Respondent stockyard operator, who, after a hearing, had been
found to have short-weighted livestock and underpaid consignors on
the basis of the false weights, was ordered by a Judicial Officer
acting for the Secretary of Agriculture to cease and desist and to
keep correct records, and its registration under the Packers and
Stockyards Act was suspended for 20 days. The Court of Appeals
upheld all but the suspension, which it found inappropriate in view
of the other sanctions, and contrary to the Secretary's practice
except for "intentional and flagrant" violations.
Held: In setting aside the suspension order, the Court
of Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of
administrative sanctions, since the Secretary had full authority to
make the suspension order as a deterrent to violations, whether
intentional or negligent, and issuance of the order against
respondent, who had ignored previous warnings against
short-weighting, was not an abuse of administrative discretion. Pp.
185-189.
454 F.2d 109, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST,
JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
DOUGLAS, J., joined,
post, p.
411 U. S.
189.
Page 411 U. S. 183
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture, acting
for the Secretary of Agriculture, found that respondent, a
registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat.
159, 7 U.S.C. § 181
et seq., willfully violated §§ 307(a)
and 312(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 208(a) and 213(a), by incorrect
weighing of livestock, and also breached § 401, 7 U.S.C. § 221, by
entries of false weights. An order was entered directing that
respondent cease and desist from the violations and keep correct
accounts, and also suspending respondent as a registrant under the
Act for 20 days. Upon review of the decision and order, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld, as supported by
substantial evidence, the findings that respondent violated the Act
by short-weighting cattle, and also sustained the cease and desist
order and the order to keep correct accounts. The Court of Appeals,
however, set aside the 20-day suspension. 454 F.2d 109 (1972). We
granted certiorari to consider whether, in doing so, the Court of
Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of
administrative sanctions. 409 U.S. 947 (1972). We conclude that the
setting aside of the suspension was an impermissible judicial
intrusion into the administrative domain under the circumstances of
this case, and reverse.
Respondent operates a stockyard in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. As a
registered "market agency" under § 303 of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 203,
respondent is authorized to sell consigned livestock on commission,
subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act and the Secretary's
implementing regulations. [
Footnote
1] Investigations of respondent's operations
Page 411 U. S. 184
in 1964, 1966, and 1967 uncovered instances of underweighing of
consigned livestock. Respondent was informally warned to correct
the situation, but when a 1969 investigation revealed more
underweighing, the present proceeding was instituted by the
Administrator of the Packers and Stockyards Administration.
Following a hearing and the submission of briefs, the Department
of Agriculture hearing examiner found that respondent had
"intentionally weighed the livestock at less than their true
weights, issued scale tickets and accountings to the consignors on
the basis of the false weights, and paid the consignors on the
basis of the false weights. [
Footnote 2]"
The hearing examiner recommended, in addition to a cease and
desist order and an order to keep correct records, a 30-day
suspension of respondent's registration under the Act.
The matter was then referred to the Judicial Officer. After
hearing oral argument, the Judicial Officer filed a decision and
order accepting the hearing examiner's findings and adopting his
recommendations of a cease and desist order and an order to keep
correct records. The recommended suspension was also imposed, but
was reduced to 20 days. The Judicial Officer stated:
"It is not a pleasant task to impose sanctions, but, in view of
the previous warnings given respondent, we conclude that we should
not only issue a cease and desist order, but also a suspension of
respondent
Page 411 U. S. 185
as a registrant under the act, but for a lesser period than
recommended by complainant and the hearing examiner."
30 Agri.Dec. 179, 186 (1971).
The Court of Appeals agreed that 7 U.S.C. § 204 authorized the
Secretary to suspend "any registrant found in violation of the
Act," 454 F.2d at 113, that the suspension procedure here satisfied
the relevant requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 558, and that
"the evidence indicates that [respondent] acted with careless
disregard of the statutory requirements and thus meets the test of
'willfulness.'"
454 F.2d at 115. The court nevertheless concluded that the
suspension order was "unconscionable" under the circumstances of
this case. The court gave two reasons. The first, relying on four
previous suspension decisions, was that the Secretary's practice
was not to impose suspensions for negligent or careless violations,
but only for violations found to be "intentional and flagrant," and
therefore that the suspension in respondent's case was contrary to
a policy of "
achiev[ing] . . . uniformity of sanctions for
similar violations.'" The second reason given was that
"[t]he cease and desist order coupled with the damaging
publicity surrounding these proceedings would certainly seem
appropriate and reasonable with respect to the practice the
Department seeks to eliminate."
Id. at 114, 115.
The applicable standard of judicial review in such cases
required review of the Secretary's order according to the
"fundamental principle . . . that, where Congress has entrusted
an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the
means of achieving the statutory policy 'the relation of remedy to
policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.'"
American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S.
90,
329 U. S. 112
(1946). Thus, the Secretary's choice of sanction was not to be
overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it
"unwarranted
Page 411 U. S. 186
in law or . . . without justification in fact,. . . ."
