In addition to authorizing United States magistrates to perform
certain specified statutory functions, the Federal Magistrates Act
(Act) authorizes district courts to assign to magistrates "such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Pursuant to that
provision, the District Court adopted General Order No. 104-D,
which,
inter alia, requires initial reference to a
magistrate of actions to review administrative determinations
regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits, including
Medicare. Respondent challenged the final determination of the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that respondent was not
entitled to claimed Medicare benefits. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) a
district court can review such a determination only on the basis of
the pleadings and administrative record, and the court is bound by
the Secretary's factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence. The case was assigned to a District Judge and, at the
same time, referred to a Magistrate to
"prepare a proposed written order or decision, together with
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law where necessary or
appropriate"
for consideration by the District Judge after the Magistrate had
reviewed the record and heard the parties' arguments. Contending
that the reference to the Magistrate under the District Court's
general order violated Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 53(b), and was not
authorized by the Act, the Secretary moved to vacate the order of
reference. The District Court refused to vacate the reference
order. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: In the context of this case, the preliminary
review function assigned to the Magistrate was one of the
"additional duties" that the Act contemplates magistrates are to
perform. Pp.
423 U. S.
266-275.
(a) Section 636(b) was enacted to permit district courts to
increase the scope of responsibilities that magistrates can
undertake upon reference, as part of its plan "to establish a
system
Page 423 U. S. 262
capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal
judiciary." But Congress also intended that, in such references,
the district judge retain ultimate responsibility for
decisionmaking. Pp.
423 U. S.
266-270.
(b) In this type of case, the magistrate helps the court focus
on the relevant portions of what might be a voluminous record and
move directly to any substantial legal arguments by putting before
the court a preliminary evaluation of the evidence in the record.
Although substantially assisting the court, the magistrate performs
only a preliminary review of a closed administrative record, and
any recommendation to the court is confined to whether or not
substantial evidence supports the Secretary's decision. The final
determination remains with the judge, who has discretion to review
the record anew. Pp.
423 U. S.
270-272.
(c) The order of reference here does not constitute the
magistrate a special master, and there is no conflict with the
requirement of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 53(b) that "reference to a master
shall be the exception and not the rule," made in nonjury cases
"only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."
The magistrate here acts in an advisory role as a magistrate, not
as a master; the judge is free to accept or reject the magistrate's
recommendation in whole or in part, whereas, under Rule 53(e), the
court must accept a special master's finding of fact if it is not
clearly erroneous.
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
352 U. S. 249,
distinguished. Pp.
423 U. S.
272-275.
503 F.2d 1049, affirmed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
Members joined, except STEVENS, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
Page 423 U. S. 263
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the Federal
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631
et seq., permits a United
States district court to refer all Social Security benefit cases to
United States magistrates for preliminary review of the
administrative record, oral argument, and preparation of a
recommended decision as to whether the record contains substantial
evidence to support the administrative determination -- all subject
to an independent decision, on the record, by the district judge
who may, in his discretion, hear the whole matter anew.
(1)
Respondent Weber brought this action in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California to challenge
the final determination of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare that he was not entitled to reimbursement under the
Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat.
291, and amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395
et seq., for medical
payments he made on behalf of his wife. Such a suit for judicial
review is authorized by § 205(g) of the Federal Magistrates Act, as
added, 53 Stat. 1370, and amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and governed
by its standards. The court may consider only the pleadings and
administrative record, and must accept the Secretary's findings of
fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
When respondent's complaint was filed, the Clerk of the court
pursuant to court rule assigned the case to a named District Judge,
and simultaneously referred it to a United States Magistrate with
directions "to notice and conduct such factual hearings and legal
argument as may be appropriate" and to
"prepare a proposed written order or decision, together with
proposed findings of fact and
Page 423 U. S. 264
conclusions of law where necessary or appropriate"
for consideration by the District Judge. The Clerk took these
steps pursuant to General Order No. 104-D of the District Court,
which requires initial reference to a magistrate in seven
categories of review of administrative cases, [
Footnote 1] including actions filed under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
Page 423 U. S. 265
The parties may object to the magistrate's recommendations.
After acting on any objections, the magistrate is to forward the
entire file to the district judge to whom the case is assigned for
decision; the district judge "will calendar the matter for oral
argument before him if he deems it necessary or appropriate."
