In this suit raising the question whether the federal
constitutional rights of respondent state employee were violated by
her discharge from employment over her request for a
pre-termination hearing, the District Court properly abstained from
deciding that question pending state court construction of the
relevant state statutes, because it appears that the statutes may
require the hearing demanded, thus obviating the need for decision
on constitutional grounds.
Certiorari granted; 511 F.2d 834, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Musgrave, an employee of the Indiana State Highway
Commission, was dismissed for cause, her request for a
pre-termination hearing having been denied. She then brought this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit asserting hearing rights rooted in the
Federal Constitution and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The
District Court held that the controlling state statutes, as yet
unconstrued by the state courts, might require the hearing demanded
by respondent, and so obviate decision on the constitutional issue.
It therefore abstained until construction of the Indiana statutes
had been sought in the state courts. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, finding nothing in the language of the
relevant state statutes that would support a claim for a
pre-termination hearing and then resolving the federal
constitutional question in respondent's favor.
We reverse. Where the Indiana Administrative Adjudication Act is
applicable,
"[t]he final order or
Page 423 U. S. 7
determination of any issue or case applicable to a particular
person shall not be made except upon hearing and timely notice of
the time, place and nature thereof."
Ind.Code § 21-5 (1974). The Act applies to all issues or cases
applicable to particular persons
"excluding . . . the dismissal or discharge of an officer or
employee by a superior officer, but including hearings on discharge
or dismissal of an officer or employee for cause where the law
authorizes or directs such hearing."
§ 21-2. It may be that the Court of Appeals is correct in its
"forecast,"
see Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496,
312 U. S. 499
(1941), that, when construed together by the state courts, the
Administrative Adjudication Act and the Indiana Bipartisan
Personnel System Act, which is applicable to Highway Commission
employees and which neither expressly authorizes nor precludes
termination hearings, would not require the hearing respondent has
demanded. On the other hand, the relevant statutory provisions may
fairly be read to extend such hearing rights to respondent;
*
Page 423 U. S. 8
and, in these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court
was right to abstain from deciding the federal constitutional issue
pending resolution of the state law question in the state courts.
Meridian v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 358 U.
S. 639,
358 U. S. 640
(1959);
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S.
82 (1970);
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.
S. 528 (1965);
Fornars v. Ridge Tool Co.,
400 U. S. 41
(1970);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
consideration consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
* The possibility that the Indiana state courts would adopt the
construction contrary to that of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit is somewhat enhanced by the fact that the
construction adopted by the Seventh Circuit may fairly be said to
raise federal constitutional problems under recent procedural due
process decisions of this Court,
e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U. S. 134
(1974), particularly if, as the Seventh Circuit appears to have
assumed, the Administrative Adjudication Act would leave respondent
without a state law right to a hearing
at any time in
connection with her dismissal for cause. The state courts may be
reluctant to attribute to their legislature an intention to pass a
statute raising constitutional problems, unless such legislative
intent is particularly clear.
See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles,
357 U. S. 116,
357 U. S.
129-130 (1958);
Johnson v. Robison,
415 U. S. 361,
415 U. S.
366-367 (1974).
See Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention
doctrine, 122 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1071, 1117-1118 (1974).
Although the question of respondent's federal constitutional
right to a hearing
at some time, in connection with a
discharge for cause may already have been resolved in respondent's
favor in
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.
S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U. S. 564
(1972); and
Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, the tenured
employee's right to a pre-removal hearing has been determined by
this Court only in the context of a statute providing notice and an
opportunity to respond in writing before removal, coupled with a
full hearing after removal.
See concurring opinion of
POWELL, J., in
Arnett v. Kennedy, supra at
416 U. S. 164,
416 U. S.
170.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The position of the Court continues the strangulation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 that has recently been evident.
See, e.g.,
Huffman v. Pursue, Ld., 420 U. S. 592
(1975). The road of the respondent employee has been longer and
more expensive than the Congress planned.
See Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U. S. 167,
360 U. S.
179-184 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). I would affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals.