A plaintiff may, in an action in form
ex delicto
against several defendants, enter a
nolle prosequi against
one of them. But in actions in form
ex contractu, unless
the defense be merely in the personal discharge of one of the
defendants, a
nolle prosequi cannot be entered as to one
defendant without discharging the other.
Qu. Whether a plea which sets up new matter and
concludes "to the country" is good.
A plea alleging merely that seals were affixed to a bond without
the consent of the defendant, without also alleging that it was
done with the knowledge, or by the authority or direction of the
plaintiffs, is not sufficient.
A plea which has on the face of it two intendments ought to be
construed most strongly against the party who pleads it.
A party who claims under an instrument which appears on its face
to have been altered is bound to explain the alteration, but not so
when the alteration is averred by the opposite party and it does
not appear upon the face of the instrument.
Where the plea is bad and the demurrer is to the plea, the
court, having the whole record before them, will go back to the
first error.
Where the date of a surety bond is subsequent to the appointment
of the principal to office, the declaration should allege that the
money collected by the principal remained in his hands at the time
when the surety bond was executed.
This is a sequel to the case between the same parties reported
in
40 U. S. 15
Pet. 291. The circumstances are sufficiently set forth in the
opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The writ or summons issued in the cause purports to be in a plea
of debt for one hundred thousand dollars. And the declaration
contains three counts upon the following instrument, which upon
oyer craved by the defendants is set out upon the record.
Page 42 U. S. 105
"Know all men by these presents, that we, William Linn, David B.
Waterman, Lemuel Lee, James M. Duncan, John Hall, William Walters,
Asahel Lee, William L. D. Ewing, Alexander P. Field, and Joseph
Duncan, are held and firmly bound unto the United States of
America, in the full and just sum of one hundred thousand dollars,
money of the United States, to which payment, well and truly to be
made, we bind ourselves jointly and severally, our joint and
several heirs, executors, and administrators, firmly by these
presents, sealed with our seals, and dated this first day of
August, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six."
They also crave oyer of the condition of the said supposed
writing obligatory, and it is read to them in these words:
"The condition of the foregoing obligation is such that whereas
the President of the United States hath, pursuant to law, appointed
the said William Linn receiver of public moneys for the district of
lands subject to sale at Vandalia, in the State of Illinois, for
the term of four years, from 12 January, 1835, by commission
bearing 12 February, 1835. Now therefore, if the said William Linn
shall faithfully execute and discharge the duties of his office,
then the above obligation to be void and of none effect, otherwise
it shall abide and remain in full force and virtue."
"Sealed and delivered in the presence of Presley G. Pollock, as
to Wm. Linn, D. B. Waterman, Lemuel Lee, J. M. Duncan, John Hall,
Wm. Walters, Asahel Lee, Wm. L. D. Ewing, and A. P. Field; A.
Caldwell as to Joseph Duncan."
"WILLIAM LINN [L.S.]"
"LEMUEL LEE [L.S.]"
"JOHN HALL [L.S.]"
"ASAHEL LEE [L.S.]"
"A. P. FIELD [L.S.]"
"D. B. WATERMAN [L.S.]"
"J. M. DUNCAN [L.S.]"
"WM. WALTERS [L.S.]"
"WM. L. D. EWING [L.S.]"
"JOSEPH DUNCAN [L.S.]"
"GENERAL LAND OFFICE"
"Approved, August 30, 1836 ETHAN A. BROWN"
To the first count, which purports to be debt on the bond, the
defendants plead jointly
non est factum and several other
pleas not necessary here to be noticed.
To the second and third counts which are upon the same
instrument, not described however as a bond, but as a certain
Page 42 U. S. 106
instrument in writing. To these counts the defendant, Joseph
Duncan, put in the following plea.
"And the said Joseph Duncan impleaded as aforesaid, by Logan and
Brown, his attorneys, comes and defends the wrong and injury, when
&c. And as to the said second and third counts in the said
plaintiffs' declaration contained, says that the said plaintiffs
their said action on the said second and third counts ought not to
have or maintain against him, this defendant, because, he says,
that protesting that he executed the supposed written instrument
declared upon it be said second and third counts of the plaintiffs'
amended declaration, he says that after he had signed said
instrument, and delivered it to his co-defendant, Linn, to be
transmitted to the plaintiffs, and after the securities to the said
written instrument had been affixed (approved) by the Hon.
Nathaniel Pope, Judge of the District Court of the United States
for the State of Illinois, it was, without the consent, direction,
or authority of said Joseph Duncan, materially altered in this --
that scrawls, by way of seals, were affixed to the signature of
said Joseph Duncan to said written instrument, and to the
signatures of the other parties to said written instrument, whereby
the character and effect of the said written instrument, declared
in the second and third counts aforesaid, was materially changed,
and said instrument declared on vitiated."
"And so said Duncan says that the said supposed written
instrument declared on in the second and third counts of
plaintiffs' amended declaration is not his act and instrument --
and of this he puts himself upon the country."
To which plea there is interposed a special demurrer, and the
court gave judgment for the defendant Joseph Duncan upon the
demurrer, thereby adjudging that the plea was sufficient in law to
bar the plaintiffs from maintaining their action against him. And
issues being joined upon the pleas to the first count, the cause
came on to be tried by a jury, and under the instructions of the
court a verdict was found for the defendants upon the issues of
fact. Exceptions were taken to the instructions of the court to the
jury. And the correctness of such instructions is the first
question presented on this writ of error.
Upon the trial, after reading the bond to the jury, the
defendants called a witness, who testified in substance that he saw
the
Page 42 U. S. 107
bond after it had been signed by the obligors, in the hands of
William Linn, the obligor first named therein, after it had been
returned from the district judge with his certificate endorsed of
the sufficiency of the sureties. That the district judge, in a note
in writing, accompanying the bond, had pointed out the omission of
seals to the names of the signers of the instrument, and said Linn,
saying he would obviate that difficulty, took a pen, and in the
presence of the witness, added scrawls, by way of seals, to each
name subscribed, as makers of the instrument. Other testimony was
given, under the issues of fact, which it is not material to
notice.
Upon this evidence the court gave the following instruction to
the jury:
"If they shall find from the evidence, that after the instrument
upon which the action is brought, was signed by the defendants, it
was altered by William Linn, one of the defendants, without the
knowledge or assent of the other defendants, by adding to the names
of the defendants the scrawl seals which now appear upon the face
of the instrument, and such defendants have not at any time since
the alteration sanctioned it, the instrument is not the deed of
such defendants, and the jury will find a verdict in their
favor."
And the question is whether this instruction was in point of law
correct, under the pleadings and evidence in the cause. All the
defendants united in a joint plea of
non est factum, and
the proof was that the scrawls were added by Linn to his own name
and to the names of the other defendants. The adding the scrawl by
Linn to his own name did not vitiate the instrument as to him: he
had a right to add the seal, or at least, he can have no right to
set up his own act in this respect to avoid his own deed. It was
therefore his deed, and the plea of
non est factum as to
him is false. And the question is whether it is not false as to all
who joined him in the plea of
non est factum. It is laid
down by Chitty in his Treatise on Pleading that a plea which is bad
in part is bad
in toto. If therefore two defendants join
in a plea, which is sufficient for one but not for the other, the
plea is bad as to both. For the court cannot sever it, and say that
one is guilty, and that the other is not, when they put themselves
on the same terms. Chitty 598. A plaintiff may in an action in form
ex delicto against several defendants, enter a
nolle
prosequi as to one of them. But in
Page 42 U. S. 108
actions in form
ex contractu, unless the defense be
merely in the personal discharge of one of the defendants, a
nolle prosequi cannot be entered, as to one defendant,
without discharging the other, for the cause of action is entire
and indivisible. Chitty 599. The rule laid down by Chitty is fully
sustained by the English and American decisions. In
Smith v.
