Certain land abutting the east bank of the Colorado River was
conveyed in 1910 by federal patent to a railroad company. Upon
admission to the Union in 1912, Arizona succeeded the Federal
Government to title to the bed of the Colorado River. The river's
gradual eastward movement submerged the subject land by erosion so
that title was mechanically transferred to the State as part of the
riverbed. In 1955, petitioner cattle company acquired title to the
original railroad grant, most of which by that time was covered by
water. In 1959, the subject land was abandoned by the Colorado as a
result of a federal rechanneling project. Petitioner cattle company
filed this action to quiet title and prevailed in the lower courts,
but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the
equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act, Arizona held
title to the beds of all navigable waters within its borders, and
thus to the subject land as a result of the river's gradual
eastward movement.
Held:
1. Ownership of the subject land is governed by federal law. The
issue here is not what rights the State has accorded private owners
in lands that the State holds as sovereign, but how far the State's
sovereign right extends under the equal-footing doctrine and the
federal Submerged Lands Act,
i.e., whether the State
retains title to lands formerly beneath the Colorado or whether
title thereto is defeasible by withdrawal of those waters. Pp.
414 U. S.
317-321.
2. The equal-footing doctrine does not support the State's
claim, since, when the water receded from the disputed land, there
was no longer a public purpose to be served by the State, as
sovereign, holding title thereto. Pp.
414 U. S.
321-324.
3. Nor does the Submerged Lands Act, which did not abrogate the
federal law of accretion, support the State's claim, since that Act
does not extend to the States any interest in the beds of navigable
rivers beyond those afforded by the equal-footing doctrine. Pp.
414 U. S.
324-325.
4. Title to the subject land, under the applicable federal
common law, is vested in petitioner as riparian landowner, and not
in the State as owner of the riverbed. Pp.
414 U. S.
325-332.
(a) Analysis of the interests of the State and petitioner,
in
Page 414 U. S. 314
light of the rationales for the federal common law doctrines of
accretion and avulsion, compels the conclusion that, as between the
State, as owner of the riverbed, and petitioner, as riparian owner,
the surfacing of the subject land should be treated as an
accretion; hence, title to the disputed land should be vested in
petitioner. Pp.
414 U. S.
325-330.
(b) The doctrine of avulsion (whereby an avulsive change caused
by a stream suddenly and perceptively abandoning its old channel
does not affect title and the boundary established by the former
river stream remains at that line, even if the result is to cut off
a landowner's riparian rights) does not apply here, because of the
limited interests of the State in the subject property. Pp.
414 U. S.
328-329.
107 Ariz. 465,
489 P.2d
699, and 108 Ariz. 258,
495 P.2d
1312, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,
joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
414 U. S. 332.
REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, announced by MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN.
The question for decision is whether title to land abandoned by
the stream of the Colorado River as a
Page 414 U. S. 315
result of a federal rechanneling project vests in the State of
Arizona, as owner of the beds under navigable streams within its
borders, or in petitioner cattle company, as the owner of land
riparian to the river at the time of the rechanneling.
The circumstances that give rise to this case are as follows. In
1910, the subject land was conveyed by federal patent, as part of a
larger parcel, to the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co. A survey
conducted in 1905 and 1906, and approved by the Surveyor General of
the United States in 1906, indicates that, as of the date of the
patent, the Santa Fe parcel abutted the east bank of the Colorado
River. [
Footnote 1] Upon
admission to the Union in 1912, Arizona succeeded the Federal
Government to title to the bed of the Colorado River. The exact
location of the river in 1912 in relation to the subject property
is unclear from the record, but it is generally agreed that,
between 1903 and 1959 (when it was rechanneled), the river moved
gradually eastward, eroding its east bank and depositing alluvion
on its west bank, resulting in the submergence by erosion of the
subject land. As the river crept eastward, the boundary between
Page 414 U. S. 316
upland owners and the state-owned riverbed moved mechanically
with it, transferring title to the lands which became part of the
riverbed to the State. The operation of Hoover Dam, begun in 1938,
reduced the flow of water in the Colorado River and substantially
decreased its annual flood stage high-water mark. Nonetheless, by
1955, when the Bonelli Cattle Co. acquired title to the subject
portion of the original Santa Fe grant, all but 60 acres in the
southeast corner of its parcel was covered by water. In 1959, a
Federal Bureau of Reclamation Project deepened and rechanneled the
Colorado River in the area of the subject land, thereby confining
the stream of the river to a substantially reduced portion of the
Bonelli property. [
Footnote
2]
In 1962, the Bonelli Cattle Co. filed the instant action to
quiet title to the land from which the river had withdrawn as a
result of the federal rechanneling project. The state trial court
granted judgment for Bonelli and against the State of Arizona. The
Arizona Court of Appeals, the State's intermediate appellate court,
affirmed, upholding Bonelli's contention that, if the changes in
the river were accretive, the surfaced land belonged to Bonelli, as
a riparian owner, and if the change were avulsive, the land
nonetheless belonged to Bonelli under the doctrine of reemergence.
