Petitioners, operating a large, vertically integrated poultry
business (including breeding farms, chicken hatcheries, a
slaughtering and processing plant, and a mill for producing poultry
feed), contract with 119 independently owned and operated farms for
the raising of chickens which are hatched in petitioners'
hatcheries. Petitioners supply the farms with one-day-old chicks,
their feed, medicine and supplies, and fuel, and pick up the chicks
about nine weeks later when ready for slaughtering and processing.
Petitioners retain title to the chicks at all times, and pay the
farmers a guaranteed sum plus a bonus based on poultry weight in
exchange for the farmers' services in caring for and housing the
chicks. The chicks are fed with feed from petitioners' feedmill
delivered by truck drivers employed by petitioners specifically for
this purpose. The petitioners refused to bargain collectively with
a union representing these drivers, contending that the drivers
were not employees as defined in § 2(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, but were exempted from protections of the Act as
agricultural laborers by the related definition in § 3(f) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The union's resulting unfair labor
practice charge was sustained by the National Labor Relations Board
and the Court of Appeals on the ground that the truck drivers were
not agricultural laborers because their duties were not incidental
to petitioners' agricultural activities.
Held: The drivers are "employees" within the coverage
of the NLRA, not agricultural laborers, their status being
determined by the character of the work that they perform for their
employer, which work is not incidental to any of their employer's
(petitioners') agricultural activities, the feedmill operation
being nonagricultural and the storage and use of feed on the
independent farms being agricultural activity performed by the
independent farmers, not by petitioners. The NLRB's conclusion that
the truck drivers are employees is based on a reasonable
interpretation of the NLRA, comports with the NLRB's prior
holdings, and is supported by the Secretary of Labor's construction
of § 3(f). Pp.
429 U. S.
299-304.
527 F.2d 436, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 429 U. S. 299
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioners, collectively described as "Bayside," are three
affiliated corporations operating a large, vertically integrated
poultry business in Maine. [
Footnote 1] The question they present is whether six of
their employees, who truck poultry feed from their feedmill to 119
farms on which their chickens are being raised, are "agricultural
laborers," and therefore not covered by the National Labor
Relations Act.
After a few preliminary talks, Bayside refused to bargain with
the union representing these drivers on the ground that they were
not "employees" within the meaning of the Act. [
Footnote 2] The union's resulting unfair labor
practice charge was sustained by the National Labor Relations Board
and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. [
Footnote 3] An apparent conflict with
decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits [
Footnote 4] led us to grant certiorari, 425 U.S. 970.
We now affirm.
The protections of the National Labor Relations Act [
Footnote 5] extend
Page 429 U. S. 300
only to "employees." Section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
152(3), provides that the "term
employee' . . . shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer. . . ."
Congress has further provided that the term "agricultural laborer"
in the NLRA shall have the meaning specified in § 3(f) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. [Footnote
6] It is, therefore, that section and the decisions construing
it which are relevant, even though this proceeding arose under the
NLRA.
Section 3(f) provides, in relevant part:
"'Agriculture' includes farming in all its branches [including]
the raising of . . . poultry, and any practices . . . performed by
a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such
farming operations. . . ."
52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 203(f). This statutory definition
includes farming in both a primary and a secondary sense. [
Footnote 7] The raising of poultry is
primary
Page 429 U. S. 301
farming, but hauling products to or from a farm is not primary
farming. Such hauling may, however, be secondary farming if it is
work performed "by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in
conjunction with such farming operations. . . ." Since there is no
claim that these drivers work "on a farm," the question is whether
their activity should be regarded as work performed "by a farmer."
The answer depends on the character of their employer's
activities.
An employer's business may include both agricultural and
nonagricultural activities. Thus, even though most of the
operations on a sugar plantation are agricultural, persons employed
in the plantation's sugar processing plant are not "agricultural
employees."
Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co.,
349 U. S. 254,
349 U. S. 264
270. In this case, both parties agree that some of Bayside's
operations are agricultural and some are not.
The mill in which Bayside produces poultry feed and the
processing plant in which it slaughters and dresses poultry are not
agricultural operations. [
Footnote
8] On the other hand, the six farms on which it produces
hatching eggs, and its activities in breeding and hatching chicks,
are clearly agricultural in character. The parties are in dispute
with respect to the character of Bayside's work related to the
raising of the chickens.
