Respondent Edwards was arrested shortly after 11 p.m. on May 31,
1970, and taken to jail. The next morning, a warrantless seizure
was made of his clothing and over his objection at his later trial,
which resulted in conviction, was used as evidence. The Court of
Appeals reversed. Though conceding the legality of the arrest, that
probable cause existed for believing that the clothing would reveal
incriminating evidence, and that searches and seizures that could
be made at the time of arrest may be legally conducted when the
accused arrives at the place of detention, the court held that the
warrantless seizure of Edwards' clothing "after the administrative
process and the mechanics of the arrest [had] come to a halt" was
unconstitutional.
Held: The search and seizure of Edwards' clothing did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp.
415 U. S.
802-809.
(a) At the time Edwards was placed in his cell, the normal
processes incident to arrest and custody had not been completed,
and the delay in seizing the clothing was not unreasonable, since,
at that late hour, no substitute clothing was available, and when,
the next morning, the police were able to supply substitute
clothing and took Edwards' clothing for laboratory analysis, they
did no more than they were entitled to do incident to the usual
arrest and incarceration. Pp.
415 U. S.
804-805.
(b) Once an accused has been lawfully arrested and is in
custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention
that were subject to search at the time and place of arrest may
lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even after a
substantial time lapse between the arrest and later administrative
processing, on the one hand, and the taking of the property for use
as evidence, on the other. Pp.
415 U. S.
806-808.
474 F.2d 1206, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
STEWART,
Page 415 U. S. 801
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
415 U. S.
809.
MR. .JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether the Fourth Amendment should be
extended to exclude from evidence certain clothing taken from
respondent Edwards while he was in custody at the city jail
approximately 10 hours after his arrest. Shortly after 11 p.m. on
May 31, 1970, respondent Edwards was lawfully arrested on the
streets of Lebanon, Ohio, and charged with attempting to break into
that city's Post Office. [
Footnote
1] He was taken to the local jail and placed in a cell.
Contemporaneously or shortly thereafter, investigation at the scene
revealed that the attempted entry had been made through a wooden
window which apparently had been pried up with a pry bar, leaving
paint chips on the window sill and wire mesh
Page 415 U. S. 802
screen. The next morning, trousers and a T-shirt were purchased
for Edwards to substitute for the clothing which he had been
wearing at the time of and since his arrest. His clothing was then
taken from him and held as evidence. Examination of the clothing
revealed paint chips matching the samples that had been taken from
the window. This evidence and his clothing were received at trial
over Edwards' objection that neither the clothing nor the results
of its examination were admissible because the warrantless seizure
of his clothing was invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Expressly disagreeing with two
other Courts of Appeals, [
Footnote
2] it held that, although the arrest was lawful and probable
cause existed to believe that paint chips would be discovered on
respondent's clothing, the warrantless seizure of the clothing
carried out "after the administrative process and the mechanics of
the arrest have come to a halt" was nevertheless unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. 474 F.2d 1206, 1211 (CA6 1973). We
granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 818, and now conclude that the Fourth
Amendment should not be extended to invalidate the search and
seizure in the circumstances of this case.
The prevailing rule under the Fourth Amendment that searches and
seizures may not be made without a warrant is subject to various
exceptions. One of them permits warrantless searches incident to
custodial arrests,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218 (1973);
Chimel v. California,
395 U. S. 752,
395 U. S. 755
(1969);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383,
232 U. S. 392
(1914), and has traditionally been justified by the reasonableness
of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of
crime
Page 415 U. S. 803
when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully
detained.
United States v. Robinson, supra. [
Footnote 3]
It is also plain that searches and seizures that could be made
on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later
when the accused arrives at the place of detention. If need be,
Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217
(1960), settled this question. There, the defendant was arrested at
his hotel, but the belongings taken with him to the place of
detention were searched there. In sustaining the search, the Court
noted that a valid search of the property could have been made at
the place of arrest and perceived little difference
"when the accused decides to take the property with him, for the
search of it to occur instead at the first place of detention when
the accused arrives there, especially as the search of property
carried by an accused to the place of detention has additional
justifications, similar to those which justify a search of the
person of one who is arrested."
Id. at
362 U. S. 239.
The courts of appeals have followed this same rule, holding that
both the person and the property in his immediate possession may be
searched at the station house after the arrest has occurred at
another place and if evidence of crime is discovered, it may be
seized and admitted in evidence. [
Footnote 4] Nor is there any doubt
Page 415 U. S. 804
that clothing or other belongings may be seized upon arrival of
the accused at the place of detention and later subjected to
laboratory analysis, or that the test results are admissible at
trial. [
Footnote 5]
Conceding all this, the Court of Appeals in this case
nevertheless held that a warrant is required where the search
occurs after the administrative mechanics of arrest have been
completed and the prisoner is incarcerated. But even on these
terms, it seems to us that the normal processes incident to arrest
and custody had not been completed when Edwards was placed in his
cell on the night of May 31. With or without probable cause, the
authorities were entitled at that point not only to search Edwards'
clothing, but also to take it from him and keep it in official
custody. There was testimony that this was the standard practice in
this city. [
Footnote 6] The
police
Page 415 U. S. 805
were also entitled to take from Edwards any evidence of the
crime in his immediate possession, including his clothing. And the
Court of Appeals acknowledged that contemporaneously with or
shortly after the time Edwards went to his cell, the police had
probable cause to believe that the articles of clothing he wore
were themselves material evidence of the crime for which he had
been arrested. 47 F.2d at 1210. But it was late at night; no
substitute clothing was then available for Edwards to wear, and it
would certainly have been unreasonable for the police to have
stripped respondent of his clothing and left him exposed in his
cell throughout the night.
Cf. United states v. Caruso,
358 F.2d 184, 185-186 (CA2),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 862
(1966). When the substitutes were purchased the next morning, the
clothing he had been wearing at the time of arrest was taken from
him and subjected to laboratory analysis. This was no more than
taking from respondent the effects in his immediate possession that
constituted evidence of crime. This was and is a normal incident of
a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay in effectuating it does
not change the fact that Edwards was no more imposed upon than he
could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately
upon arrival at the place of detention. The police did no more on
June 1 than they were entitled to do incident to the usual
custodial arrest and incarceration.
Page 415 U. S. 806
Other closely related considerations sustain the examination of
the clothing in this case. It must be remembered that, on both May
31 and June 1, the police had lawful custody of Edwards and
necessarily of the clothing he wore. When it became apparent that
the articles of clothing were evidence of the crime for which
Edwards was being held, the police were entitled to take, examine,
and preserve them for use as evidence, just as they are normally
permitted to seize evidence of crime when it is lawfully
encountered.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 (1969);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.
S. 731 (1969);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294 (1967);
Ker v. California, 374 U. S.
23 (1963) (plurality opinion);
Zap v. United
States, 328 U. S. 624
(1946),
vacated on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947).
Surely, the clothes could have been brushed down and vacuumed while
Edwards had them on in the cell, and it was similarly reasonable to
take and examine them as the police did, particularly in view of
the existence of probable cause linking the clothes to the crime.
Indeed, it is difficult to perceive what is unreasonable about the
police's examining and holding as evidence those personal effects
of the accused that they already have in their lawful custody as
the result of a lawful arrest.
In
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S.
58 (1967), an accused had been arrested for a narcotics
offense and his automobile impounded preparatory to institution of
forfeiture proceedings. The car was searched a week later without a
warrant and evidence seized that was later introduced at the
defendant's criminal trial. The warrantless search and seizure were
sustained because they were
"closely related to the reason petitioner was arrested, the
reason his car had been impounded, and the reason it was being
retained. . . . It would be unreasonable to hold that the police,
having to retain the car in their
Page 415 U. S. 807
custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their
own protection, to search it."
Id. at
386 U. S. 61-62.
It was no answer to say that the police could have obtained a
search warrant, for the Court held the test to be not whether it
was reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search
itself was reasonable, which it was.
Id. at
386 U. S. 62.
United states v. Caruso, supra, expresses similar views.
There, defendant's clothes were not taken until six hours after his
arrival at a place of detention. The Court of Appeals properly held
that no warrant was required:
"He and his clothes were constantly in custody from the moment
of his arrest, and the inspection of his clothes and the holding of
them for use in evidence were, under the circumstances, reasonable
and proper."
358 F.2d at 185 (citations omitted).
Caruso is typical of most cases in the courts of
appeals that have long since concluded that, once the accused is
lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession
at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time
and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without
a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed
between the arrest and subsequent administrative processing, on the
one hand, and the taking of the property for use as evidence, on
the other. This is true where the clothing or effects are
immediately seized upon arrival at the jail, held under the
defendant's name in the "property room" of the jail, and at a later
time searched and taken for use at the subsequent criminal trial.
[
Footnote 7] The result is
the
Page 415 U. S. 808
same where the property is not physically taken from the
defendant until sometime after his incarceration. [
Footnote 8]
In upholding this search and seizure, we do not conclude that
the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is never applicable to
post-arrest seizures of the effects of an arrestee. [
Footnote 9] But we do think that the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit captured the essence of situations
like this when it said, in
United States v. DeLeo, 422
F.2d 487, 493 (1970) (footnote omitted):
"While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the
privacy of his premises, it does -- for at
Page 415 U. S. 809
least a reasonable time and to a reasonable extent -- take his
own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in
weapons, means of escape, and evidence."
