When state law permits a defendant to plead guilty without
forfeiting his right to judicial review of specified constitutional
issues, such as the lawfulness of a search or the voluntariness of
a confession, the defendant is not foreclosed from pursuing those
constitutional claims in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Pp.
420 U. S.
288-293.
(a) Thus, here where a New York statute permitted an appeal from
an adverse decision on a motion to suppress evidence allegedly
obtained as a result of unlawful search and seizure though the
conviction was based on a guilty plea, respondent, who had been
convicted in state court on a guilty plea to a drug charge and who
had unsuccessfully presented to the state courts on direct appeal
his federal constitutional claim that evidence seized incident to
an unlawful arrest should have been suppressed, was not precluded
from raising such claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Pp.
420 U. S.
288-292.
(b) To hold otherwise not only would deprive respondent of a
federal forum despite his having satisfied all the requirements for
invoking federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, but would also
frustrate the State's policy in providing for post-guilty plea
appellate review of pretrial motions to suppress. Pp.
420 U. S.
292-293.
492 F.2d 1166, affirmed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
post, p.
420 U. S. 294,
and POWELL, J.,
post, p.
420 U. S. 302,
filed dissenting opinions, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST,
J., joined.
Page 420 U. S. 284
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent Leon Newsome was arrested pursuant to N.Y.Penal
Law § 240.35(6) for loitering in the lobby of a New York City
Housing Authority apartment building. A search of Newsome conducted
at the time of his arrest produced a small quantity of heroin and
related narcotics paraphernalia. Consequently, in addition to the
offense of loitering, he was also charged with possession of a
dangerous drug, fourth degree, N.Y.Penal Law § 220.05 (now
codified, as modified, as N.Y.Penal Law § 220.03), and criminally
possessing a hypodermic instrument. N.Y.Penal Law § 220.45.
The New York City Criminal Court conducted a nonjury trial on
the loitering charge and a hearing on Newsome's motion to suppress
the evidence seized at the time of his arrest. Newsome argued that
the arresting officer did not have probable cause for the loitering
arrest, that there was insufficient evidence to support a loitering
conviction, and that the loitering statute was unconstitutional,
and therefore could not serve as the basis for either a loitering
conviction or a lawful search incident to arrest. The court
rejected these arguments, found Newsome guilty of loitering, and
denied the motion to suppress.
One month later, on the date scheduled for trial on the drug
charges, Newsome withdrew his prior pleas of not guilty and pleaded
guilty to the lesser charge of attempted possession of dangerous
drugs. N.Y.Penal Law § 110. He was immediately sentenced to 90
days' imprisonment on the attempted possession conviction and
received an unconditional release on the loitering conviction.
Page 420 U. S. 285
At the sentencing proceeding, Newsome indicated his intention to
appeal both the loitering conviction and the denial of his motion
to suppress the drugs and related paraphernalia seized at the time
of his arrest. Appeal of the adverse decision on the motion to
suppress was authorized by N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. § 81c (now
recodified as N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law §§ 710.20(1), 710.70(2)), which
provided that an order denying a motion to suppress evidence
alleged to have been obtained as a result of unlawful search and
seizure
"may be reviewed on appeal from a judgment of conviction
notwithstanding the fact that such judgment of conviction is
predicated upon a plea of guilty. [
Footnote 1]"
On direct appeal to the Appellate Term of the New York Supreme
Court, the loitering conviction was reversed for insufficient
evidence and a defective information. Because the court held that
there was probable cause to arrest Newsome for loitering, however,
the search incident to that arrest was upheld and the drug
conviction affirmed. Newsome sought further review of the drug
conviction, but leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals
was denied. This Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Newsome v. New York, 405 U. S. 908.
Newsome then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court for the Eastern District of
Page 420 U. S. 286
New York. The petition reiterated the claim that the loitering
statute was unconstitutional, that Newsome's arrest was therefore
invalid, and that as a result the evidence seized incident to that
arrest should have been suppressed. Prior to the District Court's
decision on the merits of Newsome's petition, [
Footnote 2] the New York Court of Appeals declared
New York's loitering statute unconstitutional.
People v.
Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411. In light of the
Berck decision, the District Court granted Newsome's
application for a writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner, the Attorney General of New York, who had been
granted leave by the District Court to intervene as a respondent in
the habeas corpus proceeding, appealed. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court,
United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166,
adhering to its earlier rulings that a New York defendant who has
utilized state procedures to appeal the denial of a motion to
suppress may pursue his constitutional claim on a federal habeas
corpus petition although the conviction was based on a plea of
guilty.
Id. at 1169-1171. The court held that New York's
loitering statute violated due process because it failed to specify
adequately the conduct it proscribed and failed to provide
sufficiently clear guidance for police, prosecutors, and the courts
so that they could enforce the statute in a manner consistent with
the constitutional requirement that arrests be based on probable
cause.
Id. at 1171-1174.
Page 420 U. S. 287
Accordingly; the court held that, because Newsome was searched
incident to an arrest for the violation of a statute found to be
unconstitutional on the ground that it substituted mere suspicion
for probable cause as the basis for arrest, the search of Newsome
was also constitutionally invalid. The court concluded that the
evidence seized should have been suppressed, and affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting the writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 1174-1175.
The Attorney General of New York sought review here of both the
Court of Appeals' decision that Newsome had not waived his right to
file a federal habeas corpus petition by pleading guilty and its
decision as to the constitutionality of New York's loitering
statute. Because of a conflict between the judgment in the present
case and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
[
Footnote 3] we granted
certiorari limited to the question of a defendant's right to file a
federal habeas corpus petition challenging the lawfulness of a
search or the voluntariness of a confession or presenting other
constitutional claims when a State provides for appellate review of
those issues after a guilty plea. 17 U.S. 967. [
Footnote 4]
Page 420 U. S. 288
I
In contending that Newsome is precluded from raising his
constitutional claims in this federal habeas corpus proceeding, the
petitioner relies primarily on this Court's decisions in the guilty
plea trilogy of
Brady v. United States, 397 U.
S. 742,
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.
S. 759, and
Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U. S. 790, and
on our decision in
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.
S. 258. The
Brady trilogy announced the general
rule that a guilty plea, intelligently and voluntarily made, bars
the later assertion of constitutional challenges to the pretrial
proceedings. This principle was reaffirmed in
Tollett v.
Henderson, supra, at
411 U. S.
267:
"When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is, in fact, guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to
the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea."
But the Court also suggested in the
Brady trilogy that
an exception to this general rule might be proper when a State
decides to permit a defendant to appeal from an adverse ruling in a
pretrial hearing despite the fact that his conviction is based on a
guilty plea.
See McMann v. Richardson, supra, at
397 U. S. 766,
and n. 11,
397 U. S. 770
n. 13. [
Footnote 5] The
justification for such an exception lies in the special
Page 420 U. S. 289
nature of the guilty plea of a New York defendant like
Newsome.
In most States, a defendant must plead not guilty and go to
trial to preserve the opportunity for state appellate review of his
constitutional challenges to arrest, admissibility of various
pieces of evidence, or the voluntariness of a confession. A
defendant who chooses to plead guilty, rather than go to trial, in
effect deliberately refuses to present his federal claims to the
state court in the first instance.
McMann v. Richardson,
supra, at
397 U. S. 768.
Once the defendant chooses to bypass the orderly procedure for
litigating his constitutional claims in order to take the benefits,
if any, of a plea of guilty, the State acquires a legitimate
expectation of finality in the conviction thereby obtained.
Cf.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391,
372 U. S. 438.
It is in this sense, therefore, that ordinarily "a guilty plea
represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in
the criminal process."
Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at
411 U. S.
267.
New York, however, has chosen not to treat a guilty plea as such
a "break in the chain of events" with regard to certain types of
constitutional claims raised in pretrial proceedings. For a New
York defendant whose basic defense consists of one of those
constitutional claims and who has already lost a pretrial motion to
suppress based on that claim, there is no practical difference in
terms of appellate review between going to trial and pleading
guilty. In neither event does the State assert any claim of
finality because of the judgment of conviction. In either event,
under New York procedure, the defendant has available the full
range of state appellate review of his constitutional claims. As to
those claims, therefore, there is no "break" at all in the usual
state procedure for adjudicating constitutional issues. The guilty
plea operates simply as a procedure by which the constitutional
issues can be litigated without the necessity of
Page 420 U. S. 290
going through the time and effort of conducting a trial, the
result of which is foreordained if the constitutional claim is
invalid. The plea is entered with the clear understanding and
expectation by the State, the defendant, and the courts that it
will not foreclose judicial review of the merits of the alleged
constitutional violations. [
Footnote 6]
In sum, although termed by the New York Criminal Procedure Law a
"guilty plea," the same label given to the pleas entered by the
defendants in the
Brady trilogy of cases and
Tollett
v. Henderson, Newsome's plea had legal consequences quite
different from the consequences of the pleas entered in traditional
guilty plea cases. Far from precluding review of independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the entry of his "guilty plea," Newsome's plea carried
with it the guarantee that judicial review of his constitutional
claims would continue to be available to him. In this respect,
there is no meaningful difference between Newsome's conviction and
a New York conviction entered after a trial. [
Footnote 7]
Page 420 U. S. 291
Because of the entirely different expectations surrounding
Newsome's plea and the completely different legal consequences
flowing from it, earlier guilty plea cases holding that
"[t]he focus of federal habeas inquiry is the nature of the
advice [of counsel] and the voluntariness of the plea, not the
existence as such of an antecedent constitutional infirmity,"
Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at
411 U. S. 266,
are simply inapposite. Newsome has satisfied all the prerequisites
for invoking the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts.
[
Footnote 8] He is no less
entitled to federal review of his constitutional claim than is any
other defendant who raises his claim in a timely fashion, in
accordance with state procedure, and who pursues his
Page 420 U. S. 292
claim through all available levels of state appellate review.
[
Footnote 9]
II
Denying Newsome the right to file a federal habeas corpus
petition raising his claim of an unconstitutional seizure would not
only deprive him of a federal forum despite the fact that he has
satisfied all the requirements for invoking federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction, it would also frustrate the State's policy in
providing for post-guilty plea appellate review of pretrial motions
to suppress.
Many defendants recognize that they cannot prevail at trial
unless they succeed in suppressing either evidence seized by the
police or an allegedly involuntary confession. Such defendants in
States with the generally prevailing rule of finality of guilty
pleas will often insist on proceeding to trial for the sole purpose
of preserving their claims of illegal seizures or involuntary
confessions for potential vindication on direct appellate review or
in collateral proceedings. Recognizing the completely unnecessary
waste of time and energy consumed in such trials, New York has
chosen to discourage them by creating a procedure which permits a
defendant to
Page 420 U. S. 293
obtain appellate review of certain pretrial constitutional
claims without imposing on the State the burden of going to
trial.
To deny federal habeas corpus relief to those in Newsome's
position would make New York's law a trap for the unwary. [
Footnote 10] On the other hand, it
is safe to predict that those New York defendants who knew that
federal habeas corpus would be foreclosed would again be dissuaded
from pleading guilty, and instead would insist on a trial solely to
preserve the right to an ultimate federal forum in which to
litigate their constitutional claims. Such a result would
eviscerate New York's commendable efforts to relieve the problem of
congested criminal trial calendars in a manner that does not
diminish the opportunity for the assertion of rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. [
Footnote
11]
Accordingly, we hold that, when state law permits a defendant to
plead guilty without forfeiting his right to judicial review of
specified constitutional issues, the defendant is not foreclosed
from pursuing those constitutional claims in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Page 420 U. S. 294
[
Footnote 1]
Section 813-c was directed to the right to appeal an adverse
ruling on a claim of an unlawful search and seizure after a plea of
guilty. N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. § 813-g (recodified as
N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law §§ 710.20.(3), 710.70(2)), permitted similar
appeals from denials of motions to suppress allegedly coerced
confessions.
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.
S. 759,
397 U. S. 766
n. 11. New York now also provides by statute for post-guilty plea
appeals from denials of motions to suppress identification
testimony claimed to be tainted by improper pretrial
identifications. N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law §§ 710.20(5), 710.70(2).