The Secretary moved to vacate the order of reference, arguing
(1) that referral under a general order of this type violated
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 53(b) and (2) that such referral was not
authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act. The Secretary also
argued that the reference was of doubtful constitutionality, and in
contravention of the judicial review provisions of the Social
Security Act, arguments that he has expressly declined to make in
this Court. The District Court refused to vacate the order of
reference, but certified the reference question for appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 503 F.2d 1049 (CA9 1974). That
court stressed the limited and preliminary nature of the inquiry in
review actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the limited scope
of the Magistrate's role on reference, and the fact that final
authority for decision remained with the District Judge.
"Were the broad provisions of General Order No. 104-D . . .
before us, the Secretary might have grounds to complain. As
applied, the rule is not vulnerable to the attack here
mounted."
503 F.2d at 1051. The Court of Appeals thus reached a decision
squarely in conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in
Ingram. v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268
(1972). We granted certiorari, 420 U.S. 989 (1975), [
Footnote 2] and we affirm.
Page 423 U. S. 266
(2)
After several years of study, the Congress, in 1968, enacted the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631
et seq. The Act
abolished the office of United States commissioner and sought
to
"reform the first echelon of the Federal judiciary into an
effective component of a modern scheme of justice by establishing a
system of U.S. magistrates."
S.Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1967) (hereafter
Senate Report). In order to improve the former system and to
attract the most competent men and women to the office, the Act in
essence made the position analogous to the career service,
replacing the fee system of compensation with substantial salaries;
the Act also gave both full- and part-time magistrates a definite
term of office, and required that, wherever possible, the district
courts appoint only members of the bar to serve as magistrates.
Magistrates took over most of the duties of the commissioners, and
the Act gave them new authority to try a broad range of
misdemeanors with the consent of the parties.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) outlines a procedure by which the
district courts may call upon magistrates to perform other
functions, in both civil and criminal cases. It provides:
"Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of
a majority of all the judges of such district court, may establish
rules pursuant to which any full-time United States magistrate, or,
where there is no full-time magistrate reasonably available, any
part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be
assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States. The additional duties authorized by rule
may include, but are not restricted to -- "
Page 423 U. S. 267
"(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action,
pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district
courts;"
"(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial
or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and"
"(3) preliminary review of applications for post-trial relief
made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission
of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the
district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether
there should be a hearing."
"The three examples § 636(b) sets out are, as the statute itself
states, not exclusive. The Senate sponsor of the legislation,
Senator Tydings, testified in the House hearings:"
"The Magistrate[s] Act specifics these three areas because they
came up in our hearings and we thought they were areas in which the
district courts might be able to benefit from the magistrate's
services. We did not limit the courts to the areas mentioned. Nor
did we require that they use the magistrates for additional
functions at all."
"We hope and think that innovative, imaginative judges who want
to clean up their caseload backlog will utilize the U.S.
magistrates in these areas, and perhaps even come up with new areas
to increase the efficiency of their courts."
Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act before Subcommittee No.
4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 81
(1968) (hereafter House Hearings).
See also Hearings on
the Federal Magistrates Act before the Subcommittee on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th
Page 423 U. S. 268
Cong., 2d Sess., and 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 14, 27 (1966 and
1967) (hereafter Senate Hearings).
Section 636(b) was included to
"permit . . . the U.S. district courts to assign magistrates, as
officers of the courts, a variety of functions . . . presently
performable only by the judges themselves."
Senate Report 12. In enacting this section and in expanding the
criminal jurisdiction conferred upon magistrates, Congress hoped,
by
"increasing the scope of the responsibilities that can be
discharged by that office, . . . to establish a system capable of
increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal judiciary. . .
."
Id. at 11.
The Act grew from Congress' recognition that a multitude of new
statutes and regulations had created an avalanche of additional
work for the district courts which could be performed only by
multiplying the number of judges or giving judges additional
assistance. The Secretary argues that Congress intended the
transfer to magistrates of simply the irksome, ministerial tasks;
respondent [
Footnote 3] urges
that Congress intended magistrates to take on a wide range of
substantive judicial duties and advisory functions. We need not
accept the characterization of the federal magistrate as either a
"para-judge," as respondent would have it, or a "supernotary," as
the Secretary argues, in order to resolve this case; finding the
best analogy to this new office is not particularly important.
