Respondent's decedent, a seaman, was discharged for misconduct
from petitioner's ship while it was docked in South Vietnam.
Because of South Vietnamese currency regulations and other
complications precluding paying the seaman in American currency the
wages due him that he had earned prior to his discharge, petitioner
purchased for him an airline ticket to the United States for $510,
and this ticket, together with a wage voucher for $118.5,
representing wages due less the $510, were given to him. When the
seaman arrived back in the United States, he received the $118.45.
Subsequently he sued petitioner, claiming that it had withheld $510
in wages from him. He contended that petitioner was liable to him
for the $510, and for an added sum pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 596,
which requires the master or owner of a vessel making foreign
voyages to pay a discharged seaman his wages within four days after
the discharge, and, upon refusal or neglect to make such payment
"without sufficient cause," to pay the seaman a sum equal to two
days' pay for every day during which payment is delayed. Finding
that the seaman had consented to the purchase of the airline ticket
for his purposes with his money and that such purchase therefore
constituted a partial payment of wages, the District Court held
that petitioner had not refused or neglected to pay, and hence was
not liable under § 596. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
§ 596 requires that wage payments be made directly to the seaman,
and that therefore the $510 paid to the airline could not be
regarded as a partial payment of wages. On remand, the District
Court assessed damages pursuant to § 596, and the Court of Appeals
dismissed an appeal from this assessment.
Held: Under the circumstances, the transaction
resulting in the seaman's receipt of an airline ticket purchased
with money owed to him as wages constituted a payment of wages, and
therefore there was no refusal or neglect to make payment, and
hence no liability, under § 596.
Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Johnson, 343 U. S. 779,
distinguished. Since the transaction was a partial payment of wages
and not a "deduction
Page 423 U. S. 151
from" wages, the requirement of 46 U.S.C. § 642 that a ship's
master enter wage deductions in the logbook does not apply, and
thus the master's failure to make a logbook entry that the $510 had
been paid does not bar viewing the transaction as a partial payment
of wages. Pp.
423 U. S.
156-160.
Reversed and remanded;
see 488 F.2d 469.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Granville C. Matise, a seaman, brought this suit alleging that
upon his discharge from the S.S. American Hawk, petitioner, the
ship's owner, withheld $510 in wages from him. Matise claimed that,
pursuant to Rev.Stat. § 4529, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 596, he was
entitled to two days' pay for every day that payment of the $510
had been delayed.
Title 46 U.S.C. § 596 provides in relevant part:
"The master or owner of any vessel [making foreign voyages]
shall pay to every seaman his wages . . . within twenty-four hours
after the cargo has been discharged, or within four days after the
seaman has been discharged, whichever first happens. . . . Every
master or owner who refuses or neglects to make payment in the
manner hereinbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to
the seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for each and every day
during which payment is delayed beyond the respective periods,
which sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim made before
the court. "
Page 423 U. S. 152
The parties to this case differ over the meaning of "sufficient
cause" under § 596; they are in conflict, too, over whether the
trial court can exercise any discretion in determining the amount
of the award under § 596. [
Footnote
1] But we need not address either of these questions today. We
hold simply that, in this case, the District Court correctly
concluded that petitioner shipowner never "refuse[d] or neglect[ed]
to make payment" to Matise. This being so, petitioner incurred no
liability under § 596.
I
Granville Matise was hired on January 11, 1969, as a seaman
aboard the S.S.
American Hawk. Between February 14 and
March 19, 1969, there were five occasions on which the ship's
master entered in the ship's log reports that Matise either was
absent from his duty position or, because of intoxication, was
unable to fulfill his normal responsibilities. On the first four
occasions, relatively minor penalties of the loss of several days'
pay were imposed. On March 19, the date of the fifth log entry, the
master decided that Matise should be discharged. With the ship
docked in Saigon, South Vietnam, the master took Matise before the
United States Vice Consul stationed in Saigon. The Vice Consul,
Page 423 U. S. 153
whose duty in such situations is to "inquire carefully into the
facts and circumstances, and [to] satisfy himself that good and
substantial reasons exist fora discharge," 22 CFR § 82.16,
[
Footnote 2] agreed with the
master that Matise's discharge was justified. He granted the
discharge application without objection from Matise, and entered
into the ship's log a notation stating that he "agreed to remove
[Matise] from the vessel on grounds of misconduct at the Master's
request and for the good of the vessel." The Vice Consul also
advised the master that, because the discharge resulted from
repeated instances of misconduct by Matise, petitioner was not
obligated to pay for Matise's repatriation. [
Footnote 3]
Petitioner did, of course, have an obligation to pay Matise the
wages that he had earned prior to his discharge.