Bouchin, 2 Strange 993, the action was trespass and false
imprisonment; plea not guilty by all, and a justification as to
eight days' imprisonment. And the court held, that although the
officer and jailer might have been excused, if they had pleaded
severally, but having joined in the plea with others who could not
justify, they had forfeited their justification. In
Moors v.
Parker, 3 Mass. 310, the action was trespass
de bonis
asportatis against several, and all join in the plea of not
guilty, and also in a plea of justification. The court held that
the bar set up was no justification for one of the defendants, and
if several defendants join in pleading in bar, if the plea is bad
as to one defendant it is bad as to all.
So in the case of
Schermerhorne v. Tripp, 2 Caines 108,
which was in error from a court of common pleas. The action was
trespass against a justice of the peace, the constable, and the
plaintiff, and all joined in a plea of not guilty. The court said
the constable having joined with the others in the plea of the
general issue, they are all equally trespassers. If he had pleaded
separately, he would probably have been excused; but he has now
involved himself with others, and we cannot separate their
fates.
It is unnecessary to multiply authorities on this point, the
books are full of them, and it is a well settled and established
rule in pleading. The reason is because the plea, being entire,
cannot be good in part and bad in part, an entire plea not being
divisible, and consequently, if the matter jointly pleaded be
insufficient as to one of the parties, it is so
in toto. 1
Saunders 28, n. 2, and cases there cited.
It has been suggested that this objection is waived by the
following entry in the bill of exceptions:
"A judgment having been obtained against Linn for the full
amount of his defalcation, a judgment on this bond was not asked
against him or any of the defendants, unless the jury shall find
against all the defendants. "
Page 42 U. S. 109
It is not perceived how this can be considered a waiver of any
error. No judgment could have been given against Linn separately,
the plea of
non est factum being joint. But the
plaintiffs, according to the express terms of this memorandum, did
ask a verdict and judgment against all the defendants, and if from
the pleadings and evidence they were entitled to judgment against
all, as we think they were, there was no waiver that will justify
the instructions given to the jury.
The next question arises upon the special demurrer to the plea
of Joseph Duncan to the second and third counts of the declaration.
This plea sets up new matter to avoid the instrument upon which the
action is founded, and concludes to the country. And it may well be
questioned whether upon the best and soundest rules of pleading it
ought not to have concluded with a verification. Chitty, in his
Treatise on Pleading, 1 Chitty 590, says it is an established rule
in pleading, that whenever new matter is introduced on either side,
the pleading must conclude with a verification, in order that the
other party may have an opportunity of answering it. And this rule
has the sanction of many adjudged cases. In the case of
Service
v. Heermance, 1 Johns. 92, the court said there is no rule in
pleading better or more universally established than that whenever
new matter is introduced, the pleading must conclude with an
averment. And the reason, said the court, is obvious because the
plaintiff might otherwise be precluded from setting forth matter
which would maintain his action, although the matter pleaded by the
defendant might be true. And in
Henderson v. Whitby, 2
Durn. & East 576, Buller, Justice, in giving the judgment of
the court, said:
"By the rules of pleading, whenever new matter is introduced,
the other party must have an opportunity of answering it. So that
the replication setting up new matter concluded properly with an
averment. Numerous authorities both in England and in the United
States might be cited in support of this rule. But there is
certainly no little confusion and diversity of opinion appearing in
the books with respect to the question when the pleadings ought to
conclude to the country and when with a verification. Many of these
discrepancies may grow out of rules, said by Mr. Chitty to have
been recently established in the English courts relating to
pleadings, which have not fallen under our
Page 42 U. S. 110
notice. We will, however, pass by the demurrer for that cause in
the present case and proceed to an examination of the special
matter set up in the plea in bar of the action. If this mode of
pleading be adopted, the special matter set up must, as in a
special plea, be such, that if true in point of fact, it will bar
the action and defeat the plaintiff's right to recover. The matter
set up in this plea, when stripped of some circumlocution, is that
after he, Joseph Duncan, and the other parties to the instruments
had signed the same, it was, without his consent, direction, or
authority, altered by affixing seals to their signatures."