The chickens are raised on 119 separate farms owned and operated
by independent contractors. Pursuant to a standard contractual
arrangement, Bayside provides each such farm with chicks, feed,
medicine, fuel, litter, and vaccine. Bayside retains title to the
chicks and pays the farmer a guaranteed sum, plus a bonus based on
the weight of the bird when grown, in exchange for the farmer's
services in housing and caring for the chicks. Bayside delivers the
chicks to the
Page 429 U. S. 302
independent farms when they are one day old and picks them up
for processing about nine weeks later. During the nine-week period,
the contract farmers feed the chicks with poultry feed delivered to
their feedbins by Bayside drivers.
Bayside argues that the activity on the independent farms is
part of Bayside's farming operation. The argument is supported by
the pervasive character of its control over the raising of the
chicks, its ownership of the chicks, its assumption of the risks of
casualty loss and market fluctuations, and its control over both
the source and the destination of the poultry. In response, the
Labor Board argue that the owners of the farms are independent
contractors, rather than employees of Bayside, and therefore the
farming activity at these locations is attributable to them, rather
than to Bayside.
The Labor Board has squarely and consistently rejected the
argument that all of the activity on a contract farm should be
regarded as agricultural activity of an integrated farmer such as
Bayside. [
Footnote 9] This
conclusion by the Board is one we must respect even if the issue
might "with nearly equal reason be resolved one way rather than
another." [
Footnote 10]
Page 429 U. S. 303
Even if we should regard a contract farm as a hybrid operation
where some of the agricultural activity is performed by Bayside and
some by the owner of the farm, we would nevertheless be compelled
to sustain the Board's order. For the activity of storing poultry
feed and then using it to feed the chicks is work performed by the
contract farmer, rather than by Bayside. Since the status of the
drivers is determined by the character of the work which they
perform for their own employer, the work of the contract farmer
cannot male the drivers agricultural laborers. And their employer's
operation of the feedmill is a nonagricultural activity. [
Footnote 11] Thus, the Board
properly concluded that the work of the truck drivers on behalf of
their employer is not work performed "by a farmer" whether
attention is focused on the origin or the destination of the feed
delivery.
The Board's conclusion that these truck drivers are not
agricultural laborers is based on a reasonable interpretation of
the statute, is consistent with the Board's prior holdings,
[
Footnote 12] and is
supported by the Secretary of Labor's construction of § 3(f).
[
Footnote 13] Moreover, the
conclusion applies to but one
Page 429 U. S. 304
specific instance of he "[m]yriad forms of service relationship,
with infinite and subtle variations in the terms of employment,
[which] blanket the nation's economy," [
Footnote 14] and which the Board must confront on a
daily basis. Accordingly, regardless of how we might have resolved
the question as an initial matter, the appropriate weight which
must be given to the judgment of the agency whose special duty is
to apply this broad statutory language to varying fact patterns
requires enforcement of the Board's order. [
Footnote 15]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Bayside Enterprises, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary
Poultry Processing, Inc., are operating corporations; the
subsidiary Penobscot Poultry Co. is apparently inactive.
[
Footnote 2]
The drivers are represented by Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers Union, Local No. 340, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. That
local and the Amalgamated Meatcutters Local 385 jointly represent
employees in petitioners' processing plant.
[
Footnote 3]
216 N.L.R.B. 502,
enf'd, 527 F.2d 436 (1975). The
Board's order requires Bayside to bargain with the union.
[
Footnote 4]
NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025 (CA5
1969);
NLRB v. Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20 (CA9
1972).
[
Footnote 5]
49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq.
[
Footnote 6]
Annually since 1946, Congress, in riders to the Appropriations
Acts for the Board, has tied the definition of "agricultural
laborer" in § 2(3) of the NLRA to § 3(f) of the FLSA. The latest
such rider (90 Stat. 23) provides in relevant part as follows:
"
Provided, That no part of this appropriation shall be
available to organize or assist in organizing agricultural laborers
or used in connection with investigations, hearings, directives, or
orders concerning bargaining units composed of agricultural
laborers as referred to in section 2(3) of the Act of July 5, 1935
(29 U.S.C. 152), and as amended by the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 1947, as amended, and as defined in section 3(f) of the Act of
June 25, 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203). . . ."