See 46
U.S.C. § 596. But payment in a form enabling Matise to secure
transportation back to the United States was no easy matter. South
Vietnamese law prohibited American seamen from carrying American
currency ashore, and required that any ship's safe containing
American currency be sealed while the ship was in port. An airline
ticket to the United States, however, could be purchased only with
American currency. Thus, Matise could not simply be put ashore with
his wages and left there to secure transportation back to the
United States for himself. [
Footnote 4]
Page 423 U. S. 154
In order to resolve the resulting dilemma, Vietnamese Customs
officials gave the ship's master special permission to break the
seal on the ship's safe and to remove enough money to purchase an
airline ticket to the United States. The ticket was purchased and
given to Matise along with a wage voucher for $118.45 -- a sum
which, as indicated on the voucher itself, represented the amount
of the wages due him, less the $510 paid for the airline ticket.
[
Footnote 5] When Matise
arrived back in the United States, he signed off the ship's
articles, executed a mutual release, [
Footnote 6] and, on March 24, 1969, received the $118.45
from petitioner.
Almost one year later, Matise filed suit against petitioner in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. [
Footnote 7] He
claimed that petitioner had withheld from him $510 in wages, and
that petitioner was liable to him for that amount and, as provided
in § 596, for two days' pay for every day that payment had been
delayed. The District Court rejected Matise's claim, finding that
he had "consented to and approved the purchase of an airline ticket
for his purposes with his money," and concluding that "[t]he
purchase of that ticket under those circumstances constituted
the
Page 423 U. S. 155
equivalent of payment of monies over to the seaman." Having
found that the purchase of the airline ticket for $510 constituted
a partial payment of wages, the District Court concluded that
petitioner had not "refuse[d] or neglect[ed]" to pay and had
therefore incurred no liability under § 596.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 488 F.2d
469 (1974). It read § 596 as requiring that wage payments be paid
directly to the seaman, and held that the $510 paid to the airline
without ever having passed through Matise's hands could not be
regarded as a partial payment of wages. Citing this Court's
indication in
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.
S. 779 (1952), that only deductions and setoffs for
derelictions of duty specifically provided for by Congress could
lawfully be deducted from a seaman's wages, the Court of Appeals
concluded that, since the statutory scheme does not provide for
setoffs for return transportation expenses, the "withholding" here
at issue was improper, and was without "sufficient cause" under §
596.
On remand, the District Court assessed damages in the amount of
$510 for the wages "wrongfully withheld" and $29,462 in penalties,
[
Footnote 8] representing
double wages calculated from March 24, 1969, four days after the
discharge, until December 15, 1971, the date of the first District
Court judgment in the case. [
Footnote 9] Petitioner's appeal from this assessment was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals as frivolous, and this Court
thereupon granted certiorari. 420 U.S. 971 (1975). We reverse.
Page 423 U. S. 156
II
The threshold question in this case is whether petitioner's
purchase and Matise's receipt of the airline ticket constituted a
partial payment of wages. If it was a partial payment, then there
was no refusal or neglect to pay wages and there can be no
double-wage liability under § 596. [
Footnote 10] Only if the transaction was not a partial
payment are we presented with the question whether the
"withholding" of the $510 was without "sufficient cause" under §
596.
In
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, supra, on which the
Court of Appeals heavily relied, there was no question that what
this Court was faced with was a refusal or neglect to make payment.
There, respondent, a seaman, had stabbed one of his shipmates while
at sea. Over respondent's objection, the shipowner deducted from
his wages amounts spent for the medical care and hospitalization of
the shipmate. We held that, because the deductions were not
provided for in the relevant statutes, [
Footnote 11] they should not have been made -- even
though it might later have been determined that the shipowner had a
valid claim for reimbursement against the respondent.
The situation before us today is quite different from that in
Isbrandtsen. While the deductions in
Isbrandtsen
were made over the seaman's objection, the District Court in this
case explicitly found that Matise "consented to and approved the
purchase of an airline ticket for his purposes with his money."
[
Footnote 12] Moreover,
unlike
Page 423 U. S. 157
the seaman in
Isbrandtsen, Matise received a benefit
from the petitioner's expenditure that he simply could not have
obtained through being paid in cash. [
Footnote 13] Because of South Vietnamese currency
regulations, it was only the procedure that was followed that
allowed Matise to secure air transportation to the United States.
Under such circumstances, it is evident that the shipowner did not
refuse or neglect to make payment under § 596 as the shipowner in
Isbrandtsen so clearly did; [
Footnote 14] rather, the
Page 423 U. S. 158
transaction in question constituted a partial payment of
Matise's wages.