"The plea does not indicate in any manner by whom the alteration
was made. It does not allege that it was done with the knowledge or
by the authority or direction of the plaintiffs, nor does it even
deny that it was done with the knowledge of the defendant, Joseph
Duncan. The plea does not contain any allegation inconsistent with
the conclusion that it was altered by a stranger without the
knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs, and if so, it would not
have affected the validity of the instrument. It is said that the
demurrer admits the truth of the matter set up in the plea. The
demurrer admits whatever is well pleaded. But it does not admit any
more, and certainly does not admit what is not pleaded at all. The
demurrer then admits nothing more than that the seals were affixed
after the instrument had been signed by the parties and delivered
to Linn to be transmitted to the plaintiffs, and that this was done
without the consent, direction, or authority of him, the said
Joseph Duncan. Is this enough to avoid the instrument and bar the
recovery? It certainly is not, for the seals might have been
affixed by a stranger without the knowledge or authority of the
plaintiffs, and would not have affected the validity of the
instrument. The plea not alleging by whom the seals were affixed,
it is open to two intendments. Either that this was made by the
plaintiffs, which would make the instrument void, or that it was
done by a stranger, which would not invalidate it. And what is the
rule of construction of such a plea? It is that it is to be
construed most strongly against the defendant. This is the rule
laid down by Chitty, 1 Chitty 578, and in which he is supported by
numerous authorities. And the reason assigned for this rule of
construction is that it is a natural presumption that the party
pleading will
Page 42 U. S. 111
state his case as favorably as he can for himself. And if he do
not state it with all its legal circumstances, the case is not in
fact favorable to him, and the rule of construction in such case is
that if a plea has on the face of it two intendments, it shall be
taken most strongly against the defendant -- that is, says he, the
most unfavorable meaning shall be put upon the plea, a rule which
obtains also in other pleadings, and a number of cases are put
illustrating this rule. The present plea falls directly within it.
The plea not alleging by whom the seals were affixed, it is left
open to intendment that it was done either by the plaintiffs or by
a stranger. In the first case, it would make the deed void; in the
last it would not vitiate it. And under the rule that has been
stated, the most unfavorable meaning must be put upon the plea --
that is, that which will operate most against the party pleading
it. And the alteration must be presumed to have been made so as not
to vitiate the instrument, if the plea will admit of such
construction. Suppose the plea had concluded with a verification,
and the plaintiffs had replied that the affixing the seal was done
without their knowledge, consent, or authority, and this state of
the case had been sustained by the proof, it would not have avoided
the instrument."
But it is said the law imposes upon the party who claims under
the instrument the burden of explaining the alteration. This is the
rule, undoubtedly, where the alteration appears on the face of the
instrument, as an erasure, interlineation, and the like. In such
case, the party having the possession of the instrument and
claiming under it, ought to be called upon to explain it. It is
presumed to have been done while in his possession. But, where no
such
prima facie evidence exists, there can be no good
reason why this should devolve upon a party, simply because he
claims under the instrument. The plea avers the alteration, and the
defendant therefore holds the affirmative, and the general rule is
that he who holds the affirmative must prove it. And this, under
the present plea, can impose no hardship on the defendant, for his
affirming the fact of alteration affords a reasonable presumption
that he knew by whom the alteration was made. And, in addition to
this, it is a circumstance deserving considerable weight, that the
defendant in his plea does not deny his having such knowledge. He
avers that the seal was affixed without
Page 42 U. S. 112
his consent, direction, or authority; but he does not say it was
done without his knowledge. And it is not an unreasonable inference
that if he had, in his plea, disclosed by whom it was done, it
would appear to have been done in a way that did not affect the
validity of the instrument. There is not upon the face of this
instrument anything indicating an alteration, or casting a
suspicion upon its validity, that should put the plaintiffs upon
inquiry. The instrument upon its face admits it was sealed with the
seals of the defendants, and purports to have been sealed and
delivered, in the common conclusion of a sealed bond. So that, when
the instrument came into the possession of the plaintiffs, there
was nothing on the face of it to raise a suspicion against its
validity. The case of
Henman v. Dickinson, 5 Bingham 183,
has been relied upon to show that the onus of accounting for the
alteration is thrown upon the plaintiffs. All that this case
decides is that the party who sues on an instrument which on the
face of it appears to have been altered, it is for him to show that
the alteration has not been improperly made. The circumstance of
the alteration appearing on the face of the instrument is
emphatically relied upon by the court to show that the party
claiming under the instrument must account for the alteration. This
was a question of evidence upon the trial, and did not arise upon
the pleadings, and the report of the case does not furnish us with
the pleadings. Many other cases might be cited to the same
effect.
