Where it appears that the running of the limitations period
might have been the trial court's independent ground for denying
appellants' mineral rights claim, so that any decision of this
Court on whether the tax sale notice provisions of state law met
federal due process requirements would be advisory and beyond the
Court's jurisdiction, the court below should consider whether
appellants preserved the right to challenge the trial court's
determination that the statute of limitations bars their claim, and
whether, under state law, it does so irrespective of the
constitutional adequacy of the tax sale notice provisions.
502 P.2d 1265,
vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In this case, we noted probable jurisdiction, 411 U.S. 915
(1973), in order to consider whether the published notice
provisions of the then-applicable Oklahoma tax sale statutes,
Okla.Stat., Tit. 68, §§ 382 and 432b (1951), comported with due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 1]
See
Mullane v. Central
Hanover
Page 414 U. S. 101
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306
(1950). This was the only issue addressed by the appellate courts
of Oklahoma [
Footnote 2] and by
the parties in the Jurisdictional Statement and the papers
responsive thereto filed with this Court.
After oral argument and upon our review of the record, it now
appears that there might have been an independent and, possibly, an
unchallenged ground for the judgment of the state trial court,
viz., the running of the Oklahoma period of limitation for
adverse claims. [
Footnote 3]
If
Page 414 U. S. 102
that should prove to be the case, any decision by this Court
would be advisory. and beyond our jurisdiction.
Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590,
87 U. S. 636
(1875).
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is therefore
vacated and the case is remanded to that court to consider whether
the appellants preserved the right to challenge the trial court's
determination that the State's statute of limitations is a bar to
their mineral rights claim, and, if so, whether, under state law,
the statute of limitations independently bars appellants' claim,
irrespective of the constitutional adequacy of the tax sale notice
provisions of §§ 382 and 432b. [
Footnote 4]
Cf. Walker v. Homan, 405 P.2d 57
(Okla.1965).
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The
ad valorem taxes in question were for the year
1952. The original tax sale took place in November, 1953, and the
resale in May, 1956. Okla.Stat., Tit. 68, §§ 383 and 432 (1951).
The statutes cited (§§ 382, 383, 432, and 432b) were repealed by
Okla.Sess.Laws 1965, c. 501, § 3, and replaced by corresponding
provisions of the State's present Ad Valorem Tax Code, namely,
Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit. 68, §§ 24312, 24313, 24329, and 24331
(1966).
[
Footnote 2]
See 502 P.2d 1265
(1972). The earlier opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals,
Division 2, is not reported; it is reproduced in the Jurisdictional
Statement, App. A, p. vii.
[
Footnote 3]
The trial court's judgment read in part as follows:
"(2) The Court Further Finds, Orders, Adjudges and Decrees that,
from the date of the recording of said resale tax deed, on June 6,
1956 . . . , said Grantees therein, the Cross-Petitioners, R. W.
Garrett and R. H. Vaughn, have been in the open, continuous,
visible, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession of said lands
and premises, receiving all of the rents, profits and income
therefrom, and that said contesting substituted party defendants
are further forever barred and precluded by the statute of
limitations, from seeking to assert the invalidity of said resale
tax deed, as provided by 12 O. S.1961, Sec. 93(3) and (6)."
Jurisdictional Statement, App. B, p. xvii.
Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit. 12, § 93 (Supp. 1973-1974), reads:
"§ 93. Limitation of real actions. -- Actions for the recovery
of real property, or for the determination of any adverse right or
interest therein, can only be brought within the periods
hereinafter prescribed, after the cause of action shall have
accrued, and at no other time thereafter:"
"
* * * *"
"(3) An action for the recovery of real property sold for taxes,
within five (5) years after the date of the recording of the tax
deed . . . provided, nothing herein shall be construed as reviving
any cause of action for recovery of real property heretofore barred
nor as divesting any interest acquired by adverse possession prior
to the effective date hereof."
"
* * * *"
"(6) Numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 shall be fully operative
regardless of whether the deed or judgment or the precedent action
or proceeding upon which such deed or judgment is based is void or
voidable in whole or in part, for any reason, jurisdictional or
otherwise; provided that this paragraph shall not be applied so as
to bar causes of action which have heretofore accrued, until the
expiration of one (1) year from and after its effective date."
[
Footnote 4]
Whether the alleged lack of constitutionally valid notice would
preclude the running of the statute of limitations for an adverse
land claim is a question that has not been presented to this Court
or to the Oklahoma courts below.
Cf. Shroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U. S. 208,
371 U. S.
213-214 (1962). We intimate no view on this issue.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART concurs,
dissenting.
Appellants claim title to the mineral interests here in
controversy through deeds recording the severed interests on the
books of the Seminole County Clerk in 1926 and 1930. In 1952, the
owner of the separate surface interest failed to pay
ad
valorem taxes, and the county satisfied its tax claim by
selling the entire fee to the appellees after "notice" through
newspaper publication. The tax sale statutes did not require that
notice be given to the mineral owners by way of personal service,
mailing, or
Page 414 U. S. 103
posting, and no such notice was attempted. In an action to quiet
title, appellants contended that, as record owners of the mineral
rights, they were never given constitutionally sufficient notice of
the tax delinquency proceedings, and, as to them, the proceedings
were invalid.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U. S. 306
(1950).
The trial court, finding the tax sale proceedings valid and
finding appellants' attack on the tax sale deed barred by the
statute of limitations, quieted title in appellees. The Oklahoma
Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, but was itself reversed by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, each court addressing itself expressly
only to the constitutional claim. The Court today remands the case
to determine whether appellants adequately preserved the right to
challenge the adverse trial court ruling on the statute of
limitations issue and whether this may serve as an independent bar
to the assertion of their claim.
It should first be noted that proper preservation of this issue
in the state courts is a hurdle facing not the appellants, but the
appellees. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals quieted title in
appellants, and thus must necessarily have found not only that the
tax sale was constitutionally infirm, but also that the appellants'
claim was not time-barred. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed that
judgment and affirmed the judgment of the trial court after finding
that "
[t]he question for decision is whether the Oklahoma
statutory procedure . . . complies with . . . due process of law."
502 P.2d 1265,
1266 (1972) (emphasis added). Whether appellees adequately raised
the statute of limitations ground in objecting to the Court of
Appeals judgment we do not know. What we do know is that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court quieted title in appellees by rejecting
appellants' constitutional claim. Either because the issue was
not
Page 414 U. S. 104
properly before the court or because decision on it was not
necessary, the statute of limitations issue was not reached.
What faces this Court is thus a decision quieting title in
appellees by rejecting appellants' federal constitutional claim. As
the majority notes, this was the only issue addressed by the
parties in the Jurisdictional Statement and the responsive papers
filed with this Court. When a constitutional adjudication is not
the only basis on which a state court judgment rests, a review of
that adjudication by this Court would be advisory, since the
judgment would rest on its independent grounds regardless of the
outcome of our review. But the only issue before us in this case is
a constitutional one, since the only basis for the reversal below
is the rejection of appellants' constitutional claim. When a
decision rests only on a constitutional determination, a review of
that determination is dispositive of the correctness of the
decision, and is thus not advisory. I would therefore face the
constitutional claim at this point.