[
Footnote 3]
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, [
Footnote 4] holding that, under the equal-footing doctrine
and the Submerged Lands Act, Arizona holds title to the beds of all
navigable
Page 414 U. S. 317
waters within its borders, and thus to the subject land, as a
result of the gradual eastward movement of the river. The Arizona
Supreme Court found that, because the federal rechannelization
project was an "engineering relocation of the waters of the river
by artificial means," it was, under state law, an avulsive change,
which did not divest the State of its title to the exposed land
which had formerly been part of the riverbed. The court denied a
rehearing and, in a supplemental opinion, clarified the extent of
the dry land owned by the State. [
Footnote 5] It held that the high-water mark of the river,
to which the State's ownership extends, was fixed by the natural
state of the river as it existed in 1938, before the operation of
Hoover Dam. [
Footnote 6] We
granted certiorari, 410 U.S. 908 (1973). We hold that the ownership
of the subject land is governed by federal law, and that the land
surfaced by the narrowing of the river channel belongs not to the
State, as owner of the riverbed, but to Bonelli, as riparian owner.
We need not, therefore, reach the question of whether the Arizona
Supreme Court properly determined the average high-water mark of
the river.
I
The first issue we must decide is whether state or federal law
governs this controversy. The State of Arizona claims title to the
subject land by virtue of the equal-footing doctrine [
Footnote 7] and the Submerged Lands Act,
[
Footnote 8] the basic
principles of which are as follows. When the
Page 414 U. S. 318
Original Colonies ratified the Constitution, they succeeded to
the Crown's title and interest in the beds of navigable waters
within their respective borders. As new States were forged out of
the federal territories after the formation of the Union, they were
"admitted [with] the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction . .
. as the original States possess within their respective borders."
Mumford v.
Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423,
73 U. S. 436
(1867). Accordingly, title to lands beneath navigable waters passed
from the Federal Government to the new States, upon their admission
to the Union, under the equal-footing doctrine.
See, e.g.,
44 U. S.
Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845);
Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U. S. 1 (1894);
Weber v. Board of Harbor
Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57,
85 U. S. 65-66
(1873).
In order for the States to guarantee full public enjoyment of
their navigable watercourses, [
Footnote 9] it has been held that their title to the bed
of a navigable river mechanically follows the river's gradual
changes in course.
See Oklahoma v. Texas, 268 U.
S. 252 (1925). Thus, where portions of a riparian
owner's land are encroached upon by a navigable stream, under
federal law, the State succeeds to title in the bed of the river to
its new highwater mark.
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 did not disturb these doctrines
or their inherent limitations. The Act merely confirmed the States'
preexisting rights in the beds of the navigable waterways within
their boundaries by, in effect, quitclaiming all federal claims
thereto. And, consonant with the above-described common law
doctrine concerning title to the bed of a river that has shifted
course, the Submerged Lands Act quitclaims all federal rights to
title to lands beneath the navigable streams, as "hereafter
modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction." 43 U.S.C. §
1301(a)(1).
Page 414 U. S. 319
The State of Arizona asserts title to the subject land on the
basis of the following application of these principles. When
Arizona achieved statehood in 1912, it assumed title to the land
beneath the stream of the Colorado River by virtue of the
equal-footing doctrine. [
Footnote 10] It subsequently acquired title to the
subject land when it was submerged by the river's eastward
movement. The State asserts that, once having acquired title, it
was not divested of its proprietary interest in the land by the
subsequent withdrawal of the water due to the rechanneling of the
river.
Having concluded that title to the subject land was thus vested
in the State as a matter of settled federal law, the state courts
determined that local law controlled whether petitioner, as a
riparian owner, had any interest in the land thereafter. As the
Court said in
Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.
S. 158,
246 U. S. 176
(1918):
"[I]t is for the States to establish for themselves such rules
of property as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable
waters within their borders and the riparian lands adjacent to
them. . . ."
We continue to adhere to the principle that it is left to the
States to determine the rights of riparian owners in the beds of
navigable streams which, under federal law, belong to the State.
But this doctrine does not require that state law govern the
instant controversy. The issue before us is not what rights the
State has accorded private owners in lands which the State holds as
sovereign, but, rather, how far the State's sovereign right extends
under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act --
whether the State retains title
Page 414 U. S. 320
to the lands formerly beneath the stream of the Colorado River
or whether that title is defeasible by the withdrawal of those
waters. As this Court observed in
Borax, Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U. S. 10,
296 U. S. 22
(1935):
"The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is,
as to the limit of the land conveyed, . . . is necessarily a
federal question. . . . [I]t involves the ascertainment of the
essential basis of a right asserted under federal law."
Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra, and the cases cited
therein are not to the contrary. In
Arkansas v. Tennessee,
for example, we held that federal law governed the question of how
far into the river channel a State held title. Only then did this
Court turn to state law to determine whether riparian owners had
been accorded any rights in that land. But even the State's
disposition of its submerged land
vis-a-vis private owners
was to be "in each case limited by the interstate boundary," a
matter determined by federal law. 246 U.S. at
246 U. S. 176.
Similarly, in
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S.
