DYKE v. GEORGIA, 421 U.S. 952 (1975)
U.S. Supreme Court
DYKE v. GEORGIA , 421 U.S. 952 (1975)421 U.S. 952
Edward H. DYKE
v.
State of GEORGIA.
No. 74-903.
Supreme Court of the United States
April 28, 1975
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.
Petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court of Fulton County, Georgia, of exhibiting an allegedly obscene film in violation of Ga.Code Ann. 26-2101, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
terly without redeeming social value and if, in addition it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters.'
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
It is my view that 'at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obstrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.' Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, the definition of 'obscene' as contained in 26-2101, is unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47d 419 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia was rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 494, 495 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Finally, it does not appear that the obscenity of the disputed
materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based
on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 141, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974), I believe that, consistent
with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an
opportunity to have his case decided on, and introduce evidence
relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has
ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court
should vacate [421
U.S. 952 , 954]
U.S. Supreme Court
DYKE v. GEORGIA , 421 U.S. 952 (1975) 421 U.S. 952 Edward H. DYKEv.
State of GEORGIA.
No. 74-903. Supreme Court of the United States April 28, 1975 On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court of Fulton County, Georgia, of exhibiting an allegedly obscene film in violation of Ga.Code Ann. 26-2101, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