In the case of
Taylor v. Mosely, 6 Car. & Payne
273, the bill upon which the suit was brought appeared on its face
to have been altered, and there was no evidence on either side when
or by whom the alteration was made, and the question was submitted
to the jury by Lord Lyndhurst, with the remark, that it lay on the
plaintiff to account for the suspicious form and obvious alteration
of the note, and they must judge from the inspection of the
instrument, and if they thought the alteration was made after the
completion of the bill, the verdict must be for the defendant. In
the case now before the Court, the inspection of the instrument
furnishes no ground of suspicion, and from the facts stated in the
plea, there must have been a considerable distance of time after
the instrument was signed by Duncan before it came into the
possession of the plaintiffs. The plea alleges that it was
delivered to Linn, one of the defendants, to be transmitted to
the
Page 42 U. S. 113
plaintiffs. But the plea does not allege that the alteration was
made after the instrument came into the possession of the
plaintiffs, and under this state of facts alleged in the plea, the
onus of proving when and by whom altered, is more properly cast
upon the defendant. We are accordingly of opinion that the plea is
bad. But it is a settled rule that, when the demurrer is to the
plea, the court having the whole record before them will go back to
the first error, and when the demurrer is by the plaintiffs, his
own pleadings must be scrutinized, and the court will notice all
exceptions to the declaration that might have been taken on general
demurrer. We are accordingly thrown back on the record to examine
the sufficiency of the declaration in the second and third
counts.
The second count sets out the instrument as of the date of 1
April, 1836. That Linn's commission bears date 12 February, 1835,
and that he was appointed receiver for four years from 12 January,
1835. And the count then alleges that after the making and
delivering the said instrument in writing, and after the
appointment of the said Linn, he entered upon the duties of his
office; and that within four years from 12 January, and while he
was receiver of public moneys, there came into his hands, as
receiver, the sum of four millions of dollars, which it was his
duty to pay over to the plaintiffs when requested, yet the said
William Linn hath not, nor would he, although often requested so to
do, to-wit on 2 April, in the year 1838, account for and pay over
to the said plaintiffs the said sums of money or any part thereof,
but hath wholly neglected and refused so to do. It is said this
count is bad because from the time stated in the count he might
have received the money after 12 January, 1835, the commencement of
his office, and before 1 April, 1836, when the instrument signed by
the sureties bears date, and that the sureties cannot be
responsible for any moneys received before they became sureties.
The count alleges a demand of the money and a refusal to pay it on
2 April in the year 1838, long after the defendant became surety.
In the case of
Farrar & Brown v. United
States, 5 Pet. 373, which was an action upon a bond
given for the faithful discharge of the duties of a surveyor of the
public lands, the breach assigned was
Page 42 U. S. 114
that at the time of the execution of the bond, "there were in
the hands of the surveyor large sums of money to be disbursed for
the use of the United States, which he had neglected to do." And
one of the questions which arose was whether the sureties could be
made liable for any moneys paid to the surveyor prior to the
execution of the bond, and the court said there is but one ground
on which the sureties can be made answerable, and that was on the
assumption that the money was still remaining in his hands when the
bond was given. And in the case of
United
States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 208, the Court said it
matters not at what time the moneys had been received if after the
appointment of the officer they were held by him in trust for the
United States, and so continued to be held at and after the date of
the bond. In these cases there was a direct allegation that the
money was in the hands of the officer at the date of the bond. In
the case now before the Court there is no such direct allegation,
and this Court is therefore bad on this ground. The third count is
also bad for the same reason.
