Section 13 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act provides that the right to compensation for
disability under the Act shall be barred unless a claim therefor is
filed within one year after the injury. Section 22 provides that,
upon his own initiative or upon the application of any party in
interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a
mistake in his determination of fact, the Deputy Commissioner of
the Bureau of Employees' Compensation (the agency charged with
administering the Act) may,
"at any time prior to one year after the date of the last
payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has
been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection
of a claim,"
review a compensation case and issue a "new compensation order"
which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease
such compensation, or award compensation. A claimant, who was
injured in 1960 while working for petitioner employer, filed a
claim for total permanent disability within § 13's one-year statute
of limitations. Petitioner insurance carrier, in advance of an
award by the Deputy Commissioner, first paid the weekly amount for
total disability, though denying
Page 422 U. S. 2
the extent of disability, but, in 1965 ,filed notice that it was
contesting the extent of disability and was reducing the weekly
compensation to the amount for 50% temporary disability, and, in
1968, stopped payment of compensation after reaching the maximum of
its liability for any condition other than permanent disability or
death. In 1970, two years after his last receipt of a voluntary
compensation payment, the claimant requested a hearing on his claim
for permanent disability, this being the first requested action to
adjudicate the merits of the claim by either him or the carrier in
the 10 years following the filing of the claim, and no order or
award having been entered during this period. Respondent Deputy
Commissioner then entered an award for permanent total disability,
and petitioners brought suit to enjoin its enforcement. The
District Court held that § 22 barred the claim, but the Court of
Appeals reversed.
Held: While the language of § 22 is ambiguous, the
section's legislative history, including the history of the
amendment inserting the phrase "whether or not a compensation order
has been issued," shows that the section's one-year time limit was
meant to apply only to the Deputy Commissioner's power to modify
previously entered orders, and that therefore the section does not
bar consideration of a claim timely filed under § 13, which has not
been the subject of prior action by the Deputy Commissioner, and
with respect to which the Deputy Commissioner took no action until
more than one year after the claimant's last receipt of a voluntary
compensation payment. Taken in its historical and statutory
context, the phrase "whether or not a compensation order has been
issued" is properly interpreted to mean merely that the one-year
time limit imposed on the Deputy Commissioner's power to modify
existing orders runs from the date of final payment of compensation
even if the order sought to be modified is actually entered only
after such date. Pp.
422 U. S.
6-12.
163 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 500 F.2d 815, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 422 U. S. 3
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 13 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1432, 33 U.S.C. § 913, provided:
"The right to compensation for disability under this chapter
shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year
after the injury."
We must decide in this case whether § 22 of the same Act, as
amended, 33 U.S.C. § 922, bars consideration of a claim timely
filed under § 13, which has not been the subject of an order by the
deputy commissioner within one year after the cessation of
voluntary compensation payments.
Petitioners in the instant case are Intercounty Construction
Corp., an employer, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., its
insurance carrier. Respondents are Noah C. A. Walter, a deputy
commissioner of the Bureau of Employees' Compensation which was
charged with administration of the Act, [
Footnote 1] and Mary Jones, an intervenor below who is
the personal representative of Charles Jones, an employee claimant
under the Act. Claimant was injured in 1960 while working for the
employer in the District of Columbia. [
Footnote 2] Shortly thereafter, well within the one-year
statute of limitations established by § 13 of the Act, [
Footnote 3] he filed a claim for
total
Page 422 U. S. 4
permanent disability with the Bureau of Employees' Compensation.
