After their request for a jury trial was denied, petitioners, a
labor union officer and the union, were adjudged guilty of criminal
contempt for violating temporary injunctions issued by the District
Court pursuant to § 10(
l) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) against picketing of an employer pending the National
Labor Relations Board's final disposition of the employer's unfair
labor practice charge against such picketing. The District Court
suspended sentencing of the officer and placed him on probation,
but imposed a $10,000 fine on the union. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners' claims that they had a statutory
right to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3692, which provides for
jury trial in contempt cases arising under any federal law
governing the issuance of injunctions "in any case" growing out of
a labor dispute, and that they also had a right to a jury trial
under the Constitution (the latter question being limited in this
Court to whether the union had such a constitutional right).
Held:
1. Petitioners are not entitled to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3692. Pp.
422 U. S.
458-474.
(a) It is clear from § 10(
l) of the NLRA, as added by
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), and related sections,
particularly § 10(h) (which provides that the courts' jurisdiction
to grant temporary injunctive relief or to enforce or set aside an
NLRB unfair practice order shall not be limited by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act), and from the legislative history of such
sections, that Congress not only intended to exempt injunctions
authorized by the NLRA and the LMRA from the Norris-LaGuardia Act's
limitations, including original § 11 of the latter Act (now
repealed) requiring jury trials in contempt actions arising out of
that Act, but also intended that civil and criminal contempt
proceedings enforcing those injunctions were not to afford
contemnors the right to a jury trial. By providing for labor Act
injunctions outside the Norris-LaGuardia Act's framework, Congress
necessarily contemplated that there would be no right to a jury
trial in such contempt proceedings. Pp.
422 U. S.
458-467.
Page 422 U. S. 455
(b) Absent an express provision or any indication in the
Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. § 3692 that a substantive change in the
law was contemplated, no intention on Congress' part to change its
original intention that there be no jury trials in contempt
proceedings arising out of NLRA injunctions is shown by the fact
that § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia.Act was repealed and replaced by
§ 3692 as part of the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code. Just as §
3692 may not be read apart from other relevant provisions of the
labor law, that section likewise may not be read isolated from its
legislative history and the revision process from which it emerged,
all of which place definite limitations on this Court's latitude in
construing it. Pp.
422 U. S.
467-474.
2. Nor does petitioner union have a right to a jury trial under
Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment. Despite
18 U.S.C. § 1(3), which defines petty offenses as those crimes "the
penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six
months or a fine of not more than $500, or both," a contempt need
not be considered a serious crime under all circumstances where the
punishment is a fine of more than $500, unaccompanied by
imprisonment. Here, where it appears that petitioner union collects
dues from some 13,000 persons, the $10,000 fine imposed was not of
such magnitude that the union was deprived of whatever right to a
jury trial it might have under the Sixth Amendment. Pp.
422 U. S.
475-477.
492 F.2d 929, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS,
J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
422 U. S. 478.
STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and
POWELL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
422 U. S.
481.
Page 422 U. S. 456
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issues in this case are whether a labor union or an
individual, when charged with criminal contempt for violating an
injunction issued pursuant to § 10(
l) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, as added, 61 Stat. 149, and as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 10(
l), has a right to a jury trial under 18
U.S.C. § 3692, and whether the union has a right to a jury trial
under the Constitution when charged with such a violation and a
fine of as much as $10,000 is to be imposed.
I
Early in 1970, Local 21 of the San Francisco Typographical Union
commenced picketing a publishing plant of a daily newspaper in San
Rafael, Cal. Shortly thereafter, the newspaper filed an unfair
labor practice charge against this union activity, and the Regional
Director of the National Labor Relations Board, in response to that
filing, petitioned the District Court pursuant to § 10(
l)
for a temporary injunction against those activities pending final
disposition of the charge by the Board. The District Court, after a
hearing, granted the requested relief and, more than two months
later, granted a second petition for a temporary injunction filed
by the Regional Director in response to other union activities
related to
Page 422 U. S. 457
the original dispute. On June 24, 1970, Local 21 and certain of
its officials were found to be in civil contempt of the latter
injunction. After the entry of this contempt order, the tempo of
illegal activities in violation of both injunctions increased, with
other locals, including Local 70, participating. Various unions and
their officers, including petitioners, were subsequently ordered to
show cause why they should not be held in civil and criminal
contempt of the injunctions. After proceedings in the criminal
contempt case had been severed from the civil contempt proceedings,
petitioners demanded a jury trial in the criminal case; this
request was denied and petitioners were adjudged guilty of criminal
contempt after appropriate proceedings. The District Court
suspended the sentencing of petitioner Muniz and placed him on
probation for one year; the court imposed a fine on petitioner
Local 70 which, for purposes of this case, was $10,000. [
Footnote 1] On appeal of that judgment
to the Court of Appeals, petitioners argued,
inter alia,
that they had a statutory right to a jury trial of any disputed
issues of fact, relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3692; [
Footnote 2] petitioners also argued that they had
a right to a jury trial under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution,
and the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals rejected these and
other claims
Page 422 U. S. 458
made by petitioners, 492 F.2d 929 (CA9 1974), who then
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The writ was
granted, 419 U.S. 992 (1974), limited to the questions whether
petitioners had a statutory right to a jury trial and whether
petitioner Local 70 had a constitutional right to jury trial in
this case.
II
The petitioners' claim to jury trial under § 3692 is simply
stated: that section provides for jury trial in contempt cases
arising under any federal law governing the issuance of injunctions
in any case growing out of a labor dispute; here, the injunction
issued under § 10(
l) arose out of a labor dispute in the
most classic sense, and hence contempt proceedings were subject to
§ 3692's requirement for jury trial. Were we to consider only the
language of § 3692, we might be hard pressed to disagree. But it is
not unusual that exceptions to the applicability of a statute's
otherwise all-inclusive language are not contained in the enactment
itself, but are found in another statute dealing with particular
situations to which the first statute might otherwise apply.
[
Footnote 3]
Tidewater
Oil
Page 422 U. S. 459
Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 151
(1972);
MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Tomkins Co.,
322 U. S. 102
(1944). The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, as amended, 29
Page 422 U. S. 460
U.S.C. §.101
et seq., for example, categorically
withdraws jurisdiction from the United States courts to issue any
injunctions against certain conduct arising out of labor
Page 422 U. S. 461
disputes and permits other injunctions in labor disputes only if
certain procedural formalities are satisfied. It contains no
exceptions with respect to injunctions in those labor disputes
dealt with by the Wagner Act, passed in 1935, or by the
Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947. Yet those Acts, expressly or
impliedly,
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U. S. 235
(1970), authorized various kinds of injunctions in labor dispute
cases and expressly or impliedly exempted those injunctions from
the jurisdictional and procedural limitations of Norris-LaGuardia
to the extent necessary to effectuate the provisions of those
Acts.
