In this habeas corpus challenge to the constitutionality of
Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law made by petitioners, who were
convicted of various state crimes and committed to Patuxent
Institution for indeterminate periods,
held, that the writ
of certiorari must be dismissed as improvidently granted, since one
of the petitioners has been unconditionally released, and the
others are subject to unexpired sentences barring their release
even if their claims prevailed (
cf. McNeil v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, ante, p.
407 U. S. 245);
moreover, petitioners' challenge to one Defective Delinquency Law
should be considered in relation to other state laws regarding
civil commitment for compulsory psychiatric treatment,
Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, and
those laws are now being substantially revised to afford greater
safeguards to committed persons.
436 F.2d 1153, certiorari dismissed as improvidently
granted.
Page 407 U. S. 356
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners were convicted of various state crimes and sentenced
to fixed terms of imprisonment. They were then committed to the
Patuxent Institution in lieu of sentence, for an indeterminate
period, pursuant to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law,
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 31B. They sought federal habeas corpus,
challenging on constitutional grounds the criteria and procedures
that led to their commitment, and the conditions of their
confinement. They contend,
inter alia, that the statutory
standard for commitment is impermissibly vague, that they are
entitled to put the government to the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, that, at the compulsory psychiatric examination
prescribed by the statute, they were entitled to have the
assistance of counsel and to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination, and that they are being denied a constitutional
right to treatment. The District Court denied relief
sub nom.
Sas v. Maryland, 295 F.
Supp. 389 (Md.1969), and the Court of Appeals affirmed
sub
nom. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (CA4 1971). [
Footnote 1] We granted certiorari, 404
U.S. 999
Page 407 U. S. 357
(1971), to consider whether, and to what extent, the
constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners apply to this kind
of commitment process. After briefing and oral argument, it now
appears that this case does not present these issues in a manner
that warrants the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court.
1. Of the four petitioners, one has been unconditionally
released from confinement and the other three are subject to
criminal sentences that have not yet expired, and that would bar
their release from custody even if their claims were to prevail.
[
Footnote 2] This fact, while
not necessarily dispositive of all the claims presented by these
petitioners, casts those claims in a different light, not
contemplated by our original grant of the writ. [
Footnote 3]
Cf. McNeil v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, ante, p.
407 U. S. 245.
2. Under our decisions in
Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U. S. 107
(1966),
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.
S. 504 (1972), and
Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U. S. 715
(1972), petitioners' challenge to the Maryland Defective
Delinquency Law should be considered in relation to the
Page 407 U. S. 358
criteria, procedures, and treatment that the State of Maryland
makes available to other persons, not "defective delinquents,"
committed for compulsory psychiatric treatment. We are informed
that the statutes governing civil commitment in Maryland are
presently undergoing substantial revision designed to provide
greater substantive and procedural safeguards to committed persons.
Accordingly, it seems a particularly inopportune time for this
Court to consider a comprehensive challenge to the Defective
Delinquency Law.
In these circumstances, the writ of certiorari is therefore
dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner Murel was originally committed as a defective
delinquent in 1962, and Creswell in 1958; their separate petitions
for federal habeas corpus were denied without hearing in 1963. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals consolidated these and other similar
cases, and remanded all of them for a hearing,
sub nom. Sas v.
Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (CA4 1964). The hearing was deferred by
agreement of the parties pending the outcome of related litigation
in the state courts, which culminated in the decision in
Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397,
cert.
denied sub nom. Avey v. Boslow, 385 U.S. 940 (1966). The
federal habeas hearing was then held in the consolidated cases,
which, by this time, also included that of petitioners Hayes and
Avey, who had been committed after the Court of Appeals' remand
order. The petitions were again denied,
295 F.
Supp. 389 (Md.1969), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 436
F.2d 1153 (CA4 1971).
[
Footnote 2]
At the start of this litigation nine years ago, both Murel and
Creswell were subject to confinement that was wholly attributable
to the Defective Delinquency Law, their sentences having expired.
This is no longer the case, because Murel was recently released,
and Creswell was convicted and sentenced on new charges. We
therefore do not reach their claims.
[
Footnote 3]
We do not suggest that these claims are moot, or that a case or
controversy is lacking, or that habeas corpus is inappropriate to
test the special incidents, if any, of these defective delinquency
confinements.
See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.
S. 234 (1968);
Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U. S. 236
(1963);
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.
S. 244,
404 U. S. 248
(1971).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
Patuxent Institution is a special prison used by the State of
Maryland for the incarceration of "defective delinquents."
Individuals who have demonstrated "persistent aggravated
anti-social or criminal behavior," who have "a propensity toward
criminal activity," and who have "either such intellectual
deficiency or emotional unbalance" as to present "an actual danger
to society" may be confined at Patuxent. Md.Ann.Code, Art 31B, § 5
(1971). The initial determination that one is a defective
delinquent is made judicially, and, for those confined to Patuxent
after such a determination, there is the right to seek judicial
redetermination of their status at three-year intervals.
Id. § 6
et seq. One of the objectives of Patuxent
supposedly is to provide treatment for the inmates so that they may
be returned to society.
Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16,
31-32, 221 A.2d 397, 406 (1966). Should a defective delinquent not
receive treatment, or should the treatment prove inadequate to
return him to society, the inmate might
Page 407 U. S. 359
well remain in Patuxent for the remainder of his life.
See
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, ante, p.
407 U. S. 245.
Petitioners brought this action in the District Court
challenging various aspects of their confinement at Patuxent. The
District Court denied relief,
Sas v.
Maryland, 295 F.
Supp. 389 (Md.1969); the Court of Appeals affirmed,
Tippett
v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (CA4 1971); and we granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari. 404 U.S. 999. Because I base my
decision on narrow grounds, I do not reach the broader issues
tendered by petitioners.
When a State moves to deprive an individual of his liberty, to
incarcerate him indefinitely, or to place him behind bars for what
may be the rest of his life, the Federal Constitution requires that
it meet a more rigorous burden of proof than that employed by
Maryland to commit defective delinquents. The Defective Delinquency
Law does not specify the burden of proof necessary to commit an
individual to Patuxent, but the Maryland Court of Appeals has
determined that the State need only prove its case by the "fair
preponderance of the evidence."
E.g., Crews v. Director,
245 Md. 174, 225 A.2d 436 (1967);
Termin v. Director, 243
Md. 689, 221 A.2d 658 (1966);
Dickerson v. Director, 235
Md. 668, 202 A.2d 765 (1964);
Purks v. State, 226 Md. 43,
171 A.2d 726 (1961);
Blizzard v. State, 218 Md. 384, 147
A.2d 227 (1958);
and see Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506
(CA4 1964);
Walker v. Director, 6 Md.App. 206,
250 A.2d 900 (1969). Petitioners have thus been taken from
their families and deprived of their constitutionally protected
liberty under the same standard of proof applicable to
run-of-the-mill automobile negligence actions. [
Footnote 2/1]
Page 407 U. S. 360
The Court of Appeals disapproved this standard, but, because it
felt it insignificant, nonetheless held it to be consistent with
the requirements of the Due Process Clause:
"We might all be happier had [the burden of persuasion] been
stated in terms of clear and convincing proof, rather than in terms
of a preponderance of the evidence. However meaningful the
distinction may be to us as judges, however, it is greatly to be
doubted that a jury's verdict would ever be influenced by the
choice of one standard or the other. We all know that juries apply
the preponderance standard quite flexibly, depending upon the
nature of the case. In any event, in the present state of our
knowledge, choice of the standard
Page 407 U. S. 361
of proof should be left to the state. A legislative
[
sic] choice of the preponderance standard, the same
standard governing civil commitments of mentally ill persons who
have no history of criminality, ought not to be held in violation
of due process requirements when we have no firm foundation for an
evaluation of the practical effects of the choice."
Tippett v. Maryland, supra, at 1158-1159.
Judge Sobeloff dissented in part, and would have held the State
to a more stringent burden:
"The reasonable doubt standard is indispensable in both criminal
and juvenile proceedings . . . for 'it impresses on the trier of
fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of
the facts in issue.' . . ."
"The objections to the preponderance standard apply with equal
force in defective delinquency hearings -- indeed, they are even
more compelling in the latter class of cases, since indefinite
incarceration is at stake. Due process commands that the jury must
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to all objective facts in
dispute, including the truth of any alleged incidents relied upon
by the psychiatrists in reaching their recommendation."
Id. at 1165 (citations omitted).
In considering the constitutionally mandated burdens of proof
applicable to particular types of cases, our decisions have
attached greater significance to the varying standards than did the
Court of Appeals below. In
Speiser v. Randall,
357 U. S. 513,
357 U. S.
520-521 (1958), we said:
"To experienced lawyers, it is commonplace that the outcome of a
lawsuit -- and hence the vindication of legal rights -- depends
more often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a
disputed
Page 407 U. S. 362
construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of
precedents. Thus, the procedures by which the facts of the case are
determined assume an importance fully as great as the validity of
the substantive rule of law to be applied. And the more important
the rights at stake, the more important must be the procedural
safeguards surrounding those rights."
And see In re Winship, 397 U.
S. 358,
397 U. S. 368
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The reason for our continued concern over the applicable burden
of proof is that a lawsuit -- like any other factfinding process --
is necessarily susceptible of error in the making of factual
determinations. The nature of the rights implicated in the lawsuit
thus determines the allocation and degree of the burden of proof,
and, consequently, the party upon whom the risk of errors in the
factfinding process will be placed. We applied this reasoning in
Speiser, where First Amendment rights were implicated:
"In all kinds of litigation it is plain that, where the burden
of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome. There is always in
litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at
stake an interest of transcending value -- as a criminal defendant
his liberty -- this margin of error is reduced as to him by the
process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a
sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of producing the
evidence and convincing the factfinder of his guilt."
357 U.S. at
357 U. S.
525-526 (citations omitted).
Page 407 U. S. 363
In
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S.