The judgment of the circuit court must accordingly be
Reversed and the cause sent back for further
proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN dissented.
The joint plea of
non est factum to the first count in
the declaration being bad against Linn, is undoubtedly bad against
the other defendants. But this point was not raised in the circuit
court. It was not intended to be raised. On the contrary, the
counsel agreed to submit the question under the plea whether the
annexation of the seals by Linn vitiated the bond as against the
sureties. And the reason for this was stated in the following entry
on the record:
"A judgment having been obtained against Linn for the full
amount of his defalcation, a judgment on this bond was not asked
against him or any of the defendants unless the jury shall find
against all the defendants."
This agreement was treated by the counsel on both sides in the
circuit court as waiving any technical question arising on the
pleading. No one could doubt that the bond was good against Linn.
And it is equally clear that technically the plea was bad for the
other defendants, it being bad as to Linn. And it was to avoid any
technicality of this kind that the agreement
Page 42 U. S. 115
was entered into. It is less definite than it should have been,
but still its object seems to be manifest. That a construction here
would be given to the agreement different from that which was given
to it by the United States attorney in the circuit court, was not
expected. His construction is shown from the fact of his not having
suggested any objection to the court below arising on the joint
plea.
The plea of Joseph Duncan as to the alteration of the bond is
held to be bad because it is not averred that it was altered by the
plaintiffs or by their authority. At the same time it is admitted
that, on the general issue, the person claiming under the deed must
explain any interlineation or alteration upon its face, so as to
show the bond is not vitiated. The reason of this is clear. The
party having possession of the bond is presumed to have a knowledge
of any alteration of it, and is therefore required to explain it.
Prima facie, any material alteration vitiates the
bond.
Now the special plea in this case states a material alteration,
by affixing the seals, after the instrument had been approved of by
the district judge. The demurrer admits the facts stated in the
plea. Does it not follow, then, that the plea is good if the
alteration alleged in it be a material one, such an one as vitiates
the instrument unless explained? No rule in pleading is better
settled than that a fact which is presumed to be known to the
plaintiff and is not presumed to be within the knowledge of the
defendant, the defendant need not aver it in his plea if he can
without the averment set up a
prima facie defense. Mr.
Chitty says, 1 vol. of Plead. 255,
"It is also a general rule that matter which should come more
properly from the other side need not be stated. In other words, it
is enough for each party to make out his own case or defense. He
sufficiently substantiates the charge or answer for the purposes of
pleading if his pleading establish a
prima facie charge or
answer. He is not bound to anticipate, and therefore is not
compelled to notice and remove in his declaration or plea every
possible exception, answer, or objection which may exist and with
which the adversary may intend to oppose him."
Com.Dig. Pleader, c. 81; Plowd. 376; 2 Saund. 62a, n. 4; 1 Term
638; 8 Term 167; Stephen's Pl. 1st ed. 354.
Page 42 U. S. 116
No one can doubt that the alteration averred in the above plea,
appearing on the face of the instrument, would vitiate it unless
explained by the holder. And it follows, then, that the plea
stating the fact which the demurrer admits must be answered and
explained.
The defendant must know whether an instrument which he has
executed has been altered in a material part. But he is not
presumed to know by whom it has been altered while it is in the
possession of the party who claims under it. If the defendant must
aver this, he must prove it, and this would be impossible. But on
the other hand, the person claiming under the instrument, and who
has always been in possession of it, may well be presumed to know
by whom it has been altered, and therefore he, and he only, can
explain it. Any other rule would be most unreasonable and contrary
to any proper system of pleading.