The crucial issue is whether, in enacting the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts, Congress not only intended to exempt the
injunctions they authorized from Norris-LaGuardia's limitations,
but also intended that civil and criminal contempt proceedings
enforcing those injunctions were not to afford contemnors the right
to a jury trial. Surely, if § 10(
l) of Taft-Hartley had
expressly provided that contempt proceedings arising from the
injunctions which the section authorized would not be subject to
jury trial requirements, it would be as difficult to argue that §
3692 nevertheless requires a jury trial as it would be to insist
that Norris-LaGuardia bars the issuance of any injunctions in the
first place. Section 10(
l), of course, does not so
provide; we think it reasonably clear from that and related
sections and from their legislative history that this result is
precisely what Congress intended.
The Wagner Act made employers subject to court orders enforcing
Board cease and desist orders. Those orders, or many of them, were
of the kind Norris-LaGuardia, on its face, prohibited; but § 10(h)
of the Wagner Act provided that, in
"granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order,
or . . . enforcing . . . or setting aside . . . an order of the
Board, . . .
Page 422 U. S. 462
the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be
limited by"
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115. In 1947, in passing the Taft-Hartley Act
as part of the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress provided
for unfair labor practice proceedings against unions; and § 10(j)
gave jurisdiction to the courts to issue injunctions in unfair
labor practice proceedings, whether against unions or management,
pending final disposition by the Board. Section 10(
l) made
special provision for interim injunctions "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" in particular kinds of unfair labor
practice proceedings against unions. Section 10(h) was retained in
its original form.
No party in this case suggests that the injunctions authorized
by Congress in 1935 and 1947 were subject to the jurisdictional and
procedural limitations of Norris-LaGuardia. Neither can it be
seriously argued that, at the time of enactment of the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts, civil or criminal contempt charges arising from
violations of injunctions authorized by those statutes were to be
tried to a jury. The historic rule at the time was that, absent
contrary provision by rule or statute, jury trial was not required
in the case of either civil or criminal contempt.
See Green v.
United States, 356 U. S. 165,
356 U. S. 183,
356 U. S. 189
(1958). Section 11 of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. § 111 (1946 ed.),
[
Footnote 4] required jury
trials in contempt actions arising out of labor disputes. But § 11
was among those sections which § 10(h) expressly provided would not
limit the power of federal courts to
Page 422 U. S. 463
enforce Board orders. Moreover, § 11 was limited, by its own
terms and by judicial decision, to cases "arising under" the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
United States v. Mine Workers,
330 U. S. 258,
330 U. S. 298
(1947). Injunctions issued pursuant to either the Wagner Act or
Taft-Hartley Act were not issued "under," but in spite of,
Norris-LaGuardia; [
Footnote 5]
and contempt actions charging violations of those injunctions were
not "cases arising under" Norris-LaGuardia. Section 11 of
Norris-LaGuardia was thus, on its face, inapplicable to injunctions
authorized by the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts; petitioners do not
contend otherwise. They say:
"From the effective date of Taft-Hartley in late summer, 1947,
until June 28, 1948, the effective date of the new § 3692, an
alleged contemnor of a Taft-Hartley injunction would probably have
been denied the jury trial guaranteed by § 11 of Norris-LaGuardia,
because the injunction would not have been one arising under
Norris-LaGuardia itself."
Brief for Petitioners 41.
It would be difficult to contend otherwise. It seems beyond
doubt that, since 1935, it had been understood that the injunctions
and enforcement orders referred to in § 10(h) were not subject to
the jury requirements of § 11 of Norris-LaGuardia. When Congress
subjected labor unions to unfair labor practice proceedings in
1947, and in §§ 10(j) and 10(
l) provided for interim
injunctive relief from the courts pending Board decision in unfair
labor practice cases, it was equally plain that § 11, by its own
terms, would not apply to contempt cases arising out of these
injunctions. By providing for labor
Page 422 U. S. 464
Act injunctions outside the framework of Norris-LaGuardia,
Congress necessarily contemplated that there would be no right to
jury trial in contempt cases.
That this was the congressional understanding is revealed by the
legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act.
[
Footnote 6] The House
Managers' statement in explanation of the House Conference Report
on Taft-Hartley stated:
"Sections 10(g), (h), and (i) of the present act, concerning the
effect upon the Board's orders of enforcement and review
proceedings,
making inapplicable the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in proceedings before the court, were
unchanged either by the House bill or by the Senate amendment, and
are carried into the conference agreement."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 57 (1947)
(emphasis added). [
Footnote
7]
Page 422 U. S. 465
Such also was the understanding of Senator Ball, unchallenged on
this point by his colleagues on the floor of the Senate during the
debate on Taft-Hartley. Senator Ball stated:
"[T]he . . . Norris-LaGuardia Act is completely suspended . . .
in the current National Labor Relations Act whenever the Board goes
into court to obtain an enforcement order for one of its decisions.
Organized labor did not object to the suspension of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in that case, I suppose presumably because,
under the present act, the only ones to whom it could apply are
employers. Organized labor was perfectly willing to have the
Norris-LaGuardia Act completely wiped off the books when it came to
enforcing Board orders in labor disputes against employers."
93 Cong.Rec. 4835 (1947). This statement was made in the context
of Senator Ball's explanation of his proposed amendment to §
10(
l) as reported out of committee. That section provided
generally that the Board would be required, under certain
circumstances, to seek injunctive relief in the federal
Page 422 U. S. 466
courts against secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes
"notwithstanding any other provision of law. . . ." Senator Ball's
proposed amendment would have had two effects; first, it would have
permitted private parties, in addition to the Board, to seek
injunctive relief against the identical practices directly in the
District Court; and, second, the amendment would have left in
effect for such proceedings the provisions of §§ 11 and 12 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, giving defendants in such proceedings the
right to a jury trial. As Senator Ball stated:
"[W]hen the regional attorney of the NLRB seeks an injunction
[pursuant to § 10(
l) as reported] the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is completely suspended. . . . We do not go quite that far in our
amendment. We simply provide that the Norris-LaGuardia Act shall
not apply, with certain exceptions. We leave in effect the
provisions of sections 11 and 12. Those are the sections which give
an individual charged with contempt of court the right to a jury
trial."
93 Cong.Rec. 4834 (1947). The Ball amendment was defeated, and
private injunctive actions were not authorized. But the provisions
for Board injunctions were retained, and the necessity for them
explained in the Senate Report:
"Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and
consequently the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and
order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree of the
circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving the desired
objectives -- the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and encouragement of the practice and
procedure of free and private collective bargaining. Hence, we have
provided that the Board,
acting in the public interest and
not
Page 422 U. S. 467
in vindication of purely private rights, may seek
injunctive relief in the case of all types of unfair labor
practices, and that it shall also seek such relief in the case of
strikes and boycotts defined as unfair labor practices."
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1947) (emphasis
added).
III
It is argued, however, that whatever the intention of Congress
might have been with respect to jury trial in contempt actions
arising out of Taft-Hartley injunctions, all this was changed when
§ 11 was repealed and replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 3692 as part of the
1948 revision of the Criminal Code, in the course of which some
sections formerly in Title 18 were revised and some related
provisions in other titles were recodified in Title 18. The new §
3692, it is insisted, required jury trials for contempt charges
arising out of any injunctive order issued under the Labor
Management Relations Act if a labor dispute of any kind was
involved. Thenceforward, it is claimed, contempt proceedings for
violations by unions or employers of enforcement orders issued by
courts of appeals or of injunctions issued under § 10(j) or §
10(
l) must provide the alleged contemnor a jury trial.
