In state prisoner's action against prison officials seeking
damages and expunction of records for alleged due process
violations in summarily placing him in solitary confinement, relief
cannot be based on the rules requiring notice and a hearing in
connection with serious prison discipline determinations announced
in the nonretroactive decision,
Wolf v. McDonnell,
418 U. S. 539, or
in
Landman v. Royster, 333 F.
Supp. 621, where the discipline determinations in question all
occurred before the dates of those decisions.
Certiorari granted; reversed.
PER CURIAM.
This petition by officials of the Virginia prison system for a
writ of certiorari arises out of a suit brought against them by an
inmate of the Virginia State Penitentiary in which he alleged that,
on three occasions, between October, 1968, and March, 1970, he was
placed in solitary confinement for misconduct without being given
notice of the misconduct charged or an opportunity to meet the
charge at a hearing, [
Footnote
1] in violation of the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in which he
requested monetary damages and expunction of all records of the
discipline.
Page 420 U. S. 735
A jury at a partial trial [
Footnote 2] found that respondent had, in fact, been
placed in solitary confinement for misconduct without notice or a
hearing. It also found that he had suffered mental, but no
physical, damage. However, it made no finding with respect to the
responsibility of any of the petitioners for his confinement. After
offering respondent an additional opportunity to adduce further
proof on this issue before a second jury, the trial judge ruled
that respondent could recover nothing, as the proof was
insufficient to establish that petitioners had knowledge of or were
responsible for respondent's confinement.
Respondent appealed, and, without briefs or oral argument, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding that
the proof below would support a finding that petitioners were
ultimately responsible for respondent's solitary confinement,
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
On petition for rehearing, petitioners contended that the
constitutional rule requiring notice and some kind of a hearing in
connection with serious prison discipline determinations was
created in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.
S. 539, in 1974, and was expressly made inapplicable to
disciplinary action taken before the date of that decision.
Id. at
418 U. S.
573-574. Thus, even if respondent had proved that
petitioners were responsible for his solitary confinement, he could
not, as a matter of law, obtain relief. The Court of Appeals denied
the rehearing petition, saying that, in the district in which
respondent was incarcerated, a federal decision predating
Wolff
v. McDonnell, supra, namely
Landman v. Royster, 333
F.Supp.
Page 420 U. S. 736
621 (ED Va.1971), required notice and a hearing in connection
with serious prison discipline determinations. Petitioners contend
herethat
Landman v. Royster, supra, was itself decided
after the discipline determinations involved in this case, and thus
supplies no more basis for liability in this case than does
Wolff v. McDonnell. We agree.
In
Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, we held that a state
prisoner was entitled under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to notice and some kind of a hearing in
connection with discipline determinations involving serious
misconduct. However, we expressly rejected the holding of the Court
of Appeals in that case that
"the due process requirements in prison disciplinary proceedings
were to apply retroactively, so as to require that prison records
containing determinations of misconduct, not in accord with
required prcedures, be expunged,"
418 U.S. at
418 U. S. 573,
and we expressly held our decision not to be retroactive. The
holding was made in the context of a request for expunction of the
records of prison discipline determinations. The same result
obtains,
a fortiori, to monetary claims against prison
officials acting in good faith reliance on a preexisting procedure.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547
(1967). It is true that the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, in
Landman v. Royster,
supra, anticipated in part the holding of this Court in
Wolff v. McDonnell, supra. Even if this might bear on the
retroactivity issue with respect to discipline determinations made
in the Eastern District of Virginia after the decision in
Landman v. Royster, supra, and before the decision in
Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, the discipline determinations
in this case all occurred before the decision in
Landman v.
Royster,
Page 420 U. S. 737
supra. Therefore, neither the rule announced in that
case nor the one announced in
Wolff v. McDonnell, supra,
supports respondent's damage or expunction claims here. [
Footnote 3] Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The suit was also based on a claim that an unidentified guard
inflicted a beating on respondent. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has sustained the District Court's holding that none
of the petitioners was responsible for the beating, and respondent
has not filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari.
[
Footnote 2]
The trial judge was uncertain whether respondent was entitled to
a jury trial. Counsel and the court agreed to obtain a jury's
findings of fact on certain issues in the form of a special
verdict, and to postpone decision whether a jury trial was
warranted.
[
Footnote 3]
We do not regard the uncertain dicta in
Landman v.
Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (CA4 1966), which did predate the
discipline determinations involved here, as laying down a rule
binding on petitioners prior to the later decision in
Landman
v. Royster, 333 F.
Supp. 621 (ED Va.1971). These dicta were not mentioned or
relied on by the Court of Appeals or respondent.