Id. at
329 U. S.
112-113;
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U. S. 177,
313 U. S. 194
(1941);
Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.
S. 411,
365 U. S.
413-414 (1958);
FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp.,
387 U. S. 244,
387 U. S. 250
(1967); 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 30.10, pp. 250-251 (1958).
The Court of Appeals acknowledged this definition of the
permissible scope of judicial review, [
Footnote 3] but apparently regarded respondent's
suspension as "unwarranted in law" or "without justification in
fact." We cannot agree that the Secretary's action can be faulted
in either respect on this record. We read the Court of Appeals'
opinion to suggest that the sanction was "unwarranted in law"
because "uniformity of sanctions for similar violations" is somehow
mandated by the Act. We search in vain for that requirement in the
statute. [
Footnote 4] The
Secretary may suspend
Page 411 U. S. 187
"for a reasonable specified period" any registrant who has
violated any provision of the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 204. Nothing whatever
in that provision confines its application to cases of "intentional
and flagrant conduct" or denies its application in cases of
negligent or careless violations. Rather, the breadth of the grant
of authority to impose the sanction strongly implies a
congressional purpose to permit the Secretary to impose it to deter
repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or negligent.
Hyatt v. United States, 276 F.2d 308, 313 (CA10 1960);
G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (CA7
1958);
In re Silver, 21 Agri.Dec. 1438, 1452 (1962).
[
Footnote 5] The employment of
a sanction within the authority of an administrative agency is thus
not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe
than sanctions imposed in other cases.
FCC v. WOKO,
329 U. S. 223,
329 U. S.
227-228 (1946);
FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp.,
387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 250,
251;
G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, supra, at
296;
Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 858-859 (CA2 1970);
Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (CA2 1967);
Kent v.
Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1349 (CA5 1970).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals may have been in error in acting
on the premise that the Secretary's practice was to impose
suspensions only in cases of "intentional and flagrant conduct."
[
Footnote 6] The Secretary's
practice, rather, apparently is to employ that sanction as, in his
judgment,
Page 411 U. S. 188
best serves to deter violations and achieve the objectives of
that statute. Congress plainly intended in its broad grant to give
the Secretary that breadth of discretion. Therefore, mere
unevenness in the application of the sanction does not render its
application in a particular case "unwarranted in law."
Nor can we perceive any basis on this record for a conclusion
that the suspension of respondent was so "without justification in
fact . . . as to constitute an abuse of [the Secretary's]
discretion."
American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. at
329 U. S. 11;
Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. at
355 U. S. 414;
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.
S. 442,
347 U. S. 455
(1954). The Judicial Officer rested the suspension on his view of
its necessity in light of respondent's disregard of previous
warnings. The facts found concerning the previous warnings and
respondent's disregard of these warnings were sustained by the
Court of Appeals as based on ample evidence. In that circumstance,
the overturning of the suspension authorized by the statute was an
impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain.
Similarly, insofar as the Court of Appeals rested its action on
its view that, in light of damaging publicity about the charges,
the cease and desist order sufficiently redressed respondent's
violations, the court clearly exceeded its function of judicial
review. The fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is
for the
Page 411 U. S. 189
Secretary, not the court. The court may decide only whether,
under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the Secretary made
"an allowable judgment in [his] choice of the remedy."
Jacob
Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U. S. 608,
327 U. S. 612
(1946).
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
17 U.S.C. §§ 201-217a. Specifically, registrants are prohibited
from engaging in or using
"any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or
device in connection with . . . receiving, marketing, buying, or
selling on a commission basis or otherwise, feeding, watering,
holding, delivery, shipment, weighing, or handling . . . of
livestock,"
7 U.S.C. § 213(a), and are required to "keep such accounts,
records, and memoranda as fully and correctly disclose all
transactions involved in his business. . . ."
7 U.S.C. § 221.
The Secretary's regulations may be found in 9 CFR pt.. 201.
[
Footnote 2]
App. 35.
[
Footnote 3]
The Court of Appeals stated:
"Ordinarily it is not for the courts to modify ancillary
features of agency orders which are supported by substantial
evidence. The shaping of remedies is peculiarly within the special
competence of the regulatory agency vested by Congress with
authority to deal with these matters, and, so long as the remedy
selected does not exceed the agency's statutory power to impose,
and it bears a reasonable relation to the practice sought to be
eliminated, a reviewing court may not interfere. . . . [A]ppellate
courts [may not] enter the more spacious domain of public policy
which Congress has entrusted in the various regulatory
agencies."
454 F.2d 109, 114.
[
Footnote 4]
The Court of Appeals cited a 1962 decision by the Secretary in
which appears a reference to "uniformity of sanctions for similar
violations."