The Court of Appals rejected petitioner's attempt to treat the
giving of the plane ticket to Matise as a payment of wages. It
viewed the purchase of the ticket as a payment to the airline, not
to Matise, and observed that "the applicable statutes explicitly
and unequivocally provide that the wages due are to be paid to the
seaman, 46 U.S.C. §§ 596-597." 488 F.2d at 471 (emphasis
in original). The Court was evidently relying at this point on the
following language in § 596: "The master . . . shall pay
to
every seaman his wages . . . within four days after the seaman
has been discharged. . . ." [
Footnote 15] (Emphasis added.)
Page 423 U. S. 159
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the "payment" went to the
airline, and not to Matise, does not necessarily follow from the
facts of this case. It could as easily be argued that "payment,"
albeit in the form of an airline ticket, rather than cash, was made
to Matise. But even under the Court of Appeals' characterization of
the transaction, we are unwilling to say that the payment was
precluded by the general language of § 596. A far more explicit
statement would be required to bar such a payment under the
peculiar circumstances of this case. The obvious concern of § 596
is that the shipowner not unlawfully withhold wages, and thereby
unjustly enrich himself while wrongfully denying the seaman the
benefits of his labor. In this case, there was neither unjust
enrichment of the shipowner nor a denial of benefits to the seaman.
The shipowner made in a timely manner all the expenditures for
which it was obligated. And the seaman received full benefit from
the $510 by consenting to have it applied in the fashion most
useful to him -- the purchase of an airline ticket.
Respondent advanced an alternative theory during oral argument
to support the contention that petitioner neglected to make payment
under § 596. Respondent argued that the master's failure to enter
into the ship's logbook a notation that the $510 had been paid bars
viewing the transaction as a partial payment of wages.
We find this argument unpersuasive. When crew members become
liable for deductions from wages during
Page 423 U. S. 160
a ship's voyage, there is, it is true, a statutory requirement
that
"the master shall, during the voyage, enter the various matters
in respect to which such deductions are made, with the amounts of
the respective deductions as they occur, in the official log
book."
46 U.S.C. § 642. As we have indicated above, however, the
airline ticket transaction in this case is not a "deduction from"
Matise's wages, but rather is itself a partial payment of wages.
Section 642's terms do not apply to payments of wages. The
shipowner therefore acted properly in doing no more than rendering
Matise a complete wage voucher that clearly noted the purchase of
the airline ticket.
III
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, we do not
retreat from our view that the aim of § 596 is "to protect [seamen]
from the harsh consequences of arbitrary and unscrupulous action[s]
of their employers."
Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U. S.
52,
281 U. S. 55
(1930). In this case, there was no impropriety either in the
discharge itself or in the payment of wages to Matise. Nor do we
today compromise our holding in
Isbrandtsen that
"only such deductions and set-offs for derelictions in the
performance of . . . duties shall be allowed against . . . wages as
are recognized in the statutes."
343 U.S. at
343 U. S. 787.
We hold simply that, under the circumstances of this case, the
transaction resulting in Matise's receipt of an airline ticket
purchased with money owed to him as wages constituted a payment of
wages. There was therefore no refusal or neglect to make payment
under § 596.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
While the Third and Ninth Circuits have found that the trial
judge has no discretion in determining the amount of the penalty
under § 596,
Swain v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 81
(CA3 1966);
Escobar v. S.S. Washington Trader, 503 F.2d
271 (CA9 1974),
cert. pending sub nom. American Trading Transp.
Co. v. Escobar, No. 74-1184, the First, Second, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits have concluded that the length of time to which the
penalty applies -- and hence its amount -- is subject to the
discretion of the District Court.
Mavromatis v. United Greek
Shipowners Corp., 179 F.2d 310 (CA1 1950);
Forster v. Oro
Navigation Co., 228 F.2d 319 (CA2 1955),
aff'g 128 F.
Supp. 113 (SDNY 1954);
Southern Cross S.S. Co. v.
Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (CA4 1960),
cert. denied, 365
U.S. 869 (1961);
Caribbean Federation Lines v. Dahl, 315
F.2d 370 (CA5 1963).
[
Footnote 2]
See also 46 U.S.C. § 682; 7 Foreign Affairs Manual §
526.2.
[
Footnote 3]
Two Coast Guard officers with whom the master had earlier
consulted concerning Matise's misconduct were also present and
concurred in the Vice Consul's advice that there was no obligation
of repatriation.
[
Footnote 4]
South Vietnamese currency regulations were apparently not the
only barrier to simply discharging Matise with his full wages in
cash in Saigon. The Court of Appeals noted that South Vietnamese
law also required the shipowner to guarantee the removal from the
country of all persons whom it had transported to South Vietnam.