The insurance carrier, admitting claimant's injury in the course of
employment while denying permanent disability to the extent stated
in the claim, filed notice that it had begun payment of $54 per
week, the amount payable for total disability, in advance of an
award by the deputy commissioner. [
Footnote 4]
In 1965, the carrier filed notice that it was controverting the
pending claim on the ground,
inter alia, of extent of
disability and that it was reducing claimant's weekly compensation
to $27 per week, the rate for 50% temporary disability. In 1966, a
claims examiner from the Bureau held a hearing on the pending claim
for total permanent disability benefits, but the hearing was
adjourned without action on the claim. On January 23, 1968, the
carrier stopped payment of compensation to the claimant, since its
payments to claimant totaled $17,280, its maximum liability under
the Act at the time for any condition other than permanent total
disability
Page 422 U. S. 5
or death. On February 11, 1970, two years after his last receipt
of a voluntary payment of compensation from the carrier, claimant
requested a hearing on his previously filed claim for total
permanent disability. Although the claim had been pending since its
timely filing in 1960, neither the carrier nor the claimant had
requested action by the Bureau in the intervening 10 years to
adjudicate its merits, and no order or award had been entered
during this period resolving it. [
Footnote 5]
Deputy Commissioner Walter, reversing his own initial
determination that the claim was time-barred under § 22 of the Act,
concluded that § 22 was not applicable to this claim, and entered
an order awarding claimant compensation for permanent total
disability. Petitioners then brought this suit under 33 U.S.C. §
921(b) against respondent Walter to enjoin enforcement of the
award. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted summary judgment for the petitioners, holding that
§ 22 of the Act barred the claim. [
Footnote 6] On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that § 22 of
the Act, applicable only to the power of the deputy commissioner to
modify prior orders, erected no barrier to consideration of claims
which had not been the subject of a prior order by the deputy
commissioner. [
Footnote 7]
Because of the conflict between the holding of the Court of
Appeals in this case and that of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis,
460 F.2d 1108,
cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Strachan Shipping
Co., 409 U.S. 887 (1972), we granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 1119
(1975).
Page 422 U. S. 6
Section 22 of the Act, as amended, provides:
"Modification of awards"
"Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party
in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of
a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner,
the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after
the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a
compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one
year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in
section 919 of this title, and in accordance with such section
issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue,
reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award
compensation. Such new order shall not affect any compensation
previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation
rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and if any
part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award
decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the
date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of
such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation,
in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the
deputy commissioner with the approval of the Secretary."
Petitioners urge, and the Fifth Circuit in
Strachan Shipping
Co. held, that this provision superimposes on the express
statute of limitations contained in § 13 of the Act, providing a
time period for the filing of claims, an additional limitations
period requiring action by the deputy commissioner on pending
claims within one year after the date of the last voluntary payment
of compensation
Page 422 U. S. 7
where such payments have been made. In their view, since no
action was taken on the pending claim in the instant case until
more than one year after the claimant's last receipt of a voluntary
compensation payment, the claim was time-barred under § 22.
In contrast, respondents argue, and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held, that § 22 is applicable only to
the power of the deputy commissioner to modify prior orders and
awards issued by him. In their view, it has no application to
timely filed claims on which no prior action has been taken by the
deputy commissioner. In this case, they say that, since the timely
filed and still-pending 1960 claim had never been the subject of
action by the Deputy Commissioner prior to the order here in issue,
§ 22 has no application to it.
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit that § 22 speaks ambiguously to the question before us. The
statutory references to "new order," "new compensation order," and
"the rejection of a claim," and the limitation of the granted
authority to "a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a
determination of fact by the deputy commissioner" support an
interpretation of the section's one-year time limit as applicable
only to the power of the deputy commissioner to modify previously
entered orders. Such an interpretation would make the section
inapplicable to the authority of the deputy commissioner to enter
an initial order with respect to a claim timely filed. On the other
hand, the language "whether or not a compensation order has been
issued" points to the applicability of the section's one-year time
limit to all previously filed claims, even though not the subject
of any prior order by the deputy commissioner.
