A person in custody under a
capias ad satisfaciendum
issued under the authority of the circuit court of the United
States cannot legally be discharged from imprisonment by a state
officer acting under a state insolvent law.
The facts in the case were not disputed, and were as
follows:
Isaac Darst, Henry Darst, and Jacob Darst, citizens of the State
of Ohio, recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania
against one Jacob Roth, who was arrested on a
capias ad
satisfaciendum and handed over for safekeeping to Andrew
Duncan, Sheriff of the County of York. This was on 6 December,
1832. On the next day, Roth applied to George Barnitz, an Associate
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the County of York, for the
benefit of an act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed on 28
March, 1820, entitled,
"A supplement to the act entitled "A supplement to the act
entitled
An act for the relief of insolvent debtors,'" passed
the twenty-ninth of January, one thousand eight hundred and
twenty."
The first section of the act referred to is as follows:
"That if any debtor shall hereafter be arrested or held in
execution on a bail piece in a civil suit, and who shall have
resided six months in this commonwealth previously thereto, he may
apply, when arrested on execution, to the president or any
associate judge of the court of common pleas of the county in which
he is so arrested, or when held on a bail piece, may apply to the
president or associate judge of the said court in the county in
which the suit was instituted, and give bond to the plaintiff or
plaintiffs, at whose suit he is so arrested and held, with such
security as shall be required and approved of by the said judge,
the condition of which bond shall be that the said debtor shall be
and appear at the next court of Common Pleas for said county and
there take the benefit of the insolvent laws of this commonwealth,
and to surrender himself to the jail of the said county, if he fail
to comply with all things required by law to
Page 42 U. S. 302
entitle him to be discharged, and generally to abide all orders
of the said court, whereupon the said judge shall give an order to
the sheriff, constable, or other person having such debtor in
custody to forthwith discharge him upon his paying the jail fees,
if any be due."
It was admitted that this act was in force on 7 December, 1832,
and for a long time afterwards; that Roth had resided in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for six months previously to his
application, and that he complied in all respects with the
provisions of the above section. The judge gave an order to the
sheriff having Roth in custody to forthwith discharge him upon his
paying the jail fees, and he was thereupon discharged.
Darst brought an action against Duncan for an escape, who
pleaded specially the above matters in his defense. The plaintiff
demurred to the plea, and the demurrer was sustained in the circuit
court, and upon the validity of this demurrer the case was brought
up to this Court.
The statute of Pennsylvania above recited required the party who
desired to be discharged from imprisonment to give bond that he
would appear at the next court of common pleas and there take the
benefit of the insolvent laws of the commonwealth. Upon a reference
to the acts then existing, it will be found that the privileges
conferred upon the debtor and the duties required of him by the
insolvent laws are the following:
He was to be declared free from imprisonment not only upon that
suit, but from subsequent arrests, on his giving a warrant to
appear in court, and although the property which he might
subsequently acquire was subject to execution, yet the court was at
liberty to exempt it provided two-thirds of his creditors assented.
The duties required of the debtor were that he should hand in a
list of his property, creditors, debts, and losses; that he should
not be guilty of collusion or false swearing; that he should not
conceal or convey away his property, under penalty of imprisonment;
and that he should be liable to punishment at hard labor if found
to be a fraudulent debtor. The property of and debts due to the
debtor were vested in trustees, who were to convert them into cash
and divide it among the creditors, the surplus, if any, belonging
to the debtor.
Page 42 U. S. 303
This is the process through which it was necessary to pass
according to the bond of anyone who might be discharged from
imprisonment, as Roth was.
Page 42 U. S. 304
MR. JUSTICE CATRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
It appears from the record that in 1824, Darst and others
recovered, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a judgment against Jacob Roth for
the sum of $5,465.
In November, 1832, a
capias ad satisfaciendum was sued
out against him, returnable to the April term, 1833, of the court.
