Petitioner city's refusal to withhold from the paychecks of its
firemen dues owing their union, which represents about 351 of the
543 uniformed members of the fire department, held not to violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
refusal must meet only the standard of reasonableness, and this
standard is satisfied by the city's offered justification that its
practice of allowing withholding only when it benefits all city or
department employees is a legitimate method for avoiding the burden
of withholding money for all persons or organizations that request
a check-off. Pp.
426 U. S.
286-289.
518 F.2d 83, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and
STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a statement concurring in
the judgment,
post, p.
426 U. S.
289.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The city of Charlotte, N.C. refuses to withhold from the
paychecks of its firefighters dues owing to their
Page 426 U. S. 284
union, Local 660, International Association of Firefighters. We
must decide whether this refusal violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I
Local 660 represents about 351 of the 543 uniformed members of
the Charlotte Fire Department. Since 1969, the union and individual
members have repeatedly requested the city to withhold dues owing
to the union from the paychecks of those union members who agree to
a check-off. The city has refused each request. After the union
learned that it could obtain a private group life insurance policy
for its membership only if it had a dues check-off agreement with
the city, the union and its officers filed suit in federal court
alleging,
inter alia, that the city's refusal to withhold
the dues of union members violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote
1] The complaint asserted that,
Page 426 U. S. 285
since the city withheld amounts from its employees' paychecks
for payment to various other organizations, it could not
arbitrarily refuse to withhold amounts for payment to the
union.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina ruled against the city. The
court determined that, although the city had no written guidelines,
its
"practice has been to allow check-offs from employees' pay to
organizations or programs as required by law or where the check-off
option is available to all City employees or where the check-off
option is available to all employees within a single employee unit
such as the Fire Department."
381 F.
Supp. 500, 502 (1974). The court further found that the city
has
"not allowed check-off options serving only single employees or
programs which are not available either to all City employees or to
all employees engaged in a particular section of City
employment."
Ibid. Finding, however, that withholding union dues
from the paychecks of union members would be no more difficult than
processing any other deduction allowed by the city, the District
Court concluded that the city had not offered a rational
explanation for its refusal to withhold for the union. Accordingly,
the District Court held that the city's refusal to withhold moneys
when requested to do so by the respondents for the benefit of Local
660 "constitutes a violation of the individual [respondents']
rights to equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 502-503. The court ordered that, so long as the
city continued "without clearly stated and fair standards, to
withhold moneys from the paychecks of City employees for other
purposes," it was enjoined from refusing to withhold union dues
from the paychecks of the respondents.
Id. at 503. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 518 F.2d 83
(1975), and we granted certiorari. 423 U.S. 890 (1975). We
reverse.
Page 426 U. S. 286
II
Since it is not here asserted -- and this Court would reject
such a contention if it were made -- that respondents' status as
union members or their interest in obtaining a dues check-off is
such as to entitle them to special treatment under the Equal
Protection Clause, the city's practice must meet only a relatively
relaxed standard of reasonableness in order to survive
constitutional scrutiny. [
Footnote
2]
The city presents three justifications for its refusal to allow
the dues check-off requested by respondents. First, it argues,
North Carolina law makes it illegal for the city to enter into a
contract with a municipal union, N.C.Gen.Stat. § 95-98 (1975), and
an agreement with union members to provide a dues check-off, with
the union as a third-party beneficiary, would, in effect, be such a
contract.
See 40 N.C.Op.Atty.Gen. 591 (1968-1970). Thus,
compliance with the state law, and with the public policy it
represents of discouraging dealing with municipal unions, is said
to provide a sufficient basis for refusing respondents' request.
Second, it claims, a dues check-off is a proper subject of
collective bargaining, which the city asserts Congress may shortly
require of state and local governments. Under this theory, the
desire to preserve the check-off as a bargaining chip in any future
collective bargaining process is, in itself, an adequate basis for
the refusal. Lastly, the city contends, allowing withholding only
when it benefits all city or departmental employees is a legitimate
method for avoiding the burden of withholding money for all persons
or organizations that request a check-off. Because we find that
this explanation provides a sufficient justification for
Page 426 U. S. 287
the challenged practice, we have no occasion to address the
first two reasons proffered.
The city submitted affidavits to show that it would be unduly
burdensome and expensive for it to withhold money for every
organization or person that requested it, App. 17, 45, 55, and
respondents did not contest this showing. As respondents concede,
it was therefore reasonable, and permissible under the Equal
Protection Clause, for the city to develop standards or
restrictions to determine who would be eligible for withholding.