This argument is unpersuasive. Not a word was said in connection
with recodifying § 11 as § 3692 of the Criminal Code that would
suggest any such important change in the settled intention of
Congress, when it enacted the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, that
there would be no jury trials in contempt proceedings arising out
of labor Act injunctions. Injunctions authorized by the Labor
Management Relations Act were limited to those sought by the Board,
"acting in the public interest, and not in vindication of purely
private rights." S.Rep.
Page 422 U. S. 468
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1947). We cannot accept the
proposition that Congress, without expressly so providing, intended
in § 3692 to change the rules for enforcing injunctions which the
Labor Management Relations Act authorized the Labor Board, an
agency of the United States, to seek in a United States court.
Cf. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at
330 U. S.
269-276. [
Footnote
8] Just as § 3692 may not be read apart from other relevant
provisions of the labor law, that section likewise may not be read
isolated from its legislative history and the revision process from
which it emerged, all of which place definite limitations on the
latitude we have in construing it. The revision of the Criminal
Code was, as petitioners suggest, a massive undertaking, but,
Page 422 U. S. 469
as the Senate Report on that legislation made clear, "[t]he
original intent of Congress is preserved." S.Rep. No. 1620, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1948). Nor is it arguable that there was any
intent in the House to work a change in the understood
applicability of § 11 in enacting § 3692. The House Report stated
that
"[r]evision, as distinguished from codification, meant the
substitution of plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of
conflicting laws, omission of superseded sections, and
consolidation of similar provisions."
H.R.Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947). Revisions in
the law were carefully explained [
Footnote 9] in a series of Reviser's Notes printed in the
House Report.
Id. at A1
et seq. But the Reviser's
Note to § 3692 indicates no change of substance in the law:
"Based on section 111 of title 29, U.S.C.1940 ed., Labor (Mar.
23, 1932, ch. 90, § 11, 47 Stat. 72)."
"The phrase"
"or the District of Columbia arising under the laws of the
United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining
orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute"
"was inserted and the reference to specific sections of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act (sections 101-115 of title 29, U.S.C.1940 ed.)
were eliminated."
H.R.Rep. No. 304,
supra at A176; 18 U.S.C. pp. 4442
4443.
It has long been a
"familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit nor within the intention of its makers."
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.
S. 457,
143 U. S. 459
(1892). Whatever may be said with regard to the application of this
rule in other
Page 422 U. S. 470
contexts, this Court has stated unequivocally that the principle
embedded in the rule "has particular application in the
construction of labor legislation. . . ."
National Woodwork
Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612,
386 U. S. 619
(1967). Moreover, we are construing a statute of Congress which,
like its predecessor, created an exception to the historic rule
that there was no right to a jury trial in contempt proceedings. To
read a substantial change in accepted practice into a revision of
the Criminal Code without any support in the legislative history of
that revision is insupportable. As this Court said in
United
States v. Ryder, 110 U. S. 729,
110 U. S. 740
(1884):
"It will not be inferred that the legislature, in revising and
consolidating the laws, intended to change their policy, unless
such an intention be clearly expressed."
The general rule announced in
Ryder was applied by this
Court in
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp.,
353 U. S. 222
(1957). In that case, the question was whether venue in patent
infringement actions was to be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), a
discrete provision dealing with venue in patent infringement
actions, or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a general provision dealing with
venue in actions brought against corporations. Both of these
provisions underwent some change in wording in the 1948 revision of
the Judicial Code. [
Footnote
10] The respondents in that
Page 422 U. S. 471
case, arguing in favor of the applicability of the general venue
provision, § 1391(c), took the position that the plain language of
§ 1391(c) was "clear and unambiguous, and that its terms include
all actions. . . ." 353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 228.
This Court, stating that the respondents' argument "merely points
up the question, and does nothing to answer it,"
ibid.,
determined that the general provision, § 1391(c), had to be read in
a fashion consistent with the more particular provision, § 1400(b).
The respondents contended, however, that the predecessor of §
1400(b), which this Court had held to govern venue irrespective of
a general revenue provision,
Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin
Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561
(1942), had undergone a substantive change during the revision of
the Judicial Code in 1948 which effectively reversed the result
dictated by
Stonite.
The Court rejected this argument in terms acutely
Page 422 U. S. 782
relevant to this case. "[N]o changes of law or policy," the
Court said, "are to be presumed from changes of language in the
revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly
expressed." 353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 227.
Furthermore, a change in the language of a statute itself was not
enough to establish an intent to effect a substantive change, for
"every change made in the text is explained in detail in the
Revisers' Notes,"
id. at
353 U. S. 226,
and the Notes failed to express any substantive change. The Court
relied on the Senate and House Reports on the 1948 revision to
support this position,
id. at
353 U. S. 226
nn. 6 and 7; the language quoted by the Court from the House Report
is virtually identical to that which appears in the House Report of
the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code,
see n 9,
supra. In view of the express
disavowals in the House and Senate Reports on the revisions of both
the Criminal Code,
see supra at
422 U. S.
468-469, and the Judicial Code,
see n 10,
supra, it would seem
difficult, at best, to argue that a change in the substantive law
could nevertheless be effected by a change in the language of a
statute without any indication in the Reviser's Note of that
change. It is not tenable to argue that the Reviser's Note to §
3692, although it explained in detail what words were deleted from
and added to what had been § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, simply
did not bother to explain at all, much less in detail, that an
admittedly substantial right was being conferred on potential
contemnors that had been rejected in the defeat of the Ball
amendment the previous year and that, historically, contemnors had
never enjoyed. [
Footnote
11]
Page 422 U. S. 473
In
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.
S. 151 (1972), the Court applied the rule that revisions
contained in the 1948 Judicial Code should be construed by
reference to the Reviser's Notes. The question was whether a change
in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), made in the 1948
revision of the Judicial Code, had modified a longstanding policy
under § 2 of the Expediting Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 29, providing generally that this Court should have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over civil antitrust
Page 422 U. S. 474
actions brought by the Government. Section 1292(a)(1), as
revised, was susceptible of two constructions, one of which would
have resulted in a change in that policy. After emphasizing that
"the function of the Revisers of the 1948 Code was generally
limited to that of consolidation and codification," we invoked
the
"well established principle governing the interpretation of
provisions altered in the 1948 revision . . . that 'no change is to
be presumed unless clearly expressed.'"
409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 162,
quoting
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 228.
After going to the committee reports, the Court went to the
Reviser's Notes and, in the Note to § 1292(a)(1), found no
affirmative indication of a substantive change. On this basis, the
Court refused to give § 1292(a)(1) as revised the "plausible"
construction urged by respondents there.
In this case, involving the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code,
the House and Senate Reports caution repeatedly against reading
substantive changes into the revision, and the Reviser's Note to §
3692 gives absolutely no indication that a substantive change in
the law was contemplated. In these circumstances, our cases and the
canon of statutory construction which Congress expected would be
applied to the revisions of both the Criminal and Judicial Codes
require us to conclude, along with all the lower federal courts
having considered this question since 1948, save one, that § 3692
does not provide for trial by jury in contempt proceedings brought
to enforce an injunction issued at the behest of the Board in a
labor dispute arising under the Labor Management Relations Act.