1 (1894), the Court held that, under settled federal
law, the tidelands there at issue belonged to the State in its
sovereign capacity; hence whether the State had accorded riparian
owners any interests in the tidelands properly remained a matter of
local law;
"if [the States] choose to resign to the riparian proprietor
rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity,
it is not for others to raise objections."
Id. at
152 U. S. 43. In
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324,
94 U. S. 338
(1877), the Court left it to the States to decide whether to accord
title to the land beneath nontidal navigable waters to riparian
owners after recognizing that, under federal law such lands belong
to the States.
See also Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.
S. 229,
227 U. S. 242
(1913).
The present case, however, does not involve a question of the
disposition of lands the title to which is vested in the State as a
matter of settled federal law. The very question to be decided is
the nature and extent of
Page 414 U. S. 321
the title to the bed of a navigable stream held by the State
under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act. In
this case, the question of title as between the State and a private
landowner necessarily depends on a construction of a "right
asserted under federal law." [
Footnote 11]
II
We cannot accept the State's argument that the equal-footing
doctrine supports its claim to the disputed land. Historically,
title to the beds beneath navigable waters is held by the
sovereign,
Barney v. Keokuk, supra at
94 U. S. 338,
as a public trust for the protection of navigation and related
purposes.
"[T]itle to the . . . lands under water . . . enures to the
State within which they are situated. . . . Such title . . . [is]
held in trust for the public purposes of
Page 414 U. S. 322
navigation and fishery."
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371,
140 U. S. 381
(1891).
See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
339 U. S. 799,
339 U. S. 808
(1950). As this Court observed in an earlier federal water law
case:
"Such waters . . . are incapable of ordinary and private
occupation, cultivation and improvement, and their natural and
primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation
and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing.
. . ."
Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at
152 U. S. 11.
The State's title is to the "[river]bed as a bed," [
Footnote 12] and the State of
Arizona will continue to hold title to the bed beneath the Colorado
River to its present highwater mark. But the exposed land involved
here is no longer, as described in
Shively, "incapable of
ordinary and private occupation . . . [whose] primary uses are
public in their nature, for highways of navigation." [
Footnote 13] The equal-footing
doctrine was never intended to provide a State with a windfall of
thousands of acres of dry land exposed when the main thread of a
navigable stream is changed. [
Footnote 14] It would be at odds with the fundamental
Page 414 U. S. 323
purpose of the original grant to the States to afford a State
title to land from which a navigable stream had receded unless the
land was exposed as part of a navigational or related public
project of which it was a necessary and integral part or unless, of
course, the artificial accretion was somehow caused by the upland
owner himself. There has been no showing that the rechannelization
project was undertaken to give the State title to the subject lands
for the protection of navigation or related public goals. [
Footnote 15] Indeed, the State of
Arizona did not participate in the rechannelization of the Colorado
River, although it had implicitly assented to the project.
[
Footnote 16]
The advance of the Colorado's waters divested the title of the
upland owners in favor of the State in order to guarantee full
public enjoyment of the watercourse. But, when the water receded
from the land, there was no longer a public benefit to be
protected; consequently,
Page 414 U. S. 324
the State, as sovereign, has no need for title. That the cause
of the recession was artificial, or that the rate was perceptible,
should be of no effect.
Nor does the Submerged Lands Act provide a basis for the State's
claim to the subject lands. The Arizona Supreme Court incorrectly
construed this Act as a grant by Congress to the States of lands
"
formerly . . . beneath navigable waters." [
Footnote 17] The Act did not abrogate the
federal law of accretion, but defined lands beneath navigable
waters as being those covered by streams as "hereafter modified by
accretion, erosion, and reliction." [
Footnote 18] Contrary to the implication raised by the
Arizona Supreme Court, the Act creates no new rights for the States
in the beds of their inland waterways. The Act is not a grant of
title to land, but only a quitclaim of federal proprietary rights
in the beds of navigable waterways. [
Footnote 19] The Act specifically excepts from its scope
lands lawfully conveyed or patented by the United States. [
Footnote 20] Since the Act does not
extend to the States any interest beyond those afforded by the
equal-footing
Page 414 U. S. 325
doctrine, the State can no more base its claim to lands
unnecessary to a navigational purpose on the Submerged Lands Act
than on that doctrine.
III
The question remains as to who owns the subject land under the
applicable federal common law. It is, of course, clear that the
State of Arizona did hold title to the subject property before the
waters of the river receded. Both the State and the Solicitor
General of the United States as
amicus curiae, urge that
the federal common law doctrine of avulsion is applicable, and thus
that the State remains holder of title in the former riverbed.
Bonelli, the only private claimant, argues that the narrowing of
the river course should properly be characterized as an artificial
accretion, hence that the disputed land, which had originally been
lost from the Bonelli parcel to the river by erosion, should once
again belong to it as the riparian owner.