On 6 December, 1832, the marshal arrested Roth and delivered him to
Duncan, the sheriff and jailer of York County, for safekeeping in
the jail of that county until discharged by due course of law. On 7
December, Duncan discharged him from custody and the present suit
was brought for an escape.
He pleaded in justification that Roth applied to G. B., an
associate judge of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, gave
bond and security to appear at the next court of common pleas, then
and there to take the benefit of the insolvent laws of
Pennsylvania, and to surrender himself to the jail of the county if
he failed to comply with all things required by law to entitle him
to be discharged &c. To this plea there was a demurrer and
judgment for the plaintiffs.
To the regularity of the writ of
capias ad
satisfaciendum, to its execution on the body of Roth, or to
his delivery to Duncan as the proper jailer to receive him there is
no objection made; the case turns exclusively on the question
whether by giving
Page 42 U. S. 305
bond and security to appear in the insolvent court, the sheriff
was authorized to release Roth from imprisonment.
It is admitted that had Roth been arrested by a sheriff on a
ca. sa., issued from a state court of Pennsylvania, a
discharge would have been proper on his giving the bond, and it is
contended the same consequence followed in this case because the
acts of Congress had adopted the modes of proceeding on final
process, governing the state courts and officers.
This brings up the question to what extent Congress had adopted
the various causes of discharge (in 1832) provided by the state
laws for the release of debtors imprisoned by virtue of writs of
ca. sa. issued by courts of the United States; beyond the
state laws adopted, it is settled the federal courts are not bound
to conform to state regulations. What state laws apply and regulate
the modes of proceeding in the courts of the United States depends
on a proper understanding of the acts of Congress on the
subject.
The first in order is that of 1789, c. 21, s. 2, which declares
the forms of writs and executions and the modes of process in suits
at common law shall be the same in each state respectively as are
now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same. This act was
temporary, but is referred to and in part sanctioned by that of
1792, c. 36, s. 2. This declares
"That the forms and modes of proceeding, in suits at common law
shall be the same as are now used in the courts of the United
States respectively in pursuance of the act of 1789, c. 21."
By the first section of the act of 1828, c. 68, the then
processes and modes of proceeding of the highest state court of
original jurisdiction are prescribed as applicable to the courts of
the United States in the states respectively that came into the
Union after 1789.
But the third section applies to the old and new states equally,
except Louisiana, and declares
"That writs of execution and other final process issued on
judgments and decrees, and the proceedings thereupon, shall be the
same in each state, respectively, as are now used in the courts of
such state,"
giving the courts power to alter final process by rules so far
only as to conform to any state law subsequently passed on the
subject. No rules have been adopted in Pennsylvania, and the acts
of Congress referred to therefore govern this case.
Page 42 U. S. 306
The terms "modes of process" in the act of 1789, and
"proceedings upon executions, and other final process" in the act
of 1828, have the same meaning, and include all the regulations and
steps incident to that process, from its commencement to its
termination as prescribed by the state laws, so far as they can be
made to apply to the federal courts, as this Court held in
Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 27-28, and also in
Beers v.
Houghton, 9 Pet. 329;
United
States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301;
Amis
v. Smith, 16 Pet. 312.
Congress, however, did not intend to defeat the execution of
judgments rendered in the courts of the United States, but meant
they should have full effect by force of the state laws adopted,
and therefore all state laws regulating proceedings affecting
insolvent persons or that are addressed to state courts, or
magistrates in other respects which confer peculiar powers on such
courts and magistrates, do not bind the federal courts, because
they have no power to execute such laws. The case of
Palmer v.
Allen, 7 Cranch 563, is to this effect. Palmer as
deputy marshal arrested Allen on a
capias ad respondendum
in the District of Connecticut and imprisoned him. By the laws of
that state, this could not be done without a mittimus from a
magistrate. This Court held the process acts did not adopt the law
of Connecticut, which required the mittimus:
"That it was a peculiar municipal regulation, not having any
immediate relation to the progress of the suit, and only imposing a
restraint on the state officers, but altogether inoperative upon
those of the United States."
