Certain foremen at petitioner company's coal mine were suspended
for falsifying records to show no reduction in airflow at the mine
when, in fact, the airflow had been substantially reduced because
of the collapse of a ventilation structure. When the company
reinstated the foremen while criminal charges were pending against
them, the miners, who are represented by respondent union, struck
to protest the alleged safety hazard created by retention of the
foremen. The union refused the company's offer to arbitrate. The
company then brought this action under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, contending that the broad arbitration
clause of the collective bargaining agreement governed the dispute.
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the
union to end the strike and submit to arbitration, and ordered
suspension of the two foremen pending the arbitral decision. The
Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the injunction, holding that
there was a public policy disfavoring compulsory arbitration of
safety disputes and that, absent an express provision of the
collective bargaining agreement, the union had no contractual duty
to submit the controversy to arbitration, and hence no implied
obligation not to strike.
Held:
1. The arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement
covering,
inter alia, "any local trouble of any kind
aris[ing] at the mine," is sufficiently broad to encompass the
instant dispute, the foremen's continued presence in the mine being
plainly a local issue. Pp.
414 U. S. 374-380.
(a) On its face, such contractual language admits of only one
interpretation: that the agreement required the union to submit
this dispute to arbitration for resolution by an impartial umpire.
P.
414 U. S.
376.
(b) The "presumption of arbitrability" (an order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute,
and doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage),
Steelworkers v.
American
Page 414 U. S. 369
Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564;
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U. S. 574;
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U. S. 593,
applies to safety disputes. Pp.
414 U. S.
377-380.
2. The duty to arbitrate imposed by the collective bargaining
agreement gave rise to an implied no-strike obligation supporting
issuance of an injunction against a work stoppage since, in the
absence of an explicit expression negating any implied no-strike
obligation, the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike
should be construed as having coterminous application. Pp.
414 U. S.
380-384.
3. On the facts, § 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act
providing that the quitting of labor by employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work shall not be
deemed a strike, did not deprive the District Court of authority to
enforce the no-strike obligation, the suspension of the foremen
pending a final arbitral decision having eliminated any safety
issue. Pp.
414 U. S.
385-387.
4. The circumstances of this case satisfy the traditional
equitable considerations controlling the availability of injunctive
relief,
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U. S. 235, the
District Court finding that the union's continued breach of its
no-strike obligation would irreparably harm the petitioner, and
eliminating any safety issue by suspending the foremen pending a
final arbitral decision. P.
414 U. S.
387.
466 F.2d 1157, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p. 388.
Page 414 U. S. 370
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a labor dispute over safety conditions
between Gateway Coal Co. and United Mine Workers of America. The
questions presented are of considerable importance to the
development of federal policy regarding arbitration of safety
disputes and enforcement of a contractual duty not to strike.
Gateway Coal Co. (the company) owns and operates a large
underground coal mine known as the Gateway Mine, in Greene County,
Pennsylvania. Some 550 production and maintenance workers, employed
by the company, are represented for purposes of collective
bargaining by United Mine Workers of America (the union), including
its administrative division, District No. 4, and Local No.
6330.
On the morning of April 15, 1971, shortly before the daylight
shift at the mine reported for work, a shuttle car operator on the
departing midnight shift noticed an unusually low airflow in his
section of the mine. His foreman made an anemometer check and
discovered an airflow of only 11,000 cubic feet per minute, less
than half the normal rate of 28,000 cubic feet per minute.
[
Footnote 1]
Page 414 U. S. 371
The company evacuated the men from the mine and ordered the
day-shift employees to stand by on the surface. An ensuing
investigation revealed that the collapse of a ventilation structure
had partially blocked an intake airway. Immediate repairs restored
normal airflow, and underground mining operations resumed. In the
meantime, however, some 100 of the 226 day-shift employees had
disregarded the company's instructions to stand by and had gone
home.
The following morning, the union requested reporting pay for
those employees who did not stand by as ordered on April 15, but
the company refused. The union rejected the company's offer to
arbitrate this dispute, and the miners on all three shifts walked
off the job.
On April 17, pursuant to a union request, state and federal
inspectors visited the mine to determine the adequacy of the
repairs. The investigation revealed that, although collapse of the
ventilation structure apparently occurred between 4 and 4:30 on the
morning of April 15, records of the anemometer checks purportedly
made by three foremen sometime between 5 a.m. and 8 a.m. disclosed
no reduction in airflow. [
Footnote
2] The state inspector impounded the book of entries and
notified the company that he would press criminal charges against
the three foremen for falsification of the records. The company
immediately suspended two of the men, but decided against
suspension of the third because he had reported the trouble.
On Sunday, April 18, about-- 200 company miners attended a
special union meeting and voted not to work unless the company
suspended all three foremen. The
Page 414 U. S. 372
company acquiesced in this demand, and, the following Monday,
the miners returned to work. Criminal prosecutions were instituted
against the three foremen, and the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources undertook consideration of possible
decertification proceedings against them.