Federal law recognizes the doctrine of accretion, whereby the
"grantee of land bounded by a body of navigable water acquires a
right to any . . . gradual accretion formed along the shore."
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290,
389 U. S. 293
(1967);
accord, 59 U. S.
Johnston, 18 How. 150,
59 U. S. 156
(1856). When there is a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
land on a navigable riverbank, by way of alluvion or reliction, the
riparian owner is the beneficiary of title to the surfaced
land:
"It is the established rule that a riparian proprietor of land
bounded by a stream, the banks of which are changed by the gradual
and imperceptible process of accretion or erosion, continues to
hold to the stream as his boundary; if his land is increased he is
not accountable for the gain, and if it is
Page 414 U. S. 326
diminished, he has no recourse for the loss."
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605,
223 U. S. 624
(1912).
There are a number of interrelated reasons for the application
of the doctrine of accretion. First, where lands are bounded by
water, it may well be regarded as the expectancy of the riparian
owners that they should continue to be so bounded. [
Footnote 21] Second, the quality of being
riparian, especially to navigable water, may be the land's "most
valuable feature," and is part and parcel of the ownership of the
land itself.
Hughes v. Washington, supra, at
389 U. S. 293;
Yates v.
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497,
77 U. S. 504
(1871). Riparianness also encompasses the vested right to future
alluvion, which is an "essential attribute of the original
property."
County of St. Clair v.
Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46,
90 U. S. 68
(1874). By requiring that the upland owner suffer the burden of
erosion, and by giving him the benefit of accretions, riparianness
is maintained. Finally, there is a compensation theory at work.
Riparian land is at the mercy of the wanderings of the river. Since
a riparian owner is subject to losing land by erosion beyond his
control, he should benefit from any addition to his lands by the
accretions thereto, which are equally beyond his control.
Ibid. The effect of the doctrine of accretion is to give
the riparian owner a
""
fee, determinable upon the occupancy of his soil by the
river,' and [to afford] the State [a title] to the river bed [which
is] likewise a . . . `qualified' fee, `determinable in favor of the
riparians upon the abandonment of the bed by the river.'" [Footnote 22]
Page 414 U. S.
327
"
The doctrine of accretion applies to changes in the river course
due to artificial as well as natural causes.
County of St.
Clair v. Lovingston, supra, at
90 U. S. 64-69;
United States v. Claridge, 416 F.2d 933 (CA9 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 961 (1970) (changes in the Colorado
River's course, caused by the construction of Hoover Dam, are
accretive). Where accretions to riparian land are caused by
conditions created by strangers to the land, the upland owner
remains the beneficiary thereof. [
Footnote 23]
But the federal law is otherwise where "a stream suddenly and
perceptibly abandons its old channel."
Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. at
223 U. S.
624-625. Such an avulsive change does not affect title,
and the boundary established by the former river stream remains at
that line, even if the result is to cut off a landowner's riparian
rights.
St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.
S. 226,
138 U. S. 245
(1891). The rationale for the doctrine of avulsion is a need to
mitigate the hardship that a shift in title caused by a sudden
movement of the river would cause the abutting landowners were the
accretion principle to be applied. As this Court, quoting from 8
Op.Atty.Gen. 175, observed in
Nebraska v. Iowa,
143 U. S. 359,
143 U. S. 362
(1892):
"'[When, in] deserting its original bed, the river forces for
itself a new channel in another direction, then the nation through
whose territory the river thus breaks its way suffers injury by the
loss of territory greater than the benefit of retaining the natural
river boundary, and that boundary remains in the middle of the
deserted river bed.' "
Page 414 U. S. 328
The Arizona Supreme Court held that, because the rechanneling of
the Colorado River was an "engineering relocation of the waters of
the river by artificial means," it was, under state law, an
avulsion and did not divest the State of title to the land from
which the river had withdrawn. But federal law must be applied with
a view toward the limited nature of the sovereign's rights in the
riverbed, and an analysis of the interests of the State and
Bonelli, in light of the rationales for the federal common law
doctrines of accretion and avulsion, compels the conclusion that,
as between the State, as owner of the riverbed, and Bonelli, as a
riparian owner, the surfacing of the subject land should be treated
as accretion; hence title to the disputed land should be vested in
Bonelli.
The rationale for the application of the doctrine of avulsion is
not applicable to this dispute because of the limited interests of
the State in the subject property. The Federal Government, which
holds a paramount navigable servitude in the river, [
Footnote 24] determined that it was too
wide and shallow to permit navigation in the area of the subject
land, and that the river therefore needed to be deepened and
rechanneled. The resulting changes in the river's thread actually
enhanced the State's interest in the navigability of the river. The
State's acquisition of the exposed land here could only be a
windfall, since unnecessary to the State's purpose in holding title
to the beds of the navigable streams within its borders. [
Footnote 25] Accordingly, the
narrowing of the river and vesting of title to the surfaced land in
riparian owners does not detract from the State's legitimate
interest in title to
Page 414 U. S. 329
the riverbed, [
Footnote
26] so as to require mitigation of the accretion principle by
application of the doctrine of avulsion.
