Subsequent to the three-judge District Court's judgment
upholding, against due process and equal protection challenges, a
West Virginia statute requiring a double bond as a condition for an
appeal from a justice of the peace's judgment in a civil case, the
West Virginia Supreme Court, in another action, upheld the double
bond provision. The court held, however, that a justice of the
peace judgment against the defendant violated due process and was
"void" on the ground that, because the fee of the justice of the
peace was enhanced when he ruled in the plaintiff's favor, he had a
pecuniary interest in the case's outcome. The judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded to the District Court so that that court,
in the first instance, may evaluate the effect of the intervening
decision.
Vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
We noted probable jurisdiction in this case, 411 U.S. 905
(1973), because it appeared to present a significant issue, under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as to the validity
Page 415 U. S. 304
of that provision of W.Va.Code Ann. § 50-15-2 (1966), [
Footnote 1] requiring a double bond as
a condition for an appeal from a judgment entered by a justice of
the peace in a civil case.
See Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U. S. 56,
405 U. S. 74-79
(1972).
In November, 1968, appellant Patterson purchased a used
automobile from appellee Graham Motor Company under a
deferred-purchase money contract. That portion of the price not
paid at the time of purchase was evidenced by a negotiable
promissory note. After taking delivery of the automobile but before
completion of his payments, Patterson encountered mechanical
difficulties with the car. Finding himself unable to obtain
satisfaction from Graham, Patterson undertook to reject the
purchase, pursuant to W.Va.Code Ann. § 46-2-602 (1966), and made no
further payments on the note.
Graham then sued Patterson in appellee Warner's justice of the
peace court and, despite a number of defenses asserted by Patterson
-- breach of warranty, fraud, rightful repudiation, and others --
obtained a judgment for $300 plus costs. [
Footnote 2]
Page 415 U. S. 305
Patterson sought to appeal the case to a court of record. Bond
was set at $600, double the amount of the judgment, as § 50-15-2
specified. Patterson was unable to find an individual surety and,
being indigent, was also unable to raise the amount required by a
commercial surety. As a result, the appeal was not perfected, and
the judgment adverse to him became final.
Prior to execution on the judgment, Patterson instituted this
purported class action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia against Justice of the Peace
Warner and against Graham. He sought injunctive and declaratory
relief. A three-judge court was convened and upheld the challenged
West Virginia statute. It reasoned that the full hearing before the
justice, with the opportunity to present a defense, accorded
appellant due process, and that there was no requirement that the
State provide appellate review. Turning to equal protection, the
court held that a State may properly take steps to insure that an
appellant post adequate security to protect a damages award already
made, citing
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at
405 U. S. 77;
that an appeal
in forma pauperis in a civil case is a
privilege, not a right; and that
"the concept of Equal Protection does not include full and
unrestrained appellate review of an initial adjudication which
afforded Due Process."
Patterson's request for relief was therefore denied.
After probable jurisdiction had been noted here, and shortly
prior to the filing of briefs in this Court, the Supreme Court of
West Virginia decided
State ex rel. Reece v. Gies, ___
W.Va. ___,
198 S.E.2d
211 (1973). In
Reece, the portion of § 50-15-2
requiring an appeal bond in an amount double the damages plus one
year's rent as a prerequisite to an appeal from a justice court in
a suit for unlawful detention of real estate was under
constitutional challenge. The West Virginia court, citing
Page 415 U. S. 306
the District Court's decision in the present case and
Greer
v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477, 193 S.E.2d 668 (1973), upheld the
bond amount provision, with two of the court's five justices
dissenting on that issue, but went on to rule unanimously that the
judgment entered against the defendant by a West Virginia justice
of the peace was violative of the Due Process Clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions, and was "void." W.Va. at ___, 198
S.E.2d at 216. Its rationale was that, because the justice's fee
was enhanced when he ruled in favor of the plaintiff, he possessed
a pecuniary interest in the case's outcome, and the parties
therefore were denied a neutral and unbiased judge.
See also
State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W.Va. 887,
180 S.E.2d
74 (1971).
The judgment entered against appellant Patterson by appellee
Warner was rendered pursuant to the same West Virginia statutory
scheme that was challenged, in part successfully, in
Reece. Appellant, upon becoming aware of the
Reece decision, filed a suggestion of mootness here.
Appellee Warner at the time opposed the suggestion. Although that
aspect of the case was not addressed in the briefs, it was
discussed at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-6, 34-36. Appellant,
despite his having made the suggestion of mootness, asserted at
oral argument that
Reece had no retroactive application,
and that the judgment entered against him was not void and the case
was not moot.
Id. at 5. Appellee Warner contended
otherwise,
id. at 37-38, stating that, in West Virginia,
under
Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W.Va. 172, 41 S.E. 193
(1902), a State Supreme Court pronouncement, with one exception, is
fully retroactive in the sense that it is regarded as always having
been the law.
Inasmuch as the decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia
in
Reece was rendered after the entry of the judgment in
the present case, the three-judge District
Page 415 U. S. 307
Court had no occasion to consider whether the decision in
Reece means that the judgment obtained by Graham against
Patterson is void and whether the present case has become moot. We
deem it desirable that the District Court, in the first instance,
evaluate the effect of that intervening decision. Accordingly, the
judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded
to that court for reconsideration in the light of
State ex rel.
Reece v. Gies, ___ W.Va. ___,
198 S.E.2d
211 (1973). In so doing, we intimate no view as to whether the
case is or is not now moot.
It is so ordered. .
[
Footnote 1]
W.Va.Code Ann. § 50-15-2 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
"The appeal shall not be granted by the justice unless, within
ten days after the judgment is rendered . . . bond with good
security, to be approved by the justice, in a penalty double the
amount of the judgment, is filed with him, with condition to the
effect that the person proposing to appeal will perform and satisfy
any judgment which may be rendered against him on such appeal . . .
or if he does not wish to stay the execution on such judgment, with
condition to pay the costs of such appeal if the judgment appealed
from be affirmed. In case there be judgment before the justice
against the plaintiff for costs only, and the plaintiff desires to
appeal, the bond shall be for costs, conditioned as aforesaid, and
in a penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars. . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Three hundred dollars is the monetary limit of the jurisdiction
of a West Virginia justice of the peace in a civil action for the
recovery of money. W.Va.Code Ann. § 50-2-1.