[
Footnote 7]
"First, there is the primary meaning. Agriculture includes
farming in all its branches. Certain specific practices such as
cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, etc., are listed as
being included in this primary meaning. Second, there is the
broader meaning. Agriculture is defined to include things other
than farming as so illustrated. It includes any practices, whether
or not themselves farming practices, which are performed either by
a farmer or on a farm, incidentally to or in conjunction with
'such' farming operations."
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb,
337 U. S. 755,
337 U. S.
762-763.
[
Footnote 8]
These operations are conducted by the subsidiary, Poultry
Processing, Inc., which employs about 20 workers at its feedmill
and about 380 at its processing plant in Belfast, Me.
[
Footnote 9]
The Board has held that,
"when an employer contract with independent growers for the care
and feeding of the employer's chicks, the employer's status as a
farmer engaged in raising poultry ends with respect to those
chicks."
Imco Poultry, 202 N.L.R.B. 259, 260 (1973), citing
Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 236 (1966); 163
N.L.R.B. 972 (1967),
enf. denied, 405 F.2d 1025 (CA5
1969);
Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 40 (1971),
enf. denied, 471 F.2d 20 (CA9 1972).
Cf. Norton &
McElroy Produce, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 104 (1961).
[
Footnote 10]
This is an instance of the kind contemplated by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his concurrence in
Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co., supra at
337 U. S.
770:
"Both in the employments which the Fair Labor Standards Act
covers and in the exemptions it makes, the Congress has cast upon
the courts the duty of making distinctions that often are bound to
be so nice as to appear arbitrary in relation to each other. A
specific situation, like that presented in this case, presents a
problem for construction which may with nearly equal reason be
resolved one way, rather than another."
[
Footnote 11]
The Board has found in comparable situations that delivery is
incidental to the feedmill operation and therefore not an
agricultural activity. McElrath Poultry Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 354, 355
(1973),
enf. denied, 494 F.2d 518 (CA5 1974);
Samuel
B. Gass, 154 N.L.R.B. 728, 732-733 (1965),
enf'd, 377
F.2d 438 (CA1 1967).
[
Footnote 12]
Samuel B. Gass, supra; Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., supra;
Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., supra; Abbott Farms, Inc., 199
N.L.R.B. 472 (1972),
enf. denied, 487 F.2d 904 (CA5 1973);
Imco Poultry, supra; McElrath Poultry Co., Inc.,
supra.
[
Footnote 13]
In 1961, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
issued an interpretative bulletin which remains effective today. It
reads, in pertinent part:
"Contract arrangements for raising poultry."
"Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual
arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to
marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also
undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional
items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the
chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement, the
activities of the farmers and their employees in raising the
poultry are clearly within section 3(f). The activities of the feed
dealer or processor, on the other hand, are not 'raising of
poultry,' and employees engaged in them cannot be considered
agricultural employees on that ground. Employees of the feed dealer
or processor who perform work on a farm as an incident to or in
conjunction with the raising of poultry on the farm are employed in
'secondary' agriculture (
see §§ 780.137
et seq.,
[explaining that work must be performed in connection with the
farmer employer's own farming to qualify as 'secondary' agriculture
by a farmer] and
Johnston v. Cotton Producers Assn., 244
F.2d 553)."
29 CFR § 780.126 (1975).
[
Footnote 14]
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.
S. 111,
322 U. S. 126.
In that opinion,
id. at
322 U. S. 131,
the Court stated:
"But where the question is one of specific application of a
broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statute must determine it initially, the
reviewing court's function is limited. Like the commissioner's
determination under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Act,
that a man is not a 'member of a crew' (
South Chicago Coal
& Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251) or that he was
injured 'in the course of employment' (
Parker v. Motor Boat
Sales, 314 U. S. 244) and the Federal
Communications Commission's determination that one company is under
the 'control' of another (
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United
States, 307 U. S. 125), the Board's
determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act
is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a
reasonable basis in law."
(Footnotes omitted.)
[
Footnote 15]
Cf. NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.
S. 254,
390 U. S. 260;
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.
S. 474,
340 U. S. 488;
NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.
S. 264,
350 U. S.
269.