On May 29, while the criminal charges were still pending, the
company received word from the Department that it was at liberty to
return the three foremen to work if it so desired. [
Footnote 3] One of the three had retired
during his suspension, but the company reinstated the other two and
scheduled them to resume work on the midnight shift on June 1. On
that date, miners on all three shifts struck to protest the alleged
safety hazard created by the presence of the two foremen in the
mines. On June 8, the company formally offered to arbitrate this
dispute, but the union refused. Subsequently, the two foremen
pleaded
nolo contendere to the criminal charges for
falsification of the records and paid fines of $200 each.
Faced with a continuing strike and a refusal to arbitrate, the
company invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under § 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29
U.S.C. § 185. It argued that the broad arbitration clause of the
collective bargaining agreement governed this dispute, and
requested an injunction against continuance of the strike. In a
temporary restraining order later converted into a preliminary
injunction, the District Court required the union to end the strike
and to submit the dispute to an
Page 414 U. S. 373
impartial umpire without delay. [
Footnote 4] The order further provided for suspension of
the two foremen pending the umpire's decision and prospectively
required both parties to abide by his resolution of the
controversy.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with one
judge dissenting, reversed the judgment of the District Court and
vacated the preliminary injunction. [
Footnote 5] 466 F.2d 1157 (1972). The court intimated that
a special provision of the collective bargaining agreement involved
here might be construed to remove safety disputes from the coverage
of the general arbitration clause and reasoned that, in any event,
the usual federal policy favoring arbitration of labor relations
disputes did not apply to questions concerning safety.
Id.
at 1159-1160. Relying in part on § 502 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143, the court found that there was a
public policy disfavoring compulsory arbitration of safety
disputes. Since it was
"neither particularly stated nor unambiguously agreed in the
labor contract that the parties shall submit mine safety disputes
to binding arbitration,"
the Court of Appeals concluded that the union had no contractual
duty to submit this controversy to arbitration, and hence no
implied obligation not to strike. 466 F.2d at 1159. Perceiving no
wrong to enjoin, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether
injunctive relief in this case was appropriate under the
traditional considerations of equity set forth by this Court in
Boys Markets, Inc.
v.
Page 414 U. S. 374
Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235
(1970). We granted certiorari, 410 U.S. 953 (1973).
This case presents three questions. First, did the collective
bargaining agreement then in force between these parties impose on
them a compulsory duty to submit safety disputes to arbitration by
an impartial umpire? Second, if so, did that duty to arbitrate give
rise to an implied no-strike obligation supporting issuance of a
Boys Markets injunction? Third, did the circumstances of
this case satisfy the traditional equitable considerations
controlling the availability of injunctive relief? We answer all
three. questions in the affirmative and accordingly reverse the
judgment below.
II
No obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by
operation of law. The law compels a party to submit his grievance
to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so. At all times
material to this case, the parties were bound by the National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 (the agreement). The section
of the agreement entitled "Settlement of Local and District
Disputes" [
Footnote 6] provides
for resolution of grievances by
Page 414 U. S. 375
direct negotiation between the parties and ultimately, should
such negotiations fail, for arbitration by an impartial umpire
"mutually agreed upon by the operator or operators affected and . .
. the United Mine Workers of America." The section further states
that the "decision of the umpire shall be final." This arbitration
clause governs disputes "as to the meaning and application of the
provisions of this agreement," disputes "about matters not
specifically mentioned in this agreement," and "any local trouble
of any kind aris[ing] at the mine." Paragraph 3 of the
"Miscellaneous" section of the agreement [
Footnote 7] states that both parties
"agree and
Page 414 U. S. 376
affirm . . . that all disputes and claims which are not settled
by agreement shall be settled by the machinery provided in the
'Settlement of Local and District Disputes' section. . . ."
It excepts from the arbitration obligation only those disputes
"national in character."
This arbitration provision appears sufficiently broad to
encompass the instant dispute. The contractual obligation reaches
"any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at the mine," and the
continued presence in Gateway Mine of two particular foremen is
plainly a local issue. On its face, this contractual language
admits of only one interpretation: that the agreement required the
union to submit this dispute to arbitration for resolution by an
impartial umpire.
The Court of Appeals avoided this conclusion by reference to an
assumed public policy disfavoring arbitration of safety disputes.
The majority of that court recognized that the usual federal policy
encourages arbitration of labor disputes, but reasoned that this
presumption of arbitrability applies only to disagreements over
"wages, hours, seniority, vacations and other economic matters."
466 F.2d at 1159. The court thought that safety disputes should be
treated as
sui generis, and concluded that it should
"reject any avoidable construction of a labor contract as requiring
final disposition of safety disputes by arbitration." [
Footnote 8]
Id. at 1160. We
disagree.
Page 414 U. S. 377
The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes is
firmly grounded in congressional command. Section 203(d) of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), states in
part:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement."
In the
Steelworkers trilogy, [
Footnote 9] this Court enunciated the now well known
presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes:
"An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive
Page 414 U. S. 378
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage."
