorized by the Social Security Act.
Id. at 1169. The court held, however, that § 205(h)
[
Footnote 3] did not limit
judicial review to those methods "expressly authorize[d]" by the
Social Security Act itself. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
concluded
Page 430 U. S. 104
that § 10 other Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
"contains an independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction,
without regard to the amount in controversy," afforded the District
Court jurisdiction of respondent's complaint. 522 F.2d at 1169. We
granted certiorari
sub nom. Mathews v. Sanders, 426 U.S.
905 (1976). We reverse.
II
A
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its construction of § 10
of the APA as an independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction
is contrary to the conclusion reached by several other Courts of
Appeals. 522 F.2d at 1169. This conflict is understandable. None of
the codified statutory sections that constitute § 10 is phrased
like the usual grant of jurisdiction to proceed in the federal
courts. On the other hand, the statute undoubtedly evinces
Congress' intention and understanding that judicial review should
be widely available to challenge the actions of federal
administrative officials. Consequently, courts [
Footnote 4] and commentators [
Footnote 5] have sharply divided
Page 430 U. S. 105
over whether the statute should be read to provide a distinct
basis of jurisdiction for the review of agency actions. Three
decisions of this Court arguably have assumed, with little
discussion, that the APA is an independent grant of subject matter
jurisdiction.
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U. S. 402,
401 U. S. 410
(1971);
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.
S. 136,
387 U. S. 141
(1967);
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367,
369 U. S. 372
(1962). However, an Act of Congress enacted since our grant of
certiorari in this case now persuades us that the better view is
that the APA is not to be interpreted as an implied grant of
subject matter jurisdiction to review agency actions.
On October 21, 1976, Congress enacted Pub.L. 94-574, 90 Stat.
2721, which amends 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) to eliminate the requirement
of a specified amount in controversy as a prerequisite to the
maintenance of "any [§ 1331] action brought against the United
States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in
his official capacity." The obvious effect of this modification,
subject only to "preclusion of review" statutes created or retained
by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review
agency action, regardless of whether the APA, of its own force, may
serve as a jurisdictional predicate. We conclude that this
amendment now largely undercuts the rationale for interpreting the
APA as an independent jurisdictional provision.
As noted previously, the actual text of § 10 of the APA nowhere
contains an explicit grant of jurisdiction to challenge
Page 430 U. S. 106
agency action in the federal courts. [
Footnote 6] Furthermore, even the advocates of
jurisdiction under the APA acknowledge that there is no basis for
concluding that Congress, in enacting § 10 of the APA, actually
conceived of the Act in jurisdictional terms.
See, e.g.,
Byse & Fiocca,
supra, n 5, at 328. Thus, the argument in favor of APA
jurisdiction rests exclusively on the broad policy consideration
that, given the shortcomings of federal mandamus jurisdiction, such
a construction is warranted by the rational policy of affording
federal judicial review of actions by federal officials acting
pursuant to federal law, notwithstanding the absence of the
requisite jurisdictional amount.
See id. at 330-331;
Jaffe,
supra, n 5, at
165. We do not find this argument to be compelling in light of
Congress' apparent intention by the 1976 amendment to restructure
afresh the scope of federal question jurisdiction.
In amending § 1331, Congress obviously has expressly acted to
fill the jurisdictional void created by the preexisting
amount-in-controversy requirement. This new jurisdictional grant
was qualified, however, by the retention of § 205(h) as preclusive
of actions such as this that arise under the Social Security Act.
Read together, the expansion of § 1331, coupled with the retention
of § 205(h), apparently expresses Congress' view of the desired
contours of federal question jurisdiction over agency action. A
broad reading of the APA in this instance would serve no purpose
other than to modify Congress' new jurisdictional enactment by
overriding its decision to limit § 1331 through the preservation of
§ 205(h). Squarely faced with the question of APA jurisdiction for
the
Page 430 U. S. 107
first time, Congress' explicit entry into the jurisdictional
area counsels against our reading the APA as an implied
jurisdictional grant designed solely to fill such an interstitial
gap in § 1331 jurisdiction. This is particularly so since neither
the text nor the history of the APA speaks in favor of such a
reading, and the 1976 Congress, in redefining § 1331, appears not
to have envisioned the APA as playing any such stopgap role.
[
Footnote 7]
We thus conclude that the APA does not afford an implied grant
of subject matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review
of agency action.
B
Respondent contends that, notwithstanding the above, the Social
Security Act itself, specifically § 205(g), should be construed to
authorize judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary not
to reopen a claim of benefits. All Courts of Appeals that have
considered this contention have rejected it. [
Footnote 8] We also agree that § 205(g) cannot be
read to authorize
Page 430 U. S. 108
judicial review of alleged abuses of agency discretion in
refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits.