[
Footnote 12]
Page 422 U. S. 475
IV
We also agree with the Court of Appals that the union petitioner
had no right to a jury trial under At. III, § 2, and the Sixth
Amendment.
Green v. United States, 356 U.
S. 165 (1958), reaffirmed the historic rule that state
and federal courts have the constitutional power to punish any
criminal contempt without a jury trial.
United States v.
Barnett, 376 U. S. 681
(1964), and
Cheff v. Schneckenberg, 384 U.
S. 373 (1966), presaged a change in this rule. The
constitutional doctrine which emerged from later decisions such as
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194
(1968);
Frank v. United States, 395 U.
S. 147 (1969);
Baldwin v. New York,
399 U. S. 66
(1970);
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488
(1974); and
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.
S. 506 (1974), may be capsuled as follows: (1) Like
other minor crimes, "petty" contempts may be tried
Page 422 U. S. 476
without a jury, but contemnors in serious contempt cases in the
federal system have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial; (2)
criminal contempt, in and of itself and without regard to the
punishment imposed, is not a serious offense absent legislative
declaration to the contrary; (3) lacking legislative authorization
of more serious punishment, a sentence of as much as six months in
prison, plus normal periods of probation, may be imposed without a
jury trial; (4) but imprisonment for longer than six months is
constitutionally impermissible unless the contemnor has been given
the opportunity for a jury trial.
This Court has as yet not addressed the question whether and in
what circumstances, if at all, the imposition of a fine for
criminal contempt, unaccompanied by imprisonment, may require a
jury trial if demanded by the defendant. This case presents the
question whether a fine of $10,000 against an unincorporated labor
union found guilty of criminal contempt may be imposed after
denying the union's claim that it was entitled to a jury trial
under the Sixth Amendment. Local 70 insists that, where a fine of
this magnitude is imposed, a contempt cannot be considered a petty
offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), and that its demand
for a jury trial was therefore erroneously denied.
We cannot agree. In determining the boundary between petty and
serious contempts for purposes of applying the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial guarantee, and in holding that a punishment of more than
six months in prison could not be ordered without making a jury
trial available to the defendant, the Court has referred to the
relevant rules and practices followed by the federal and state
regimes, including the definition of petty offenses under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1(3). Under that section, petty offenses are defined as those
crimes "the penalty for which
Page 422 U. S. 477
does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a
fine of not more than $500, or both." But in referring to that
definition, the Court accorded it no talismanic significance, and
we cannot accept the proposition that a contempt must be considered
a serious crime under all circumstances where the punishment is a
fine of more than $500, unaccompanied by imprisonment. It is one
thing to hold that deprivation of an individual's liberty beyond a
six-month term should not be imposed without the protections of a
jury trial, but it is quite another to suggest that, regardless of
the circumstances, a jury is required where any fine greater than
$500 is contemplated. From the standpoint of determining the
seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible deprivation
faced by a contemnor, imprisonment and fines are intrinsically
different. It is not difficult to grasp the proposition that six
months in jail is a serious matter for any individual, but it is
not tenable to argue that the possibility of a $501 fine would be
considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union.
Indeed, although we do not reach or decide the issue tendered by
the respondent -- that there is no constitutional right to a jury
trial in any criminal contempt case where only a fine is imposed on
a corporation or labor union, Brief for Respondent 36 -- we cannot
say that the fine of $10,000 imposed on Local 70 in this case was a
deprivation of such magnitude that a jury should have been
interposed to guard against bias or mistake. This union, the
respondent suggests, collects dues from some 13,000 persons; and
although the fine is not insubstantial, it is not of such magnitude
that the union was deprived of whatever right to jury trial it
might have under the Sixth Amendment. We thus, affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
Page 422 U. S. 478
[
Footnote 1]
A fine of $25,000 was imposed initially, but $15,000 of that
fine was subsequently remitted by the District Court based on Local
70's obedience of the injunctions subsequent to the adjudication of
contempt.
[
Footnote 2]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3692 reads in pertinent part as follows:
"In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United
States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt shall
have been committed."
[
Footnote 3]
Although stating broadly at the outset that,
"[b]y its own terms, [§ 3692] encompasses all cases of contempt
arising under any of the several laws of the United States
governing the issuance of injunctions in cases of a 'labor
dispute,'"
dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART,
post at
422 U. S. 482,
that dissent seems to imply that § 3692, after all, does not reach
all cases of contempt in labor dispute injunctions. That dissent
appears to say that § 3692 provides the right to jury trials only
in cases involving criminal, as opposed to civil, contempt. This is
so, it is suggested, because that section guarantees the right to
"the accused," the inference being that one charged with civil
contempt is not one properly denominated as an "accused."
Post at
422 U. S.
487-488, n. 7. But the phrase "the accused" was taken
verbatim from § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 72, 29
U.S.C. § 111 (1946 ed.), and the legislative history of § 11 leaves
little room to doubt that, when Congress enacted § 11, it intended
that section to be applicable to both criminal and civil contempt
proceedings. That history establishes that § 11 was a compromise
between the Senate version of the bill, which provided for a jury
trial in all contempt cases, and the House version of the bill,
which provided for jury trials in all criminal contempt cases
arising under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The compromise, as
explained to the House, gave the right to a jury trial in all
contempts, civil or criminal, in cases arising under the Act. 75
Cong.Rec. 6336-6337 (1932). In the Senate, Senator Norris himself
explained the compromise as follows:
"As the House passed the bill, it did not apply to all contempt
cases under the act. As the Senate passed it, it applied to all
cases, either under the act or otherwise. As the House passed it,
it applied only to criminal contempt. As the Senate passed it, it
applied to all contempts. The compromise was to confine it to all
cases under the act and to eliminate the word 'criminal,' but the
cases must arise under this act."
Id. at 6450. And, Senator Norris continued:
"Under the compromise made, the language of the Senate was
agreed to, so that now anyone charged with any kind of a contempt
arising under any of the provisions of this act will be entitled to
a jury trial in the contempt proceedings."
Id. at 6453. Certainly when Congress used the phrase
"the accused" in § 11, it did not mean to limit that phrase to
describing only those accused of criminal contempt.
The dissent of MR. JUSTICE STEWART also suggests that this
limited reading of § 3692 is "consistent" with the placing of that
provision, based on § 11 of Norris-LaGuardia, into Title 18 in
1948. If there is any consistency in this suggestion, it is in that
dissent's consistent position that Congress in 1948, without
expressing any intention whatsoever to do so, made substantial
changes in the right to jury trial -- including outright repeal of
whatever statutory right there was to jury trial in civil contempt
cases arising out of labor disputes, thereby reversing itself on an
issue that had been thoroughly considered and decided some 16 years
before in Norris-LaGuardia.
In arguing that § 3692 may not reach civil contempt cases, MR.
JUSTICE STEWART also relies on implications which he finds in §
10(
l) of the LMRA that § 3692, despite its language, has
no application in those cases. As is clear from this opinion,
infra at
422 U. S.
463-467, we too rely on § 10(
l), as well as
other provisions, in suggesting that certain contempt cases are not
reached by § 3692.