Mathews v. Diaz, ante at
426 U. S. 82-83.
See Brief for Respondents 9. Within the limitations of the
Equal Protection Clause, of course, the choice of those standards
is for the city, and not for the courts. Thus, our inquiry is not
whether standards might be drawn that would include the union, but
whether the standards that were drawn were reasonable ones with
"some basis in practical experience."
South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
383 U. S. 331
(1966). Of course, the fact that the standards were drawn and
applied in practice, rather than pursuant to articulated
guidelines, is of no import for equal protection purposes.
The city allows withholding for taxes, retirement insurance
programs, savings programs, and certain charitable organizations.
[
Footnote 3] These categories,
the District
Page 426 U. S. 288
Court found, are those in which the check-off option can, or
must, be availed of by all city employees, or those in an entire
department. Although the District Court found that this
classification did not present a rational basis for rejecting
respondents' requests, 381 F. Supp. at 502, we disagree. The city
has determined that it will provide withholding only for programs
of general interest in which all city or departmental employees
can, without more, participate. Employees can participate in the
union check-off only if they join an outside organization -- the
union. Thus, Local 660 does not fit the category of groups for
which the city will withhold. We cannot say that denying
withholding to associational or special interest groups that claim
only some departmental employees as members and that employees must
first join before being eligible to participate in the check-off
marks an arbitrary line so devoid of reason as to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Rather, this division seems a reasonable method
for providing the benefit of withholding to employees in their
status as employees, while limiting the number of instances of
withholding and the financial and administrative burdens attendant
thereon.
Given the permissibility of creating standards and the
reasonableness of the standards created, the District Court's
conclusion that it would be no more difficult for the city to
withhold dues for the union than to process other deductions is of
no import. We may accept,
arguendo, that the difficulty
involved in processing any individual deduction is neither great
nor different in kind from that involved in processing any other
deduction. However, the city has not drawn its lines in order to
exclude individual deductions, but in order to avoid the cumulative
burden of processing deductions every time a request is made; and
inherent in such a line-drawing process are difficult choices and
"some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences. . . ."
Mathews v. Diaz,
Page 426 U. S. 289
ante at
426 U. S. 83.
See ante at
426 U. S. 82-84;
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471,
397 U. S. 485
(1970).
Cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.
S. 357,
404 U. S. 364
(1971);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.
S. 483,
348 U. S. 489
(1955).
Respondents recognize the legitimacy of such a process, and
concede that the city "is free to develop fair and reasonable
standards to meet any possible cost problem." Brief for Respondents
9. Respondents have wholly failed, however, to present any reasons
why the present standards are not fair and reasonable other than
the fact that the standards exclude them. This fact, of course, is
insufficient to transform the city policy into a constitutional
violation. Since we find a reasonable basis for the challenged
classification, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit must be reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART concurs in the judgment upon the ground that
the classification challenged in this case is not invidiously
discriminatory, and does not, therefore, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 1]
Respondents brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, grounding
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. As the Court of Appeals
noted, insofar as the suit was brought against the city of
Charlotte and the Charlotte City Council, the District Court was
without jurisdiction under § 1343, since a municipal corporation is
not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.
City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U. S. 507
(1973). We need not decide whether respondents' allegation of
$10,000 in damages was sufficient to confer § 1331 jurisdiction
over the city and city council,
see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678
(1946); Note, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 922 (1976), since respondents also
sued the individual members of the city council, and the District
Court unquestionably had jurisdiction under § 1343 to consider
those claims.
See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U. S. 538
(1972). For convenience, we shall refer to all the petitioners
collectively as the "city."
The District Court granted the city's motion to dismiss the
complaint with respect to the union, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
and certiorari was not sought on this ruling. Relief was granted
only to the union officers who, in their capacity as city
employees, had been denied a dues checkoff.
[
Footnote 2]
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.
S. 250,
415 U. S.
253-254 (1974);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330,
405 U. S. 335
(1972);
Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.
S. 621,
395 U. S. 626
(1969);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S.
23,
393 U. S. 30
(1968).
[
Footnote 3]
The following payroll deductions are required by law: (a)
federal income tax; (b) state income tax; (c) North Carolina
Firemen's Retirement System; (d) North Carolina Local Government
Employees Retirement System; (e) city, county, and state tax
levies.
The following deductions are permitted for all city employees:
(a) United States Savings Bonds; (b) medical and life insurance;
(c) Aetna Deferred Compensation Plan (a savings program); (d)
United Way.
The following deductions are permitted for all firemen: (a)
Firemen's Benefit Fund (a group life insurance program); (b)
Firemen's Credit Union (a savings and loan program); (c) Firemen's
Voluntary Pledge Fund (a special withholding providing benefits to
the survivors of deceased firemen).