Appellants challenge the constitutionality of a $25 filing fee,
which they were allegedly unable to pay, required to be paid in the
state appellate court where they sought review of agency
determinations resulting in their receiving reduced welfare
payments.
Held: Appellants were not deprived of due process,
since the increase in welfare payments sought by them has less
constitutional significance than the interest of appellants in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, and
since evidentiary hearings provided a procedure, not conditioned on
payment of any fee, through which appellants were able to seek
redress.
United States v. Kras, 409 U.
S. 434. Nor is the filing fee requirement violative of
equal protection, since the applicable standard in the area of
social and economic regulation when a suspect classification is not
present is rational justification and here the requirement of
rationality is met.
262 Ore. 375,
498
P.2d 757, affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants contend that Oregon's $25 appellate court filing fee,
as applied in this case, violates the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and, also, the First
Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth. The Supreme Court of
Oregon decided otherwise. 262 Ore. 375,
498
P.2d 757 (1972). We affirm that decision for reasons we found
persuasive in
United States v. Kras, 409 U.
S. 434 (1973).
Appellant Ortwein (who also was receiving social security and an
urban renewal allowance) sustained a reduction of approximately $39
per month in his Oregon old-age assistance when his county welfare
agency determined that he shared shelter and expenses with another
person in a manner that relieved him of some of the costs upon
which his original award had been based.
Page 410 U. S. 657
Ortwein appealed to the Oregon Public Welfare Division. The
Division conducted a hearing and upheld the county agency's
decision. [
Footnote 1]
Appellant Faubion claimed that certain expenses related to work
training under a federal program should have been deducted in
calculating her income. [
Footnote
2] Most of these deductions were disallowed, after hearing, by
the Public Welfare Division. The disallowance resulted in smaller
welfare payments to Faubion over a five-month period.
Page 410 U. S. 658
Judicial review of these agency decisions is authorized under
state law. Ore.Rev.Stat. § 183.480 (1971). In cases that are
contested, as these were, jurisdiction for judicial review is
conferred upon the Oregon Court of Appeals. § 183.480(2). All
appellants in civil cases in Oregon pay a $25 filing fee in
appellate courts. §§ 21.010 and 21.040 (1971). Each of the present
appellants alleged that he was an indigent unable to pay the filing
fee; each moved to proceed
in forma pauperis in the Oregon
Court of Appeals. The motions were denied without opinions.
Appellants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for an
alternative writ of mandamus ordering the Court of Appeals to
accept appellants' cases without payment of fees. The Supreme Court
of Oregon requested supplemental briefs and then issued its opinion
denying the petition for mandamus. 262 Ore. 375,
498 P.2d
757 (1972). From this denial the present appeal is taken.
I
Relying on this Court's opinion in
Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371
(1971), and on the "remand for reconsideration" order in
Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U.S. 937 (1971), [
Footnote 3] appellants contend that the
Oregon appellate filing fee, when applied to indigents seeking to
appeal an adverse welfare decision, violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
United States v. Kras,
409 U. S. 434
(1973), this Court upheld statutorily imposed bankruptcy filing
fees against a constitutional challenge based on
Boddie.
We emphasized the special nature of the marital relationship and
its concomitant associational interests, and noted that they were
not affected in that case, and that the objective sought by
appellant Kras could be obtained through alternative
Page 410 U. S. 659
means that did not require a fee.
Boddie, of course,
was not concerned with post-hearing review. We now conclude that
Kras, rather than
Boddie, governs the present
appeal, and we emphasize that Frederick was remanded, and not
summarily reversed.
A. In
Kras, we observed that one's interest in a
bankruptcy discharge "does not rise to the same constitutional
level" as one's inability to dissolve his marriage except through
the courts. 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 445.
In this case, appellants seek increased welfare payments. This
interest, like that of
Kras, has far less constitutional
significance than the interest of the
Boddie appellants.
Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471 (1970), and
Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U. S. 78
(1971),
with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 (1967);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.
S. 535 (1942);
Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U. S. 479
(1965), and
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.