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Edwards (hereafter also referred to as respondent) had an
alleged confederate, William T. Livesay, who was corespondent in
this case, but died after the petition for certiorari was granted.
We therefore vacate the judgment as to him and remand the case to
the District Court with directions to dismiss the indictment.
Durham v. United States, 401 U. S. 481
(1971).
[
Footnote 2]
The Court stated that it could not agree with
United States
v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4 (CA5 1969), and
United States v.
Caruso, 358 F.2d 184 (CA2),
cert. denied, 385 U.S.
862 (1966).
[
Footnote 3]
"A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that, in the case
of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that
Amendment."
United States v. Robinson, supra at
415 U. S.
235.
[
Footnote 4]
United States v. Manar, 454 F.2d 34 (CA7 1971);
United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283 (CA5 1970);
United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487 (CA1 1970);
United States v. Williams, supra; United States v. Miles,
413 F.2d 34 (CA3 1969);
Ray v. United States, 412 F.2d
1052 (CA9 1969);
Westover v. United States, 394 F.2d 164
(CA9 1968);
United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F.2d 337
(CA2 1967);
Evalt v. United States, 382 F.2d 424 (CA9
1967);
Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741 (CA10 1967);
Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (CA9 1967);
Miller v. Eklund, 364 F.2d 976 (CA9 1966);
Hancock v.
Nelson, 363 F.2d 249 (CA1 1966);
Golliher v. United
States, 362 F.2d 594 (CA8 1966);
Rodgers v. United
States, 362 F.2d 358 (CA8),
cert. denied, 385 U.S.
993 (1966);
United States v. Caruso, supra; Whalem v. United
States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 346 F.2d 812,
cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965);
Grillo v. United States,
336 F.2d 211 (CA1 1964),
cert. denied sub nom. Gorin v. United
States, 379 U.S. 971 (1965);
Robinson v. United
States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 283 F.2d 508 (1960);
Baskerville v. United States, 227 F.2d 454 (CA10
1955).
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., United States v. Caruso, supra; United States v.
Williams, supra; Golliher v. United States, supra; Whalem v. United
States, supra; Robinson v. United States, supra; Evalt v. United
States, supra; Hancock v. Nelson, supra.
[
Footnote 6]
App. 6. Historical evidence points to the established and
routine custom of permitting a jailer to search the person who is
being processed for confinement under his custody and control.
See, e.g., T. Gardner & V. Manian, Principles and
Cases of the Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure 200 (1974); E.
Fisher, Search and Seizure 71 (1970). While "[a] rule of practice
must not be allowed . . . to prevail over a constitutional right,"
Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298,
255 U. S. 313
(1921), little doubt has ever been expressed about the validity or
reasonableness of such searches incident to incarceration. T.
Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 50 (1969).
[
Footnote 7]
See Evalt v. United States, 382 F.2d 424 (CA9 1967);
Westover v. United States, 394 F.2d 164 (CA9 1968);
Baskerville v. United States, 227 F.2d 454 (CA10 1955). In
Baskerville, the effects were taken for safekeeping on
December 23 but reexamined and taken as evidence on January 6.
Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (CA5 1969), is
contra. There, the defendant's clothes were taken from him
shortly after arrival at the jail, as was the custom, and held in
the property room of the jail. Three days later, the clothing was
searched, and incriminating evidence found. A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible for want of a
warrant authorizing the search.
[
Footnote 8]
Hancock v. Nelson, 363 F.2d 249 (CA1 1966);
Malone
v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741 (CA10 1967);
United States v.
Caruso, 358 F.2d 184 (CA2 1966). In
Hancock, the
defendant was first taken into custody at 12:51 a.m. His clothes
were taken at 2 p.m. on the same day, two hours after probable
cause to do so eventuated.
[
Footnote 9]
Holding the Warrant Clause inapplicable in the circumstances
present here does not leave law enforcement officials subject to no
restraint. This type of police conduct "must [still] be tested by
the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1,
392 U. S. 20
(1968). But the Court of Appeals here conceded that probable cause
existed for the search and seizure of respondent's clothing, and
respondent complains only that a warrant should have been secured.
We thus have no occasion to express a view concerning those
circumstances surrounding custodial searches incident to
incarceration which might "violate the dictates of reason either
because of their number or their manner of perpetration."
Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 389 (CA9),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960).
Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U. S. 757
(1966);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.