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574,
363 U. S.
582-583 (1960). The Court also elaborated the basis for
this policy. It noted that commercial arbitration and labor
arbitration have different objectives. In the former case,
arbitration takes the place of litigation, while, in the latter,
"arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife."
Id.
at
363 U. S. 578.
A collective bargaining agreement cannot define every minute aspect
of the complex and continuing relationship between the parties.
Arbitration provides a method for resolving the unforeseen
disagreements that inevitably arise. And, in resolving such
disputes, the labor arbitrator necessarily and appropriately has
resort to considerations foreign to the courts:
"The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the
express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law --
the practices of the industry and the shop -- is equally a part of
the collective bargaining agreement, although not expressed in it.
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their
trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations
which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.
The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will
reflect not only what the contract says, but, insofar as the
collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect
upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the
morale of the shop, his judgment
Page 414 U. S. 379
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the
parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to
further their common goal of uninterrupted production under the
agreement, to make the agreement serve their specialized
needs."
Id. at
363 U. S.
581-582.
We think these remarks are as applicable to labor disputes
touching the safety of the employees as to other varieties of
disagreement. Certainly industrial strife may as easily result from
unresolved controversies on safety matters as from those on other
subjects, with the same unhappy consequences of lost pay, curtailed
production, and economic instability. Moreover, the special
expertise of the labor arbitrator, with his knowledge of the common
law of the shop, is as important to the one case as to the other,
and the need to consider such factors as productivity and worker
morale is as readily apparent.
The Court of Appeals majority feared that an arbitrator might be
too grudging in his appreciation of the workers' interest in their
own safety. We see little justification for the court's assumption,
especially since the parties are always free to choose an
arbitrator whose knowledge and judgment they trust We also disagree
with the implicit assumption that the alternative to arbitration
holds greater promise for the protection of employees. Relegating
safety disputes to the arena of economic combat offers no greater
assurance that the ultimate resolution will ensure employee safety.
Indeed, the safety of the workshop would then depend on the
relative economic strength of the parties, rather than on an
informed and impartial assessment of the facts.
We therefore conclude that the "presumption of arbitrability"
announced in the
Steelworkers trilogy applies to safety
disputes, and that the dispute in the instant
Page 414 U. S. 380
case is covered by the arbitration clause in the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. [
Footnote 10]
III
The second question is whether the District Court had authority
to enjoin the work stoppage. The answer depends on whether the
union was under a contractual duty not to strike. In
Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.
S. 235 (1970), the Court considered the proper
accommodation between the literal terms of § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act [
Footnote
11] and the subsequently
Page 414 U. S. 381
enacted provisions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act. [
Footnote 12] The Court
noted the shift in congressional emphasis
"from protection of the nascent labor movement to the
encouragement of collective bargaining and to administrative
techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes."
398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 251.
It concluded that § 301(a) empowers a federal court to enjoin
violations of a contractual duty not to strike.
Although the collective bargaining agreement in
Boys
Markets contained an express no-strike clause, [
Footnote 13] injunctive relief also may be
granted on the basis of an implied undertaking not to strike. In
Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S.
95 (1962), the Court held that a contractual commitment
to submit disagreements to final and binding arbitration gives rise
to an implied obligation not to strike over such disputes.
[
Footnote 14] Indeed,
the
Page 414 U. S. 382
strong federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes was
the linchpin of this Court's reasoning in
Boys Markets.
Denial of all equitable relief for breaches of no-strike
obligations would have carried "devastating implications for the
enforceability of arbitration agreements." 398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 247.
As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN stated for the Court in that case:
"[A] no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the
quid
pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance
disputes to the process of arbitration. . . . Any incentive for
employers to enter into such an arrangement is necessarily
dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which
the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated."
Id. at
398 U. S. 248.
(Citation omitted.)
Thus, an arbitration agreement is usually linked with a
concurrent no-strike obligation, but the two issues remain
analytically distinct. Ultimately, each depends on the intent of
the contracting parties. It would be unusual, but certainly
permissible, for the parties to agree to a broad mandatory
arbitration provision, yet expressly negate any implied no-strike
obligation. Such a contract would reinstate the situation commonly
existing before our decision in
Boys Markets. Absent an
explicit expression of such an intention, however, the agreement to
arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having
coterminous application.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals identified two
provisions which it thought excepted safety disputes from the
general no-strike obligation. The first is § (e) of the collective
bargaining agreement, which provides for a union mine safety
committee at each mine. As
Page 414 U. S. 383
this section was thought central to the outcome of this case, we
set forth the relevant provisions in full:
"The mine safety committee may inspect any mine development or
equipment used in producing coal. If the committee believes
conditions found endanger the life [
sic] and bodies of the
mine workers, it shall report its findings and recommendations to
the management. In those special instances where the committee
believes an immediate danger exists and the committee recommends
that the management remove all mine workers from the unsafe area,
the operator is required to follow the recommendation of the
committee."
