On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs,
dissenting.
The Court today again refuses to grant certiorari to consider
the proper implementation of the 'minimization' requirement of 18
U.S.C. 2518(5) (1970), one of the core provisions of Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See, e.g.,
Bynum v. United States,
423 U.S. 952 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The
'minimization' provision, which requires that every order and
extension thereof authorizing electronic surveillance shall
'contain a provision, that the authorization to intercept shall be
. . . conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter,'
'constitutes the congressionally
designed bulwark against conduct of authorized electronic
surveillance in a manner that violates the constitutional
guidelines announced in Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967), and
Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Congress has explicitly informed us that
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 918
the 'minimization' and companion safeguards [e.g.,
2518(3)(a)(b)(c)( d)] were designed to assure that 'the order will
link up specific person, specific offense, and specific place.
Together [the provisions of Title III] are intended to meet the
test of the Constitution that electronic surveillance techniques by
used only under the most precise and discriminate circumstances,
which fully comply with the requirement of particularity.' S.Rep.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1968, p. 2112.'Bynum v. United States, supra, at
952.
When the Court denied certiorari in Bynum, I indicated my
reasons for believing that 'we plainly fail in our judicial
responsibility when we do not review these cases to give content to
the congressional mandate of 'minimization," particularly since
guidance for judges authorizing electronic surveillance 'is
absolutely essential if the congressional mandate to confine
execution of authorized surveillance within constitutional and
statutory bounds is to be carried out.' Id., at 958-959, 953. That
review is no less appropriate now. Indeed, it is even more urgent
in light of the proliferation of opinions- exemplified by these
cases from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit-sanctioning round-the-clock surveillance in which every
conversation, whether innocuous or incriminating, is
intercepted.
The facts of this case are relatively simple. The government
sought and obtained authorization to intercept wire communications
over a certain specified telephone on the ground that there was
probable cause to believe that certain named individuals were using
that telephone in connection with the commission of narcotics
offenses, and that information concerning the offenses would be
obtained through the interception of the communications over the
telephone. The order authorized the intercep-
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 919
tion of conversations relating to the illegal importation and
transportation of narcotics and, as required by 2518(5), specified
that the interception 'shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject
to interception under this chapter.'
Although the monitoring agents were aware of the minimization
requirement, the agent in charge testified that no attempt was made
to minimize the interceptions. In fact, the agents listened to and
recorded each and every one of the 384 calls completed over the
subject telephone during the 30 days the surveillance was in
effect, even though the agents' contemporaneous reports to the
supervising judge classified the intercepted calls as only 40%
narcotics related and 60% non-narcotics related. The agents also
never informed the judge that they were taking no steps to minimize
the amount of surveillance.
After the surveillance was terminated and petitioners and others
were arrested, the District Judge conducted pretrial hearings on
the question whether all evidence obtained during the surveillance
and the fruits thereof, must be suppressed on the ground of
noncompliance with the minimization mandate of the statute and the
explicit provision of the wiretap authorization. The judge, finding
that the agents 'did not even attempt 'lip service compliance' with
the provision of the order and statutory mandate but rather
completely disregarded it,' 331 F. Supp. at 247, ordered the
complete suppression of all evidence obtained directly or
indirectly through the surveillance. Id., at 248. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration in light of
another case in which it had adopted a test by which the statutory
command of minimization was considered to be satisfied if
monitoring agents made good-
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 920
faith efforts to minimize and if those efforts were reasonable.
504 F.2d
194.
On remand, further hearings were held, and the District Judge
again concluded that 'the monitoring agents made no attempt to
comply with the minimization order of the Court but listened to and
recorded all calls over the [subject] telephone. They showed no
regard for the right of privacy and did nothing to avoid
unnecessary intrusion.' App., at 14a. The judge again acknowledged
the 'knowing and purposeful failure to comply with or even attempt
to comply with the minimization requirements,' id., at 17a, and
held that this 'admitted' 'conduct would be unreasonable even if
every intercepted call were narcotic-related.' Id., at 18a.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals again reversed, concluding that
the surveillance was reasonable because, in light of the
conversations actually intercepted, it could not identify any
categories of calls which could not have been reasonably
intercepted even if minimization procedures had been instituted.