The policies behind the doctrine of accretion are, however,
fully applicable. That doctrine guarantees the riparian character
of land by automatically granting to a riparian owner title to
lands which form between his holdings and the river, and thus
threaten to destroy that valuable feature of his property. The
riparian owner is at the mercy not only of the natural forces which
create such intervening lands, but also, because of the
navigational servitude, of governmental forces which may similarly
affect the riparian quality of his estate. Accordingly, where land
cast up in the Federal Government's exercise of the servitude is
not related to furthering the navigational or related public
interests, the accretion doctrine should provide a disposition of
the land as between the riparian owner and the State.
See
Michaelson v. Silver Beach Assn., 342 Mass. 251,
173
N.E.2d 273 (1961).
Similarly, riparian lands may suffer noncompensable losses or be
deprived of their riparian character altogether by the State or
Federal Government in the exercise of the navigational servitude.
In compensation for such losses, land surfaced in the course of
such governmental activity should inure to the riparian owner where
not necessary to the navigational project or its purpose. In
Page 414 U. S. 330
the case before us, all of the subject land, which composed a
substantial portion of Bonelli's parcel, was lost to the State by
erosion to serve the public interest in the navigability of the
river. Now that the land has resurfaced in the process of
rechannelization, it should return to the estate of the riparian
owner. [
Footnote 27]
"No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every
proprietor whose land is thus bounded [by a navigable stream] is
subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory;
and as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot
Page 414 U. S. 331
be held accountable for his gain."
New Orleans v. United
States, 10 Pet. 662,
35 U. S. 717
(1836).
Finally, recognition of the State's claim to the subject land
would raise a serious constitutional issue as to whether the
State's assertion of title is a taking without compensation, a
question which we find unnecessary to decide on our view of the
case. As MR. JUSTICE STEWART warned in
Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. at
389 U. S. 298
(concurring opinion):
"Although the State in this case made no attempt to take the
accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by
effecting a retroactive transformation of private into public
property -- without paying for the privilege of doing so. . . .
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids such
confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than through
its legislature, and no less when a taking is unintended than when
it is deliberate. . . ."
In the exercise of its navigational servitude, the State or
Federal Government may decrease the value of riparian property
without compensation because the property is held subject to the
exercise of that servitude. The government may, without paying
compensation, deprive a riparian owner of his common law right to
use flowing water,
St. Anthonys Falls Water Power Co. v. St.
Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U. S. 349
(1897), or to build a wharf over the water,
Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894).
We have held that the State may deprive the owner of the riparian
character of his property in the exercise of its navigational
servitude.
United States v. Rands, 389 U.
S. 121 (1967). But there is no claim here by the State
that depriving Bonelli of the subject land is necessary to any
navigational or related purpose.
Cf. United States v. River
Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411,
Page 414 U. S. 332
269 U. S. 419
(1926);
Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d
408, 432 P.2d 3 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949
(1968). Moreover, what is involved in this case is not just the
diminution or elimination of riparian rights, but the State's
attempt to completely divest all of Bonelli's title and interest in
the subject land.
See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. at
77 U. S.
504.
IV
We hold that title to the subject land, which was exposed by the
federal rechannelization of the Colorado River, is vested in
petitioner Bonelli Cattle Co. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Arizona is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The federal patent to the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad conveyed a
parcel of land in township 19 North of Range 22 West, described as
follows:
"The lots one, two, three, four, five and six, the south half of
the northeast quarter, the south half of the northwest quarter, the
northeast quarter of the southwest quarter, and the southeast
quarter of section three, containing five hundred eighty-nine and
forty hundredths acres."
The map of the area, approved by the Surveyor General, indicates
that, as of 1906, lots 5 and 6 of the Santa Fe parcel abutted the
Colorado River. Petitioner Bonelli Cattle Co. was deeded a parcel
of land constituting roughly the eastern half of the original Santa
Fe grant. The Bonelli deed described the subject property as the
"E[ast] 1/2 [of] Section 3, excepting Lot 2 thereof."
[
Footnote 2]
The rechannelization also surfaced a small usable pocket of land
on the west bank of the Colorado River which was part of the
Bonelli parcel. This land is not in Arizona by virtue of the
Boundary Compact between Arizona and Nevada, approved by Congress,
Pub.L. 87-50, 75 Stat. 93, and hence is not involved in the present
controversy.
[
Footnote 3]
11 Ariz.App. 412, 464 P.2d 999 (1970).
[
Footnote 4]
107 Ariz. 465,
489 P.2d
699 (1971).
[
Footnote 5]
108 Ariz. 258,
495 P.2d
1312 (1972).
[
Footnote 6]
Before the operation of Hoover Dam, the river's annual spring
floods covered substantially more of the adjacent land than at any
time thereafter. It is to the high-water mark of the river at this
annual flood stage that the State of Arizona claims title.