488 F.2d 469, 471-472.
[
Footnote 5]
Apart from the airline ticket expense, several deductions, none
of them here at issue, were also reflected on the wage voucher.
[
Footnote 6]
Such a release is required by 46 U.S.C. § 644. Once such a
release is signed, it
"shall operate as a mutual discharge and settlement of all
demands for wages between the parties thereto, on account of wages,
in respect of the past voyage or engagement,"
§ 644, except that "any court having jurisdiction may upon good
cause shown set aside such release and take such action as justice
shall require." § 597.
[
Footnote 7]
Granville Matise died during the pendency of the suit. Lillian
M. Matise, respondent in this case, was appointed by the State of
Maryland to administer his estate. Pursuant to stipulation, the
District Court substituted respondent as plaintiff in this
action.
[
Footnote 8]
The District Court also held petitioner liable for interest on
these sums, as well as for court costs in both the District Court
and Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 9]
The District Court assessment was made in conformity with
Escobar v. S.S. Washington Trader. See n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 10]
Respondent conceded as much at oral argument before this Court.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 31.
[
Footnote 11]
46 U.S.C. §§ 659, 663, 701, 707.
[
Footnote 12]
The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's finding that
Matise had consented to the purchase of the airline ticket with
part of the wages due him, in part because of its conclusion that
Matise was "compelled to sign the release and Wage Voucher in order
to receive the remainder of his wages that admittedly were due."
488 F.2d at 473. But there is nothing in the record to indicate
that Matise's signing the wage voucher and release was the product
of any such compulsion. Indeed, no claim is made that Matise
registered any dissatisfaction whatsoever with either the form or
amount of his wages until some months after signing the release.
Nor was he the subject of any fraud or misrepresentation.
See n.
14
infra. Accordingly, the District Court's finding that
Matise had consented to and approved the form and amount of his
wage payment was not clearly erroneous, and should have been
respected by the Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 13]
To the extent that the respondent in
Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Johnson, 343 U. S. 779
(1952), was ultimately liable for the expenses surrounding his
shipmate's injury, he too could be said to have benefited from the
shipowner's payment of those expenses. However, unlike the case
before us today, this was a "benefit" that he could have secured
for himself had he been paid the wages directly.
[
Footnote 14]
Any suggestion that, on Matise's discharge, petitioner had a
repatriation obligation to him independent of the obligation to pay
wages is without merit. That this is so follows from respondent's
concession that the discharge was validly based on Matise's
misconduct. A shipowner's obligation to repatriate a seaman
discharged in a foreign port depends on the circumstances of the
discharge. For instance, there is a general obligation to
repatriate seamen who, through causes other than their own
misconduct, have been injured.
See Ladzinski v. Sperlin S.S.
& Trading Corp., 300 F.
Supp. 947, 956 (SDNY 1969);
Miller v. United States,
51 F. Supp. 924 (SDNY 1943);
The Centennial, 10 F. 397 (ED
La. 1881); 1 M. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 418 (1970). On the
other hand, as the Court of Appeals recognized in this case, 488
F.2d at 471, there is no obligation to repatriate a seaman like
Matise who has been discharged for misconduct. 1 Norris,
supra, § 420.
See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.,
318 U. S. 724,
318 U. S. 731
(1943).
Nothing in
Isbrandtsen suggests that, when a seaman
concedes that his discharge for misconduct is warranted, the
shipowner must pay for the seaman's repatriation, and only later
claim reimbursement from him. It is true that
Isbrandtsen
indicated that, because of the importance of repatriation
allowances to seamen, amounts not deductible from earned wages may
not be deducted from a repatriation allowance that is owing to a
seaman. 343 U.S. at
343 U. S. 789
n. 12. But, in this case, we are presented, not with a deduction
from a repatriation allowance that was owed to Matise, but rather,
because of the nature of Matise's discharge, with the
absence of any obligation at all on the part of the
shipowner toward Matise to repatriate him. The Vice Consul's advice
to the master,
see supra at
423 U. S. 153,
that petitioner had no obligation -- even of a temporary nature --
to pay for Matise's return to the United States was correct. It
follows that Matise's consent to partial payment was not, as the
Court of Appeals indicated, 488 F.2d at 473, the product of
misinformation.
[
Footnote 15]
The Court of Appeals' reference to § 597 was apparently to the
following language:
"
Every seaman . . . shall be entitled to receive on
demand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs one-half
part of the balance of his wages . . . at the time when such demand
is made at every port where such vessel . . . shall load or deliver
cargo before the voyage is ended. . . ."
46 U.S.C. § 597 (emphasis added). For reasons identical to those
presented with regard to § 596, we reject any reading of § 597 that
bars the method of payment utilized in this case.