"If the safety committee, in closing down an unsafe area, acts
arbitrarily and capriciously, members of such committee may be
removed from the committee. Grievances that may arise as a result
of a request for removal of a member of the safety committee under
this section shall be handled in accordance with the provisions
providing for settlement of disputes."
App. 12a. The union contends that this provision reserves to the
workers the right to strike over safety disputes, and also that the
committee's determination of "immediate danger" may be wholly
subjective, and without foundation in fact. In short, the safety
committee may object to any aspect of mine operation as an
"immediate danger," and call the workers off the job to force
whatever changes it proposes. The union further argues that, since
the exercise of this option cannot constitute a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement, the District Court had no wrong to
enjoin.
We need not decide whether § (e) is subject to such an expansive
reading, for, as the District Court found, that section was never
invoked in this controversy. The safety committee did inspect the
mine to determine the
Page 414 U. S. 384
cause of the ventilation failure, but there was no showing that
it ever reported findings or made recommendations to the company
management. Nor was there any showing that the committee found
conditions dangerous to the "life [
sic] and bodies of the
mine workers" or which, if any, of its members formed the requisite
belief in the existence of "an immediate danger."
The Court of Appeals majority apparently believed that the vote
by the local membership, the body superior to the union safety
committee, constituted substantial compliance with the purpose and
intent of § (e), and obviated any need for compliance with the
formal procedure. As a matter of simple contractual interpretation,
we think that proposition doubtful. Under the union's construction
of § (e), the committee's good faith belief in the existence of an
immediate danger, no matter how unfounded that view, is conclusive.
The management's only recourse against arbitrary and capricious
decisions by the committee is to seek removal of the offending
members. Circumvention of the procedures of § (e), including a
formal vote by the committee members, thus removes the only
deterrent to unreasonable action by the committee. Given this
circumstance, one would not lightly assume that failure to follow
the specific procedures outlined in § (e) is somehow
de
minimis. In any event, whether the union properly invoked this
provision is a substantial question of contractual interpretation,
and the collective bargaining agreement explicitly commits to
resolution by an impartial umpire all disagreements "as to the
meaning and application of the provisions of this agreement."
[
Footnote 15]
Page 414 U. S. 385
The Court of Appeals majority also based its denial of
injunctive relief on § 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 143, which provides in part:
"[N]or shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees
in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work
at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed
a strike under this chapter."
This section provides a limited exception to an express or
implied no-strike obligation. The Court of Appeals held that
"a refusal to work because of good faith apprehension of
physical danger is protected activity, and not enjoinable, even
where the employees have subscribed to a comprehensive no-strike
clause in their labor contract."
466 F.2d at 1160. We agree with the main thrust of this
statement -- that a work stoppage called solely to protect
employees from immediate danger is authorized by § 502 and cannot
be the basis for either a damages award or a
Boys Markets
injunction.
The Court of Appeals majority erred, however, in concluding
Page 414 U. S. 386
that an honest belief, no matter how unjustified, in the
existence of "abnormally dangerous conditions for work" necessarily
invokes the protection of § 502. If the courts require no objective
evidence that such conditions actually obtain, they face a wholly
speculative inquiry into the motives of the workers. As Judge
Rosenn pointed out in his dissent from the judgment below, the
difficulty occasioned by this view is especially apparent where, as
here, the claim concerns not some identifiable, presently existing
threat to the employees' safety, but rather a generalized doubt in
the competence and integrity of company supervisors. [
Footnote 16] Any employee who
believes a supervisor or fellow worker incompetent and who honestly
fears that, at some future time he may commit some unspecified
mistake creating a safety hazard could demand his colleague's
discharge and walk off the job despite the contractual agreement
not to do so. Absent the most explicit statutory command, we are
unwilling to conclude that Congress intended the public policy
favoring arbitration and peaceful resolution of labor disputes to
be circumvented by so slender a thread as subjective judgment,
however honest it may be. We agree with Judge Rosenn that a union
seeking to justify a contractually prohibited work stoppage
under
Page 414 U. S. 387
§ 502 must present "ascertainable, objective evidence supporting
its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work
exists." 466 F.2d at 1162. We find this reading of the statute
consistent both with common sense and with its previous
application.
See, e.g., Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn. v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (CA3),
cert. denied sub nom.
International Longshoremen's Assn. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 833 and
841 (1964);
NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co., 330
F.2d 885 (CA8 1964);
NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d
753 (CA6 1957),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958);
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961),
enf'd as modified sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 117
U.S.App.D.C. 84, 325 F.2d 1011 (1963),
cert. denied, 377
U.S. 905 (1964).
IV
On the facts of this case, we think it clear that § 502 did not
deprive the District Court of authority to enforce the contractual
no-strike obligation. The union inferred from the foremen's failure
to record the reduced airflow on the morning of April 15 that their
return to the job created an abnormally dangerous working
condition. One may doubt whether this assertion alone could suffice
to invoke the special protection of § 502. In any event, the
District Court resolved the issue by expressly conditioning
injunctive relief on the suspension of the two foremen pending
decision by the impartial umpire.
For similar reasons, it is also evident that injunctive relief
was appropriate in the present case under the equitable principles
set forth in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 254.
The District Court found that the union's continued breach of its
no-strike obligation would cause irreparable harm to the
petitioner. It eliminated any safety issue by suspending the two
foremen pending a final arbitral decision.
Page 414 U. S. 388
In these circumstances, we cannot say that the District Court
abused its discretion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
While this reduced airflow undoubtedly increased the
accumulation of coal dust and flammable gas in the mine, it still
exceeded the state ventilation requirement of 6,000 cubic feet per
minute, Pa.Bituminous Coal Mine Act, Pub.L. 659 (1961),
Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 52, § 701-242(b) (1966), and the federal
requirement of 9,000 cubic feet per minute, Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, § 303(b), 83 Stat. 767, 30 U.S.C. §
863(b).
[
Footnote 2]
Section 303(d)(1) of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 863(d)(1), requires such inspections within
three hours immediately prior to the beginning of any shift.
[
Footnote 3]
After its investigation, the Department concluded that:
"In view of the satisfactory record and good performance of
these foreman [
sic] in the past and the pending legal
action, we feel that no further action should be taken in this
matter. The coal company is at liberty to return the three (3)
assistant foreman [
sic] to work if it so desires."
App. 16a-17a.
[
Footnote 4]
The District Court found that the present work stoppage was
occasioned by a safety dispute over the reinstatement of the
suspended foremen, rather than by an economic dispute over
reporting pay for April 15.
[
Footnote 5]
While the appeal was pending and prior to the Court of Appeals'
decision, the impartial umpire rendered his decision in favor of
the company and determined,
inter alia, that the two
foremen should be permitted to return to work. 466 F.2d 1157,
1159.
[
Footnote 6]
This section provides, in relevant part:
"Should differences arise between the Mine Workers and the
operators as to the meaning and application of the provisions of
this agreement, or should differences arise about matters not
specifically mentioned in this agreement, or should any local
trouble of any kind arise at the mine, an earnest effort shall be
made to settle such differences immediately: (The parties will not
be represented by legal counsel at any of the steps below.)"
"1. Between the aggrieved party and the mine management."
"2. Through the management of the mine and the mine
committee."
"3. Through district representatives of the United Mine Workers
of America and a commissioner representative (where employed) of
the coal company."
"4. By a board consisting of four members, two of whom shall be
designated by the Mine Workers and two by the operators. Neither
the Mine Workers' representatives on the board nor the operators'
representatives on the board shall be the same persons who
participated in steps (1), (2), or (3) of this procedure."
"5. Should the board fail to agree, the matter shall, within
twenty (20) days after decision by the board, be referred to an
umpire to be mutually agreed upon by the operator or operators
affected and by the duly designated representatives of the United
Mine Workers of America, and the umpire so agreed upon shall
expeditiously and without delay decide said case. The decision of
the umpire shall be final. Expenses and salary incident to the
services of an umpire shall be paid equally by the operator or
operators affected and by the Mine Workers."
"A decision reached at any stage of the proceedings above
outlined shall be binding on both parties hereto, and shall not be
subject to reopening by any other party or branch of either
association except by mutual agreement."
App. 13a-14a.
[
Footnote 7]
Paragraph 3 provides:
"The United Mine Workers of America and the operators agree and
affirm that they will maintain the integrity of this contract and
that all disputes and claims which are not settled by agreement
shall be settled by the machinery provided in the 'Settlement of
Local and District Disputes' section of this agreement unless
national in character, in which event the parties shall settle such
disputes by free collective bargaining as heretofore practiced in
the industry, it being the purpose of this provision to provide for
the settlement of all such disputes and claims through the
machinery in this contract provided and by collective bargaining,
without recourse to the courts."
App. 15a.
[
Footnote 8]
In finding a public policy disfavoring arbitration of safety
disputes, the court reasoned as follows:
"Considerations of economic peace that favor arbitration of
ordinary disputes have little weight here. Men are not wont to
submit matters of life or death to arbitration, and no enlightened
society encourages, much less requires, them to do so. If employees
believe that correctible circumstances are unnecessarily adding to
the normal dangers of their hazardous employment, there is no sound
reason for requiring them to subordinate their judgment to that of
an arbitrator, however impartial he may be. The arbitrator is not
staking his life on his impartial decision. It should not be the
policy of the law to force the employees to stake theirs on his
judgment."
466 F.2d at 1160. We find this analysis unpersuasive for the
reasons stated in this section of our opinion.
The Court of Appeals also relied on § 502 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143. Section 502 provides
that "the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good
faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work" shall
not "be deemed a strike under this chapter." On its face, this
section appears to bear more directly on the scope of the no-strike
obligation than on the arbitrability of safety disputes. Indeed,
there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that § 502
was intended as a limit on arbitration.
See 1 Legislative
History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, pp. 29, 156,
290, 436, 573, 895 (G.P.O.1948). For this reason, we reserve our
discussion of § 502 until
414 U. S. To
the extent that § 502 might be relevant to the issue of
arbitrability, we find that the considerations favoring
arbitrability outweigh the ambiguous import of that section in the
present context.
[
Footnote 9]
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U. S. 564
(1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574
(1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593
(1960).
[
Footnote 10]
The Court of Appeals also found support for its refusal to order
arbitration in § (e) of the collective bargaining agreement.
Section (e) provides for an employee mine safety committee
empowered to inspect mine facilities and equipment and to report
its findings to the management. If the committee finds an
"immediate danger," it may make a binding recommendation to remove
all workers from the unsafe area.
Although the Court of Appeals did not state that § (e) was an
express exception to the arbitration clause, it evidently believed
that the section created an ambiguity in the agreement which had to
be resolved against arbitrability. However, as the Court stated in
United Steelworker of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., supra, "[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage." 363 U.S. at
363 U. S. 583.
Thus,
"[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most
forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from
arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion
clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad."
Id. at
363 U. S.
584-585. Since § (e) clearly does not constitute an
express exception to the arbitration clause, it follows that the
safety dispute in the instant case must be deemed to fall within
the broad arbitration clause.
The dissent maintains that the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 742, 30 U.S.C. § 801
et seq.,
preempts the field and "displace[s] all agreements to arbitrate
safety conditions."
Post at
414 U. S. 394.
Respondents have not made this contention, and a fair reading of
the Act discloses no congressional intention, either express or
implied, to accomplish such a drastic result.
[
Footnote 11]
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any
person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as
these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts:"
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment. . . ."
47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 104.
[
Footnote 12]
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
[
Footnote 13]
398 U.S. at
398 U. S. 239
n. 3
[
Footnote 14]
Lucas Flour involved a damages action for breach of the
implied no-strike obligation, while the present case involves
injunctive relief. The policy reasons favoring the availability of
injunctive relief, however, are equally compelling. As the Court
stated in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U. S. 235,
398 U. S. 248
(1970):
"[A]n award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no
substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore,
an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute
would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early
resolution of the difficulties between employer and union."
[
Footnote 15]
Respondents also argue that Paragraph 1 of the "Miscellaneous"
section of the agreement disavows any intent to impose a no-strike
duty. Paragraph 1 provides:
"1. Any and all provisions in either the Appalachian Joint Wage
Agreement of June 19, 1941, or the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of April 11, 1945, containing any 'no strike' or
'penalty' clause or clauses or any clause denominated 'Illegal
Suspension of Work' are hereby rescinded, cancelled, abrogated and
made null and void."
App. 14a.
This paragraph effectively rescinds certain no-strike clauses in
two prior agreements. It does not, however, purport to negate any
no-strike duty created by the present agreement. As we have noted,
the agreement makes arbitration the exclusive and compulsory means
for finally resolving disputes. Under
Teamsters Local v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95
(1962), this arbitration provision gives rise to an implied
no-strike duty. We do not think that Paragraph 1 can be fairly
construed as an exception to that no-strike duty.
Cf. Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (CA6 1958) (Stewart, J.),
affirmed by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Mine Workers v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459
(1960).
[
Footnote 16]
Judge Rosenn contended with justification that a wholly
subjective test would open "new and hazardous avenues in labor
relations for unrest and strikes." He stated:
"This test will require a court to accept the naked assertion of
an employee that the presence of one of his fellow employees in a
plant constitutes a safety hazard. If employees may label another
employee a working risk and thereupon engage in a work stoppage
which, because of its characterization as a safety strike, is
unreviewable by arbitration or court, no employer can expect
stability in labor relations. Moreover, each employee is the
possible victim of the attitudes, fancies and whims of his fellow
employees. Unions themselves will be at the mercy of
'wildcatters.'"
466 F.2d at 1162.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I
The dispute in this labor case does not involve hourly wages,
pension benefits, or the like. It involves the life and death of
the workers in the most dangerous occupation in America. [
Footnote 2/1] The history of the coal miner
is a history of fatal catastrophes, which have prompted special
protective legislation. [
Footnote
2/2] Nor was the mine involved here an exception. It is
classified by the United States Bureau of Mines as "especially
hazardous," triggering special inspection procedures to insure the
safety of the men who work it. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969, § 103(i), 83 Stat. 750, 30 U.S.C. § 813(i). Congress
has received testimony about safety problems at this mine in which
the workers, a year before this dispute, complained of the
supervisors' negligence in safety matters, particularly their
practice of "not testing for gas." [
Footnote 2/3] At those hearings, Senator Harrison
Williams, the principal author of the 1969 mine safety act,
commented that the enforcement performance of the United States
Bureau of Mines was "outrageous . . . just plain unbelievable."
[
Footnote 2/4]
Page 414 U. S. 389
It was in the context of this history that the workers
discovered that three of their foremen had negligently failed to
check and record the airflow in the nine before the daylight shift
began, as was their duty. Instead, they made false entries in their
log books. As a result, they had not discovered that the airflow in
the mine was 11,000 cubic feet per minute, rather than the normal
28,000. Reduced airflow can result in a buildup of methane gas,
creating conditions for accidental explosions resulting from the
operation of normal mining equipment. The workers walked off the
job and refused to return unless the foremen were removed. The
majority passes off the workers' concern here as only "a
generalized doubt in the competence and integrity of company
supervisors," as if there were only unfounded fears about a few men
in an operation with an exemplary safety record. Yet the foremen in
question pleaded
nolo contendere to state charges of
falsifying the records involved in this incident, and their
admitted misfeasance is precisely the kind of reckless disregard
for the miners' safety which permeates the history of this
industry.
In response to this history, the union obtained, in the
collective bargaining agreement in force during this incident, a
provision for a union "mine safety committee" with the authority to
present the mine operator with a binding "recommendation" that all
workers be removed from an unsafe mine area. The agreement provides
no recourse for the operator in disagreement with the committee's
determinations, although he may subsequently seek removal from the
committee of members he believes to have acted arbitrarily. Yet it
is clear from this provision that the union reserved to itself the
authority to determine that a mine be closed because of safety
hazards. Although there is an explicit provision that a dispute
over whether a committee member should be removed is arbitrable,
there is no such provision for arbitration
Page 414 U. S. 390
if the mine operator disagrees with the committee's
recommendation. The inescapable inference, absent any contrary
presumption, is that this question is not subject to arbitration.
[
Footnote 2/5] And in what clearly
appears to be a buttress to the union's authority in this matter,
all no-strike provisions from prior contracts were explicitly
excluded from the agreement in question here, which contains no
such commitment on the part of the union. This is the contractual
context in which the employer brought this action, under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. §
185, to compel arbitration of the safety dispute and enjoin the
work stoppage. It is, of course, clearly established that, because
of congressional policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, a
general arbitration provision, as found in the agreement here in
question, is broadly construed.
Steelworkers trilogy
(
United Steelworkers of
America v.
Page 414 U. S. 391
American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564;
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U. S. 574;
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U. S. 593).
This policy is grounded, as the majority points out, in the
expression of policy by the Labor Management Relations Act. And
once a dispute is determined to be arbitrable, there is an implied
agreement by the union not to strike,
Teamsters Local v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, which
is enforceable by a federal court injunction under the principles
enunciated in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U. S. 235,
because of the close relationship between the duty to arbitrate and
the duty not to strike.
Lucas Flour, supra, at
369 U. S.
104-106;
Boys Markets, supra, at
398 U. S.
247-249.
Yet this whole scheme, grounded as it is on congressional
expression of policy, must allow for any congressionally indicated
exceptions to that policy. In a § 301 suit, the federal courts are
to apply federal law, "which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws."
Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
353 U. S. 456.
Although the "presumption of arbitrability" might be sufficient in
the ordinary case to overcome the contrary implications in the
collective bargaining agreement involved here, I find that
presumption seriously weakened in the area of safety disputes by §
502 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143, which
expressly shields walk-offs by workers concerned for their safety:
that section reads in part:
"[N]or shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees
in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work
at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed
a strike under this chapter."
Although there is nothing in the legislative history of this
section to shed light on its purpose, the words of the section are
themselves fairly clear. They recognize in the law what is in any
case an unavoidable principle of
Page 414 U. S. 392
human behavior: self preservation. As Judge Hastie said for the
majority in the Court of Appeals: "Men are not wont to submit
matters of life or death to arbitration. . . ." 466 F.2d 1157,
1160.
This is an area involving "the penumbra of express statutory
mandates" to be solved "by looking at the policy of the legislation
and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy."
Lincoln Mills, supra, at
353 U. S. 457.
Although there is a general policy favoring arbitration, I do not
find that Congress intended to extend that policy here. Application
of the "presumption of arbitrability" is not inevitable in every
labor dispute. But miners' determination to act to protect their
own safety is as inevitable in labor disputes as elsewhere. Absent
any presumption, I cannot find that the dispute here was
arbitrable, or that the union was under any duty not to strike. It
follows then, as the Court of Appeals found, that there was no
wrong to remedy.
II
Congress, in 1969, set up pervasive administrative controls over
working and environmental conditions with the coal mines, [
Footnote 2/6] 83 Stat. 742. The need for a
more effective regulatory scheme was described in H.R.Rep. No.
91-563. The 1969 Act states in its findings and purpose that "the
first priority and concern of all in the coal mining industry must
be the health and safety of
Page 414 U. S. 393
its most precious resource -- the miner." § 2(a), 30 U.S.C. §
801(a). Ease of investigating mines was insured. The Act provides
that, when a representative of the miners believes that a violation
of a mandatory standard exists and an imminent danger exists, the
right of immediate inspection is given the Federal Government. §
103(g), 30 U.S.C. § 813(g). The Secretary of the Interior may make
a spot investigation of a mine for five working days when he
believes hazardous conditions exist. § 103(i), 30 U.S.C. § 813(i).
Once a hazardous condition is found, the Secretary can order that
all miners be evacuated from the area and prohibited from entering
it. § 104(a), 30 U.S.C. § 814(a). The Secretary can abate mining in
incipient or potential mining areas, § 105, 30 U.S.C. § 815, and
his orders are, within limits, subject to judicial review by the
miners, as well as by the operators. § 106, 30 U.S.C. § 816.
Detailed ventilating requirements are placed in the Act, § 303,
30 U.S.C. § 863; and examinations of each mine must be made within
"three hours immediately preceding the beginning of any shift." §
303(d)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 863(d)(1). Examinations for hazardous
conditions must be made at least once a week, § 303(f), 30 U.S.C. §
863(f); and weekly investigations of ventilating conditions must be
made and various monitors which detect dangerous gases must be
installed, § 303(1), 30 U.S.C. § 863(1). The regulatory scheme
covers the subject matter in minute detail.
Penalties run against operators of mines and also against miners
who violate in specified ways "mandatory safety standards."
Compensation of miners laid off by closed mines is provided, §
110(a), 30 U.S.C. § 820(a); and miners are protected against
discharge or other discrimination by protests they have made
against the operations by testimony they have given. § 110(b), 30
U.S.C.§ 820(b).
Page 414 U. S. 394
Title IV of the Act treats disability payments and payments for
the death of miners. It bolsters state workmen's compensation laws,
and makes the owners liable, through self-insurance or through
liability insurance, where an adequate state law does not exist, §
423, 30 U.S.C. § 933. State laws inconsistent with the federal act
are suspended, but state laws which provide more stringent
standards or controls survive, § 506, 30 U.S.C. § 955.
A close reading of this Act convinces me that it must displace
all agreements to arbitrate safety conditions. It is in that
respect a more extreme case than
U.S. Bulk
Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.
S. 351, where we held that a federal statute giving
seamen a specific judicial remedy was not displaced by arbitration.
When it comes to health, safety of life, or determination of
environmental conditions within the mines, Congress has preempted
the field. An arbiter is no part of the paraphernalia described in
the Act. An arbiter seeks a compromise, an adjustment, an
accommodation. There is no mandate in arbitration to apply a
specific law. Those named in the present Act who construe, apply,
and formulate the law are the Secretary and the courts.
Moreover, arbitration awards might compromise administration of
the 1969 Act. Rulings of arbiters might not jibe with rulings of
the Secretary. Rulings of the arbiters might even color claims for
compensation or damages by negativing the very basis of liability
either in workmen's compensation Acts or in state lawsuits for
damages.
Hence, though I disagree with the way in which the Court reads
this particular arbitration clause, I conclude that, even though
the collective bargaining agreement is read to authorize
arbitration, the 1969 Act precludes it. The 1969 Act specifies the
arms of the law which handle these matters of safety of mines.
Congress has given arbiters no share of the power.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Injury Rates by Industry, 1970, pp.
3, 6 (Report No. 406, 1972).
[
Footnote 2/2]
S.Rep. No. 9111, pp. 3-6; H.R.Rep. No. 91-563, pp. 1-3.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Hearings on Health and Safety in the Coal Mines before the
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 27, 351 (1970).
[
Footnote 2/4]
Id. at 191.
[
Footnote 2/5]
This inference is strengthened by the agreement's provisions for
arbitration if the operator objected to recommendations by federal
coal mine inspectors. § (b)(2) of the agreement. There would
obviously be no need for this special arbitration provision if the
parties felt that safety questions could be handled through the
regular arbitration machinery.
Indeed, the provision in question here has a long history
supporting this construction. The 1946 agreement, known as the
Krug-Lewis agreement, and arising from President Truman's seizure
of the mines in 1946,
United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U. S. 258,
expressly permitted union safety committees to initiate safety
stoppages, although the Federal Coal lines Administrator (Capt.
N.H. Collisson), was given authority to halt such a stoppage. At
hearings following the Centralia mine disaster, resulting in the
death of 111 miners, Secretary of the Interior Krug testified that
the meaning of the provision "was to give the mine safety committee
complete authority to get the men out of the mine, if they felt the
mine was unsafe. . . ." Hearings pursuant to S.Res. 98 before a
Special Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Lands, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 312. The predecessor to the current provision
appeared in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1947,
which deleted Commission's authority to override the miners.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The hazards of various working conditions to the health of
workers have been of great concern to Congress, its latest Act
being the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat.
1590, which in terms does not exclude employees who are in the coal
mining business. The Act looks toward increasing the quality of the
environment in which employees work and of improving the workmen's
compensation system under which they are protected.
See
Brodeur, Casualties of the Workplace, New Yorker, Nov.19, 1973, p.
87, for an account of the industrial-medical complex that works to
keep plants profitable to the owners and dangerous to the
workers.