There is also a suggestion in the dissent of MR. JUSTICE STEWART
that one charged with contempt of an injunction issued during a
national emergency, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180, would not have the right
to a jury trial notwithstanding § 3692. Apparently this is so
because 29 U.S.C. § 178(b), § 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
"provided simply and broadly that all the provisions of that
[Norris-LaGuardia] Act are inapplicable."
Post at
422 U. S. 488.
But the language Congress used in § 178(b), "the provisions of
sections 101 to 115 of this title, shall not be applicable," is
remarkably similar to the language used in the Conference Report.
of the Taft-Hartley Act to convey the congressional understanding
of § 10(h) of the Wagner Act which it was reenacting in
Taft-Hartley: "making inapplicable the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in proceedings before the courts. . . ."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 57 (1947).
See n 6,
infra.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART's position with respect to the applicability
of § 3692 in proceedings brought in the Court of Appeals to enforce
Board orders directed against employers is even less clear, but it
would seem to be the inescapable conclusion under the dissent's
analysis that, at least in criminal contempts of such orders, the
courts of appeals would be required to empanel juries, a result
that would certainly represent a novel procedure,
see United
States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681,
376 U. S.
690-691, and n. 7 (1964).
On the other hand, if MR. JUSTICE STEWART would limit § 3692 to
apply only to disobedience of those injunctions newly authorized by
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, that section, despite its language,
would not apply to injunctions issued by the courts of appeals in
enforcement actions against employers (it would be otherwise where
unions or employees are involved) for the reason that the
provisions of the Wagner Act included in the LMRA have the effect
of exempting those situations from the reach of § 3692. Very
similar reasons furnish sound ground for the inapplicability of §
3692 to contempt cases arising out of any of the injunctions
authorized by the Taft-Hartley Act.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 111 (1946
ed.), read, in pertinent part, as follows:
"In all cases arising under sections 101-115 of this title in
which a person shall be charged with contempt in a court of the
United States (as herein defined), the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the contempt shall have been
committed."
[
Footnote 5]
The position of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting,
post
at
422 U. S.
478-479, that injunctions issued pursuant to the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts are or would have been "arising under" the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and therefore subject to § 11 prior to 1948,
is contrary to the understanding of the Congresses that passed the
Wagner Act,
n 6,
infra, and the Taft-Hartley Act,
infra at
422 U. S.
464-467, and of every court to have considered this
question,
see cases cited
n 12,
infra.
[
Footnote 6]
The only legislative history of the Wagner Act addressing this
question was the statement of a witness, apparently made in
reference to the original version of § 10(h), § 304(a) of S. 2926,
which was uncontradicted by any prior or subsequent history:
"The whole theory of enforcement of these orders is through
contempt proceedings. . . . [T]he order of the labor board is made
an order of the Federal court, subject to being punished by
contempt. Now, in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, there has been
considerable change of the ordinary procedure on contempt. I won't
go into detail, but simply state that, in a great majority of
instances, punishment, where the employees are the defendants, must
be by trial by jury. This is, of course, not permissible in any
case under the Wagner bill."
Hearings on S. 2926 before the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 505 (1934).
[
Footnote 7]
The dissents suggest that the word "jurisdiction" as used in
both § 10(h) and § 10(
l) is to be read in the technical
sense, and that the reference to all the provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia in § 10(h) was merely "an additional means of
identifying" the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Post at
422 U. S. 486.
Yet the language quoted in the text from the House Managers'
statement supports only the position that Congress, in reenacting §
10(h) in 1947, understood that section as "making inapplicable the
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," not "making inapplicable
the jurisdictional provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" as the
dissents would have it. Support for the position that § 10(h) was
understood by Congress in 1947 to make inapplicable all the
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia comes not only from the House
Managers' statement, but also from a memorandum introduced into the
Congressional Record a decade later by Representative Celler, who
concluded that
"the clear and unequivocal wording of section 10(h). . . clearly
indicates a waiver of all the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, including the provisions for a jury trial, in cases where the
Government was a party to the original action."
103 Cong.Rec. 8685 (1957). Representative Celler was the
chairman of a House subcommittee which had previously held hearings
on the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code including § 3692. The
dissents offer nothing from the legislative history that should
lead us to reject the clear meaning of the House Managers'
statement with respect to the congressional understanding of §
10(h).
[
Footnote 8]
Petitioners' contention that § 3692 was Congress' response to
the Court's decision in
United States v. Mine Workers,
supra, is particularly insupportable in light of the fact that
the Reviser's Note, as set forth
infra at
422 U. S. 469,
was taken verbatim from the prior Reviser's Note to § 3692 that was
reported to the House on February 15, 1945, more than two years
prior to this Court's decision in
Mine Workers and more
than three years prior to the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code.
The bill reported to the House in 1945, H.R. 2200, was adopted by
the House on July 16, 1946, again prior to the decision in
United Mine Workers and prior to February 5, 1947, when
the House Committee on Education and Labor began hearings on labor
legislation which eventually led to the introduction of the
Taft-Hartley bill in the House on April 10, 1947. The identical
version of the Criminal Code passed the House for the final time on
May 12, 1947, almost two months prior to the House's acceptance of
the conference version of Taft-Hartley.
There could be no argument that the change in wording in § 3692
was intended to reach criminal contempt proceedings for violation
of those Board injunctions newly authorized in 1947, for the House
of Representatives passed § 3692 for the first time more than six
months before hearings even commenced in the House to consider the
Taft-Hartley legislation, and passed it for the second and final
time, unchanged, almost two months before the House accepted the
conference version of Taft-Hartley.
[
Footnote 9]
The House Report states that "[t]he reviser's notes . . .
explain in detail every change made in text." H.R.Rep. No. 304,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1947).
[
Footnote 10]
The Court's analysis in
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Corp., 353 U. S. 222
(1957), is particularly relevant to our inquiry in this case
because of the parallel courses followed by the revisions of the
Criminal and Judicial Codes. The revision to the Criminal Code was
prepared by a staff of experts drawn from various sources and,
after this staff completed its work on that revision, the same
staff turned its attention to the revision of the Judicial Code.
The only hearings held in the House on either of the revisions were
held jointly by a subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary. Hearings on Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United
States Code, before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The House Reports
issued subsequent to those hearings parallel one another in many
respects, including almost identical statements respecting the
purpose and scope of the two revisions.
Compare H.R.Rep.
No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947), quoted in the text,
supra at
422 U. S. 469,
with H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947):
"Revision, as distinguished from codification, required the
substitution of plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of
conflicting laws, repeal of superseded sections, and consolidation
of related provisions."
The Senate Reports on the two revisions likewise expressed the
intention of preserving the original meaning of the statutes
undergoing revision.
Compare S.Rep. No. 1620, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1 (1948), quoted in the text,
supra at
422 U. S. 469,
with S.Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1948)
("great care has been exercised to make no changes in the existing
law which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval").
Testimony in the House joint hearings confirms that the methods and
intent of the revisers themselves were the same with respect to
both revisions. Hearings,
supra at 6.
[
Footnote 11]
This point was clearly made by the Law Revision Counsel to the
House subcommittee which held joint hearings on the revisions to
the Judicial and Criminal Codes:
"There is one thing that I would like to point out . . . , and
that is the rule of statutory construction."