[
Footnote 2]
The District Court initially dismissed the petition because
Newsome, who had been released on bail pending final disposition of
his case, was not "in custody" as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Newsome appealed the dismissal, and, in light of this Court's
holding on the custody question in
Hensley v. Municipal
Court, 411 U. S. 345, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case to the
District Court for a decision on the merits.
[
Footnote 3]
California, like New York, permits a defendant to appeal
specified adverse pretrial rulings even though he subsequently
pleads guilty. Cal.Penal Code § 1538.5(m). Unlike the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, held that such a defendant
may not pursue his constitutional claim on a federal habeas corpus
petition.
Mann v. Smith, 488 F.2d 245, 247.
[
Footnote 4]
Certiorari was granted limited to Question 1 in Attorney General
Lefkowitz' petition:
"Does a state defendant's plea of guilty waive federal habeas
corpus review of his conviction, even though, under state law, he
has been permitted review in the state appellate courts of the
denial of his motion, on constitutional grounds, to suppress the
evidence that would have been offered against him had there been a
trial?"
417 U.S. 967.
[
Footnote 5]
Since the guilty pleas in
McMann v. Richardson were
entered prior to the effective date of New York's statutory scheme
permitting a defendant pleading guilty to challenge on appeal the
admissibility of evidence allegedly seized improperly or of an
allegedly coerced confession, the Court in
McMann
expressly reserved ruling on the question presented by the judgment
now before us. 397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 770 n. 13. That express reservation
unquestionably belies the argument advanced in the dissenting
opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE,
post at
420 U. S.
297-298, that the question before us was answered in
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.
S. 790, a case decided together with
McMann.
[
Footnote 6]
The petitioner concedes that this review ultimately includes the
certiorari or appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Indeed, in
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, we
reversed a state court conviction on the ground that the
appellant's motion to suppress evidence should have been granted,
notwithstanding the fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty and
pursued his appeal under § 813-c.
See id. at
392 U. S. 45 n.
2. If Newsome's guilty plea is not a sufficient "break in the chain
of events [that] preceded it" to prevent review of his
constitutional claims in this Court, then
a fortiori the
plea cannot rationally foreclose resort to federal habeas relief.
For even when state procedural grounds are adequate to bar direct
review of a conviction in this Court, federal habeas corpus relief
is nonetheless available to litigate the defendant's constitutional
claims unless there has been a deliberate bypass of the state
procedures.
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.
S. 391,
372 U. S.
428-431.
[
Footnote 7]
New York could easily have provided that, rather than pleading
"guilty," a defendant who intends to appeal his pretrial claim of
an involuntary confession or an unlawful seizure but has no desire
to impose upon the State the burden of going to trial should plead
"not guilty" and, at the same time, stipulate to all the evidence
the State can introduce to prove his guilt. Upon the inevitable
entry of a judgment of conviction based on the stipulation, the
defendant would then be able to pursue his state appellate
remedies. And, presumably, because there would then be no "solemn
admission of guilt," all would concede that the defendant would not
be foreclosed from pursuing those constitutional claims in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding. But the only difference between
such a procedure and the one New York has chosen is that the plea
entered is labeled a plea of "not guilty", rather than "guilty,"
and there is a stipulation by the defendant as to the facts the
State would prove demonstrating his guilt, rather than a recitation
by the defendant in court. The availability of federal habeas
corpus depends upon functional reality, not upon an infatuation
with labels.
See Fay v. Noia, supra.
[
Footnote 8]
Newsome is "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
See n 2,
supra. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleged
that this custody was in violation of the laws of the United
States. § 2241(c)(3). And he has satisfied the exhaustion
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by presenting his federal claims to
the state courts on direct appeal.
See Francisco v.
Gathright, 419 U. S. 59.
[
Footnote 9]
In
Fay v. Noia, supra, the Court held that a federal
habeas judge may deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately
bypassed the orderly state court procedures for reviewing his
constitutional claim. 372 U.S. at
372 U. S. 438.
But the Court also held that, if the state courts have entertained
the federal constitutional claims on the merits in a subsequent
proceeding, notwithstanding the deliberate bypass, the federal
courts have no discretion to deny the applicant habeas relief to
which he is otherwise entitled.