516 F.2d
751. The bad faith of the monitoring agents in not instituting
any minimization procedures was thus deemed essentially irrelevant:
the 'agents could publicly declare their intent to disobey the
minimization provisions of the wiretap order, and yet it is
possible that the ultimate interceptions will be found to have been
reasonable.' Id., at 756.
Rehearing en banc was denied, with four judges stating why they
believed reconsideration by the full court was absolutely
essential. Their statement is pertinent as an indication of the
necessity for granting certiorari in this case. The dissenters
observed, 522 F.2d, at 1333-1334 ( Robinson, J., joined by Bazelon,
C. J., and
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 921
Wright and Leventhal, JJ.) (emphasis supplied) (footnotes
omitted):
'The decision in these cases appears
to be seriously inconsistent with our earlier decision in United
States v. James, [161 U.S.App.D.C. 88,
494 F.2d
1007, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020d 294 (1974)]. Beyond that,
the extent to which judicial interpretations of a statute
sanctioning telephone wiretaps may tolerate otherwise
unconstitutional invasions of privacy is a question of exceptional
and recurring importance. For these reasons- traditional
foundations for full-court consideration-I would grant rehearing en
banc in these cases.
'The governing statute requires all
judicially authorized wiretapping to 'be conducted in such a way as
to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception . . .' James adopted a construction of this
provision which was formulated originally by the Second Circuit.
Under the James standard, the duty to minimize is satisfied 'if 'on
the whole the [intercepting] agents have shown a high regard for
the right of privacy and have done all they reasonably could to
avoid unnecessary intrusions." Thus James demands an inquiry as to
the intercepting agent's subjective intent to minimize the
interception of innocent calls, as well as an objective
determination that the agent could reasonably have believed that
calls actually intercepted were likely to be illicit.
'The instant decision acknowledges
this holding in James, but concludes that although the agents'
attitude 'is a relevant factor to be considered, . . . the decisive
factor is the second element-the objective reasonableness of the
interceptions.' The first ele-
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 922
ment is relegated to a far less significant position: '[t]he
subjective intent of the monitoring agents is not a sound basis for
evaluating the legality of the seizure'; '[w]hen the monitoring
agents fail to manifest 'a high regard for the right of privacy,'
the Government will simply have a heavier burden of showing that
the interceptions were reasonable.' Indeed, the court now says that
'the agents could publicly declare their intent to disobey the
minimization provisions of the wiretap order, and yet it is
possible that the ultimate interceptions will be found to have been
reasonable.'
'Despite the admitted fact that
'[t]hroughout these proceedings the Government has conceded that
its agents did not minimize the interception of any conversations,'
and the further fact, found by the District Court, that there was a
'knowing and purposeful failure by the monitoring agents to comply
with [its] minimization order,' the decision herein rejects the
District Court's ruling 'that the failure to attempt minimization
was itself proof that the interceptions were unreasonable.' The
opinion does concede that '[t] he presence or absence of a good
faith attempt to minimize on the part of the agents is undoubtedly
one factor to be considered in assessing whether the minimization
requirements [sic] has been satisfied.' But the court stresses that
in the final analysis 'the decision on . . . suppression . . . must
ultimately be based on the reasonableness of the actual
interceptions and not on whether the agents subjectively intended
to minimize their interceptions.'
'This interpretation effectively
destroys the subjective criterion of James' two-pronged standard
for minimization efforts, and fatally undermines the
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 923
force of the minimization requirement itself. Once the decisive
test of the validity of an interception becomes its 'objective
reasonableness,' there is grave danger that determinations of
reasonableness will be dictated by hindsight evaluations of
evidence uncovered by wiretaps. This, in turn, is bound to generate
a strong temptation to wiretap first and then use the fruits of the
interception in an effort to demonstrate that the intrusion was
justified. Courts have repeatedly refused to validate searches and
seizures in this after-the-fact manner, and any decision which
implies that Fourth Amendment safeguards apply less stringently to
wiretaps than to other searches deserves close scrutiny by the
entire court.
'Moreover, the practical
ramifications of this decision are serious. It appears to destroy
any incentive for law enforcement agents conducting wiretap
surveillances to respect the rights of citizens to privacy in
noncriminal telephone conversations in advance of their intrusion.