"In the work of revision, principally codification, as we have
done here, keeping revision to a minimum, I believe the rule of
statutory construction is that a mere change of wording will not
effect a change in meaning unless a clear intent to change the
meaning is evidenced."
"To find out the intent, I think the courts would go to the
report of the committee on the bills and these reports are most
comprehensive. We have incorporated in them . . . notes to each
section of the bills, both the criminal code and the judicial
code."
"It is clearly indicated in each of those revisers' notes
whether any change was intended, so that, merely because we have
changed the language -- we have changed the language to get a
uniform style, to avoid awkward expression, to state a thing more
concisely and succinctly -- but a mere change in language will not
be interpreted as an intent to change the law unless there is some
other clear evidence of an intent to change the law."
Hearings on Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States
Code before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 (1947) (emphasis added).
This statement is particularly persuasive in view of the fact
that its maker, Mr. Zinn, had served as Counsel to the Committee on
Revision of the Laws for the previous eight years; the House Report
on the revision of the Criminal Code pointed out that Mr. Zinn had,
for that Committee, "exercised close and constant supervision" over
the work of the revisers who prepared the revision. H.R.Rep. No.
304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1947). The nature of the revision
process itself requires the courts, including this Court, to give
particular force to the many express disavowals in the House and
Senate Reports of any intent to effect substantive changes in the
law.
[
Footnote 12]
Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed Mill
Workers, 334 F.2d 1014 (CA7 1964),
cert. denied, 379
U.S. 967 (1965) (§ 10(
l) proceeding);
Schauffler v.
Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Assn., 189 F. Supp.
737 (ED Pa.1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 292 F.2d 182
(CA3 1961) (§ 10(
l) proceeding).
See United States v.
Robinson, 449 F.2d 925 (CA9 1971) (suit for injunctive relief
brought by the United States against employees of a federal
agency);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.
Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 127 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 380 F.2d
570,
cert. denied, 389 U. S. 327
(1967) (proceeding under Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151
et
seq.);
NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, 193 F.2d 979
(CA5 1952) (proceeding brought for violation of § 7 of the Wagner
Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, now 29 U.S.C. § 157);
In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 386 F.2d 309 (CA5 1967)
(proceedings for violation of § 7 of the Wagner Act, as amended by
the Taft-Hartley Act, now 29 U.S.C. § 157);
Mitchell v. Barbee
Lumber Co., 35 F.R.D. 544 (SD Miss.1964) (proceedings brought
for violation of order issued for violation of Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq.);
In re Piccinini,
35 F.R.D. 548 (WD Pa.1964) (proceedings brought for violation of
consent decree involving Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq.). The only decision to the contrary,
In re
Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 502 F.2d 113 (CA1 1974), was
decided without express reference to any of the pertinent
legislative history of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts; the panel
of the Court of Appeals was itself divided over the correct result,
see id. at 121-122 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I
I believe that petitioners are entitled to trial by jury under
18 U.S.C. § 3692, which provides that, with certain exceptions not
here material:
"In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United
States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury. . . ."
In enacting this language in 1948, Congress reaffirmed the
purpose originally expressed in § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
47 Stat. 72, 29 U.S.C. § 111 (1946 ed.). That Act was intended to
shield the organized labor movement from the intervention of a
federal judiciary perceived by some as hostile to labor. The Act
severely constrained the power of a federal court to issue an
injunction against any person "participating or interested in a
labor dispute." Section 11 provided for trial by jury in "all cases
arising under this Act in which a person shall be charged with
contempt." In the context of the case now before us, I view this
section as affording, at the very least, a jury trial in any
criminal contempt proceeding involving an alleged violation of an
injunction issued against a participant in a "labor dispute." Any
such injunction issued by a federal court was one "arising under"
the Act, for it could have been issued only in accordance with the
Act's prescriptions. [
Footnote 2/1]
The evident congressional intent was to provide
Page 422 U. S. 479
for the interposition of a jury when disobedience of such an
injunction was alleged. [
Footnote
2/2]
For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE STEWART,
post at
422 U. S.
485-486, I am persuaded that §§ 10(h) and 10(
l)
of the National Labor Relations Act made inapplicable only the
anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and did not
disturb § 11. The broad mandate of § 11, to afford trial by jury in
a contempt proceeding involving an injunction issued in a labor
dispute, was thus, continued in § 3692. [
Footnote 2/3]
See Green v. United States,
356 U. S. 165,
356 U. S. 217
(1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
II
I would reverse the judgment against Local 70 or constitutional
grounds. [
Footnote 2/4] Article
III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all
Crimes, except
Page 422 U. S. 480
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . . ." And the Sixth
Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . .
."
(Emphasis added.) The Court fails to give effect to this
language when it declares that a $10,000 fine is not "of such
magnitude that a jury should have been interposed to guard against
bias or mistake."
Ante at
422 U. S. 477.
I have previously protested this Court's refusal to recognize a
right to jury trial in cases where it deems an offense to be
"petty." [
Footnote 2/5] But even
the "petty offense" exception cannot justify today's result, for it
is impossible fairly to characterize either the offense or its
penalty as "petty." [
Footnote 2/6]
Disobedience of an injunction obtained by the Board is hardly a
transgression trivial by its nature, and the imposition of a
$10,000 fine is not a matter most locals would take lightly. In any
event, the Constitution deprives us of the power to grant or
withhold trial by jury depending upon our assessment of the
substantiality of the penalty. To the argument that the Framers
could not have intended to provide trial by jury in cases involving
only
Page 422 U. S. 481
"small" fines and imprisonment, the response of Justices
McReynolds and Butler in
District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U. S. 617,
300 U. S.
633-634 (1937) (separate opinion), is apt:
"In a suit at common law to recover above $20.00, a jury trial
is assured. And to us, it seems improbable that, while providing
for this protection in such a trifling matter, the framers of the
Constitution intended that it might be denied where imprisonment
for a considerable time or liability for fifteen times $20.00
confronts the accused."
I would follow the clear command of Art. III and the Sixth
Amendment and reverse the judgment as to Local 70.
[
Footnote 2/1]
As initially enacted by the Senate, § 11 contained no "arising
under" language, and would have applied in all criminal contempt
proceeding, whether or not involving an injunction issued in a
labor dispute.
See S.Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.,
23 (1932); 75 Cong.Rec. 4510-4511, 4757-4761 (1932). The "arising
under" language was added by the House-Senate conferees to restrict
the scope of § 11 to labor disputes.
See id. at 6336-6337,
6450.
[
Footnote 2/2]
This construction is consistent with the remark in
United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258,
330 U. S. 298
(1947), that
"§ 11 is not operative here, for it applies only to cases
'arising under this Act,' and we have already held that the
restriction upon injunctions imposed by the Act do [
sic]
not govern this case."
As the entire sentence makes clear, § 11 was "not operative"
because the Court had found that the underlying dispute between the
Government and the Mine Workers was not the kind of "labor dispute"
to which the Norris-LaGuardia Act had been addressed.
See
330 U.S. at
330 U. S.
274-280.