Strachan
Shipping Co. v. Hollis, 460 F.2d at 1116. This phrase might
also merely mean, when read in context, that the time limit
established by
Page 422 U. S. 8
this provision, applicable only to the modification of
previously entered orders, runs from the date of the last voluntary
payment even though the order sought to be modified is entered
after receipt of the last voluntary payment. 163 U.S.App.D.C. at
150, 500 F.2d at 818;
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis,
supra at 1117 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). These conflicting
indicia are not completely reconcilable if the language in the
statute is considered alone, and so we must resort to the
legislative history of the provision.
Section 22 was first enacted as part of the original
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in 1927. 44
Stat. 1424-1446. As petitioners concede, the provision as
originally drafted applied only to the modification of orders
previously entered by the deputy commissioner:
"
MODIFICATION OF AWARDS"
"SEC. 22. Upon his own initiative, or upon application of any
party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions, the
deputy commissioner may at any time during the term of an award and
after the compensation order in respect of such award has become
final, review such order in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in respect of claims in section 19, and in accordance
with such section issue a new compensation order which may
terminate, continue, increase, or decrease such compensation. Such
new order shall not affect any compensation paid under authority of
the prior order."
Id. at 1437.
As originally adopted, § 22 provided power to the deputy
commissioner to modify a prior order only "during the term of an
award," and the provision was construed to constrict the power to
modify a previous order to the period of payments pursuant to an
award.
Cf.
Page 422 U. S. 9
F. Jarka Co. v. Monahan, 29 F.2d 741, 742 (Mass.1928).
The United States Employees' Compensation Commission (USECC), then
charged with the administration of the Act, repeatedly recommended
that § 22 be amended to allow continuing review of previously
entered orders. 14th Ann.Rep. USECC 75 (1930); 15th Ann.Rep. USECC
77 (1931); 16th Ann.Rep. USECC 49 (1932); 17th Ann.Rep. USECC 18
(1933).
See Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, 390 U.
S. 459,
390 U. S.
463-465 (1968). In none of the annual reports of the
USECC is there any indication that amendment of this provision was
sought for any purpose other than broadening the length of time
during which the deputy commissioner could exercise his power to
modify previously entered orders.
In 1934, Congress responded by amending this provision to
read:
"
MODIFICATION OF COMPENSATION CASES"
"SEC. 22. Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of
any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or
because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy
commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one
year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or
not a compensation order has been issued, review a compensation
case in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of
claims in section 19, and in accordance with such section issue a
new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate,
increase, or decrease such compensation. Such new order shall not
affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award
increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the
date of the injury, and if any part of the compensation due or to
become due
Page 422 U. S. 10
is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made
effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior
thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any
unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be
determined by the deputy commissioner with the approval of the
commission."
48 Stat. 807.
This amendment inserted the phrase "whether or not a
compensation order has been issued," the phrase upon which the
petitioners' statutory claim rests, and they naturally urge that it
was intended to apply the one-year time limit of § 22, formerly
applicable only to the modification of previously entered orders,
to all pending claims. But the legislative history does not bear
out petitioners' contention.
The committee reports of both Houses of Congress accompanying
this change explain it in the following language:
"[This bill] amends section 22 of the existing act so as to
broaden the grounds on which a deputy commissioner can modify an
award, and also, while strictly limiting the period, extends the
time within which such modification may be made. . . ."
"The amendment is in line with the recommendation of the [USECC]
except that it limits to 1 year after the date of the last payment
of compensation the time during which such modification may be
made."
S.Rep. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1934); H.R.Rep. No.
1244, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934). As we similarly stated in
Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, supra at
390 U. S. 464:
"The purpose of this amendment was to
broaden the grounds on
which a deputy commissioner can modify an award.'" See, e.g.,
404 U. S.
Aerojet
Page 422 U. S. 11
General Shipyards, 404 U. S. 254,
404 U. S.
255-256 (1971). There is no indication that Congress
sought by this amendment to superimpose a new statute of
limitations, in addition to the required period for filing provided
by § 13, on all claims filed under the Act upon which payments are
made. Taken in historical and statutory context, the phrase
"whether or not a compensation order has been issued" is properly
interpreted to mean merely that the one-year time limit imposed on
the power of the deputy commissioner to modify existing orders runs
from the date of final payment of compensation even if the order
sought to be modified is actually entered only after such date.
