The conflict of laws rules to be applied by a federal court in
Texas must conform to those prevailing in the Texas state courts.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.
S. 487. Hence, in affirming judgment for respondents
(plaintiffs below) based on the Texas law of strict liability in a
diversity action in a Federal District Court in Texas for death and
injury from an explosion occurring in a foreign country, the Court
of Appeals erred in declining to apply the Texas choice of law
rules for determining what substantive law governed the case.
Certiorari granted; 512 F.2d 77, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents sued petitioner in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas seeking to recover damages for
death and personal injury resulting from the premature explosion of
a 105-mm. howitzer round in Cambodia. Federal jurisdiction was
based on diversity of citizenship. The District Court held that the
Texas law of strict liability in tort governed, and submitted the
case to the jury on that theory. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of respondents. 512 F.2d 77
(1975).
The Court of Appeals stated that, were it to apply Texas choice
of law rules, the substantive law of Cambodia, the place of injury,
would certainly control as to the wrongful death, and perhaps as to
the claim for personal injury. It declined nevertheless to apply
Texas choice of law rules, based in part on an earlier decision in
Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884 (CA5 1970) ,
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971), which it
Page 423 U. S. 4
summarized as holding that
"[w]e refused to look to the Louisiana conflict of law rule,
deciding that, as a matter of federal choice of law,
we could
not apply the law of a jurisdiction that had no interest in the
case, no policy at stake."
512 F.2d at 80 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals
further supported its decision on the grounds that the rationale
for applying the traditional conflicts rule applied by Texas "is
not operative under the present facts," and that it was "a Court of
the United States, an instrumentality created to effectuate the
laws and policies of the United States."
We believe that the Court of Appeals either misinterpreted our
longstanding decision in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U. S. 487
(1941), or else determined for itself that it was no longer of
controlling force in a case such as this. We are of the opinion
that
Klaxon is, by its terms, applicable here, and should
have been adhered to by the Court of Appeals. In
Klaxon,
supra at
313 U. S. 496,
this Court said:
"The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court
in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state
courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
state and federal courts sitting side by side.
See Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, [
304 U.S.
64,
304 U. S. 74-77 (1938)]."
(Footnote omitted.)
By parity of reasoning, the conflict of laws rules to be applied
by a federal court in Texas must conform to those prevailing in the
Texas state courts. A federal court in a diversity case is not free
to engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications which
may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not
commended themselves to the State in which the federal court sits.
The Court of Appeals in this case
Page 423 U. S. 5
should identify and follow the Texas conflicts rule. What
substantive law will govern when Texas' rule is applied is a matter
to be determined by the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
Left to my own devices, I would deny the petition for
certiorari. Inasmuch, however, as the Court chooses to emphasize
and correct certain misapprehensions in the Court of Appeals'
opinion and to vacate that court's judgment, I merely point out
that, as I read the Court's per curiam opinion, the Court of
Appeals, on remand, is to determine and flatly to apply the
conflict of laws rules that govern the state courts of Texas. This
means to me that the Court of Appeals is not foreclosed from
concluding, if it finds it proper so to do under the circumstances
of this case, that the Texas state courts themselves would apply
the Texas rule of strict liability. If that proves to be the
result, I would perceive no violation of any principle of
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.
S. 487 (1941). I make this observation to assure the
Court of Appeals that, at least in my view, today's per curiam
opinion does not necessarily compel the determination that it is
only the law of Cambodia that is applicable.