Congress had a number of precedents for this new officer before it:
British masters, justices of peace, and magistrates; our own
traditional special masters in equity; and pretrial examiners.
[
Footnote 4] The
Page 423 U. S. 269
office Congress created drew on all prior experience. What is
important is that the congressional anticipation is becoming a
reality; in fiscal 1975, for example, the 500 full- or part-time
United States magistrates disposed of 255,061 matters, most of
which would otherwise have occupied district judges. These included
36,766 civil proceedings, 537 of which were Social Security review
cases. Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts VIII-4 (1975).
See also Sussman, The
Fourth Tier in the Federal Judicial System: The United States
Magistrate, 56 Chicago Bar Record 134 (1974); Geffen, Practice
Before the United States Magistrate, 47 L.A.Bar Bull. 462 (1972);
Doyle, Implementing the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J.Kan.Bar Assn.
25 (1970).
Congress manifested concern as well as enthusiasm, however, in
considering the Act. Several witnesses, including the Director of
the Administrative Office and representatives of the Justice
Department, expressed some fear that Congress might improperly
delegate to magistrates duties reserved by the Constitution to
Article III judges. Senate Hearings 107-128, 241n; House Hearings
123-128. [
Footnote 5] The
hearings and committee
Page 423 U. S. 270
reports indicate that, in § 636(b) Congress met this problem in
two ways. First, Congress restricted the range of matters that may
be referred to a magistrate to those where referral is "not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. .
. ." Second, Congress limited the magistrate's role in cases
referred to him under § 636(b). The Act's sponsors made it quite
clear that the magistrate acts "under the supervision of the
district judges" when he accepts a referral, and that authority for
making final decisions remains at all times with the district
judge. Senate Report 12.
"[A] district judge would retain ultimate responsibility for
decision making in every instance in which a magistrate might
exercise additional duties jurisdiction."
House Hearings 73 (testimony of Sen. Tydings).
See also
id. at 127 (testimony of Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen. Finley).
(3)
We need not define the full reach of a magistrate's authority
under the Act, or reach the broad provisions of General Order No.
104-D, in order to decide this case. Under the part of the order at
issue, the magistrates perform a limited function which falls well
within the range of duties Congress empowered the district courts
to assign to them. The magistrate is directed to conduct a
preliminary review of a closed administrative record -- closed
because, under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), neither party may put any additional evidence before the
district court. The magistrate gives only a recommendation to the
judge, and only on the single, narrow issue: is there in the record
substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision? [
Footnote 6] The magistrate may do no
more than propose
Page 423 U. S. 271
a recommendation, and neither § 636(b) nor the General Order
gives such recommendation presumptive weight. The district judge is
free to follow it or wholly to ignore it, or, if he is not
satisfied, he may conduct the review in whole or in part anew. The
authority -- and the responsibility -- to make an informed, final
determination, we emphasize, remains with the judge.
The magistrate's limited role in this type of case nonetheless
substantially assists the district judge in the performance of his
judicial function, and benefits both him and the parties. A
magistrate's review helps focus the court's attention on the
relevant portions of what may be a voluminous record, from a point
of view as neutral as that of an Article III judge. Review also
helps the court move directly to those legal arguments made by the
parties that find some support in the record. Finally, the
magistrate's report puts before the district judge a preliminary
evaluation of the cumulative effect of the evidence in the record,
to which the parties may address argument, and in this way narrows
the dispute. Each step of the process takes place with the full
participation of the parties. They know precisely what
recommendations the judge is receiving and may frame their
arguments accordingly.