[
Footnote 7]
See Joint Res. No. 8, To Admit the Territories of New
Mexico and Arizona as States into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States, 37 Stat. 39.
[
Footnote 8]
67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1301
et seq.
[
Footnote 9]
See discussion
infra at
414 U. S.
321-324.
[
Footnote 10]
The Colorado River has been determined to be a navigable
waterway,
Arizona v. California, 283 U.
S. 423 (1931), and, once found to be navigable, it
remains so.
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 311 U. S. 377,
311 U. S. 408
(1940).
[
Footnote 11]
Petitioner Bonelli and the Solicitor General of the United
States, as
amicus curiae, assert that this case should be
governed by federal law for a different reason. In
Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U. S. 290
(1967), this Court held that, where an upland property owner traced
its title to a pre-statehood federal patent, the owner's right to
accretions is a question of federal law.
Id. at
389 U. S. 292.
We are here again concerned with the right to accretions conveyed
by a pre-statehood federal patent, but it is unclear whether, at
the time of Santa Fe Pacific's patent, the portion of the land
which ultimately became Bonelli's parcel was actually riparian.
Bonelli argues that its remote grantor, the Santa Fe Pacific
Railroad, was given a patent by the United States which afforded it
the right to riparian accretions as governed by federal law, and
that it was expected that the river might wander within the parcel
of land making parts thereof riparian which were not so at the time
of the patent. Petitioner argues that its predecessor was therefore
entitled to pass onto his successors all the rights he had in the
property -- including his riparian rights. We need not, however,
decide whether Hughes compels the application of federal law to the
controversy before us, because the State's claim in this case is
premised on a construction of the federal equal-footing doctrine
and the congressionally enacted Submerged Lands Act.
[
Footnote 12]
State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 183,
66 So.
2d 141, 145 (1953). For a perceptive discussion of the
historical antecedents for the sovereign's rights in the beds of
navigable waterways and of the State's modern interests in those
lands,
see Lundquist, Artificial Additions to Riparian
Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 Ariz.L.Rev. 315
(1972).
[
Footnote 13]
152 U.S. at
152 U. S. 11.
[
Footnote 14]
The Supreme Court of Arizona relied on this Court's decisions in
Goodtitle v.
Kibbe, 9 How. 471 (1850), and
Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), for the
proposition that a federal rechanneling project could not diminish
the extent of the State's landholdings. Those decisions involved
post-statehood federal patents of land covered by navigable waters
at the time of statehood. This Court held only that, since title to
lands beneath navigable waters was vested in Alabama at statehood,
the Federal Government did not thereafter own the subject lands,
hence its attempted conveyance was void. The Court did not intimate
that the operation of federal law could not diminish the State's
title to lands formerly beneath navigable waters.
[
Footnote 15]
For a discussion of the navigational purpose limitation on the
State's interest in the lands beneath its waterways,
see United
States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411,
269 U. S. 419
(1926);
Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d
408, 416, 432 P.2d 3, 8-9 (1967),
cert. denied, 390
U.S. 949 (1968);
Michaelson v. Silver Beach Ass., 342
Mass. 251,
173
N.E.2d 273 (1961). The extent of the State's interests should
not be narrowly construed, because it is denominated a navigational
purpose.
See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (CA5 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971) (recognizing
conservation as a proper interest). Since the State asserts no
public need for ownership of the subject land, we do not attempt to
define the exact parameters of the permissible public purposes.
[
Footnote 16]
In contrast, this Court's decision in
Marine R. & Coal
Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 47
(1921), involved a determination of federal rights in land created
when the Federal Government itself filled in tidelands belonging to
it under a series of interstate compacts.
[
Footnote 17]
108 Ariz. at 259, 495 P.2d at 1313 (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 18]
43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1)
[
Footnote 19]
The legislative history of the Act indicates that it was
intended to be merely confirmatory of the State's existing rights
in the beds of their navigable waterways. S.Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong.
1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 6-8 (1953);
People v.
Hecker, 179 Cal. App.
2d 823, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1960).
See generally 1953
U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 1395-1640. Congress was concerned
about this Court's decision in
United States v.
California, 332 U. S. 19
(1947), which held that the Federal Government had a "paramount
interest" in the marginal sea lands "outside of inland waters, but
within territorial limits" -- and that the States had no title in
those lands.
See H.R.Rep. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,
5 (1948). That concern is irrelevant to the case before us, which
involves an inland waterway.
[
Footnote 20]
43 U.S.C. § 1301(f).
[
Footnote 21]
E.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.
S. 359,
143 U. S.
365-366 (1892);
Harding v. Jordan, 140 U.
S. 371 (1891);
Anderson-Tully Co. v. Tingle,
166 F.2d 224, 227-228 (CA5),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816
(1948).
[
Footnote 22]
107 Ariz. at 472, 489 P.2d at 706 (Lockwood, J., dissenting),
quoting
State v. R. E. Janes Gravel Co., 175 S.W.2d 739,
741 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Maufrais v. State, 142 Tex. 559, 180 S.W.2d 144 (1944).