The pertinent part of § 205(g) provides:
"Any individual, after any
final decision of the Secretary
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of
the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by
a civil action commenced within sixty days. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.) This provision clearly limits judicial
review to a particular type of agency action, a "final decision of
the Secretary made after a hearing." But a petition to reopen a
prior final decision may be denied without a hearing as provided in
§ 205(b), 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V);
see Cappadora
v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 4 (CA2 1966);
Ortego v.
Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CA5 1975). Indeed, the
opportunity to reopen final decisions and any hearing convened to
determine the propriety of such action are afforded by the
Secretary's regulations, and not by the Social Security Act.
Moreover, an interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial
review simply by filing -- and being denied -- a petition to reopen
his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly
evidenced in § 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial
review of the Secretary's final decision on the initial claim for
benefits. 20 CFR § 404.951 (1976). Congress' determination so to
limit judicial review to the original decision denying benefits is
a policy choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or
belated litigation of stale eligibility claims. Our duty, of
course, is to respect that choice.
Respondent argues, however, that
Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U. S. 749
(1975), and
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.
S. 319 (1976), have rejected this interpretation of §
205(g). We do not agree. It is true that both cases authorized
judicial
Page 430 U. S. 109
review under § 205(g) of the Secretary's decision to deny or
discontinue social security benefits notwithstanding the absence of
a prior § 205(b) hearing. In both instances, however, the claimants
challenged the Secretary's decisions on constitutional grounds.
Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in
administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the
courts is essential to the decision of such questions. Furthermore,
since federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is
precluded by § 205(h),
Weinberger v. Salfi, supra at
422 U. S. 761,
a decision denying § 205(g) jurisdiction in
Salfi or
Eldridge would effectively have closed the federal forum
to the adjudication of colorable constitutional claims. Thus those
cases merely adhered to the well established principle that, when
constitutional questions are in issue, the availability of judicial
review is presumed, and we will not read a statutory scheme to take
the "extraordinary" step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless
Congress' intent to do so is manifested by "
clear and
convincing'" evidence. 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 762;
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361,
415 U. S.
366-367 (1974).
This is not one of those rare instances where the Secretary's
denial of a petition to reopen is challenged on constitutional
grounds. Respondent seeks only an additional opportunity to
establish that he satisfies the Social Security Act's eligibility
standards for disability benefits. Therefore, § 205(g) does not
afford subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The pertinent provisions of § 10, as codified in 5 U.S.C. §§
701-704, are the following:
"§ 701. Application; definitions."
"(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof,
except to the extent that -- "
"(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or"
"(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law."
"§ 702. Right of review."
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
"§ 703. Form and venue of proceeding."
"The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a
court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy
thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for
declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory
injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive
opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action
is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for
judicial enforcement."
(Sections 702 and 703 were amended by Pub.L. 94-574, 90 Stat.
2721, in respects to be discussed
infra at
430 U. S.
105-107, insofar as it modifies the scope of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.)
"§ 704 Actions reviewable."
"Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or
intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is
subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except
as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise
final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not
there has been presented or determined an application for a
declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency
authority."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as
added and amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), provides in pertinent
part:
"Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made
after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount
in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of
notice of such decision or within such further time as the
Secretary may allow. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
Section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h),
provides:
"The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such
hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be
reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No action against the United States, the
Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought
under [§ 1331
et seq.] of Title 28 to recover on any claim
arising under this subchapter."
This section has been held to require the exhaustion of
available administrative procedures, to foreclose jurisdiction
under the general grant of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and to route review through § 205(g).
See Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U. S. 749,
422 U. S. 757,
422 U. S. 761
(1975).
[
Footnote 4]
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that § 10
of the APA is an independent grant of jurisdiction.
See Bradley
v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (CA1 1973);
Deering Milliken,
Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (CA4 1961);
Ortego v.
Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (CA5 1975);
Sanders v.
Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1167 (CA7 1975) (case below);
Brandt
v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (CA9 1970);
Brennan v. Udall,
379 F.2d 803 (CA10 1967);
Pickus v. United States Board of
Parole, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 507 F.2d 1107 (1974). The Courts
of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits disagree.
Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (CA3 1970);
Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (CA6 1974);
Twin
Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,
370 F.2d 529 (CA8 1967). The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit views the question as unsettled.
See South Windsor
Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910 (1976).
[
Footnote 5]
Compare, e.g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review
of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 308 (1967), K.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 23.02 (Supp. 1976), and L.
Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 165 (1965) (all
advocating APA jurisdiction),
with Cramton, Nonstatutory
Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory
Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and
Parties Defendant, 68 Mich.L.Rev. 389 (1970),
and C.
Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Jurisdiction § 3568 (1975) (rejecting APA jurisdiction).
[
Footnote 6]
Title 5 U.S.C. § 702 makes clear that person wronged by agency
action "is entitled to judicial review thereof." But § 703 suggests
that this language was not intended as an independent
jurisdictional foundation, since such judicial review is to proceed
"in a court specified by statute" or "in a court of competent
jurisdiction." Both of these clauses seem to look to outside
sources of jurisdictional authority. Thus, at best, the text of §
10 is ambiguous in providing a separate grant of subject matter
jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 7]
Respondent argues that Congress intended its modification of §
1331 to be supplementary to the APA, and, therefore, contemplated
that the APA would remain as a distinct jurisdictional provision.
But the contrary seems true, for the legislative history suggests
that Congress believed that the APA does not confer jurisdiction
over administrative action, and, therefore, deletion of the
jurisdictional amount from § 1331 was warranted. This understanding
was made explicit by the Senate Judiciary Committee:
"An anomaly in Federal jurisdiction
prevents an
otherwise competent United States district court from hearing
certain cases seeking '
nonstatutory' review of Federal
administrative action, absent the jurisdictional amount in
controversy required by 28 U.S.C. section 1331, the general
'Federal question' provision. These cases 'arise under' the Federal
Constitution or Federal statutes, and the committee believes they
are appropriate matters for the exercise of Federal judicial power
regardless of the monetary amount involved."
S.Rep. No. 94-996, p. 12 (1976) (emphasis supplied);
see H.R.Rep. No. 94-1656, p. 13 (1976).
[
Footnote 8]
See Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 4-5 (CA2
1966);
Davis v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 772, 775 (CA3 1972);
Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d at 1007-1008;
Maddox v.
Richardson, 464 F.2d 617, 621 (CA6 1972);
Stuckey v.
Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904, 909 (CA9 1973);
Neighbors v.
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 511 F.2d 80, 81
(CA10 1974).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that Sanders cannot seek judicial review
of the Secretary's refusal to reopen a final decision
Page 430 U. S. 110
denying social security benefits. I arrive at that conclusion,
however, by a somewhat shorter route.
Section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h),
states in full:
"The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such
hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be
reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided. No action against the United States, the
Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought
under [§ 1331
et seq.] of Title 28 to recover on any claim
arising under this subchapter."
It is clear that the determination not to reopen the prior
decision denying benefits to Sanders was a "findin[g] of fact or
decision of the Secretary." The conclusion is thus inescapable, as
I see it, that the administrative decision before us is not to "be
reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as
herein provided" -- that is, except as the Social Security Act
itself, specifically in § 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), authorizes
review. Although the apparent literal meaning of statutory language
is not an unfailing guide to the meaning of a congressional
enactment, I can see no reason in this case why the second sentence
of § 205(h) should not be read to mean exactly what it says -- that
the decision before us is reviewable under § 205(g) or not at
all.
The Court's decision in
Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U. S. 749,
supports this reading of § 205(h).
Salfi held that the
first two sentences of § 205(h) "prevent review of decisions of the
Secretary save as provided in the Act, which provision is made in §
[2]05(g)." 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 757.
Although
Salfi was principally concerned with an assertion
of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the plaintiffs there, like
Sanders, also relied upon § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
See Brief for Appellants 17 n. 13,
Brief for Appellees
Page 430 U. S. 111
42, and App. 7, in
Weinberger v. Salfi, O.T. 1974, No.
74-214. Yet the Court ruled that, as to those plaintiffs who could
not seek review under § 205(g), the District Court should have
dismissed the complaint because "[o]ther sources of jurisdiction
[were] foreclosed by § [2]05(h)." 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 764.
*
Thus, I see no reason at all in this case to consider whether §
10 of the APA in general confers subject matter jurisdiction upon
the district courts to review federal administrative action. For
even if it does, § 205(h) specifically and unequivocally limits
Sanders and others in his position to whatever jurisdiction is
provided under § 205(g). And as the Court today explains,
ante at
430 U. S.
107-109, there is clearly no jurisdiction under the
latter provision to review the Secretary's refusal to reopen the
decision denying benefits to Sanders.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
* The
Salfi Court's treatment of the first two
sentences of § 205(h) as requiring the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 757,
is in no way inconsistent with a reading of the second sentence of
§ 205(h) as precluding review outside of § 205(g). That sentence
simply requires that all review take place within the confines of
the procedural scheme established by § 205(g). Section 205(h) thus
bars attempts to circumvent those procedures, whether by seeking
review under § 205(g) without having fulfilled the exhaustion
requirement, or by seeking review under some other jurisdictional
grant that does not prescribe the administrative steps that must
first be taken.