The three-judge District Court's order, in a class action
challenging the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statutory scheme
for involuntary commitment of mental patients, that "judgment be
and hereby is entered in accordance with the Opinion heretofore
entered," which opinion stated that appellees were entitled to
injunctive relief against further enforcement of "the present
Wisconsin scheme," is sufficient as an order "granting" an
injunction to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1253.
Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.
S. 383, distinguished. For purposes of plenary judicial
review, however, the court's order does not satisfy the
requirements of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 65(d) that an order granting an
injunction "be specific in terms" and "describe in reasonable
detail . . . the act or acts sought to be restrained. . . ."
349
F. Supp. 1078, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In October and November, 1971, appellee Alberta Lessard was
subjected to a period of involuntary commitment under the Wisconsin
State Mental Health Act, Wis.Stat. § 51.001
et seq. While
in confinement, she filed this suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, on behalf of herself
and all other persons 18 years of age or older who were being held
involuntarily pursuant to the Wisconsin involuntary commitment
laws, alleging that the statutory scheme was violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisdiction was
predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since both
declaratory
Page 414 U. S. 474
and injunctive relief were sought, a District Court of three
judges was convened, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281.
After hearing argument and receiving briefs, the District Court
filed a comprehensive opinion declaring the Wisconsin statutory
scheme unconstitutional.
349 F.
Supp. 1078. The opinion concluded by stating that
"Alberta Lessard and the other members of her class are entitled
to declaratory and injunctive relief against further enforcement of
the present Wisconsin scheme against them. . . . [Miss Lessard] is
also entitled to an injunction against any further extensions of
the invalid order which continues to make her subject to the
jurisdiction of the hospital authorities."
Id. at 1103. Over nine months later, the District Court
entered a judgment, which simply stated that
"It is Ordered and Adjudged that judgment be, and hereby is,
entered in accordance with the Opinion heretofore entered. . .
."
The defendant appellants now seek to invoke the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. That
statute provides that
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
In response, the appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction. Relying upon this Court's decision
in
Gunn v. University Committee to End the War,
399 U. S. 383, she
claims that the District
Page 414 U. S. 475
Court's judgment did not constitute "an order granting or
denying" an injunction.
In
Gunn, a statutory three-judge court had found a
Texas breach of the peace statute unconstitutional. There, as here,
the opinion of the District Court concluded by stating that the
plaintiffs "are entitled to . . . injunctive relief."
University Committee to End the War v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp.
469, 475 (WD Tex.). The District Court in
Gunn, however,
entered no further order or judgment of any kind; the concluding
paragraph of the opinion was the only mention of injunctive relief.
Thus, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, because of the total absence of any order
"granting or denying" an injunction.
Although the language of the District Court opinion here
parallels that, in
Gunn, there is thus an important
distinction between the two cases. While the record in
Gunn was devoid of any order granting injunctive relief,
there was in the present case a judgment entered "in accordance
with the Opinion." Since the opinion of the District Court, by its
own terms, authorizes the granting of injunctive relief to the
appellee, we believe that the judgment here is sufficient to invoke
our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Yet, although sufficient to invoke our appellate jurisdiction,
the District Court's order provides a wholly inadequate foundation
upon which to premise plenary judicial review. Rule 65(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
"Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order
shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in
terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to
the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be
restrained. . . . "
Page 414 U. S. 476
The order here falls far short of satisfying the second and
third clauses of Rule 65(d). Neither the brief judgment order nor
the accompanying opinion is "specific" in outlining the "terms" of
the injunctive relief granted, nor can it be said that the order
describes "in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be
restrained." Rather, the defendants are simply told not to enforce
"the present Wisconsin scheme" against those in the appellee's
class.
As we have emphasized in the past, the specificity provisions of
Rule 65(d) are no mere technical requirements. The Rule was
designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those
faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of
a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.
International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade
Assn., 389 U. S. 64,
389 U. S. 74-76;
Gunn, supra, at
399 U. S.
388-389.
See generally 7 J. Moore, Federal
Practice 1 65.11; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2955. [
Footnote
1] Since an injunctive order prohibits conduct under threat of
judicial punishment, basic fairness requires that those enjoined
receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.
[
Footnote 2]
Page 414 U. S. 477
The requirement of specificity in injunction orders performs a
second important function. Unless the trial court carefully frames
its orders of injunctive relief, it is impossible for an appellate
tribunal to know precisely what it is reviewing.
Gunn,
supra, at
399 U. S. 388.
We can hardly begin to assess the correctness of the judgment
entered by the District Court here without knowing its precise
bounds. In the absence of specific injunctive relief, informed and
intelligent appellate review is greatly complicated, if not made
impossible.
Hence, although the order below is sufficient to invoke our
appellate jurisdiction, it plainly does not satisfy the important
requirements of Rule 65(d). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of
the District Court and remand the case to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents.
[
Footnote 1]
The record in this case suggests that a good deal of confusion
has been engendered by the absence of a specific injunctive order.
About six months after the opinion in this action was entered, the
appellee submitted a memorandum to the District Court alleging
numerous instances of "noncompliance" with the decision and
requesting affirmative judicial relief. No action was taken on this
request, and, on July 18, 1973, both the appellee and the
appellants joined in a "Motion to Reconvene for Clarification of
Opinion." That motion outlined the uncertainty that had followed
the District Court's original opinion, and asked the court to
"clarify" its precise holdings. The District Court has taken no
action on this joint motion, perhaps because of the subsequent
filing of a notice of appeal.
[
Footnote 2]
"The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is
founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a
deadly one. Congress responded to that danger by requiring that a
federal court frame its orders so that those who must obey them
will know what the court intends to require and what it means to
forbid."
International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Philadelphia Marine
Trade Assn., 389 U. S. 64,
389 U. S.
76.