It is evident that when agents endeavor in good faith to honor
these rights, innocent conversations are less likely to be
intercepted. But when agents completely disregard their obligations
to minimize no conversation is likely to escape their ears. That in
my view is a result which hardly comports with a statute explicitly
requiring minimization. The court as a whole should take a hard
look at these cases, and should itself define the extent to which
would-be wiretappers must maintain allegiance to the statute and
the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, in Walker v. United States, App., at 52a (Memorandum),
in which the Court also denies certiorari today,
425
U.S. 917 a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Colum-
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 924
bia Circuit declared that it would have found a violation of the
minimization requirement had the Court of Appeals not denied
rehearing en banc in Scott:
'This panel is of the view that
2518(5) was violated. However, this court in a case
indistinguishable on this point, United States v. Scott . . . held
otherwise. Since a suggestion to rehear Scott en banc was pending
at the time this case was sub judice, thus panel moved the court to
rehear Scott and this case en banc. That motion was denied. . . .
Under the circumstances, on this issue this panel is bound by the
decision in Scott.
In light of the general importance of the minimization provision
in the conduct of electronic surveillance and the conflict between
the holding in Scott and other formulations of the minimization
requirement, and especially in light of the Scott opinion's
denigration of the importance of the monitoring agents' good-faith
attempt to comply with the statute and its retroactive validation
of a Fourth Amendment search on the basis of what was uncovered by
the search, there is simply no justification for failing to grant
the writ of certiorari in this case. The minimization issue is not
clouded by other factors, and given the District Judge's findings
of total noncompliance with the statutory command, only an
unyielding hostility to the statutory command of minimization, and
the constitutional interest in privacy which it was fashioned to
protect, can motivate the Court to continue to refuse to review
decisions which condone round-the-clock interception of every
conversation that transpires during the conduct of a particular
surveillance. No concern with crowded dockets, at a time when we
review a not insubstantial number of trivial cases, can excuse the
failure to address this crucial issue of statutory
construction,
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 925
fraught as it is with substantial constitutional overtones.
This refusal is not only inexcusable, but also especially
anomalous in light of related actions by this Court in the
electronic surveillance area. In United States v. Kahn,
415 U.S. 143 ( 1975), the
Court, addressing the question of who must be named in an
application and order authorizing surveillance, held, id., at 155,
94 S. Ct. at 984, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 236, that
'Title III requires the naming of a
person in the application or interception order only when the law
enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that the
individual is 'committing the offense' for which the wiretap is
sought.'
In response to the argument of the Court of Appeals and the
dissent, see id., at 158-163, 94 S. Ct. at 985-988, 39 L. Ed. 2d at
238-241 (Douglas, J., with whom Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concur),
that such a conclusion would amount to approval of a general
warrant proscribed by both Title III and the Fourth Amendment, the
Kahn Court relied on the minimization mandate as an adequate
safeguard to prevent such unlimited invasions of personal privacy,
id., at 154-155, 94 S. Ct. at 983-984, 39 L.Ed.2d at 236- 237:
'[I]n accord with the statute the
order required the agents to execute the warrant in such a manner
as to minimize the interception of any innocent conversations. . .
. Thus, the failure of the order to specify that Mrs. Kahn's
conversations might be the subject of interception hardly left the
executing agents free to seize at will every communication that
came over the wire-and there is no indication that such abuses took
place in this case.'
Yet the Court has consistently refused, and today persists in
that refusal, to confront a case presenting the minimization
question and the abuse that emanates from the seizure of 'every
communication that came over the
Page 425 U.S.
917 , 926
wire.' Indeed, the refusal is even more troubling since
certiorari has been granted in United States v. Donovan, 424 U.S.
907, a case in which the Solicitor General requests that we dilute
even further the standard enunciated in Kahn for naming the
subjects of proposed surveillance. I fail to comprehend how, in
light of the above passage from Kahn, the Court can undertake that
analysis without concomitantly addressing the contours of the
minimization requirement. Inaction can only continue evisceration
of the statutory mandate and require that Congress take a further
and clearly unnecessary step of enacting more legislation to give
concrete content to 2518(5).
I would grant the petition for certiorari.
Mr. Justice POWELL would grant the petition for certiorari.