On the record in this case, petitioner, who made an uncounseled
guilty plea in open court and was sentenced to prison, may
collaterally attack the plea and is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, since his motion under that
provision set out detailed factual allegations, in part documented
by records, supporting his claim that the plea was coerced, and
since it cannot be said that the record before the District Court
"conclusively showed" that petitioner was entitled to no
relief.
Vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
On November 13, 1969, the petitioner was arraigned in a federal
district court upon a charge of robbery of a federally insured
bank. [
Footnote 1] He executed
a written waiver of his right to counsel and to a grand jury
indictment, and pleaded guilty. Before accepting the plea, the
trial judge, proceeding under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11, addressed the
petitioner personally. The petitioner acknowledged in substance
that his plea was given voluntarily and knowingly, that he
understood the nature of
Page 411 U. S. 214
the charge and the consequences of the plea, and that he was, in
fact, guilty.
See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.
S. 459,
394 U. S.
464-467;
cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.
S. 238,
395 U. S. 242.
The judge then accepted the guilty plea and subsequently sentenced
the petitioner to 20 years in prison.
On August 6, 1971, the petitioner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 to vacate his sentence on the ground that his plea of guilty
had been induced by a combination of fear, coercive police tactics,
and illness, including mental illness. The District Judge who had
accepted the petitioner's plea and sentenced him to prison
considered the motion, but denied it without an evidentiary
hearing; the District Judge reasoned that, since the requirements
of Rule 11 had been met, this collateral attack was
per se
unavailable, stating:
"When the trial court has so questioned the accused about
pleading guilty, the petitioner cannot now be heard to collaterally
attack the record and deny what was said in open court."
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same
grounds.
Petitioner seeks certiorari to review that judgment; he urges
that, under the plain wording of § 2255 and our decision in
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.
S. 487, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claims. Petitioner's motion for relief under § 2255 sets out
detailed factual allegations regarding alleged circumstances
occurring after his arrest and before his appearance in court.
Those allegations describe physical abuse and illness from a recent
gunshot wound that required hospitalization which was documented by
records tendered in support of his petition. The records also
showed that, a month following the plea, he was again hospitalized
for heroin addiction, for aggravation of the earlier gunshot wound,
and for other severe illnesses. Petitioner further alleges that
prolonged interrogation continued during the
Page 411 U. S. 215
period preceding his plea. All of this, he claims, coerced his
confession, his waiver of counsel, and the uncounseled plea of
guilty. It is elementary that a coerced plea is open to collateral
attack.
Machibroda v. United States, supra, at
368 U. S. 43.
See also Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.
S. 101;
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.
S. 275;
Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d 35,
39;
Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284, 285-286. It is
equally clear that § 2255 calls for a hearing on such allegations
unless "the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. . .
."
We need not take issue with the Government's generalization
that, when a defendant expressly represents in open court, without
counsel, that his plea is voluntary and that he waived counsel
voluntarily, he "may not ordinarily" repudiate his statements to
the sentencing judge. The objective of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11, of
course, is to flush out and resolve all such issues, but, like any
procedural mechanism, its exercise is neither always perfect nor
uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an
opportunity to prove the allegations. [
Footnote 2]
On this record, we cannot conclude with the assurance required
by the statutory standard "conclusively show" that under no
circumstances could the petitioner establish facts warranting
relief under § 2255; accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand to that court to the end that the
petitioner be afforded a hearing on his petition in the District
Court.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissents.
[
Footnote 1]
He had been arrested by state officers, and had been in the
custody of state police and in state jurisdiction until the time of
the federal charge.
[
Footnote 2]
The petitioner has also urged in this Court that his plea must
be vacated because the transcript of his pleading fails to disclose
an intelligent waiver of counsel. But this claim was not raised in
the Court of Appeals or in the petition for certiorari, and we
accordingly express no view upon the question.