S. 165 (1952).
MR JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
The Court says that the question before us "is whether the
Fourth Amendment should be extended" to prohibit the warrantless
seizure of Edwards' clothing. I think, on the contrary, that the
real question in this case is whether the Fourth Amendment is to be
ignored. For, in my view, the judgment of the Court of Appeals can
be reversed only by disregarding established Fourth Amendment
principles firmly embodied in many previous decisions of this
Court.
As the Court has repeatedly emphasized in the past,
"the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions.'"
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443,
403 U. S. 451
155;
Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347,
389 U. S. 357.
Since it is conceded here that the seizure of Edwards' clothing was
not made pursuant to a warrant, the question becomes whether the
Government has met its burden of showing that the circumstances of
this seizure brought it within one of the "jealously and carefully
drawn" [
Footnote 2/1] exceptions to
the warrant requirement.
Page 415 U. S. 810
The Court finds a warrant unnecessary in this case because of
the custodial arrest of the respondent. It is, of course, well
settled that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search or
seizure incident to a constitutionally valid custodial arrest.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218;
Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752. But the mere fact of an arrest does not allow
the police to engage in warrantless searches of unlimited
geographic or temporal scope. Rather, the search must be spatially
limited to the person of the arrestee and the area within his
reach,
Chimel v. California, supra, and must, as to time,
be "substantially contemporaneous with the arrest,"
Stoner v.
California, 376 U. S. 483,
376 U. S. 486;
Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364,
376 U. S.
367-368.
Under the facts of this case, I am unable to agree with the
Court's holding that the search was "incident" to Edwards'
custodial arrest. The search here occurred fully 10 hours after he
was arrested, at a time when the administrative processing and
mechanics of arrest had long since come to an end. His clothes were
not seized as part of an "inventory" of a prisoner's effects, nor
were they taken pursuant to a routine exchange of civilian clothes
for jail garb. [
Footnote 2/2] And
the considerations that typically justify a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest were wholly absent here. As Mr.
Justice
Page 415 U. S. 811
Black stated for a unanimous Court in
Preston v. United
States, supra, at
376 U. S.
367:
"The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for
example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might
be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime --
things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on
the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these
justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place
from the arrest. [
Footnote
2/3]"
Accordingly, I see no justification for dispensing with the
warrant requirement here. The police had ample time to seek a
warrant, and no exigent circumstances were present to excuse their
failure to do so. Unless the exceptions to the warrant requirement
are to be "enthroned into the rule,"
United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56,
339 U. S. 80
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), this is precisely the sort of
situation where the Fourth Amendment requires a magistrate's prior
approval for a search.
The Court says that the relevant question is "not whether it was
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search
itself was reasonable."
Ante at
415 U. S. 807.
Precisely such a view, however, was explicitly rejected in
Chimel v. California, supra, at
395 U. S.
764-765, where the Court characterized the argument
as
"founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the
acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests."
As
Page 415 U. S. 812
they were in
Chimel, the words of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter are again most relevant here:
"To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some
criterion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for
district judges or the police to say that an 'unreasonable search'
is forbidden -- that the search must be reasonable. What is the
test of reason which makes a search reasonable? The test is the
reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the
history and the experience which it embodies and the safeguards
afforded by it against the evils to which it was a response. There
must be a warrant to permit search, barring only inherent
limitations upon that requirement when there is a good excuse for
not getting a search warrant. . . ."
United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, at
339 U. S. 83
(dissenting opinion).
The intrusion here was hardly a shocking one, and it cannot be
said that the police acted in bad faith. The Fourth Amendment,
however, was not designed to apply only to situations where the
intrusion is massive and the violation of privacy shockingly
flagrant. Rather, as the Court's classic admonition in
Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616,
116 U. S. 635,
put the matter:
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right,
Page 415 U. S. 813
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
Because I believe that the Court today unjustifiably departs
from well settled constitutional principles, I respectfully
dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Jones v. United States, 357 U.
S. 493,
357 U. S.
499.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Government conceded at oral argument that the seizure of the
respondent's clothing was not a matter of routine jail procedure,
but was undertaken solely for the purpose of searching for the
incriminating paint chips.
No contention is made that the warrantless seizure of the
clothes was necessitated by the exigencies of maintaining
discipline or security within the jail system. There is thus no
occasion to consider the legitimacy of warrantless searches or
seizures in a penal institution based upon that quite different
rationale.
[
Footnote 2/3]
No claim is made that the police feared that Edwards either
possessed a weapon or was planning to destroy the paint chips on
his clothing. Indeed, the Government has not even suggested that he
was aware of the presence of the paint chips on his clothing.