The rules lately adopted by the courts of England in regard to
pleading seem "not to have fallen under the notice of this court."
This is to be regretted, as those rules have been published in the
late editions of Mr. Chitty on Pleading and are known to the
profession throughout the country.
It is true, as the court said, that intendments are taken
against the plea, but intendments must not only be practicable, but
reasonable. If a fact in the plea be omitted, which the defendant
cannot be presumed to know, and which must be known to the
plaintiff, no intendment against the plea can be drawn.
Mr. Stephens, in his Treatise on Pleading 350, under the head
that, "it is not necessary to state matter which would come more
properly from the other side," says,
"this, which is the ordinary form of the rule, does not fully
express its meaning. The meaning is that it is not necessary to
anticipate the answer of the adversary, which, according to Hale,
C.J., 'is like leaping before one comes to the stile.' It is
sufficient that each pleading should in itself contain a good
prima facie case, without reference to possible objections
not yet urged. . . . Thus, in pleading a devise of land by force of
the statute of wills, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, it is sufficient to allege
that such an one was seized of the land in fee, and devised it by
his last will, in writing, without alleging that such devisor was
of full age. For though the statute provides that wills made by
femes covert or persons within age, &c., shall not
Page 42 U. S. 117
be taken to be effectual; yet if the devisor were within age, it
is for the other party to show this in his answer, and it need not
be denied by anticipation."
"So where an action of debt was brought upon the statute 21 Hen.
6, against the bailiff of a town for not returning a burgess of
that town for the last Parliament (the words of the statute being
that the sheriff shall send his precept to the mayor, and if there
be no mayor, then to the bailiff), the plaintiff declared that the
sheriff had made his precept unto the bailiff, without averring
that there was no mayor. And after verdict for the plaintiff, this
was moved in arrest of judgment. But the court was of opinion
clearly that the declaration was good, for we shall not intend that
there was a mayor, except it be showed; if there were one, it
should come more properly on the other side."
"Where the matter is such that its affirmation or denial is
essential to the apparent or
prima facie right of the
party pleading, there it ought to be affirmed or denied."
Now the alteration of the instrument in a material part, after
Duncan the defendant had signed it, without his consent or
knowledge, did make a
prima facie case. It made such a
case as, upon the general issue, would have required the plaintiffs
to show by whom it was altered. And this shows that the plea is
good. It is the same principle whether it arise on the general
issue or by special plea. The same order of proof is required. The
plaintiffs, therefore, instead of demurring, should have pleaded
over and alleged that the alteration was made by a stranger, and
consequently that it did not vitiate the instrument.
The plea should have concluded with a verification, and not to
the country. But this could only be taken advantage of by special
demurrer. This defect is not one of the causes assigned in the
demurrer, and therefore cannot be objected to.
The second and third counts of the declaration being bad, as
ruled by the court, the judgment of the circuit court should, on
those counts, have been affirmed, and not reversed. Mr. Stephens,
in his Pleading 144, says again,
"It is a rule that on demurrer the court will consider the whole
record, and give judgment for the party who, on the whole, appears
to be entitled to it. . . . Thus, on demurrer to the replication,
if the court thinks the replication bad but perceives a substantial
fault in the plea, it
Page 42 U. S. 118
will give judgment not for the defendant, but for the plaintiff,
provided the declaration be good; but if the declaration also be
bad in substance, then, upon the same principle, judgment would be
given for the defendant."
Piggot's case, 5 Rep. 29a;
Bates v. Cost, 2
Barn. & Cres. 474.
I believe this case is the first exception to the above rule.
Notwithstanding the above defective counts, judgment is given
generally against the defendant. It is hoped that this ruling will
not establish a precedent in other cases.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Illinois and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is
now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of
the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby
reversed and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to
the said circuit court with directions to proceed therein
conformably to the opinion of this Court.