S. 438 (1972). Each of the present appellants has
received an agency hearing at which it was determined that the
minimum level of payments authorized by law was being provided. As
in
Kras, we see "no fundamental interest that is gained or
lost depending on the availability" of the relief sought by
appellants. 409 U.S. at
409 U. S.
445.
B. In
Kras, the Court also stressed the existence of
alternatives, not conditioned on the payment of the fees, to the
judicial remedy.
Id. at
409 U. S. 446.
The Court has held that procedural due process requires that a
welfare recipient be given a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
397 U. S. 264,
397 U. S.
266-271 (1970). These appellants have had hearings.
[
Footnote 4] The
Page 410 U. S. 660
hearings provide a procedure, not conditioned on payment of any
fee, through which appellants have been able to seek redress. This
Court has long recognized that, even in criminal cases, due process
does not require a State to provide an appellate system.
McKane
v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684,
153 U. S. 687
(1894);
see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S.
12,
351 U. S. 18
(1956);
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.
S. 617,
300 U. S. 627
(1937);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S.
56,
405 U. S. 77
(1972). Under the facts of this case, appellants were not denied
due process. [
Footnote 5]
II
Appellants urge that the filing fee violates the Equal
Protection Clause by unconstitutionally discriminating against the
poor. As in
Kras, this litigation, which deals with
welfare payments, "is in the area of economics and social welfare."
409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 446;
see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S.
485-486. No suspect classification, such as race,
nationality, or alienage, is present.
See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 365,
403 U. S. 372
(1971). The applicable standard is that of rational justification.
United States v. Kras, supra.
The purpose of the filing fee, as with the bankruptcy fees in
Kras, is apparent. The Oregon court system incurs
operating costs, and the fee produces some small revenue to assist
in offsetting those expenses.
Cf. Ore.Rev.Stat. § 21.590
(1971). Appellants do not contend that the fee is disproportionate
or that it is not an effective means to accomplish the State's
goal. The requirement of rationality is met.
Page 410 U. S. 661
III
Relying on
Lindsey v. Normet, supra, appellants contend
that the fee is not required of certain classes of litigants, and
that an appeal is thus "capriciously and arbitrarily denied" to
other appellants, such as themselves, also in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
See 405 U.S. at
405 U. S. 77.
They assert that criminal appeals, habeas corpus petitions from
state institutions or civil commitment proceedings, and appeals
from terminations of parental rights may be filed
in forma
pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals. Jurisdictional
Statement 23. We are not told just why these filings are permitted,
but the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oregon makes it clear that
in forma pauperis appeals are allowed only if supervening
law requires a right to a free appeal. 262 Ore. at 384, 498 P.2d at
761-762.
If the Oregon courts have interpreted the applicable law to give
special rights in the criminal area, in civil cases that result in
loss of liberty, and in cases terminating parental rights, we
cannot say that this categorization is capricious or arbitrary.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART dissents, believing that the doctrine of
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371
(1971), requires reversal of this judgment.
See United States
v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434,
409 U. S. 451
(1973) (dissenting opinion). He is convinced, however, that the
Court is so resolutely firm in its contrary view that it would
serve no useful purpose to set this case for oral argument.
[
Footnote 1]
The Division found that the county agency
"acted within its discretion by determining that the claimant's
living arrangement represented a living situation in which shelter
and expenses are shared."
The agency's order explained that that reduction in the room and
board allowance was proper because
"[t]he eligibility of recipients who share shelter with
non-recipients, and do not pay for room and board, shall be
determined on a share/fraction basis at [Public Welfare Division]
standards."
Record 9. In his petition for review, Ortwein contended that the
order was not supported by "reliable, probative and substantial
evidence in the whole record."
[
Footnote 2]
Faubion received an incentive training allowance of $120 per
month for approximately five months from a program under the
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, as amended, 76 Stat.
23, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2571-2574. Record 12. Faubion also was receiving
over $210 per month through a state-administered AFDC program.