See also id. at
330 U. S.
328-330 (Black and DOUGLAS, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/3]
We deal here with criminal contempt proceedings. Whether § 3692
affords trial by jury in civil contempt proceedings is a question
not presented here and on which, accordingly, I express no
opinion.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Petitioner Muniz apparently decided not to raise the
constitutional issue in this Court; our grant of certiorari on the
issue thus, extended only to Local 70. 419 U.S. 992 (1974).
[
Footnote 2/5]
E.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S.
66,
399 U. S. 74-76
(1970) (Black, J., joined by DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment);
Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147,
395 U. S.
159-160 (1969) (Black, J., joined by DOUGLAS, J.,
dissenting).
See also Johnson v. Nebraska, 419 U.
S. 949 (1974) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
[
Footnote 2/6]
As noted in my dissenting opinion in
Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373,
384 U. S.
386-391 (1966), the "petty offense" doctrine began as an
effort to identify offenses that were by their nature "petty," and
the punishment prescribed or imposed was one factor to be
considered in characterizing the offense. Under the Court's current
formulation, the penalty is of controlling significance.
See
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506,
418 U. S. 512
(1974).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR.
JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
In 1948, Congress repealed § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47
Stat. 72, 29 U.S.C. § 111 (1946 ed.), which provided a right to a
jury trial in cases of contempt arising under that Act, and added §
3692 to Title 18 of the United States Code, broadly guaranteeing a
jury trial
"[i]n all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United
States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute."
I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that this
congressional action was without any significance and that § 3692
does not apply to any contempt proceedings involving injunctions
that may be issued pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 49
Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151
et seq. Accordingly,
I would reverse the judgment before us.
The contempt proceedings in the present case arose out of a
dispute between Local 21 of the International Typographical Union
and the San Rafael Independent Journal.
Page 422 U. S. 482
Local 21 represents the Independent Journal's composing room
employees. Following expiration of the old collective bargaining
agreement between Local 21 and the Independent Journal,
negotiations for a new agreement reached an impasse. As a result,
Local 21 instituted strike action against the Independent Journal.
See San Francisco Typographical Union No. 21, 188 N.L.R.B.
673,
enforced, 465 F.2d 53 (CA9). The primary strike
escalated into illegal secondary boycott activity, in which four
other unions, including the petitioner Local 70, participated. The
National Labor Relations Board, through its Regional Director,
obtained an injunction pursuant to § 10(
l) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as added, 61 Stat. 149, and as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(
l), to bring a halt to that secondary
activity. When the proscribed secondary conduct continued,
apparently in willful disobedience of the § 10(
l)
injunction, criminal contempt proceedings were instituted.
See
ante at
422 U. S.
456-457.
Section 3692 unambiguously guarantees a right to a jury trial in
such criminal contempt proceedings. The section provides in
pertinent part:
"In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United
States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt shall
have been committed."
Section 3692 thus, expressly applies to more than just those
cases of contempt arising under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. By its
own terms, the section encompasses all cases of contempt arising
under any of the several laws of the United States governing the
issuance of injunctions in cases of a "labor dispute." Section
10(
l) of
Page 422 U. S. 483
the National Labor Relations Act, which authorized the
injunction issued by the District Court, is, in the context of this
case, most assuredly one of those laws.
Section 10(
l) requires the Board's regional official to
petition the appropriate district court for injunctive relief
pending final Board adjudication when he has "reasonable cause" to
believe that a labor organization or its agents have engaged in
certain specified unfair labor practices. [
Footnote 3/1] Although not all unfair labor practices
potentially subject to § 10(
l) injunctions need arise out
of a "labor dispute," both the primary strike and the secondary
activity in this case concerned the "terms or conditions of
employment" of Local 21 members. Thus, the injunction and
subsequent contempt proceedings clearly involved a "labor dispute"
as that term is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
National Labor Relations Act. [
Footnote
3/2] Accordingly, § 10(
l) is here a law governing the
issuance of an injunction in
Page 422 U. S. 484
a case growing out of a labor dispute, and the criminal contempt
proceedings against the petitioners clearly come within the
explicit reach of § 3692. [
Footnote
3/3]
There is nothing in the rather meager legislative history of §
3692 to indicate that, despite the comprehensive language of the
section, Congress intended that it was to apply only to injunctions
covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The revisers did not say that
§ 3692 was intended to be merely a recodification of § 11 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. [
Footnote
3/4] Rather, the revisers said that the section was "based on"
§ 11, and then noted without additional comment the change in
language from reference to specific sections of Norris-LaGuardia to
the more inclusive "laws of the United States. . . ." H.R.Rep. No.
304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A176. In contrast, although the
recodification of 18 U.S.C. § 402, dealing with contempts
constituting crimes, was also "based on" prior law, the revisers
specifically noted that,
"[i]n transferring these sections to this title and in
consolidating them numerous changes of phraseology were
Page 422 U. S. 485
necessary which do not, however, change their meaning or
substance."
H.R.Rep. No. 304,
supra at A30; 18 U.S.C. p. 4192. The
brief legislative history of § 3692 is, accordingly, completely
consistent with the plain meaning of the words of that section.
Nothing in § 10(
l), or in any other provision of the
National Labor Relations Act, requires that § 3692 be given any
different meaning in cases involving injunctions issued pursuant to
the Act. To be sure, § 10(
l) provides that, upon the
filing of a Board petition for a temporary injunction,
"the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such
injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just
and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law. . . ."
But requiring a jury trial prior to finding a union or union
member in criminal contempt for violation of a § 10(
l)
injunction is entirely compatible with that provision. Although
such a reading of § 3692 provides procedural protection to the
alleged contemnor, it in no way limits the jurisdiction of the
district court to grant an injunction at the request of the
Board.
Similarly, § 10(h) does not indicate a congressional intent to
eliminate the jury trial requirement for criminal contempts arising
from disobedience of injunctions issued pursuant to the National
Labor Relations Act. [
Footnote 3/5]
That
Page 422 U. S. 486
section provides in part that,
"[w]hen granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining
order, . . . the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not
be limited by the Act entitled 'An Act to amend the Judicial Code
and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting in
equity, and for other purposes,' approved March 23, 1932 (U.S.C.
Supp. VII, title 29, secs. 101-115)."
Although § 10(h) thus cites parenthetically all the sections of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, including § 11's jury trial provision,
which was codified at 29 U.S.C. § 111, it does so solely as an
additional means of identifying the Act. Substantively § 10(h),
like § 10(
l), provides only that the jurisdiction of
equity courts shall not be limited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But
Norris-LaGuardia, as its title indicates, was enacted to limit
jurisdiction "and for other purposes." Section 11, upon which §
3692 was based, was not concerned with jurisdiction; it provided
procedural protections to alleged contemnors, one of the Act's
"other purposes."
In contrast, when Congress provided for the issuance of
injunctions during national emergencies as part of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 176-180, it did not merely state that the
jurisdiction of district courts under those circumstances is not
limited by Norris-LaGuardia. Rather, it provided simply and broadly
that all of the provisions of that Act are inapplicable. 29 U.S.C.
§ 178(h). [
Footnote 3/6]
Page 422 U. S. 487
If, contrary to the above discussion, there is any ambiguity
about § 3692, it should nonetheless be read as extending a right to
a jury trial in the criminal contempt proceedings now before us
under the firmly established canon of statutory construction
mandating that any ambiguity concerning criminal statutes is to be
resolved in favor of the accused.