Id. at
372 U. S. 439.
It would seem to follow necessarily that, when there is no bypass
of state appellate procedures, deliberate or otherwise, and the
state courts entertained the federal claims on the merits, a
federal habeas corpus court must also determine the merits of the
applicant's claim.
[
Footnote 10]
At the time Newsome pleaded guilty, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit had repeatedly held that a New York defendant who
has utilized § 813-c in the state courts may pursue his
constitutional claim on a federal habeas corpus petition.
E.g.,
United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209;
United States ex rel. Molloy v. Follette, 391 F.2d
231.
[
Footnote 11]
The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure would create an even
broader right of appeal than is currently provided for in New York,
permitting post-guilty plea appeal of any order denying a pretrial
motion which, if granted, would be dispositive of the case. Uniform
Rule Crim.Proc. 444(d).
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Because I believe that
federal law provides respondent
Newsome no right to set aside his plea of guilty -- a solemn,
counseled admission in open court that he is, in fact, guilty --
even assuming that he had previously been the victim of a search
which did not measure up to federal standards, I respectfully
dissent.
I
The federal habeas corpus statute, pursuant to which Newsome
sought to have the courts below set aside his plea of guilty,
provides relief only if the petitioner can establish that "he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It is common ground, I take
it, that the Federal Constitution does not itself entitle a
defendant who has pleaded guilty to have that plea set aside upon a
showing that he has previously been the victim of an
unconstitutional search, even if he can also show that he pleaded
guilty only because the prosecution planned to use the fruits of
the search against him at trial. [
Footnote 2/1]
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S.
21 (1974);
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.
S. 258 (1973);
Brady v. United States,
397 U. S. 742
(1970);
McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S.
Page 420 U. S. 295
759 (1970);
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.
S. 790 (1970). In
Tollett, we said:
"We thus reaffirm the principle recognized in the
Brady
trilogy: a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events
which has preceded it in the criminal process.
When a criminal
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is, in fact,
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent
character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received
from counsel was not within the standards set forth in
McMann."
411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 267.
(Emphasis added.) This "principle" is a rule of substantive
constitutional law limiting the federal constitutional grounds upon
which a defendant may attack a judicial admission of guilt. It is
not, as the majority assumes,
ante at
420 U. S. 289,
a rule of procedure, dissentitling a defendant to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim which was not properly"preserved"under state law.
If it were such a rule of procedure, both
McMann and
Tollett would have come out differently: both were federal
habeas corpus proceedings; as the majority points out,
ante at
420 U. S. 290
n. 6, federal issues are "preserved" for habeas corpus purposes
unless state procedures for litigating them have been "deliberately
bypassed"; and neither the petitioner in
McMann nor the
petitioner in
Tollett had "deliberately bypassed" state
procedures for raising the coerced confession or grand jury
discrimination claims there involved. [
Footnote 2/2] Indeed, the entire majority
Page 420 U. S. 296
opinion rests on the erroneous notion that we refused to hear
antecedent constitutional claims in
McMann and
Tollett because the defendants had "bypassed" those claims
by pleading guilty. In fact, those decisions were based on the
substantive proposition that the defendants' guilt in those cases,
and the State's consequent absolute right to incarcerate them, was
established by their voluntary and intelligent pleas of guilty.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The question raised in this case, therefore, is whether, if a
State chooses to open its appellate courts to hear claims of
constitutional deprivations preceding entry of a guilty plea and to
set aside the plea if the antecedent violation is established, the
State thereby creates a
federal
Page 420 U. S. 297
constitutional right to set aside the guilty plea where none
would have existed otherwise. The question almost answers itself.
More importantly, however, it has already been answered by this
Court in
Parker v. North Carolina, supra.
In
Parker, the defendant sought to set aside his guilty
plea in a state habeas corpus proceeding alleging,
inter
alia, that a confession had been unconstitutionally coerced
from him and that he pleaded guilty only because of the confession.
The state trial court held a hearing on the merits of the coerced
confession claim and found both the confession and the subsequent
plea to have been voluntary. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals clearly accepted the proposition that Parker's plea should
be set aside if the confession was involuntary and if it was the
but-for cause of the plea.