Jurisdictional Statement 4; Record 11. States, in making their
income calculations under AFDC, deduct from gross income all
expenses "reasonably attributable" to the earning of the income. 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(7); 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(3)(iv) (Sept.1972). Faubion
claimed that she had work training expenses of $20 per month for
essential clothing and grooming, of $20 per month for lunches on
the job, of $30 per month for convenience foods for family use made
necessary because of her job, of $5 per month for oil, tuneups and
repairs, and of $5 per month for miscellaneous school supplies.
Record 13. Although the Division allowed some deductions, it
determined that the remaining expenses were not "reasonably
attributable" to the training program. Record 12. On appeal,
Faubion sought to challenge this finding.
[
Footnote 3]
See also Huffman v. Boersen, 406 U.
S. 337 (1972).
[
Footnote 4]
These evidentiary hearings, of course, must meet the minimal
requirements of due process.
Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254,
397 U. S.
266-271 (1970). Appellants have alleged that the
hearings were deficient in several ways, Jurisdictional Statement
9-10, but neither the record nor the opinion of the Oregon court
provides support for these contentions.
[
Footnote 5]
Appellants also claim a violation of their First Amendment right
to petition for redress. Our discussion of the Due Process Clause,
however, demonstrates that appellants' rights under the First
Amendment have been fully satisfied.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The majority today broadens and fortifies the "private preserve
for the affluent."
Meltzer v. C. Buck Le Craw & Co.,
402 U.S. 954, 961 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.).
Page 410 U. S. 662
The Court upholds a scheme of judicial review whereby justice
remains a luxury for the wealthy.
I
Appellants, welfare recipients whose benefits were reduced after
adverse determinations by the Oregon Public Welfare Division, were
denied access to the Oregon courts for review of those decisions
solely on the grounds that they were unable to pay a $25 filing
fee. Judicial review of administrative decisions is not otherwise
available under Oregon law. I continue to believe that this
invidious discrimination against the poverty-stricken -- a
classification based upon wealth -- is proscribed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Meltzer, supra;
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371,
401 U. S. 383
(DOUGLAS, J., concurring in result);
cf. United States v.
Kras, 409 U. S. 434,
409 U. S. 457
(opinion of DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ.).
There is an additional consideration relevant here. The majority
properly notes that "[t]his Court has long recognized that, even in
criminal cases, due process does not require a State to provide an
appellate system." We are concerned in this case not with appellate
review of a judicial determination, but with initial access to the
courts for review of an adverse administrative determination. By
analogizing these two situations, the majority,
sub
silentio, answers a question this Court studiously has avoided
-- whether there is a due process right to judicial review.
See 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28.18.
Access to the courts before a person is deprived of valuable
interests, at least with respect to questions of law, seems to me
to be the essence of due process.
Cf. Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U. S. 56,
405 U. S. 84
(DOUGLAS, J., dissenting in part). We have recognized that token
access cannot satisfy the requirements
Page 410 U. S. 663
of due process.
See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co., 339 U. S. 306.
Certainly, no access at all cannot stand in better stead. Appellant
Ortwein contends that the order of the Public Welfare Division is
not supported by substantial evidence; appellant Faubion contends
that the order applicable to her conflicts with federal provisions.
Moreover, each contends that the administrative hearing was
deficient under
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254, because questions of law were not considered.
The majority affirms the judgment without discussing its bearing on
appellants' contention that the Oregon scheme of judicial review
discriminates against the poor with respect to an exercise of a
fundamental right.
Accordingly, I cannot agree that a "rational justification" will
support the Oregon statute as it affects the poor. The primary
justification by the State and fixed upon by the majority is the
State's interest in offsetting the expenses of its court system.
This interest falls far short of the "compelling interest" required
to justify a suspect classification or discrimination which
infringes on fundamental rights.
See Boddie v. Connecticut,
supra, at
401 U. S. 382;
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618,
394 U. S.
633.