Had it been necessary to ask the aid of the magistrate, to
execute the process, then he would have had the discretion to
refuse, and thereby to defeat it.
As state courts or magistrates cannot be compelled to aid a
federal court in the exercise of its jurisdiction, so neither can
they be permitted to restrain its process by injunction or
otherwise, as was held in
McKim v.
Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279. It follows that a state law
regulating the practice of state courts and addressed to its judges
and magistrates, but which can only be executed by them or with
their aid, is a peculiar municipal regulation, not adopted by the
acts of Congress nor applicable to the courts of the United
States.
The case of Duncan must be tested by these rules. Roth
applied
Page 42 U. S. 307
to a judge of the common pleas, and gave a bond to appear at
that court at its next term and take the benefit of the insolvent
laws. On this single step's being taken, the jailer discharged him.
The proceeding had no reference to the process by which Roth was
imprisoned, but to a new proceeding proposed to be instituted by
which all his property should be equally distributed among all his
creditors and his person be exempted in future from arrest for his
existing debts when discharged.
As all the creditors of Roth had the right to become parties to
the proceeding in the insolvent court no matter where they resided,
it is manifest the circuit court of the United States could take no
jurisdiction of the parties, nor execute the insolvent law, had an
application been made to that court for such purpose. It is
therefore a peculiar law as respects the court of the United
States, is strictly municipal in its character, and as it could
only be executed by the state courts, no action under it by these
courts could affect the process by which Roth was imprisoned.
This opinion is in conformity to the decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of
Duncan v.
Klinefetter, 5 Watts 141. That was an action on the case by
the present plaintiff in error, Duncan, against the jailer his
deputy for discharging Roth, whereby Duncan alleged he had
sustained damage.
It is insisted the foregoing conclusion is in conflict with the
decision of this Court in the case of
Beers v.
Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, and which decision is
confidently relied on as governing this case. In that case, Beers
sued Harris in the Circuit Court of Ohio; Haughton became bail for
Harris. Judgment was recovered in December, 1830; a
ca.
sa. was run against Harris and returned not found.
In February, 1832, Harris took the benefit of the insolvent law
of Ohio: by this proceeding his person was exempted from arrest in
all cases, for debts previously contracted.
In December, 1832, Beers sued Haughton on the bail bond, who
pleaded and relied on the discharge of Harris.
By the laws of Ohio, the bail has the right to surrender the
principal at any time before he is thus sued and served with the
process.
Haughton undertook that Harris should surrender his person if he
failed to pay the debt. To enforce this condition, the
ca.
sa. issued. The bail had the right to arrest the principal and
deliver
Page 42 U. S. 308
him to the marshal, who could imprison the debtor as if arrested
by the
ca. sa. Not being subject to imprisonment after the
discharge under the insolvent law, the marshal could not receive
the prisoner; nor could be have lawfully arrested him. It followed
the bail was equally inhibited, and of course discharged from
performance by the act of the law, just as certainly as he would
have been discharged by the act of God had Harris died at the time
he was released under the insolvent act. This is the doctrine
settled in
Beers v. Haughton.
Had Roth been discharged in the insolvent court by its judgment
from future imprisonment before the
ca. sa. was executed
by the marshal, then a case would have arisen to which the
principle declared in that of
Beers v. Haughton would
apply, as the State of Pennsylvania had the undoubted right to
exempt persons thus discharged from imprisonment for debt, so she
might exempt all persons whatever. But it does not follow that one
not excepted from the operation of the general law, who had been
properly arrested and imprisoned by the process of a federal court,
could be discharged by a state judge. The general rule is -- 10 Co.