Parker v. State, 2 N.C.App. 27,
32,
162
S.E.2d 526, 529. It concluded, however, that Parker's
confession was voluntary and his plea not the product of it. On
certiorari, we did not feel compelled -- by the fact that North
Carolina gave Parker a right to set aside his plea if it was based
upon a confession coerced in violation of federal standards -- to
give him a similar right. Instead, assuming that the confession was
inadmissible and that he pleaded guilty in the contrary belief, we
held that Parker was not entitled "to disavow his admission in open
court that he committed the offense with which he was charged." 397
U.S. at
397 U. S. 797.
[
Footnote 2/4] Like Newsome in New
York, a defendant who loses a pretrial suppression motion in North
Carolina and then pleads guilty may assume, by reading the North
Carolina Court of Appeals opinion in
Parker v.
Page 420 U. S. 298
State, supra, that state appellate courts will hear the
merits of his claim (in a state habeas corpus proceeding, if he can
establish that his guilty plea was entered because the suppression
motion was denied). However, our decision in
Parker would
preclude any claim that this Court or any federal court would do
likewise. Similarly, here, Newsome's guilt has been established by
as reliable a method as is known to the criminal law -- his solemn
admission of guilt, made in open court. The Federal Constitution
entitles him to set aside that plea only upon a showing that it was
involuntary or unintelligent. The fact that New York State has
nonetheless chosen to set aside his conviction upon a showing that
he was the victim of a previous illegal seizure does not, and
cannot, alter substantive federal constitutional law. [
Footnote 2/5]
II
The majority contends, however, that, since state law provides a
defendant with a "guarantee" that he may plead guilty and still
litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, it cannot possibly be said
that he has chosen to bypass that claim by pleading guilty.
Moreover, the majority asserts that the New York guilty plea
involved here is a "guilty plea" in name only, and is something
else in reality, in light of the "different expectations"
surrounding it and the different "legal consequences" flowing from
it. There are two things wrong with these contentions.
Page 420 U. S. 299
First, the contentions assume that the
Brady trilogy
was based upon notions of waiver. In other words, it assumes that
this Court has in the past refused to set aside "guilty pleas" on
the basis of antecedent violations of constitutional rights only
because the plea was deemed to have "waived" those rights. This
assumption finds some support in the language of those cases, but
waiver was not their basic ingredient. In any event, the Court
squarely and conclusively rejected the waiver rationale in
Tollett v. Henderson, supra. We said there:
"If the issue were to be cast solely in terms of 'waiver,' the
Court of Appeals was undoubtedly correct in concluding that there
had been no such waiver here."
411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 266.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals' decision in
Tollett was
reversed. Under
Tollett's interpretation of the trilogy,
and under
Tollett itself, federal constitutional
principles simply preclude the setting aside of a state conviction
by a federal court where the defendant's guilt has been
conclusively established by a voluntary and intelligent plea of
guilty. Labels aside, a guilty plea for federal purposes is a
judicial admission of guilt conclusively establishing a defendant's
factual guilt. Newsome's plea plainly qualifies. [
Footnote 2/6]
Page 420 U. S. 300
Second, the contentions assume that New York State intended to
create the expectation, and has the power to create the
expectation, on the part of defendants who plead guilty that they
will be able to litigate their antecedent Fourth Amendment claims
not only in state courts, but also in federal courts. There is
absolutely no reason to suppose that New York intended to create
such expectations, and, if it had so intended, it would have been
acting plainly beyond its power. New York State may, of course,
give its defendants, as a matter of state law, the right to set
aside guilty pleas on the basis of antecedent violations of federal
constitutional search standards. If they do, it cannot be said that
a defendant who pleads guilty has "waived" that state law right.