Section 22 was amended in 1938 to read as it presently does. 52
Stat. 1167. The chief change was permitting the deputy commissioner
to review a case "at any time prior to one year after the rejection
of a claim." Such amendment would have been largely superfluous if
Congress, in 1934, had already extended this provision to cover
claims whether or not previously disposed of by the deputy
commissioner. And, in fact, the legislative history surrounding the
1938 amendment reveals a clear congressional understanding that §
22 applied only to modification of prior orders of the deputy
commissioner. Thus, for example, the House Report accompanying the
1938 amendment stated that
"[t]he purpose of this amendment is to extend to such cases the
same provisions which now apply in connection with other cases
finally acted upon by the deputy commissioner."
H.R.Rep. No.1945, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 9 (1938). (Emphasis
added.)
See also H.R.Rep. No. 1807, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,
5 (1935); S.Rep. No. 1199, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1935);
H.R.Rep. No. 2237, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1936); S.Rep. No.1988,
75th Cong., 3d Sess., 8-9 (1938). Regulations issued under the Act
by the USECC,
Page 422 U. S. 12
contemporaneously with passage of the 1938 amendment, reflect an
administrative understanding that § 22 governed "application[s] to
the deputy commissioner for review of a compensation case for
modification of an award." 20 CFR § 31.15 (1938); 20 CFR § 31.16
(1949).
The Fifth Circuit, in
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis,
supra, indicated its belief that the absence of a procedure
for orderly conclusion of compensation cases was incompatible with
a scheme of cooperation and voluntary payments by employers and
insurers envisaged by the Act. 460 F.2d at 1116. The court below
disagreed, indicating its belief that the present procedures giving
a carrier the right to compel the deputy commissioner to adjudicate
claims eliminate any unfairness which might result from the absence
of a fixed conclusion to such cases. 163 U.S.App.D.C. at 152, 500
F.2d at 820.
Cf. 33 U.S.C. § 919(c); 5 U.S.C. § 706(1);
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d
794 (CA5 1960). Whatever the merits of a fixed period for
resolution of pending compensation claims not previously the
subject of an order, Congress did not, in § 22, establish such a
period. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit is therefore
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
In 1972, this responsibility was transferred to the Office of
Workmen's Compensation Programs of the Department of Labor.
See 20 CFR §§ 701.101-701.103 (1973).
[
Footnote 2]
The District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act incorporates
by reference the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901
et seq. as amended.
See
D.C.Code Ann. § 3501 (1973).
[
Footnote 3]
Section 13 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 913, provided in part:
"The right to compensation for disability under this chapter
shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year
after the injury . . . except that, if payment of compensation has
been made without an award on account of such injury . . . , a
claim may be filed within one year after the date of the last
payment. . . ."
Section 12 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 912 (1970 ed. and Supp. III),
requires the employee to give notice of injury unless the employer
has actual notice of the injury.
[
Footnote 4]
Since the Act requires the employer to begin making the payments
called for by the Act within 14 days after receiving notice of
injury without awaiting resolution of the compensation claim, and
permits withholding of payments only to the extent of any dispute,
voluntary payment in advance of an actual order is common under the
Act.
See § 14 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 914 (1970 ed. and
Supp. III). Either party may obtain resolution of a pending claim
by request under § 19(c) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(c), but, in
practice, many pending claims are amicably settled through
voluntary payments without the necessity of a formal order by the
deputy commissioner.
[
Footnote 5]
See n 4,
supra.
[
Footnote 6]
The decision of the District Court is unreported.
[
Footnote 7]
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 163
U.S.App.D.C. 147, 500 F.2d 815 (1974).