[
Footnote 23]
See sources collected at
Burns v. Forbes, 412
F.2d 995, 997 n. 2 (CA3 1969);
cf. Beaver v. United
States, 350 F.2d 4, 11 (CA9 1965),
cert. denied, 383
U.S. 937 (1966);
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La.
915,
98 So. 2d
236,
aff'd on rehearing, 233 La. 940, 98 So. 2d 244
(1957).
[
Footnote 24]
See, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605,
223 U. S.
633-635 (1912).
[
Footnote 25]
See discussion
supra at
414 U. S.
321-324.
[
Footnote 26]
The State may well have an interest in the river as an
interstate boundary justifying application of avulsion principles
to determining the location of that boundary; "[t]he emergence of
land . . . ought not in reason to have any controlling effect upon
the location of the boundary line. . . ."
Arkansas v.
Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158,
246 U. S. 175
(1918). But, since the land claimed by the State and petitioner is
already limited by the interstate boundary, however determined,
there is no such interest to compel application of avulsion
principles to the disposition of title to the subject property.
[
Footnote 27]
Under the doctrine of reemergence, when identifiable riparian
land, once lost by erosion, subsequently reemerges as a result of
perceptible change in the river course, title to the surfaced land
revests in its former owner.
See Arkansas v. Tennessee,
246 U.S. at
246 U. S.
174-175;
Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d at
11. The reemergence doctrine has been accepted by a number of
States,
Herron v. Choctaw Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830
(CA10 1956) (applying Oklahoma law);
State v. Gill, 259
Ala. 177,
66 So. 2d
141 (1953);
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La.
915,
98 So. 2d
236,
aff'd on rehearing, 233 La. 940, 98 So. 2d 244
(1957);
Mulry v. Norton, 100 N.Y. 424, 3 N.E. 581 (1885).
Because of the limited interest of the State in the former
riverbed, we have held the doctrine of avulsion inapplicable to
this suit between the State and a private riparian owner, who is
seeking title to surfaced land identifiable as part of his original
parcel. In that sense, we have embraced the reemergence
concept.
But we need not here determine whether, in a suit between
private landowners (or in which the State claims title in some
capacity other than as owner of the riverbed), the differing
interests of the parties might require a holding that the
rechannelization should be treated as an avulsion. Nor need we
determine whether, in a suit between a riparian owner and a former
owner of surfaced land, the former should take the property as an
accretion or the latter as a reemergence. It is only the State's
claim to title under the equal-footing doctrine which required the
invocation of federal law to resolve the instant dispute.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting.
The Court in this case holds that federal common law governs the
resolution of conflicting claims to the exposed bed of a navigable
river between Arizona as the owner of the riverbed and a riparian
landowner. [
Footnote 2/1] I
Page 414 U. S. 333
think this ruling emasculates the equal-footing doctrine, under
which this Court has long held
"that the new States since admitted have the same rights,
sovereignty and jurisdiction . . . as the original States possess
within their respective borders."
Mumford v.
Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423, 436 (1867).
After the Revolution, the 13 Original States succeeded both to
the Crown's title to the beds underlying navigable rivers and to
its sovereignty over that property.
Ibid.
"[T]he shores of navigable waters and the soils under the same
in the original States were not granted by the Constitution to the
United States, but were reserved to the several States."
Ibid. If the equal-footing doctrine means what it says,
then the States that were later admitted to the Union must hold the
same title and must exercise the same sovereignty.
Weber v.
Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57,
85 U. S. 65-66
(1873);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S.
1,
152 U. S. 16
(1894);
Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 3 How. 212,
44 U. S. 223
(1845). Just as with other real property within a State's
boundaries, an element of sovereignty over the property
constituting the riverbed is the power of the State's courts to
determine and apply state property rules in the resolution of
conflicting claims to that property. Today, however, the Court
holds that federal common law supersedes the common law property
rules applied by Arizona pursuant to its sovereign authority over
the property in question.
This Court has repeatedly recognized a State's power, as a
function of its sovereignty over the lands within its borders, to
apply state common law property rules
Page 414 U. S. 334
such as those applied by the Supreme Court of Arizona in this
case:
"Th[e] right of the States to regulate and control the shores of
tide waters, and the land under them, is the same as that which is
exercised by the Crown in England. In this country, the same rule
has been extended to our great navigable lakes . . . , and also . .
. to navigable rivers . . . , but it depends on the law of each
State to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the
State over the lands under water shall be exercised."
Harding v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371,
140 U. S. 382
(1891). With respect to an avulsion exposing large portions of
riverbed and leading to conflicting claims to the ownership of the
exposed land, virtually the twin of this case, the Court has
said:
"How the land that emerges . . . shall be disposed of as between
public and private ownership is a matter to be determined according
to the law of each State, under the familiar doctrine that it is
for the States to establish for themselves such rules of property
as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable waters within
their borders and the riparian lands adjacent to them. . . . Thus,
[the State] may limit riparian ownership by the ordinary high-water
mark . . . , [or] may, in the case of an avulsion followed by a
drying up of the old channel of the river, recognize the right of
former riparian owners to be restored to that which they have lost
through gradual erosions in times preceding the avulsion. . .