76 b, same cases cited in note, 5 Watts 144 -- (and nothing is
better settled), that an officer is not justified in obeying the
order of a judge or court having no jurisdiction in the matter, and
this rule applies in an especial manner, as between the state and
federal courts, where it never has been supposed that the judges of
the one could control the process of the other. If it was otherwise
and writs of injunction, of supersedeas, and orders to discharge
defendants from imprisonment could be granted by state courts or
judges to render ineffectual process issued from the courts of the
United States, the jurisdiction of the latter might be, and
probably would be, overthrown in parts of the Union, as it would be
the exercise of the power of PROHIBITION, and might be extended to
defeat the fruits of all judgments rendered by federal courts at
the discretion of state courts and judges. A conflict of
jurisdiction fraught with more dangerous consequences could not
well be supposed, and to concede the validity of the discharge of
Roth would involve such a consequence, however innocently meant by
the state judge, of whose integrity of intention we have no
doubt.
If, during Roth's confinement in prison, he had been
declared
Page 42 U. S. 309
insolvent, by the Court of Common Pleas of York County, then it
might have been a question properly made before the circuit court
of the United States whether he should be discharged from
imprisonment. But as such a motion would have called into exercise
the legal discretion of the court upon a mixed question of law and
fact, it can be affirmed with something like safety that the merely
giving a bond to appear before the insolvent court would not have
been sufficient to authorize his release from imprisonment. Be this
as it may, that court alone had jurisdiction to act in the
matter.
It is insisted for the defendant in error that the Act of
Congress of 1800, c. 4, for the relief of persons imprisoned for
debt is the only law by which a discharge can be had from a
ca.
sa. awarded by a court of the United States. We do not think
so. By that law, the district judges are authorized by themselves,
or through commissioners appointed for the purpose, to discharge
the debtor; he must show and swear that he is not worth thirty
dollars, and give notice to the execution creditor, before a
discharge can be ordered. The debtor may have, and usually has,
outstanding claims to choses in action and interests in property of
various kinds, perhaps contingent and remote; probably of little
value, or it might turn out they are of much value; and as he has
to swear that he has no estate, real or personal, in possession,
reversion, or remainder, to the amount or value of thirty dollars,
it will often happen the oath cannot be taken by the most honest
and conscientious debtor. The consequence is he must remain in
prison until the humanity of the creditor interposes, and as he
usually resides at a distance, cases of the greatest hardship and
distress may occur if the state laws afford no additional remedy.
Whereas, by the laws of some of the states, he may give bond and
security, when the process issues from a state court to the
sheriff, to appear at the return term of the writ and give in a
schedule of his property, the title and possession of which are
conferred on the sheriff for the benefit of the execution creditor,
and the proceeds are applied to the satisfaction of the judgment,
and then the debtor is permitted to take the insolvent oath and be
discharged.
As the marshals and courts of the United States are necessarily
governed by the same rules that the sheriffs and courts of the
Page 42 U. S. 310
respective states are in this respect, they must proceed in the
same manner.
So there are other modes of discharge prescribed by the state
laws that can be executed just as conveniently and properly by the
federal courts and judges as they can be by the state courts or
judges in cases where the execution issues from the latter courts.
State laws of this description have been adopted by the acts of
Congress as incident to the remedy; they are cumulative and in
addition to the Act of Congress of 1800, both being in force.
As we have adopted in effect the same construction, where
property had been levied on, in Amis v. Smith, 16 Pet. 312, it
would be harsh to hold otherwise, in restraint of personal
liberty.
In that case, a forthcoming bond for property levied on had been
taken by the marshal and the property been released according to
the laws of Mississippi, the statute of that state authorizing such
a bond and the release of the property. This mode of proceeding was
held to be incident to the process of execution because it had been
adopted by the Act of Congress of 1828; previously no delivery bond
could have been taken nor the property released by the marshal.
If bond and security could be taken for the delivery of property
seized, the same could not be refused for the appearance at court
of the defendant conditioned that he give in a schedule of his
property and take the benefit of the insolvent laws when the
statutes of the state where the proceeding was had expressly
commanded it to be done in like cases under process issued from the
state courts, directed to their officers.
We think the judgment of the circuit court upon the demurrer was
correct, and order it to be
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel. On
consideration whereof it is now here ordered and adjudged by this
Court that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be
and the same is hereby affirmed with costs and damages at the rate
of 6 percentum per annum.