The judgement is affirmed.
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr.
Justice POWELL join, dissenting.
'There was a young lady from
Niger
Who smiled as she rode on a tiger.
They returned from the ride
With the lady inside,
And the smile on the face of the tiger.'
Page 415 U.S.
961 , 962
When Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act in 1938, the state
regulatory agencies were among its strongest supporters. [
Footnote 1] For, without supplanting
any of the existing authority of the state agencies, the Act was
intended to provide a powerful regulatory partner, the Federal
Power Commission, which could regulate activities where the state
bodies could not. As the Senate Report on the bill stated:
'The bill takes no authority from
state commissions, and is so drawn as to complement and in no
manner usurp state regulatory authority, and contains provisions
for cooperative action with state regulatory bodies.'2
Yet the Court today affirms a holding of the District Court
which permits the Federal Power Commission to sue the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission and enjoin the enforcement of those state
agency orders which the court finds violate either the Natural Gas
Act or the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. After
this decision, the state regulatory agencies must surely feel a
special kinship with the young lady from Niger.
Page 415 U.S.
961 , 963
The District Court judgment which is here affirmed arose out of
an action brought by respondent Federal Power Commission against
petitioner Corporation Commission of Oklahoma in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The complaint
alleged that various orders which had been issued by the Oklahoma
Commission were invalid under the Commerce Clause and also
conflicted with the authority of the Federal Power Commission
granted by the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717 et seq. The
three-judge District Court which was convened agreed with the
contentions of the Federal Power Commission, and enjoined
enforcement of the orders of the Oklahoma Commission.
My disagreement with the Court's summary affirmance of this
judgment stems not from any disagreement with the substantive
holding of the District Court, but with what seems to me the more
important holding that the Federal Power Commission has authority
to institute an action such as this at all. Despite the total
absence of precedent for such litigation by the Federal Power
Commission, and language in the Natural Gas Act which at least on
its face seems to preclude it, the Court chooses to summarily
affirm. At the least, I feel the question deserves plenary
consideration.
I
The major share of the Natural Gas Act as it presently exists
was passed by Congress in 1938 with the recognition that 'the
business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate
distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and
that Federal regulation in matters relating to the transportation
of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign
commerce is necessary in the public interest.'3 Congress
recognized
Page 415 U.S.
961 , 964
at that time that state regulatory agencies, with authority over
intrastate sales and transportation of natural gas, were unable to
deal effectively with interstate sales and transportation of that
resource. The States themselves acknowledged their inadequacy in
this area, and earnestly supported the bill as a supplement to the
jurisdictions of their own regulatory agencies. [
Footnote 4] The Act specifically stated that it
'shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas
or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities
used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of
natural gas.'5 There can be no doubt, I think, that the autonomy of
the state regulatory agencies and their spheres of influence were
to be preserved. [
Footnote
6]
The Act grants to the Federal Power Commission extensive
authority to regulate the interstate transportation and sale of
natural gas. It makes unlawful the establishment of rates and
charges which are not 'just and reasonable,'7 and further grants to
the Commission the power to establish just and reasonable rates
where natural gas companies have not done so.8 'Any State,
municipality, or State commission' may file a complaint with the
Commission relating to 'anything done or omitted to be done by any
natural-gas company in contravention of the provisions' of the
Natural Gas Act. [
Footnote 9]
The Commission is then empowered to hold hearings on
Page 415 U.S.
961 , 965
the complaint,10 and the parties are given the right of appeal
from any resulting order of the Commission to the appropriate Court
of Appeals. [
Footnote
11]
The Act does no simply grant the Commission administrative and
adjudicative functions, but prosecutorial functions as well. The
first subsection of 15 U.S.C. 717s reads as follows:
'(a) Whenever it shall appear to the
Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage in any
acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation
of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule, regulation, or
order thereunder, it may in its discretion bring an action in the
proper district court of the United states, . . . to enjoin such
acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or
any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, and upon a proper
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or
restraining order shall be granted without bond.' (Emphasis
added.)
It is clear from this section that the Commission is granted
ample authority to proceed against any person engaging in practices
which violate the Natural Gas Act. It would seem equally clear that
if the Commission deemed companies subject to its jurisdiction to
be engaging in such practices under claim of authority from the
Oklahoma Commission those companies could be forced to defend their
conduct in District Court under the provisions of 717s. But it is a
long leap from this provision, which finds a counterpart in other
regulatory acts, to the conclusion reached by the District Court
here: that the state commission itself was a 'person' for purposes
of 717s, and might be named a defendant in the District Court for
pur-
Page 415 U.S.
961 , 966
poses of enjoining enforcement of its orders claimed to violate
provisions of the Natural Gas Act. I find no support in the Act for
that result.
II
The Term 'person' is defined in the Act itself, 15 U.S.C. 717a,
as follows:
"Person' includes an individual or a
corporation.'
Since one would not commonly expect a state corporation
commission to be subsumed under the term 'individual,' it seems
reasonable to look at the definition of the word 'corporation' to
determine whether a state agency is within the class of 'persons'
which the Federal Power Commission has authority to bring into
federal court. But the term 'corporation' is defined in 15 U.S.C.
717a(2) to specifically exclude 'municipalities as hereinafter
defined.' Turning to subsection 3, which defines 'municipality,'
one finds that the term means 'a city, county, or other political
subdivision or agency of a state.' Whatever else this chain of
definitions may mean, it must mean that a state agency is not
included within the definition of the term 'corporation.'
The District Court in this case conceded that the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission was neither an individual nor a corporation
within the meaning of the Act, but nevertheless concluded that it
was a 'person' who could be sued by the Federal Power Commission
under 717s. According to the District Court, the verb 'includes' as
used in the definition of the word 'person' is a verb of
'enlargement' and not a verb of 'limitation.' 12 Therefore, the
court reasoned: '[W]hether the defendant Oklahoma Corporation
Commission is a non-
Page 415 U.S.
961 , 967
individual 'person' against which the [Federal Power Commission]
may proceed, is to be determined by the 'legislative
environment."13
I do not think the convoluted statutory construction of the
District Court withstands analysis. The Federal Power Commission is
given statutory authority to sue 'any person,' defined in the Act
to include an 'individual' or a 'corporation.' While use of the
word 'include' would in some circumstances permit suits against
'persons' who could not fairly be classified as either
'individuals' or 'corporations,' the term hardly can be said to
cover an agency with corporate characteristics which is
nevertheless specifically excluded from the definition of
'corporation.' Yet this is exactly the result reached by the
District Court here: Though the statute excludes 'municipalities as
hereinafter defined' from the term 'corporation,' and defines them
to mean, inter alia, an 'agency of a state,' the careful process of
exclusion and inclusion pursued by Congress is rendered nugatory by
the District Court's conclusion that the Oklahoma Commission is a
'non-individual 'person."14
Page 415 U.S.
961 , 968
The 'legislative environment' to which the District Court
purported to look in reaching its conclusion not only fails to
support the court's interpretation but points in precisely the
opposite direction. [
Footnote
15] As indicated earlier in this opinion, the Act was passed in
an atmosphere of cooperation between the existing state regulatory
agencies and the newly created federal regulatory agency, and was
unanimously endorsed by the state regulatory agencies. There is
nothing in this environment, and nothing indicated by the District
Court, which suggests that the state agencies, by their approval,
were consenting to be sued by the FPC in federal courts. The cases
cited by the District Court for its holding with respect to the
'legislative environment' of the Natural Gas Act arose out of
statutes taxing sales of intoxicating liquors and prohibiting
conspiracies and restraint of trade, respectively. In Ohio v.
Helvering,
292 U.S.
360, 54 S. Ct. 725 (1934), the Court held that, under a statute
taxing 'persons' selling intoxicating liquor, federal tax policy
would support a tax on the State acting in a 'proprietary'
capacity. In Georgia v. Evans,
316 U.S. 159 (1942), the
Court held that a State was included in the definition of 'person'
for purposes of suing for treble damages under 7 of the Sherman
Act. These cases are scarcely authority for the proposition that
the term 'person' in one congressional enactment necessarily means
the same thing in another. Neither the Liquor Taxation Act nor the
Sherman Act defined 'person' to include a term such as
'corporation' which was then additionally defined to exclude the
entity sought to be brought within the statute's definition. My
reading of the Natural Gas Act and attendant legislative history
affords no basis for the belief that the Federal Power Commission
was authorized to bring state commissions into federal court
whenever it suspected that state regulatory orders interfered with
its own statutory mission. The Federal Power Commission is given
full authority to establish rates, to disapprove rates which are
considered unreasonable or unjust, and to bring before it alleged
violators of the Act. To go further, at least on arguments as
tenuous as those offered in support of the result reached by the
District Court, and to conclude that Congress intended the
Commission to hale state regulatory agencies into federal court
whenever it felt their policies were inconsistent with its own, is
not only unnecessary to the effectuation of the federal agency's
responsibilities, but seriously undermines established notions of
comity between state and federal bodies. While there may be many
questions of statutory construction which are resolved by
three-judge courts which are of no great import to any large
segment of the public, this assuredly is not one of them.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 S.Rep.No.1162,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1937).
Footnote 2 S.Rep.No.1162,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). This Court has recognized that the
Act was not intended to deprive States of their prior
authority:
'The Act, though extending federal
regulation, had no purpose or effect to cut down state power. On
the contrary, perhaps its primary purpose was to aid in making
state regulation effective, by adding the weight of federal
regulation to supplement and reinforce it in the gap created by the
prior decisions. The Act was drawn with meticulous regard for the
continued exercise of state power, not to handicap or dilute it in
any way.' Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service
Commission of Indiana,
332 U.S. 507, 517-518, 68
S.Ct., 190 (1947).
Footnote 3 15 U.S.C.
717(a).
Footnote 4 See n. 1,
supra.
Footnote 5 15 U.S.C.
717(b).
Footnote 6 The Court in
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., n. 2, supra, stated: 'Congress, it
is true, occupied a field. But it was meticulous to take in only
territory which this Court had held the state could not reach.' 332
U. S., AT 519.
Footnote 7 15 U.S.C.
717c(a).
Footnote 8 15 U.S.C.
717d(a).
Footnote 9 15 U.S.C.
717l.
Footnote 10 15 U.S.C.
717n(a).
Footnote 11 15 U.S.C.
717r(b).
Footnote 12 Appx. to
J.S., p. xli.
Footnote 13 Appx. to
J.S., p. xlii.
Footnote 14 Additional
argument to support the conclusion that state regulatory agencies
were not intended to fall within the definition of 'person' in the
Natural Gas Act can be found by examination of that term's use in
other portions of the Act. For example, the very section in which
the definition of 'person' is found, 15 U.S.C. 717a, contains an
additional definition of 'state commission.' Furthermore, in the
same section, 'natural-gas company' is defined to mean a 'person
engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for
resale.' (Emphasis added.) Obviously, inclusion of a state
regulatory body within the definition of 'person' in that section
would be meaningless.
Section 717r provides that '[a]ny person, State, municipality,
or State commission aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission'
may apply to the Commission for a rehearing. If the term 'person'
included state regulatory bodies as a matter of course, the
duplicate use of 'person' and 'municipality' or 'State commission'
would be purely superfluous. Also, 15 U.S.C. 717t provides that
'[a]ny person' who willfully or knowingly violates the provisions
of the Natural Gas Act should be subject to fine or imprisonment.
Certainly the word 'person' in this subsection would not be held to
apply to state regulatory bodies.
Footnote 15 Although the
District Court stated that the 'legislative environment' would be
persuasive, it should be noted that the court made no study of the
environment of the Natural Gas Act. The only environment examined
related to the two acts discussed in the text, infra.