We conclude that, in the context of this case the preliminary
review function assigned to the magistrate, and
Page 423 U. S. 272
at issue here, is one of the "additional duties" that the
statute contemplates magistrates are to perform. [
Footnote 7]
(4)
The Secretary argues that the magistrate, in taking this
reference, functions as a special master. From this premise, the
Secretary asks us to hold that a general rule requiring automatic
reference in a category of cases does not comply with the mandate
of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 53(b) that "reference to a master shall be
the exception and not the rule," made in nonjury cases "only upon a
showing that some exceptional condition requires it." He also
argues that, for similar reasons, the reference here is
Page 423 U. S. 273
not permissible under our decision in
La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U. S. 249
(1957). [
Footnote 8]
Section 636(b) expressly provides that a district court may, in
an appropriate case and in accordance with Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 53,
call upon a magistrate to act as a special master. But the statute
also is clear that not every reference, for whatever purpose, is to
be characterized as a reference to a special master. It treats
references to the magistrate acting as master quite separately in
subsection (1), indicating by its structure that other references
are of a different sort. Moreover, Rule 53(e) provides that, in
nonjury cases referred to a master, the court shall accept any
finding of fact that is not clearly erroneous. Under the reference
in this case, however, the judge remains free to give the
magistrate's recommendation whatever weight the judge decides it
merits. It cannot be said, therefore, that the magistrate acts as a
special master in the sense that either Rule 53 or the Federal
Magistrates Act uses that term. The order of reference at issue
does not constitute the magistrate a special master.
The Secretary argues that the magistrate will be a master, in
fact, because the judge will accept automatically the
recommendation made in every case. Nothing
Page 423 U. S. 274
in the record or within the scope of permissible judicial notice
supports this argument; nor does common observation of the
performance of United States judges remotely lend the slightest
credence to such an extravagant assertion. We express no opinion
with respect to either the wisdom or the validity of automatic
referral in other types of cases; only the narrow portion of
General Order No. 10-D that led to reference of this particular
case is before us today. In this narrow range of cases, reference
promotes more focused, and so more careful, decisionmaking by the
district judge. We categorically reject the suggestion that judges
will accept, uncritically, recommendations of magistrates.
Our decision in
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., supra,
does not call for a different result. In
La Buy, the
District Judge, on his own motion, referred to a special master two
complex, protracted antitrust cases on the eve of trial. The cases
had been pending before him for several years, he had heard
pretrial motions, and he was familiar with the issues involved. The
master, a member of the bar, was to hear and decide the entire
case, subject to review by the District Judge under the "clearly
erroneous" test. The judge cited the problems attendant to docket
congestion to satisfy Rule 53's requirement that a reference to a
special master be justified by "exceptional circumstances." The
Court held that, on these facts, reference was not permissible, and
affirmed the Court of Appeals' supervisory prohibition.
La Buy, although nearly two decades past, is the most
recent of our cases dealing with special masters, and our decision
today does not erode it. [
Footnote
9] The Magistrate here acted in his capacity as magistrate, not
as a special
Page 423 U. S. 275
master, under a reference authorized by an Act passed 10 years
after
La Buy was decided. Other factors distinguish this
case from
La Buy as well. The issues here are as simple as
they were complex in
La Buy, and the District Judge had
not yet invested any time in familiarizing himself with the case.
The reference in this case will result in a recommendation that
carries only such weight as its merit commands and the sound
discretion of the judge warrants. We are persuaded that the
important premises from which the
La Buy decision
proceeded are not threatened here.
Finally, our decision in
Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.
S. 461 (1974), does not bear on this case. The Secretary
has abandoned any claim that the statute giving the District Court
jurisdiction of the case in the first instance, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
precludes reference to a magistrate. It was the Court's reading of
the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2243, that formed the basis
for the holding in
Wingo v. Wedding.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
General Order No. 10-D provides for reference in the following
types of review of administrative cases:
"(A) Actions to review administrative determinations re
entitlement to benefits under the Social Security Act and related
statutes, including but not limited to actions filed under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g)."
"(B) Actions filed by the United States or a carrier to review,
implement or restrain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission
re freight overcharges, including but not limited to actions under
28 U.S.C.§ 1336 and 49 U.S.C. § 304a."
"(C) Actions, whether in the form of judicial review, habeas
corpus or otherwise, for review of orders and other actions of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Included, but not by way of
limitation, are actions involving deportation orders, denial of
preference classification visas and denial of petitions to adjust
status."
"(D) Actions for review of adjudications by the Civil Service
Commission, or the various departments or agencies, involving
personnel actions such as wrongful discharge, reductions in force,
transfers, retirements, etc."
"(E) Actions for review of an order of any branch or
establishment of the military service denying discharge of
petitioner from the military, whether such actions are brought in
the form of petitions for judicial review, habeas corpus or actions
for declaratory relief and injunction."
"(F) Actions filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(f)(3) to review
administrative decisions denying applications for licenses to
engage in business as a firearms or ammunition importer,
manufacturer or dealer."
"(G) Actions to review administrative decisions by the
Department of Labor denying applications for alien employment
certification required pursuant to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(14)."
The petition for certiorari raises only the issue of the
propriety bf the part of subsection (A) of the General Order that
authorizes reference of cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and
we intimate no opinion on the validity of its other provisions.
[
Footnote 2]
Because respondent has declined to appear, he invited an
amicus curiae to support the decision of the Court of
Appeals. 421 U.S. 985 (1975)
[
Footnote 3]
For convenience, the position taken by
amicus in
support of the Court of Appeals' judgment will be referred to as
the position of respondent.
[
Footnote 4]
The administration of the Act also profits from the British
analogy.
See Institute of Judicial Administration, Report
of the Committee to Study the Role of Masters in the English
Judicial System (Federal Judicial Center 1974).
[
Footnote 5]
Some courts have manifested a like concern.
See TPO, Inc. v.
McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (CA7 1972);
Reed v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (CA1 1972).
But cf. Palmore
v. United States, 411 U. S. 389
(1973).
See also Note, Masters and Magistrates in the
Federal Courts, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 779 (1975); Comment, An Adjudicative
Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 584
(1973). Because we limit our consideration of the Act and General
Order No. 10-D to the particular reference presented by this case,
we need not deal with these broad constitutional issues. Petitioner
expressly declines to rely on any constitutional argument.
[
Footnote 6]
Ordinarily, the parties will agree as to the legal standard,
leaving as the sole issue whether the Secretary's determination is
supported by substantial evidence. In some cases, the magistrate
may preliminarily resolve issues of law before making a
recommendation; in some few cases, the recommendation may turn
wholly upon an issue of law. The parties have not suggested that
cases in either of these subcategories raise issues of statutory
interpretation that require separate treatment, and we do not reach
them on this record. Experience with the magistrate's role under
the Act may well lead to the conclusion that sound judicial
administration calls for sending directly to the district judge
those cases that turn solely upon issues of law.
[
Footnote 7]
Though we do not rely upon subsequently expressed congressional
views, the Congress plainly considers claims such as respondent
brought in the District Court as matters that could appropriately
be referred for preliminary review to a magistrate. In considering
magistrates' salaries in 1972, a Senate subcommittee noted:
"Magistrates are judicial officers of the Federal district
courts. . . . They may also be authorized to screen prisoner
petitions, hold pretrial conferences in civil and criminal cases,
hear certain preliminary motions,
review social security
appeals, review Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act matters,
and serve as special masters. In short, they render valuable
assistance to the judges of the district courts, thereby freeing
the time of those judges for the actual trial of cases."
S.Rep. No. 92-1065, p. 3 (1972) (emphasis added).
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the
statutory body that supervises the administrative aspects of the
Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 604(d)(1), reads the Act in the same
way. It has distributed a "checklist" of magistrate duties that
includes review of Social Security appeals brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on
the Administration of the Federal Magistrates System, Duties Which
Might Be Assigned to U.S. Magistrates (Mar. 14, 1975). The
Administrative Office first noted in its 1972 report that district
courts were assigning Social Security appeals to magistrates under
the 1968 Act. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual
Report of the Director VI-8 (1972).
[
Footnote 8]
These arguments persuaded the Court of Appeals in
Ingram v.
Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (CA6 1972). Other federal courts to
consider the issue reached a contrary result.
Yascavage v.
Weinberger, 379 F.
Supp. 1297 (ID Pa.1974);
Bell v.
Weinberger, 378 F.
Supp. 198 (ND Ga.1974);
Murphy v. Weinberger,
[Oct.1966-Dec.1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Unempl. Ins. Rep. � 17,608
(Conn.1974).
Several courts have relied upon these arguments to one extent or
another in disapproving references that involved a broader grant of
authority to the magistrate.
See, e.g., Flowers v.
Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F.2d 1378 (CA7 1974);
TPO, Inc.
v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (CA7 1972);
Reed v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (CA1 1972).
[
Footnote 9]
See generally Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts:
Rule 53, 58 Col.L.Rev. 452 (1958);
CAB v. Carefree Travel,
Inc., 513 F.2d 375 (CA2 1975).