."
Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.
S. 158,
246 U. S.
175-176 (1918).
Page 414 U. S. 335
Along the same vein, the Court has said:
"It is generally conceded that the riparian title attaches to
subsequent accretions to the land effected by the gradual and
imperceptible operation of natural causes. But whether it attaches
to land reclaimed by artificial means from the bed of the river, or
to sudden accretions produced by unusual floods, is a question
which each State decides for itself. . . . The confusion of
navigable with tide water, found in the monuments of the common
law, long prevailed in this country. . . . [I]t laid the foundation
in many States of doctrines with regard to the ownership of the
soil in navigable waters above tide-water at variance with sound
principles of public policy. Whether, as rules of property, it
would now be safe to change these doctrines where they have been
applied . . . is for the several States themselves to determine. .
. . [The decision] properly belongs to the States by their inherent
sovereignty. . . ."
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324,
94 U. S.
337-338 (1877).
To put the matter bluntly, the Court's application of the
equal-footing doctrine in this case seems to me wholly wrong. While
conceding that the later admitted States have "
the same rights,
sovereignty and jurisdiction . . . as the original States possess
within their respective borders,'" ante at 414 U. S. 318,
the Court holds that "the nature and extent of the title to the bed
of a navigable stream held by the State under the equal-footing
doctrine" involves a "`right asserted under federal law'" that must
be determined under the rules of federal common law. The effect of
the Court's analysis is completely to undercut the equal-footing
doctrine. As noted above, the original States derived their
sovereign rights
Page 414 U. S. 336
and powers directly from the Crown after the Revolution and
retained whatever powers they did not later surrender or limit in
the Federal Constitution. Even under the Court's "title" analysis,
therefore, federal common law would not govern the conflicting
claims involved here if the river were located in Massachusetts or
Virginia, rather than in Arizona.
The upshot of the Court's decision is that the 13 Original
States are free to develop and apply their own rules of property
law for the resolution of conflicting claims to an exposed bed of a
river, while those States admitted after the Constitution's
ratification must, under today's decision, knuckle under to this
Court's supervisory view of "federal common law." A later-admitted
State like Arizona is thus not at all on an equal footing with the
original States in the exercise of sovereignty over real property
within its boundaries. And the vehicle used by the Court to arrive
at this unjust result is, incredibly, the very doctrine that was
intended to insure to the new States equal footing with the
original States. Thus, the Court's strange application of the
equal-footing doctrine brings that constitutional principle into
fundamental conflict with the purpose it was intended to serve.
If the equal-footing doctrine means anything, it means that
Arizona cannot be treated as a second-class State. It means that,
upon admission to the Union, it received title to, and sovereignty
over, the beds of navigable rivers within its boundaries, to the
same extent as the original States after the Revolution. As a
function of that sovereignty, Arizona courts have the power to
develop and apply state common law in determining legal questions
that arise with respect to this property, including conflicting
claims to the bed that is later exposed by the vagaries of the
river. And
Page 414 U. S. 337
the power of the Arizona courts to decide this controversy under
state law surely includes the power to decide it in a way that we
here might think is wholly wrong. [
Footnote 2/2]
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court emphasizes the fact that it is the State that holds
the title to the riverbed property. The nature of the title held by
the State, however, is such that it could be conveyed to a private
owner. ("[T]he settled law of this country [is] that the ownership
of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters,
or navigable [rivers], within the limits of the several States,
belong to the respective States within which they are found, with
the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof. . .
."
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1,
152 U. S. 47
(1894);
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.
S. 387,
146 U. S. 435
(1892);
United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U. S.
49,
270 U. S. 54-55
(1926).) Since the State could hardly convey more title than it
held, it would appear from the Court's opinion that federal law
would also govern the resolution of conflicting claims to the
exposed riverbed as between a private owner of the bed and a
private riparian owner.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court implies, but does not hold, that the decision of the
Arizona Supreme Court might constitute a taking of the petitioner
cattle company's property without compensation, in violation of due
process of law. My conviction that this infirmity was present in
the decision of the Washington Supreme Court was the reason for my
special concurrence in
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.
S. 290,
389 U. S.
294-298 (1967).
Hughes was a case in which a
state court effected a retroactive change in state property law
that resulted in an unconstitutional taking of property without
compensation. That, however, is not the situation here. The Arizona
Supreme Court simply applied its established property rules with
regard to the effects of avulsion, accretion, erosion, and
reliction in resolving conflicting claims to the exposed riverbed.
It declined the petitioners' invitation to adopt the "enlightened"
reemergence doctrine as part of the law of Arizona. This case,
therefore, does not involve a retroactive alteration of state law
such as would constitute an unconstitutional taking of private
property.