But it is for Congress or this Court to decide whether federal law
gives a defendant the right to set aside his plea under such
circumstances. The "legal circumstances" in federal courts which
will flow from a state plea, and the "expectations" which a
defendant should have about what will occur in federal courts
following the plea are not matters to be decided by the New
York
Page 420 U. S. 301
Legislature and surely not finally by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. If this Court had followed its prior decisions
and reiterated in the present context that Newsome may not litigate
his Fourth Amendment claim in federal court, then, once those who
counsel defendants in the New York court system read the opinion,
it would be incontestable that a guilty plea in New York would
foreclose federal habeas corpus relief based on already rejected
Fourth Amendment claims, and that no defendant might legitimately
harbor "expectations" to the contrary. [
Footnote 2/7]
Thus, even under a waiver theory, counseled defendants waive all
rights by pleading guilty, which the applicable law says they
waive; and, since the applicable law in this case is federal, it is
for us, and not the New York State Legislature, to say whether
Fourth Amendment claims such as those involved here will or will
not be waived by a guilty plea. To illustrate, suppose, instead of
passing the statute involved here, New York had sought to achieve
substantially the same result by permitting pretrial appeals from
denials of suppression motions in all cases in which the trial
judge certified that the seized evidence was likely to be
determinative of the outcome of the trial. Suppose further that a
defendant avails himself of this opportunity, loses on the merits
of his Fourth Amendment claim in the highest state court, and
subsequently pleads guilty. Suppose, finally, the
Page 420 U. S. 302
State passed a second statute permitting a defendant who pleads
guilty under the circumstances just described to appeal his
conviction directly to this Court or to bring directly a federal
habeas corpus proceeding attacking the constitutionality of the
search -- the statute expressly stating that the Fourth Amendment
right is deemed not waived by the plea of guilty. The second
statute would, obviously, be of no effect whatever, since it would
be a plain effort by the State to legislate federal law. However,
so far as the federal courts are concerned, the hypothesized
statute is the functional equivalent of the statute at issue in
this case as construed and effectuated by the majority. The only
difference is that, in the case of the real statute, the state
appeals follow the plea, rather than precede it.
Finally, the majority argues that a contrary decision by this
Court would interfere with the State's policy of avoiding
unnecessary trials by permitting appeals from guilty pleas. New
York, whose policy this Court is seeking to further, has appeared
here through its Attorney General and argued precisely to the
contrary. Obviously, New York believes that its policy is
adequately served by the state appeals. There is no reason for the
Court to decide the case one way for New York's benefit when New
York is arguing strenuously that we should decide the case the
other way.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Indeed, not only does the United States Constitution grant no
such entitlement, but the federal courts have, for the most part,
refused to create such an entitlement in the exercise of their
supervisory powers over the administration of criminal justice in
the federal system.
See United States v. Sepe, 474 F.2d
784 (CA5),
aff'd en banc, 486 F.2d 1044 (1973);
United
States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937 (CA6 1972);
United States v.
Mizell, 488 F.2d 97 (CA5 1973), and cases there cited.
But
see United States v. Dole, 348 F.2d 715, 719 (CA2),
cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
[
Footnote 2/2]
McMann was a case involving a coerced confession claim
in which the plea was entered before
Jackson v. Denno,
378 U. S. 368
(1964), and therefore at a time when the defendant believed the
jury would hear his confession regardless.
Tollett
involved a guilty plea entered in ignorance of the facts underlying
the defendant's later attack on than grand jury.
[
Footnote 2/3]
It is true that Fourth Amendment claims are never attacks on the
accuracy of the finding of factual guilt,
Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S. 618
(1965). Under our legal system, reversal of a conviction on Fourth
Amendment grounds is perfectly consistent with a recognition that
the defendant is, in fact, guilty. Thus, it may be argued that,
unlike some other claims, Fourth Amendment claims are not undercut
by a guilty plea in which guilt is solemnly admitted. The short
answer to this argument is that it applies as well in the case of
States which do not permit appeals from guilty pleas as in the case
of those which do, and the argument has therefore already been
rejected.
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.
S. 258 (1973);
Brady v. United States,
397 U. S. 742
(1970);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.
S. 759 (1970);
Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U. S. 790
(1970);
United States v. Sepe, supra. More to the point,
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule should be furthered
at the lowest possible cost to society in terms of freeing the
guilty. By precluding defendants who plead guilty from litigating
Fourth Amendment issues, we do not seriously detract from the
deterrent purpose of the rule (a policeman about to improperly
invade someone's privacy can hardly rely upon the erroneous
pretrial denial of a suppression motion by a trial judge and the
defendant's mistaken decision to plead guilty), and we avoid
unnecessarily freeing the guilty.