29 (1971), MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, in an opinion joined by
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, again applied these
principles and reasoned that the important First Amendment
interests present in defamation actions required plaintiffs to meet
an extraordinary burden of proof. JUSTICE BRENNAN said,
"In libel cases . . . an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff
[is] most serious. . . . [T]he possibility of such error . . .
would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship which the
First Amendment cannot tolerate."
Id. at
403 U. S. 50.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN thus concluded that a more rigorous burden of
proof was necessary to safeguard the important First Amendment
rights involved:
"We . . . hold that a libel action . . . by a private individual
against a licensed radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a
newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or
general concern may be sustained only upon clear and convincing
proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."
Id. at
403 U. S.
52.
In re Winship, supra, dealt with an individual's
personal liberty which we had characterized as "an interest of
transcending value" in
Speiser, 357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 525.
There, we determined that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" was
constitutionally required "because of the possibility that [an
individual might] lose his liberty" and because of the stigma of a
criminal conviction. 397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 363.
And see Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
385 U. S. 276,
385 U. S. 285
(1966).
In the present case, petitioners were deprived of their most
basic right -- their personal liberty -- under a burden of proof
which was constitutionally inadequate. The
Page 407 U. S. 364
right to liberty is one of transcendent value. Without it, other
constitutionally protected rights such as the right of free
expression and the right of privacy become largely meaningless. Yet
Maryland has deprived petitioners of this right, using a burden of
proof which fails to give sufficient weight to the interests
involved.
It is no answer to say that petitioners' commitments were in
"civil" proceedings, and that the requirement for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required only in "criminal" cases.
In re
Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967),
and
In re Winship, supra, specifically rejected this
distinction, and looked instead at the interests involved and the
actual nature of the proceedings.
See also Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107
(1966);
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.
S. 605 (1967). Nor would it be persuasive to argue that
the difficulty in proving one's state of mind requires that the
State be afforded the benefit of a lesser burden of proof. Proving
a state of mind is no more difficult than many other issues with
which courts and juries grapple each day. [
Footnote 2/2] An individual who is confronted with
Page 407 U. S. 365
the possibility of commitment, moreover, runs the risk of losing
his most important right -- his liberty.
Speiser and
Winship indicate that an
individual's personal liberty is an interest of transcending value
for the deprivation of which the State must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. I would follow established precedent, and hold
that a State may not subject individuals to lengthy -- if not
indefinite -- incarceration under a lesser burden of proof.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment below.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In petitioner Murel's redetermination hearing on December 21,
1964, for example, the trial court instructed the jury:
"The burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of
evidence, as I have stated to you, that the defendant does come
within all phases of the definition of a defective delinquent."
Trial Transcript 70.
The jury instructions in petitioner Creswell's December 20,
1961, redetermination trial were similar:
"The burden of proof in this particular case is governed by our
normal civil rules of evidence. The burden of proof is on the State
to satisfy you that this defendant is a defective delinquent. If
the State has not satisfied you by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that he is a defective delinquent, or if your minds are in
a state of equal balance, or even balance, after considering all
the evidence as to whether he is or is not a defective delinquent,
then it is your duty to find him to be not a defective
delinquent."
"However, if you are satisfied by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that he is a defective delinquent, then it is your duty to
so find him to be such defective delinquent."
Trial Transcript 75-76.
The record developed in the District Court also included the
jury instructions in the October 30, 1959, redetermination hearing
of Charles Tippett, who was a petitioner in the District Court:
"The Court informs you that, having once been determined to be a
defective delinquent and now that he comes before you and asks to
be released as cured of whatever defect there was, the burden is on
him to convince you by a fair preponderance of the testimony that
that is 80."
Trial Transcript 40.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Bruce J. Ennis, Staff Attorney of the New York Civil Liberties
Union and Director of the Civil Liberties and Mental Illness
Project, testified as follows before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 277-278 (1969 and 1970):
"As I mentioned earlier, the mentally ill are possibly less
dangerous than the mentally healthy. A five and a half year study
of 5,000 patients discharged from New York State mental hospitals
showed that"
"patients with no record of prior arrest have a strikingly low
rate of arrest after release. . . . Their over-all rate of arrest
is less than 1/12 that of the general population, and the rate for
each separate offense is also far lower, especially for more
serious charges"
"Another psychiatrist states that there is 'not a shred of
evidence that the mentally ill are any more dangerous than the
mentally healthy.' A diagnosis of mental illness tells us nothing
about whether the person so diagnosed is or is not dangerous. Some
mental patients are dangerous, some are not. Perhaps the
psychiatrist is an expert at deciding whether a person is mentally
ill, but is he an expert at predicting which of the persons so
diagnosed are dangerous? Sane people, too, are dangerous, and it
may legitimately be inquired whether there is anything in the
education, training or experience of psychiatrists which renders
them particularly adept at predicting dangerous behavior.
Predictions of dangerous behavior, no matter who makes them, are
incredibly inaccurate, and there is a growing consensus that
psychiatrists are not uniquely qualified to predict dangerous
behavior, and are, in fact, less accurate in their predictions than
other professionals."
"Because predictions of dangerous behavior are so grossly
unreliable, we should authorize confinement only if the predicted
danger is proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' rather than by a mere
preponderance of the evidence."
(Footnotes omitted.)