II
The majority affirms the judgment below without the benefit of
briefs or argument, relying on
United States v. Kras,
supra. Although I did not join the Court's opinion in
Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, I am compelled to comment on
the propriety of disposing of this case summarily in view of the
decision in that case. However one views the merits of
Kras, it seems to me that this case falls far closer to
Boddie than
Kras.
The majority distinguished
Kras from
Boddie on
three
Page 410 U. S. 664
grounds. It is only proper that this case be compared on the
same basis.
(1) The majority in
Kras concluded that a debtor's
desire to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy does not implicate a
"fundamental interest." While it is true that our decisions attach
less constitutional significance to welfare payments than the
interests of the
Boddie appellants, we have never decided
that there is no constitutional right to judicial review of an
adverse administrative determination. The majority also noted in
Kras that "[g]aining or not gaining a discharge [in
bankruptcy] will effect no change with respect to basic
necessities." 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 445.
It is clear in this case, however, that appellants suffered an
inroad on their ability to subsist.
(2) Unlike Kras, who had a theoretical opportunity to seek
relief from his creditors in a nonjudicial accommodation,
appellants' only avenue of relief lies in the courts.
(3) Unlike Kras, who was afforded the opportunity to pay the
bankruptcy filing fee in installments over six months, appellants
must file their fee in a lump sum.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
Although I am in substantial agreement with my Brothers DOUGLAS
and MARSHALL that this case is distinguishable from our recent
decision in
United States v. Kras, 409 U.
S. 434 (1973), I see no reason to set this case for
argument in light of the majority's firmly held view that
Kras is controlling. On the merits, I would reverse for
the reasons stated in my separate opinion in
Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371,
401 U. S. 386
(1971) (concurring in part).
See also United States v. Kras,
supra, at
409 U. S. 457
(opinion of DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ.).
Page 410 U. S. 665
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
I adhere to my dissenting opinion in
United States v.
Kras, 409 U. S. 434,
409 U. S. 458
(1973), and would reverse the judgment on that basis. But even were
I to accept the majority position in
Kras, there are still
important differences between that case and this one which, in my
judgment, require that this case be set for argument.
In
Kras, the majority correctly noted that "[t]here is
no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one's debts in
bankruptcy."
Id. at
409 U. S. 446.
Therefore, the only issue in the case was whether the Government
could, on the basis of a
de facto wealth classification,
limit access to a remedy which it could concededly deny
altogether.
The question here is quite different. Appellants seek a judicial
remedy for the action of an administrative agency which deprived
them of a preexisting right. As my Brother DOUGLAS demonstrates, it
is, at very least, doubtful that the Due Process Clause permits a
State to shield an administrative agency from all judicial review
when that agency acts to revoke a benefit previously granted.
* I share the view
of Mr. Justice Brandeis that
"[t]he supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity
to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was
applied; and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated
was conducted
Page 410 U. S. 666
regularly."
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U. S. 38,
298 U. S. 84
(1936) (concurring opinion).
Cf. Yakus v. United States,
321 U. S. 414
(1944);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22 (1932).
That opportunity was denied in this case, and important benefits
were thereby taken from appellants without affording them a chance
to contest the legality of the taking in a court of law.
Cf.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67
(1972).
The extent to which the State may commit to administrative
agencies the unreviewable authority to restrict preexisting rights
is one of the great questions of constitutional law about which
courts and commentators have debated for generations.
See
generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
Harv.L.Rev. 1362 (1953); 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §
28.18 (1958). Because I am not ready to decide that question
summarily,
sub silentio, and without the benefit of full
briefing and oral argument, I must dissent from the Court's
decision.
* The majority's statement that "[t]his Court has long
recognized that, even in criminal cases, due process does not
require a State to provide an appellate system,"
ante at
410 U. S. 660,
is thus true, but irrelevant and misleading. The cases cited by the
majority all involve efforts to secure appellate review of a
decision by a lower court. Here, in contrast, no court has ever
examined appellants' claims on the merits. Appellants assert only
that they must have
some access to
some court to
contest the legality of administrative action adversely affecting
them.