See, e.g., United States v.
Bass, 404 U. S. 336,
404 U. S. 347;
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808,
401 U. S. 812;
Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1,
360 U. S. 9. On
the other hand, there is no sound policy argument for limiting the
scope of § 3692. A guarantee of the right to a jury trial in cases
of criminal contempt for violation of injunctions issued pursuant
to § 10(
l) does not restrict the ability of the Board's
regional official to seek, or the power of the District Court to
grant, temporary injunctive relief to bring an immediate halt to
secondary boycotts and recognitional picketing pending adjudication
of unfair labor practice charges before the Board. Nor does it
interfere with the authority of the District Court to insure prompt
compliance with its injunction through the use of coercive civil
contempt sanctions. [
Footnote 3/7]
Indeed,
Page 422 U. S. 488
construing § 3692 as it is written, so as to include this kind
of an injunction issued pursuant to the National Labor Relations
Act, would not even affect the power of the court to impose
criminal contempt sanctions. It would only require that, prior to
imposition of criminal punishment for violation of a court order,
the necessary facts must be found by an impartial jury, rather than
by the judge whose order has been violated. [
Footnote 3/8]
Page 422 U. S. 489
In sum, the plain language of § 3692 and the absence of any
meaningful contradictory legislative history, together with the
established method of construing criminal statutes, require that §
3692 be interpreted to include a right to a jury trial in criminal
contempt proceedings for violation of § 10(
l) injunctions.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
[
Footnote 3/1]
Section 10(
l), as enacted in 1947, 61 Stat. 149,
provided that, whenever the Board's regional official has
"reasonable cause" to believe the truth of a charge of illegal
secondary boycotting or minority picketing, the official "shall,"
on behalf of the Board, petition a district court for appropriate
injunctive relief pending final Board adjudication. Once reasonable
cause is found, a Board petition for temporary relief under §
10(
l) is mandatory.
See S.Rep. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 27. Congress in 1959 added charges of illegal
hot cargo agreements and recognitional picketing to the mandatory
injunction provision of § 10(
l). 73 Stat. 544.
[
Footnote 3/2]
"Labor dispute" as defined for the purpose of § 11 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, upon which § 3692 was based, included
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee."
47 Stat. 73. Section 2(9) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 152(9), defines "labor dispute" in virtually identical
language.
[
Footnote 3/3]
While the respondent concedes that unfair labor practices often
arise out of a "labor dispute," he argues that the National Labor
Relations Act is not essentially a law "governing the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders" in cases "involving or growing
out of a labor dispute." Although it may be true that not all
provisions of the Act authorizing restraining orders are properly
classified as such laws, it is clear that Congress concluded that
at least some provisions were. Otherwise, there would have been no
reason for Congress to have specifically exempted the jurisdiction
of courts "sitting in equity" under § 10 of the Act from the
limitations of Norris-LaGuardia, which apply only in cases
involving requests for injunctive relief growing out of a labor
dispute.
See In re Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 502
F.2d 113, 118 (CA1).
[
Footnote 3/4]
Any such intention would be inconsistent with the decision to
repeal § 11 and to replace it with a broadly worded provision in
the title of the United States Code dealing generally with "Crimes
and Criminal Procedure."
[
Footnote 3/5]
It may be questioned whether § 10(h) has any relevance at all to
the issue before us. As enacted in 1935, § 10(h) was concerned
solely with the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals (and district
courts "if all the . . . courts of appeals to which application may
be made are in vacation," § 10(e)), to modify and enforce Board
orders following an administrative hearing and entry of findings by
the Board. Section 10(h) was retained without significant change at
the time of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act:
"Sections 10(g), (h), and (i) of the present act, concerning the
effect upon the Board's orders of enforcement and review
proceedings, making inapplicable the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in proceedings before the courts, were
unchanged either by the House bill or by the Senate amendment, and
are carried into the conference agreement."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (House Managers'
statement), 57. The section would thus seem, at the most, to be of
limited relevance in determining congressional intent concerning
the procedures to be used in district courts issuing and enforcing
§ 10(
l) injunctions prior to final adjudication of unfair
labor practice charges by the Board.
[
Footnote 3/6]
The principal piece of legislative history offered as evidence
of an affirmative congressional intent to free from the
requirements of Norris-LaGuardia criminal contempt proceedings for
violations of a § 10(
l) injunction is a statement by
Senator Ball made during debate over the Senator's proposed
amendment to that section.
See 93 Cong.Rec. 4834.
Particularly in view of the complete absence of any support for
Senator Ball's expansive interpretation of § 10(
l) in the
committee and conference reports,
see, e.g., S.Rep. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 27; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (House Managers' statement), 57, that individual
expression of opinion is without significant weight in the
interpretation of the statute.
McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate
Co., 283 U. S. 488,
283 U. S.
493-494;
Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S.
78,
232 U. S.
90.
[
Footnote 3/7]
On its face, § 3692, which guarantees to "the accused" the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury in language
identical to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in
criminal cases, appears to be limited to trials for criminal
contempt. That construction is also consistent with the decision of
Congress to place the provision in Title 18, dealing with crimes
and criminal procedure. Moreover, while it is clear that a trial
for criminal contempt is an independent proceeding, and "no part of
the original cause,"
Michaelson v. United States ex rel.
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 266 U. S.
42,
266 U. S. 64,
civil contempt proceedings to insure compliance with an injunction
are extensions of the original equitable cause of action.
See
id. at
266 U. S. 64-65.
It is therefore arguable that § 10(
l)'s explicit statement
that the "jurisdiction" of the district courts shall not be
affected by "any other provision of law" renders inapplicable any
otherwise relevant statutory requirement of a jury trial for civil
contempts.
See In re Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 502
F.2d at 119-121.
[
Footnote 3/8]
Although injunctive relief under §§ 10(j) and (
l) is
sought by the Board acting on behalf of the public, rather than to
vindicate private economic interests, this fact has little
significance in considering the policy justifications for requiring
a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings. Regardless of
whether the Board or an employer has sought the injunction, in the
absence of a jury trial, the judge who granted the order will be
given complete authority to impose criminal punishment if he finds
that his injunction has been deliberately disobeyed. The existence
of this unbridled power in district court judges prior to 1932 was
one of the principal factors leading to enactment of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and, in particular, passage of the § 11 jury
trial requirement.
See generally A. Cox & D. Bok,
Cases and Materials on Labor Law 75-76 (7th ed.). Accordingly, the
accommodation of § 10(
l) and § 3692 "which will give the
fullest possible effect to the central purposes of both
[statutes],"
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U. S. 195,
370 U. S. 216
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting), is to recognize the Board's power to
seek temporary injunctive relief under § 10(
l) without
regard to the limitations of Norris-LaGuardia, and to permit the
issuing court to coerce obedience through civil contempt
proceedings. But when the court deems it necessary to impose
after-the-fact punishment through criminal contempt proceedings, §
3692 must be read to mean what it says -- the accused contemnor has
the right to a jury trial.
See In re Union Nacional de
Trabajadores, supra at 121.