CIUZIO v. U.S, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)
U.S. Supreme Court
CIUZIO v. U.S , 416 U.S. 995 (1974)416 U.S. 995
Eugene Robert CIUZIO
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 73-5842.
Supreme Court of the United States
May 13, 1974
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1974.
See 417 U.S. 978.
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL, join, dissenting.
Successive prosecutions of petitioner and one Cioffi
resulted from an alleged agreement to sell an undercover agent $500,000 worth of counterfeit 6-cent stamps and an alleged delivery to the agent of a sample sheet of four hundred of the stamps. The first prosecution was upon a two-count indictment that charged the pair in the first count with having attempted to sell stamps known to be falsely made, forged and counterfeited, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 472, and, in the second count, with conspiracy to violate the same section. The trial on that indictment ended with a directed verdict of acquittal on the first count as to Cioffi, a dismissal of the first count as to petitioner and a mistrial on the second count when the jury could not agree upon a verdict.
Instead of proceeding to a retrial on the second count, the Government abandoned its efforts under 472 and procured a second indictment under 18 U.S.C. 501 based upon the very same course of conduct. The second indictment was also a two-count indictment, the first count charging that the pair 'knowingly did possess with intent to use and sell, approximately four hundred forged and counterfeited postage stamps . . .,' in violation of 501, and count 2 charging conspiracy to violate that section. The overt acts alleged were the same as in the first indictment and the evidence at the trials was much the same.
I
Petitioner and Cioffi unsuccessfully claimed that, since the
second prosecution grew out of the same transaction, the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the second
prosecution. In my view the rejection of this claim was error. I
adhere to the position that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the
prosecution, except in most limited circumstances not present here,
'to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow
out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction.'
Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, [416
U.S. 995 , 997]
U.S. Supreme Court
CIUZIO v. U.S , 416 U.S. 995 (1974) 416 U.S. 995 Eugene Robert CIUZIOv.
UNITED STATES.
No. 73-5842. Supreme Court of the United States May 13, 1974 Rehearing Denied June 17, 1974. See 417 U.S. 978. On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL, join, dissenting. Successive prosecutions of petitioner and one Cioffi Page 416 U.S. 995 , 996 resulted from an alleged agreement to sell an undercover agent $500,000 worth of counterfeit 6-cent stamps and an alleged delivery to the agent of a sample sheet of four hundred of the stamps. The first prosecution was upon a two-count indictment that charged the pair in the first count with having attempted to sell stamps known to be falsely made, forged and counterfeited, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 472, and, in the second count, with conspiracy to violate the same section. The trial on that indictment ended with a directed verdict of acquittal on the first count as to Cioffi, a dismissal of the first count as to petitioner and a mistrial on the second count when the jury could not agree upon a verdict. Instead of proceeding to a retrial on the second count, the Government abandoned its efforts under 472 and procured a second indictment under 18 U.S.C. 501 based upon the very same course of conduct. The second indictment was also a two-count indictment, the first count charging that the pair 'knowingly did possess with intent to use and sell, approximately four hundred forged and counterfeited postage stamps . . .,' in violation of 501, and count 2 charging conspiracy to violate that section. The overt acts alleged were the same as in the first indictment and the evidence at the trials was much the same. I Petitioner and Cioffi unsuccessfully claimed that, since the second prosecution grew out of the same transaction, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the second prosecution. In my view the rejection of this claim was error. I adhere to the position that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances not present here, 'to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction.' Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, Page 416 U.S. 995 , 997 453-454 (1970) (concurring opinion); see Mullin v. Wyoming, 414 U.S. 940 (1973) ( dissenting opinion); Grubb v. Oklahoma, 409 U.S. 1017, 34 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1972) (dissenting opinion); Miller v. Oregon, 405 U.S. 1047 (1972) (dissenting opinion); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 (1971) ( concurring opinion). II I would grant certiorari in any event to decide another Double Jeopardy claim argued by petitioner based upon the action of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in remanding for a new trial after reversing the conviction of petitioner and Cioffi under the second indictment, 487 F.2d 492 (1973). The substantive 501 first count alleged possession of the stamps 'with intent to use and sell.' Shortly before submission of the case to the jury, the indictment was redacted to delete all references to 'sell.' The redaction was acquiesced in by the prosecution when sought by the defense, apparently because the Government's evidence was insufficient to support the charge of possession with intent to 'sell.' The case thus went to the jury under instructions limited to the charge of possession with intent to 'use.' The Court of Appeals held, however, that the instructions defining 'use' were erroneous because not confined to use for postal purposes. Instead of remanding for a new trial limited to the 'use' charge, as was proper although the Government's evidence at the first 501 trial may have been insufficient, Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950), the Court of Appeals remanded for a trial on the 'sell' charge finding that the Government's evidence on that charge was sufficient to present a jury question of possession with intent to 'sell'. The Court of Appeals stated:
