Petitioner, a previously convicted felon, was convicted of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), a part of the Gun Control Act of
1968, by falsely stating, in connection with the redemption from a
pawnbroker of three guns petitioner had pawned, that he had not
been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than
a year. The pawnbroker was a federally licensed firearms dealer.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Section 922(a)(6) makes it an
offense knowingly to make a false statement "in connection with the
acquisition . . . of any firearm . . . from a . . . licensed
dealer" and
"intended or likely to deceive such . . . dealer . . . with
respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other
disposition of such firearm. . . ."
Held: Section 922(a)(6) applies to the redemption of a
firearm from a pawnshop. Pp.
415 U. S.
819-833.
(a) Petitioner's contention that the statute covers only a
sale-like transaction is without merit, since "acquisition," as
used in § 922(a)(6), clearly includes any person, by definition,
who "comes into possession, control, or power of disposal" of a
firearm. Moreover, the statutory terms "acquisition" and "sale or
other disposition" are correlatives. It is reasonable to conclude
that a pawnbroker might "dispose" of a firearm through a redemptive
transaction. Finally, Congress explicitly included pawnbrokers in
the Gun Control Act, specifically mentioned pledge and pawn
transactions involving firearms, and did not include them in the
statutory exemptions. Pp.
415 U. S.
819-823.
(b) That pawnshop firearms redemptions are covered by the
challenged provision comports with the legislative history of Title
IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and
the Gun Control Act of 1968, which are aimed at controlling access
to weapons by those whose possession thereof is contrary to the
public interest, through a regulatory scheme focusing on he
federally licensed firearms dealer. Pp.
415 U. S.
824-829.
(c) Section 922(a)(6) contains no ambiguity warranting a narrow
construction in petitioner's favor, and application of the
Page 415 U. S. 815
statute to the pawn redemptions here raises no issue of
constitutional dimension. Pp.
415 U. S.
830-833.
472 F.2d 592, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
415 U. S.
833.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6),
[
Footnote 1] declaring that it
is unlawful knowingly to make a false statement "in connection with
the acquisition . . . of any firearm . . . from a . . . licensed
dealer," covers the redemption of a firearm from a pawnshop.
On October 6, 1971, petitioner, William C. Huddleston, Jr.,
pawned his wife's Winchester 30-30-caliber rifle for $25 at a
pawnshop in Oxnard, California. On the following October 15 and on
December 28, he pawned at
Page 415 U. S. 816
the same shop two other firearms, a Russian 7.62-caliber rifle
and a Remington .22-caliber rifle, belonging to his wife. For these
he received loans of $10 and $15, respectively. The owner of the
pawnshop was a federally licensed firearms dealer.
Some weeks later, on February 1, 1972, and on March 10,
Huddleston redeemed the weapons. In connection with each of the
redemptions, the pawnbroker required petitioner to complete
Treasury Form 4473, entitled "Firearms Transaction Record." This is
a form used in the enforcement of the gun control provision of
Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 225, as amended by the Gun Control Act of
1968, Pub.L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, of which the above-cited 18
U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) is a part. Question 8b of the form is:
"Have you been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year? (Note: The actual
sentence given by the judge does not matter -- a yes answer is
necessary if the judge could have given a sentence of more than one
year.)"
The question is derived from the statutory prohibition against a
dealer's selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm to any person
who "has been convicted in any court of . . . a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).
[
Footnote 2] Petitioner
answered "no" to Question 8b on each of the three
Page 415 U. S. 817
Forms. 4473. He then affixed his signature to each form's
certification that the answers were true and correct, that he
understood that a person who answers any of the questions in the
affirmative is prohibited by federal law from "purchasing and/or
possessing a firearm," and that he also understood that the making
of any false statement with respect to the transaction is a crime
punishable as a felony.
In fact, Huddleston, six years earlier, had been convicted in a
California state court for writing checks without sufficient funds,
an offense punishable under California law by a maximum term of 14
years. [
Footnote 3] This fact,
if revealed to the pawnshop proprietor, would have precluded the
proprietor from selling or otherwise disposing of any of the rifles
to the petitioner because of the proscription in 18 U.S.C. §
922(d)(1).
Huddleston was charged in a three-count indictment with
violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a). [
Footnote 4] He moved to dismiss the indictment, in
part on the ground that § 922(a)(6) was never intended to apply,
and should not apply, to a pawnor's redemption of a weapon he had
pawned. This motion was denied. Petitioner then pleaded not guilty
and waived a jury trial.
Page 415 U. S. 818
The Government's evidence consisted primarily of the three
Treasury Forms 4473 Huddleston had signed; the record of his
earlier California felony conviction; and the pawnbroker's federal
license. A Government agent also testified that petitioner, after
being arrested and advised of his rights, made statements admitting
that he had known, when filling out the forms, that he was a felon,
and that he had lied each time when he answered Question 8b in the
negative.
Huddleston testified in his own defense. He stated that he did
not knowingly make a false statement; that he did not read the
form, and simply answered "no" upon prompting from the pawnbroker;
and that he was unaware that his California conviction was
punishable by a term exceeding one year. [
Footnote 5]
The District Judge found the petitioner guilty on all counts. He
sentenced Huddleston to three concurrent three-year terms. The
sentences were suspended, however, except for 20 days to be served
on weekends. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed the conviction. 472 F.2d 592
(1973). The dissenting judge agreed that the statute was
constitutional as applied, but concluded that what Huddleston did
was to "reacquire" the rifles, and that "reacquire" is not
necessarily included within the statute's term "acquire."
Id. at 593. We granted certiorari, 411 U.S. 930 (1973), to
resolve an existing conflict among the circuits on the issue
whether the
Page 415 U. S. 819
prohibition against making false statements in connection with
the acquisition of a firearm covers a firearm's redemption from a
pawnshop. [
Footnote 6]
II
Petitioner's assault on the statute under which he was convicted
is two-pronged. First, it is argued that both the statute's
language and its legislative history indicate that Congress did not
intend a pawnshop redemption of a firearm to be an "acquisition"
covered by the statute. Second, it is said that, even if Congress
did intend a pawnshop redemption to be a covered "acquisition," the
statute is so ambiguous that its construction is controlled by the
maxim that ambiguity in a criminal statute is to be resolved in
favor of the defendant.
We turn first to the language and structure of the Act. Reduced
to a minimum, § 922(a)(6) relates to any false statement made "in
connection with the acquisition . . . of any firearm" from a
licensed dealer and intended or likely to deceive the dealer "with
respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other
disposition of such firearm."
Petitioner attaches great significance to the word
"acquisition." He urges that it suggests only a sale-like
transaction. Since Congress in § 922(a)(6) did not use words of
transfer or delivery, as it did in other sections of the Act, he
argues that "acquisition" must have a narrower meaning than those
terms. Moreover, since a pawn transaction is only a temporary
bailment of personal property, with the pawnshop having merely a
security interest in the pledged property, title or ownership is
constant in the pawnor, and the "pawn
Page 415 U. S. 820
plus redemption" transaction is no more than an interruption in
the pawnor's possession. The pawnor simply repossesses his own
property, and he does not "acquire" any new title or interest in
the object pawned. At most, he "reacquires" the object, and
reacquisition, as the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals
noted, is not necessarily included in the statutory term
"acquisition."
On its face, this argument might be said to have some force. A
careful look at the statutory language and at complementary
provisions of the Act, however, convinces us that the asserted
ambiguity is contrived. Petitioner is mistaken in focusing solely
on the term "acquisition" and in enshrouding it with an
extra-statutory "legal title" or "ownership" analysis. The word
"acquire" is defined to mean simply "to come into possession,
control, or power of disposal of." Webster's New International
Dictionary (3d ed., 1966, unabridged);
United States v.
Laisure, 460 F.2d 709, 712 n. 3 (CA5 1972). There is no
intimation here that title or ownership would be necessary for
possession, or control, or disposal power, and there is nothing
else in the statute that justifies the imposition of that gloss.
Moreover, a full reading of § 922(a)(6) clearly demonstrates that
the false statements that are prohibited are those made with
respect to the lawfulness of the sale "or other disposition" of a
firearm by a licensed dealer. The word "acquisition," therefore,
cannot be considered apart from the phrase "sale or other
disposition." As the Government suggests, and indeed as the
petitioner implicitly reasoned at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg.
11, if the pawnbroker "sells" or "disposes" under § 922(a)(6), the
transferee necessarily "acquires." These words, as used in the
statute, are correlatives. The focus of our inquiry, therefore,
should be to determine whether a "sale or other disposition" of a
firearm by a pawnbroker encompasses the redemption of the firearm
by a pawnor.
Page 415 U. S. 821
Clearly, a redemption is not a "sale" for the simple reason that
a sale has definite connotations of ownership and title. Some
"other disposition" of a firearm, however, could easily encompass a
pawnshop redemption. We believe that it does.
It is the dealer who sells or disposes of the firearm. The
statute defines the dealer to be:
"(A) any person engaged in the business of selling firearms or
ammunition at wholesale or retail, (B) any person engaged in the
business of repairing firearms or of making or fitting special
barrels, stocks, or trigger mechanisms to firearms, or (C)
any
person who is a pawnbroker."
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(11) (emphasis supplied). It defines a
"pawnbroker" as
"any person whose business or occupation includes the taking or
receiving, by way of pledge or pawn, of any firearm or ammunition
as security for the payment or repayment of money."
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(12) (emphasis supplied).
These definitions surely suggest that a "sale or other
disposition" of a firearm in a pawnshop is covered by the statute.
This, of course, does not of itself resolve the question as to
exactly what "other disposition" by a pawnbroker is included. It
should be apparent, however, that, if Congress had intended to
include only a pawnbroker's default sales of pledged or pawned
goods, or his wholesale and retail sales of nonpawned goods, and to
exclude the
redemption of pawned articles, then the
explicit inclusion of the pawnbroker in the definition of "dealer"
would serve no purpose, since part (A) of the definition, covering
wholesale and retail sales, would otherwise reach all such sales.
United States v. Rosen, 352 F. Supp. 727, 729 (Idaho
1973). At oral argument, counsel suggested that the specific
reference to a pawnbroker might have been intended to include
"disposition"
Page 415 U. S. 822
by barter, swap, trade, or gift. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7. This
interpretation strains belief. Trades or gifts are not peculiar to
pawnbrokers. Wholesalers and retailers may indulge in such
dispositions. There is nothing in the legislative history to
indicate that this interpretation prompted the specific mention of
a pawnbroker in part (C) of the definition. To the contrary, the
committee reports indicate that part (C) "specifically provides
that a pawnbroker
dealing in firearms shall be considered
a dealer." H.R.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1968)
(emphasis supplied).
See also S.Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 30 (1968).
We also cannot ignore the explicit reference to a firearm
transaction "by way of pledge or pawn" in the statutory definition
of "pawnbroker" in § 921(a)(12). Had Congress' desire been to
exempt a transaction of this kind, it would have artfully worded
the definition so as to exclude it. We are equally impressed by
Congress' failure to exempt redemptive transactions from the
prohibitions of the Act when it so carefully carved out exceptions
for a dealer "returning a firearm" and for an individual mailing a
firearm to a dealer "for the sole purpose of repair or
customizing." § 922(a)(2)(A). Petitioner contends that a redemptive
transaction is no different from the return of a gun left for
repair. His argument is that the pawned weapon is simply "returned"
to the individual who left it and represents a mere restoration to
its original status. We believe, however, that it was not
unreasonable for Congress to choose to view the pawn transaction as
something more than the mere interruption in possession typical of
repair. The fact that Congress thought it necessary specifically to
exempt the repair transaction indicates that it otherwise would
have been covered and, if this were so, clearly a pawn transaction
likewise would be covered.
Page 415 U. S. 823
Other provisions of the Act also make it clear that the statute
generally covers all transfers of firearms by dealers to
recipients. Section 922(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person,
except a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer, to engage in
the business of "dealing" in firearms, or in the course of such
business "to ship, transport, or receive any firearm." Section
922(b)(1) makes it unlawful for a dealer "to sell or deliver"
firearms of specified types to persons under 18 or 21 years of age.
Section 922(b)(2) makes it unlawful for a dealer to "sell or
deliver" a weapon to a person in any State where "at the place of
sale, delivery or other disposition," the transfer would violate
local law. Section 922(d) makes it unlawful for a dealer "to sell
or otherwise dispose of" a firearm to a person under a felony
indictment, a felon, a fugitive, a narcotic addict, or a mental
defective. Section 923(g) requires that each licensed dealer
maintain "records of importation, production, shipment, receipt,
sale, or other disposition, of firearms."
In sum, the word "acquisition," as used in § 922(a)(6), is not
ambiguous, but clearly includes any person, by definition, who
"come[s] into possession, control, or power of disposal" of a
firearm. As noted above, "acquisition" and "sale or other
disposition" are correlatives. It is reasonable to conclude that a
pawnbroker might "dispose" of a firearm through a redemptive
transaction. And because Congress explicitly included pawnbrokers
in the Act, explicitly mentioned pledge and pawn transactions
involving firearms, and clearly failed to include them among the
statutory exceptions, we are not at liberty to tamper with the
obvious reach of the statute in proscribing the conduct in which
the petitioner engaged.
Page 415 U. S. 824
III
The legislative history, too, supports this reading of the
statute. This is apparent from the aims and purposes of the Act and
from the method Congress adopted to achieve those objectives. When
Congress enacted the provisions under which petitioner was
convicted, it was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms
and with their general availability to those whose possession
thereof was contrary to the public interest. Pub.L. 90-351, § 1201,
82 Stat. 236, as amended by Pub.L. 90-618, § 301(a)(1), 82 Stat.
1236, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1201. Congress determined that the ease with
which firearms could be obtained contributed significantly to the
prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States.
S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 (1968). The principal
purpose of the federal gun control legislation, therefore, was to
curb crime by keeping "firearms out of the hands of those not
legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal
background, or incompetency." S.Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 22 (1968).
Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968 are thus aimed at restricting
public access to firearms. Commerce in firearms is channeled
through federally licensed importers, manufacturers, and dealers in
an attempt to halt mail-order and interstate consumer traffic in
these weapons. The principal agent of federal enforcement is the
dealer. He is licensed, §§ 922(a)(1) and 923(a); he is required to
keep records of "sale . . . or other disposition," § 923(g); and he
is subject to a criminal penalty for disposing of a weapon contrary
to the provisions of the Act, § 924.
Section 922(a)(6), the provision under which petitioner
Page 415 U. S. 825
was convicted, was enacted as a means of providing adequate and
truthful information about firearms transactions. Information drawn
from records kept by dealers was a prime guarantee of the Act's
effectiveness in keeping
"these lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug
addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons
whose possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to
allow."
114 Cong.Rec. 13219 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings). Thus, any
false statement with respect to the eligibility of a person to
obtain a firearm from a licensed dealer was made subject to a
criminal penalty.
From this outline of the Act, it is apparent that the focus of
the federal scheme is the federally licensed firearms dealer, at
least insofar as the Act directly controls access to weapons by
users. Firearms are channeled through dealers to eliminate the mail
order and the generally widespread commerce in them, and to insure
that, in the course of sales or other dispositions by these
dealers, weapons could not be obtained by individuals whose
possession of them would be contrary to the public interest. Thus,
the conclusion we reached above with respect to the language and
structure of the Act, that firearms redemptions in pawnshops are
covered, is entirely consonant with the achievement of this
congressional objective and method of enforcing the Act.
Moreover, as was said in
United States v. Bramblett,
348 U. S. 503,
348 U. S. 507
(1955),
"There is no indication in either the committee reports or in
the congressional debates that the scope of the statute was to be
in any way restricted."
(Footnotes omitted.) Indeed, the committee reports indicate that
the proscription under 922(d) on the sale or other disposition of a
firearm to a felon "goes to all types of sales or dispositions
--
Page 415 U. S. 826
over-the-counter as well as mail order." [
Footnote 7] S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
115 (1968).
See S.Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 34
(1968). As far as the parties have informed us, and as far as our
independent research has revealed, there is no discussion of the
actual meaning of "acquisition" or of "sale or other disposition"
in the legislative history. Previous legislation relating to the
particular term "other disposition" sheds some light, however, and
prudence calls on us to look to it in ascertaining the legislative
purpose.
United States v. Katz, 271 U.
S. 354,
271 U. S. 357
(1926). The term apparently had its origin in § 1(k) of the
National Firearms Act, Pub.L. 474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934). That Act
set certain conditions on the "transfer" of machine guns and other
dangerous weapons. As defined by the Act, "transfer" meant "to
sell, assign, pledge, lease, loan, give away, or otherwise dispose
of." The term "otherwise dispose of" in that context was aimed at
providing
Page 415 U. S. 827
maximum coverage. The interpretation we adopt here accomplishes
the same objective. [
Footnote
8]
There also can be no doubt of Congress' intention to deprive the
juvenile, the mentally incompetent, the criminal, and the fugitive
of the use of firearms. Senator Tydings stated:
"Title IV, the concealed weapons amendment, is a very limited,
stripped-down, bare-minimum gun traffic control bill, primarily
designed to reduce access to handguns for criminals, juveniles, and
fugitives. . . . I can fairly say that this concealed weapons
amendment does not significantly inconvenience hunters and
sportsmen in any way. The people it does frustrate are the
juveniles, felons, and fugitives who today can, with total
anonymity and impunity, obtain guns by mail or by crossing into
neighboring States with lax or no gun laws at all, regardless of
the law of their own State."
114 Cong.Rec. 13647 (1968).
Page 415 U. S. 828
Congressman Celler, the House Manager, stated:
"Mr. Chairman, none of us who supports Federal firearms controls
believe that any bill or any system of control can guarantee that
society will be safe from firearms misuse. But we are convinced
that a strengthened system can significantly contribute to reducing
the danger of crime in the United States. No one can dispute the
need to prevent drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with a
history of mental disturbances, and persons convicted of certain
offenses, from buying, owning, or possessing firearms. This bill
seeks to maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the
hands of such persons."
Id. at 21784. Congressman McCulloch, a senior member of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, in referring specifically to
922(a)(6), stated,
"[The bill] makes it unlawful . . . [f]or any person, in
connection with obtaining a firearm or ammunition from a licensee,
to make a false representation material to such acquisition."
Id. at 21789. [
Footnote
9] Given these statements of congressional purpose, it would be
unwarranted to except pawnshop redemptions
Page 415 U. S. 829
when, by virtue of the statutory language itself, such
redemptions would be covered. Otherwise every evil Congress hoped
to cure would continue unabated. [
Footnote 10]
Page 415 U. S. 830
IV
Petitioner urges that the intention to include pawn redemptions
is so ambiguous and uncertain that the statute should be narrowly
construed in his favor. Reliance is placed upon the maxim that an
"ambiguity
Page 415 U. S. 831
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity."
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.
S. 808,
401 U. S. 812
(1971);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.
S. 336,
404 U. S. 347
(1971). This rule of narrow construction is rooted in the concern
of the law for individual rights, and in the belief that fair
warning should be accorded as to what conduct is criminal and
punishable by deprivation of liberty or property.
United
States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
18 U. S. 95
(1820);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. at
404 U. S. 348.
The rule is also the product of an awareness that legislators and
not the courts should define criminal activity. Zeal in forwarding
these laudable policies, however, must not be permitted to shadow
the understanding that "[s]ound rules of statutory interpretation
exist to discover, and not to direct, the Congressional will."
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.
S. 537,
317 U. S. 542
(1943). Although penal laws are to be construed strictly, they
"ought not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious
intention of the legislature."
American Fur Co. v. United
States, 2 Pet. 358,
27 U. S. 367
(1829);
United States v. Wiltberger, supra; 39 U.
S. Morris, 14 Pet. 464,
39 U. S. 475
(1840);
United States v. Lacher, 134 U.
S. 624 (1890);
United States v. Bramblett, 348
U.S. at
348 U. S. 510;
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. at
404 U. S.
351.
We perceive no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language
and structure of the Act. The statute in question clearly
proscribes petitioner's conduct and accorded him fair warning of
the sanctions the law placed on that conduct. Huddleston was not
short of notice that his actions were unlawful. The question he
answered untruthfully was preceded by a warning in boldface type
that "an untruthful answer may subject you to criminal
prosecution." The question itself was forthright and direct,
stating that it was concerned with conviction of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a
Page 415 U. S. 832
term exceeding one year, and that this meant the term which
could have been imposed and not the sentence actually given.
Finally, petitioner was required to certify by his signature that
his answers were true and correct and that he understood that "the
making of any false oral or written statement . . . with respect to
this transaction is a crime punishable as a felony." This warning
also was in boldface type. Clearly, petitioner had adequate notice
and warning of the consequences of his action.
Our reading of the statute cannot be viewed as judicial
usurpation of the legislative function. The statute's language
reveals an unmistakable attempt to include pawnshop transactions,
by pledge or pawn, among the transactions covered by the Act. And
Congress unquestionably made it unlawful for dealers, including
pawnbrokers, "to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm" to a
convicted felon, a juvenile, a drug addict, or a mental defective.
§ 922(d). Under these circumstances, we will not blindly incant the
rule of lenity to "destroy the spirit and force of the law which
the legislature intended to [and did] enact."
American Tobacco
Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284,
207 U. S. 293
(1907);
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. at
271 U. S. 357.
[
Footnote 11]
Page 415 U. S. 833
V
The petitioner suggests, lastly, that the application of §
922(a)(6) to a pawn redemption would raise constitutional questions
of some moment, and that these would not arise if the statute were
narrowly construed. We fail to see the presence of issues of that
import. There was no taking of Huddleston's property without just
compensation. The rifles, in fact, were not his, but his wife's.
Moreover, Congress has determined that a convicted felon may not
lawfully obtain weapons of that kind. Nor were petitioner's false
answers in any way coerced.
United States v. Knox,
396 U. S. 77,
396 U. S. 79
(1969);
Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S.
64,
396 U. S. 72
(1969). Finally, no interstate commerce nexus need be demonstrated.
Congress intended, and properly so, that §§ 922(a)(6) and (d)(1),
in contrast to 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1),
see United States v.
Bass, supra, were to reach transactions that are wholly
intrastate, as the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned, "on the
theory that such transactions affect interstate commerce." 472 F.2d
at 593.
See also United States v. Menna, 451 F.2d 982, 984
(CA9 1971),
cert. denied, 405
U. S. 963 (1972), and
United States v. O'Neill,
467 F.2d 1372, 1373-1374 (CA2 1972).
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
"§ 922. Unlawful acts."
"(a) It shall be unlawful -- "
"
* * * *"
"(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition . . . of
any firearm . . . from a . . . licensed dealer . . . knowingly to
make any false or fictitious oral or written statement . . .
intended or likely to deceive such . . . dealer . . . with respect
to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other
disposition of such firearm . . . under the provisions of this
chapter."
[
Footnote 2]
"§ 922. Unlawful acts."
"
* * * *"
"(d) It shall be unlawful for any . . . licensed dealer . . . to
sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm . . . to any person
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person
--"
"(1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year."
[
Footnote 3]
Cal.Penal Code § 476a (1970). The California complaint against
Huddleston was in six counts, and contained an allegation that he
had been convicted previously in the State of Iowa of an offense
which, if committed in California, would have been a violation of §
476 of the California Penal Code. He was eventually sentenced on
the check charge to 30 days in jail.
[
Footnote 4]
"§ 924. Penalties."
"(a) Whoever violates any provision of this chapter or knowingly
makes any false statement or representation with respect to the
information required by the provisions of this chapter to be kept
in the records of a person licensed under this chapter, . . . shall
be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both, and shall become eligible for parole as the Board
of Parole shall determine."
[
Footnote 5]
Huddleston at first testified that his California attorney and
his probation officer there told him that, when he completed his
probation period and made restitution, "it would go on record as a
misdemeanor," and that the attorney had told him he "couldn't get
over a year." App. 37, 39. Upon inquiry by the court, he testified
that, when he was arraigned, he thought he "could get more than one
year," and was so informed.
Id. at 41.
[
Footnote 6]
In agreement with the Ninth Circuit's decision is
United
States v. Beebe, 467 F.2d 222 (CA10 1972). To the contrary is
United States v. Laisure, 460 F.2d 709 (CA5 1972).
[
Footnote 7]
James v. Bennett, then Director of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, in Senate testimony offered a "case study" vividly
illustrating nonsale situations that would qualify as a firearms
"disposition" or "acquisition." One of his illustrations was the
following:
"On September 26, 1958, a 20-year-old youth shot and seriously
wounded a teller during the course of a bank robbery in St. Paul;
only a week previously, he had bought the revolver, a .357 Smith
& Wesson, in a Minneapolis sporting goods store, pawned it the
same day, and on the day of the robbery redeemed it with money
obtained from check forgeries."
Mr. Bennett concluded his testimony with the observation,
"No responsible and thoughtful citizen can, in my opinion,
seriously object to measures which would discourage youngsters, the
mentally ill, and criminals from coming into possession of
handguns."
Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 14, pp. 3369, 3377 (1963).
[
Footnote 8]
Testimony by then Attorney General Ramsey Clark also supports
the rejection of petitioner's suggestion that the language of the
statute be given a restrictive meaning:
"Mr. Donohue. Do you not think, Mr. Attorney General, to attain
the real objective and purpose of this bill, it should not only
deal with the sale, but whoever sells or delivers?"
"Mr. Clark. It covers delivery, too."
"Mr. Donohue. Where?"
"Mr. Clark. Well, generally, through the bill, when you talk
about -- well, it would be unlawful for any licensed importer to
sell or deliver. Any licensed dealer to sell or deliver."
"Mr. Donohue. It is not restricted to just sale for
consideration?"
"Mr. Clark. No. The delivery, too."
Hearings on an Anti-Crime Program before Subcommittee No. 5 of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 260
(1967).
[
Footnote 9]
It should be apparent from these statements that Congress was
not so much concerned with guaranteeing no interference with the
ownership of weapons as it was in distinguishing between
law-abiding citizens and those whose possession of weapons would be
contrary to the public interest. Hunting, target practice, gun
collecting, and the legitimate use of guns for individual
protection are not proscribed by the Act. Ownership of a weapon,
however, may be interfered with by seizure and forfeiture under the
Act for any violation of its provisions. Section 924(d)
incorporates the seizure and forfeiture provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code when there is any violation of the provisions of the
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder. The Act itself thus
contemplates interference with the ownership of weapons when those
weapons fall into the hands of juveniles, criminals, drug addicts,
and mental incompetents.
[
Footnote 10]
What few references there are to pawnbrokers in the debates
indicate that Congress was definitely interested in curbing
firearms traffic between pawnbrokers and convicted felons. Senator
Tydings, a strong proponent of the bill which became the Act,
expressed his concern when he compared the bill to a proposal that
was offered as an alternative:
"[O]ne reading through the amendment for the first time would
assume that pawnbrokers are covered by the critically important
provisions of the affidavit-waiting period procedure. But, if a
pawnbroker only receives second-hand weapons as security for the
repayment of a loan and does not deal in new firearms, he is not
transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm in interstate or
foreign commerce. Used weapons presumably will have come to rest in
the hands of the borrower, and the transaction will be wholly
intrastate. Such a pawnbroker would not need a Federal firearms
license to conduct over-the-counter transactions in firearms. And,
accordingly, he would not be a 'licensed dealer' required to comply
with the affidavit-waiting period procedure for his
over-the-counter sales in handguns. Now, if this analysis is
correct, and I believe it is, this is no small omission. Surely the
great bulk of criminally irresponsible purchasers of pistols and
revolvers buy their weapons second-hand, and many of them from
pawnshops. We all have seen the virtual arsenals displayed in the
windows of pawnshop dealers in all of the major cities of the
country. To say that we have effectively regulated traffic in
firearms when we will not have touched the great bulk of these
pawnbroker operations is a complete and utter hypocrisy."
114 Cong.Rec. 13222 (1968).
See also Memorandum placed
in the record by Senator Dodd.
Id. at 13320. Senator
Tydings made this further comparison:
"[I]t is obvious that many persons with criminal records
purchase from pawnbrokers, and there are many occasions when the
pawnbroker knows the criminal background of the client. Under
Amendment No. 708, many of these pawnbrokers will not be required
to be licensed. They would not need to comply with the affidavit
procedure. And even if they were licensed, there would be no
prohibition on their selling firearms to known criminals. Under
Title IV, on the other hand, all of these pawnbrokers would be
required to be licensed -- because all dealers and manufacturers
must be licensed whether or not they ship, receive, or transport in
commerce -- and all of them would be under direct Federal sanction
not to sell firearms to known criminals. I ask you, which bill is
likely to be more effective?"
Id. at 13223.
It must be conceded that these remarks refer to "selling"
firearms, but we do not credit this fact as significant for
purposes of determining whether a pawnshop redemption is covered by
the Act. The plain language of the statute as enacted prohibits a
dealer from "selling or disposing of" firearms to felons, and
petitioner's counsel at oral argument intimated that a pawnbroker,
under this language, could dispose of a firearm other than by sale
and be covered by the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. References in the
legislative debate, moreover, are replete with shorthand language,
and this is merely an instance of its use. Had the legislators been
engaged in a colloquy on the actual meaning of "sale or other
disposition of," we might be more receptive to the interpretation
proffered by the petitioner.
We also note that the President of the Pawnbrokers' Association
of the City of New York testified during congressional hearings
that almost all firearm transactions by pawnshops are by pledge and
redemption, and contended, therefore, that pawnbrokers should not
be included as dealers under the Act. Hearings on a Federal
Firearms Act before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1062-1065 (1967). Thus, informed of the fact that almost
all firearms transactions by pawnbrokers were through pledge and
redemption, and faced with the argument that pawnbrokers should not
be considered as "dealers," Congress clearly chose to retain
pawnbrokers as firearms dealers.
Finally, the language of the committee reports indicates that a
"sale or disposition" includes "all types of sales or
dispositions." S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 115
(1968).
[
Footnote 11]
The decision today does not ignore the admonition of the Court
in
United States v. Bass, 404 U.
S. 336,
404 U. S. 349
(1971), that,
"[i]n traditionally sensitive ares, such as legislation
affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement
assures that the legislature has, in fact, faced, and intended to
bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial
decision."
This statute did affect the federal balance and it did so
intentionally. As Senator Tydings explained:
"This concealed weapons amendment does not violate any State's
right to make its own gun laws. Quite the contrary, title IV
provides the controls on interstate gun traffic which only the
Federal Government can apply, and without which no State gun law is
worth the paper it is written on. . . . Without such Federal
assistance, any State gun law can be subverted by any child,
fugitive, or felon who orders a gun by mail or buys one in a
neighboring State which has lax gun laws."
114 Cong.Rec. 13647 (1968).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
This case presents a minor version of the problem confronting
the Court in
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.
S. 273. That case involved an ambiguity in a criminal
law, an ambiguity that normally would be resolved
Page 415 U. S. 834
in favor of life. A split Court in a tense period of American
history unhappily resolved the ambiguity against life -- a break
with history which the conscience of our people will sometime
rectify.
The present case is a minor species of the same genus. A person
who took his gun to a pawnshop for a loan undoubtedly had
"acquired" the gun prior to that time. It is therefore odd to think
of the "acquisition" occurring when he redeemed his own gun from
the pawnshop. I agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit,
United States v. Laisure, 460 F.2d 709, that the
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused. That is what
we have quite consistently done, except in
Rosenberg, in
the past.
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.
S. 336,
404 U. S.
347-348, and cases cited.
*
* Civil cases cited by the Court,
e.g., American Tobacco Co.
v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284,
207 U. S. 293,
are wide of the mark. For application of a law that sends people to
prison for years where Congress has not made it clear they should
be there,
United States v. Bass, supra, at
404 U. S. 346,
is only another device as lacking in due process as Caligula's
practice of printing the laws in small print and placing them so
high on a wall that the ordinary man did not receive fair
warning.
"When taxes of this kind had been proclaimed, but not published
in writing, inasmuch as many offenses were committed through
ignorance of the letter of the law, he at last, on the urgent
demand of the people, had the law posted up, but in a very narrow
place and in excessively small letters, to prevent the making of a
copy."
Suetonius, The Lives of the Twelve Caesars 192 (Modern Lib.
ed.1931).