In re Silver, 21 Agri.Dec. 1438 (1962). That
reference is no support for the Court of Appeals' decision,
however, for the Secretary said expressly in that decision: "False
and incorrect weighing of livestock by registrants under the act is
a flagrant and serious violation thereof . . ." and,
"even if respondent did not give instructions for the false
weighings,
his negligence in allowing the false weighings over
an extended period brings such situation within the reach of the
cited cases [sustaining sanctions],
and we would still
order the sanctions below."
Id. at 1452 (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 5]
It is by no means clear that respondent's violations were merely
negligent. The hearing examiner found that respondent had
"intentionally" underweighed livestock, and the Judicial Officer
stated: "We conclude then, as did the hearing examiner, that
respondent
willfully violated . . . the act." (Emphasis
added.) "Wilfully" could refer to either intentional conduct or
conduct that was merely careless or negligent. It seems clear,
however, that the Judicial Officer sustained the hearing examiner's
finding that the violations were "intentional."
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., In re Martella, 30 Agri.Dec. 1479 (1971);
In re Meggs, 30 Agri.Dec. 1314 (1971);
In re Producers
Livestock Marketing Assn., 30 Agri.Dec. 796 (1971);
In re
Trimble, 29 Agri.Dec. 936 (1970);
In re Anson, 28
Agri.Dec. 1127 (1969);
In re Williamstown Stockyards, 27
Agri.Dec. 252 (1968);
In re Middle Georgia Livestock Sales
Co., 23 Agri.Dec. 1361 (1964). These cases involve suspension
of registrants under the Packers and Stockyards Act for false
weighing of producers' livestock, and in none was there a finding
that the violation was intentional or flagrant. There are also many
cases of suspension for diverse other violations without a finding
that the conduct was intentional or flagrant.
See, e.g., In re
Wallis, 29 Agri.Dec. 37 (1970).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
dissenting.
The only remarkable thing about this case is its presence in
this Court. For the case involves no more than the application of
well settled principles to a familiar situation, and has little
significance except for the respondent. Why certiorari was granted
is a mystery to me -- particularly at a time when the Court is
thought by many to be burdened by too heavy a caseload.
See Rule 19, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
The Court of Appeals did nothing more than review a penalty
imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture that was alleged by the
respondent to be discriminatory and arbitrary. In approaching its
task, the appellate court displayed an impeccable understanding of
the permissible scope of review:
"The scope of our review is limited to the correction of errors
of law and to an examination of the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the factual conclusions. The findings and order of the
Judicial Officer must be sustained if not contrary to law and if
supported by substantial evidence. Also, this Court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the Judicial Officer's as to
which of the various inferences may be drawn from the
evidence."
454 F.2d 109, 110-111.
"
* * * *
Page 411 U. S.
190
"
"Ordinarily it is not for the courts to modify ancillary
features of agency orders which are supported by substantial
evidence. The shaping of remedies is peculiarly within the special
competence of the regulatory agency vested by Congress with
authority to deal with these matters, and, so long as the remedy
selected does not exceed the agency's statutory power to impose and
it bears a reasonable relation to the practice sought to be
eliminated, a reviewing court may not interfere."
Id. at 114.
Had the Court of Appeals used the talismanic language of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and found the penalty to be either
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), I have no doubt that
certiorari would have been denied. But the Court of Appeals made
the mistake of using the wrong words, saying that the penalty was
"unconscionable," because it was "unwarranted and without
justification in fact." [
Footnote
2/1]
Today the Court holds that the penalty was not "unwarranted in
law," because it was within permissible statutory limits. But this
ignores the valid principle of law that motivated the Court of
Appeals -- the principle that like cases are to be treated alike.
As Professor Jaffe has put the matter:
"The scope of judicial review is ultimately conditioned and
determined by the major proposition that the constitutional courts
of this country are the acknowledged architects and guarantors of
the integrity of the legal system. . . . An agency is not an island
entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the magnificent
mansion of the law. The
Page 411 U. S. 191
very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is
intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought
into harmony with the totality of the law -- the law as it is found
in the statute at hand, the statute book at large, the principles
and conceptions of the 'common law,' and the ultimate guarantees
associated with the Constitution. [
Footnote 2/2]"
The reversal today of a wholly defensible Court of Appeals
judgment accomplishes two unfortunate results. First, the Court
moves administrative decisionmaking one step closer to
unreviewability, an odd result at a time when serious concern is
being expressed about the fairness of agency justice. [
Footnote 2/3] Second, the Court serves
notice upon the federal judiciary to be wary indeed of venturing to
correct administrative arbitrariness.
Because I think the Court of Appeals followed the correct
principles of judicial review of administrative conduct, I would
affirm its judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court of Appeals borrowed this phrasing of the test from
this Court's opinion in
American Power Co. v. SEC,
329 U. S. 90,
329 U. S.
112-113.
[
Footnote 2/2]
L Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 589-590
(1965).
[
Footnote 2/3]
See generally K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A
Preliminary Inquiry (1969), reviewed by Wright, Beyond
Discretionary Justice, 81 Yale L.J. 575.