[
Footnote 2/4]
We did hold that a plea entered upon advice of counsel with
regard to the admissibility of the confession, which advice was not
"within the range of competence required of attorneys representing
defendants in criminal cases," 397 U.S. at
397 U. S.
797-798, would warrant vacation of the plea on Sixth
Amendment grounds.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40
(1968), in which we heard a Fourth Amendment claim on direct appeal
after a guilty plea, was decided before the Court created the
relevant constitutional rule in the
Brady trilogy; and, in
Sibron, the Court never addressed the question whether the
Federal Constitution entitled the defendant to set aside his guilty
plea upon establishing the antecedent Fourth Amendment
violation.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The majority argues that Newsome would have had a right to set
aside his conviction on the basis of a Fourth Amendment claim if he
had pleaded not guilty and permitted his attorney to stipulate
that, if called, certain government witnesses would testify to
certain facts, and introduce certain exhibits, among them the
allegedly illegally seized evidence; and that, therefore, he should
be permitted to set aside his functionally equivalent plea of
guilty on the basis of the same Fourth Amendment claim. The premise
is correct; the conclusion is not. In the first place, if the
conclusion were correct, it should apply equally to States which do
not permit appeals from guilty pleas. As our decisions in the
Brady trilogy and
Tollett establish, however,
guilty pleas in those States are not infirm on the basis of
antecedent constitutional violations, even though convictions in
uncontested trials are. The majority offers no reason why this
distinction should be ignored for federal purposes just because New
York ignores it for state purposes. Moreover, a conviction based
upon the defendant's solemn admission of factual guilt is not the
functional equivalent of a conviction on uncontested evidence. In
the latter case, the conviction is not based on the defendant's
admission, but on the evidence: the trial judge may always acquit,
if unpersuaded, and an appellate court may find the illegally
seized evidence not to have contributed to the verdict.
See discussion of the differences for appeal purposes
between a plea of guilty and a stipulation to evidence in
United States v. Mizell, 488 F.2d at 99-101 (guilty plea
not appealable), and
United States v. Mendoza, 491 F.2d
534, 536-538 (CA5 1974) (conviction on stipulated evidence
appealable).
See also United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d at
944-945.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Because of the possibility that prior Second Circuit law,
e.g., United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209
(1967), and
United States ex rel. Molloy v. Follette, 391
F.2d 231 (1968), affirmatively misled respondent's lawyer into
believing that federal law does permit collateral relitigation of
the antecedent Fourth Amendment violation after a New York guilty
plea, the best course would have been to permit all those,
including Newsome, who pleaded guilty before the date of this
decision in reliance on Second Circuit law to replead.
United
States v. Mizell, supra, at 101.
Cf. Santobello v. New
York, 404 U. S. 257
(1971).
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in
Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218,
412 U. S. 250
(1973). This case is even more inappropriate for federal collateral
review of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim. The prisoner
here, with advice of counsel,
Page 420 U. S. 303
pleaded guilty in open court. He does not question the
voluntariness of his plea, nor does he assert innocence. Rather, he
argues that his conviction is reviewable in federal habeas corpus
because of an uncommon New York statute which allows appeal from an
adverse suppression ruling notwithstanding the guilty plea.
Yet the Court today holds that respondent is entitled to seek
federal habeas corpus relief. This ruling distorts beyond
recognition the writ of habeas corpus. The historic and honored
purpose of habeas corpus, and indeed its only justification, is to
provide the added assurance to a free society that no innocent
person will suffer an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. The
great writ was not designed as a means for freeing persons who have
voluntarily confessed guilt under procedures comporting with due
process of law.
Apart from my views as to the inappropriateness of federal
habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment claims duly adjudicated by
state courts,
Bustamonte, supra, I also agree with MR.
JUSTICE WHITE's dissent,
ante, p.
420 U. S. 294.
As federal law is invoked by respondent, his guilty plea is
determinative under
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.
S. 258 (1973).