The District Court in this litigation involving legislative
reapportionment, after extensive hearings, approved a plan that
departed from historical boundaries as necessary to avoid dilution
of racial minority voting strength. The Court of Appeals, without
opinion, reversed, adopting Louisiana's plan retaining those
boundaries.
Held: Absent an explication of the reasons for its
summary reversal of the District Court, the Court of Appeals'
judgment is vacated and the case remanded.
Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The 1970 self-reapportionment of the Louisiana Legislature was
challenged in this lawsuit on the dual grounds that it offended
both the one-man, one-vote principle and the prohibition against
voting arrangements designed to dilute the voting strength of
racial minorities. After the United States Attorney General
interposed an objection to the election law change under § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, the
District Court appointed a Special Master to prepare a
court-imposed plan. The Master was verbally instructed to hold
hearings and to devise a proposal to maintain the integrity of
political subdivisions and to observe natural or historical
boundaries "as nearly as possible." He was also instructed that
"[n]o consideration whatsoever was to be given to the location
of the residence of either incumbents in office or of announced or
prospective candidates."
Opinion of Judge West, Civil Action No. 71-234, Aug. 24,
1971.
The Special Master held four days of hearings, during
Page 407 U. S. 192
which over 100 persons were heard. Proposed plans were received
by him. No one was denied a hearing. He then submitted his
recommendation to the District Court and, after a hearing, it was
adopted by the court.
This dispute involves only four state senate seats affected by
the reapportionment. At the hearing held by the District Judge on
the Master's proposal, the State Attorney General presented a
counterplan which differed from the Master's only with respect to
four senatorial districts in the New Orleans area. Although the
judge found that both plans satisfied the one-man, one-vote
requirement, he found that the two schemes differed in their racial
composition of the four districts, as is set out in greater detail
in the margin. [
Footnote 1]
Under the State Attorney General's scheme, four "safe" white
districts were proposed, whereas the Master's design would have
created two districts of slight majorities of black voters. Also,
under the counterplan, each incumbent would continue to reside in
his "own" district, whereas, under the Master's proposal, the
residences of the four incumbents would fall evenly between the two
districts to be composed primarily of white voters, ensuring defeat
for two of the four incumbents.
At the hearing, the State Attorney General contended that the
court's plan would make hash of the traditional ward-and-precinct
lines. The District Court acknowledged that there would be some
departure from the historical patterns but concluded that the
"'historical'
Page 407 U. S. 193
boundaries of voting districts in Louisiana reflect[ed] a
history of racial discrimination. Adherence to the historical
boundaries alluded to by objectors [had] been the prime reason why
only two negroes [had] been allowed to sit in the Louisiana
Legislature in the last 75 years."
333 F.
Supp. 452, 462. The court found that the alternative proposal
would "operate to diversify the negro voting population throughout
the four districts and thus significantly dilute their vote," and
would practically eliminate "the possibility of a negro's being
elected from any of the four districts," while the court-approved
plan would at least give blacks "a fair chance in two out of the
four districts. . . ."
Id. at 457. The court-approved plan
sought
"to protect the rights of the people, while the primary purpose
of the Senators' plan appear[ed] to be the protection of incumbent
office holders."
Id. at 458. Accordingly, as mentioned, the District
Court adopted the Master's recommendation.
Despite the District Court's findings, however, the Court of
Appeals reversed without opinion and adopted the Attorney General's
alternative division of New Orleans. The petitioners are the
original plaintiffs, and they now seek review of this summary
reversal.
An examination of the record in this case suggests that the
Court of Appeals may have believed that benign districting by
federal judges is itself unconstitutional gerrymandering even where
(a) it is employed to overcome the residual effects of past state
dilution of Negro voting strength and (b) the only alternative is
to leave intact the traditional "safe" white districts. [
Footnote 2] If that
Page 407 U. S. 194
were, in fact, the reasoning of the lower court, then this
petition would present an important federal question of the extent
to which the broad equitable powers of a federal court,
Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S.
1,
402 U. S. 15, are
limited by the color-blind concept of
Gomillon v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, and
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52,
376 U. S. 57,
376 U. S. 67
(DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). [
Footnote 3] In reapportionment cases, as JUSTICE STEWART
has observed, "the federal courts are often going to be faced with
hard remedial problems" in minimizing friction between their
remedies and legitimate state policies.
Sixty-Seventh Minnesota
State Senate v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187,
406 U. S. 204
(dissenting opinion).
Because this record does not fully inform us of the precise
nature of the litigation, and because we have not had the benefit
of the insight of the Court of Appeals, we grant the petition for
writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case
to the Court of Appeals for proceedings in conformity with this
opinion. [
Footnote 4]
Page 407 U. S. 195
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the Court's judgment.
[
Footnote 1]
According to the District Judge's opinion, the percentages of
black registered voters in each of the four districts under each of
the competing plans would be:
Master's Attorney General's
Plan Plan
District 2. . . . 51% 37.6%
District 3. . . . 18% 25.7%
District 4. . . . 58% 44.3%
District 5. . . . 20% 24.0%
[
Footnote 2]
It is possible, but unlikely, that the Court of Appeal believed
that benign districting, although permissible, was achievable here
with less violence to the parish's historical district lines. But
had that been its view, presumably the court would have remanded
for the construction of a less drastic alternative, rather than
simply directing the adoption of the Attorney General's
counterplan.
[
Footnote 3]
Although similar in some respects, this case is not controlled
by
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124. To
be sure, in both cases, the District Courts were writing on clean
slates in the sense that they were fashioning court-imposed
reapportionment plans. And, in each case, the equitable remedy of
the court conflicted with a state policy. (There, the state policy
favored multi-member districts, whereas here, the policy favors
maintenance of traditional boundaries.) The important difference,
however, is that, in
Whitcomb, it was conceded that the
State's preference for multi-member districts was not rooted in
racial discrimination, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 149.
Here, however, there has been no such concession, and, indeed, the
District Court found a long "history" of bias and franchise
dilution in the State's traditional drawing of district lines.
Cf. id. at
403 U. S.
155.
[
Footnote 4]
We, of course, agree that the courts of appeals should have wide
latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write opinions.
That is especially true with respect to summary affirmances.
See Rule 21, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. But
here the lower court summarily reversed without any opinion on a
point that had been considered at length by the District Judge.
Under the special circumstances of this case, we are loath to
impute to the Court of Appeals reasoning that would raise a
substantial federal question when it is plausible that its actual
ground of decision was of more limited importance.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR.
JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
The short recitation of specific facts in the Court's opinion
makes clear that the issues in this case, as viewed by both
petitioners and respondents, are well developed in the record. The
federal questions adverted to by the Court in its opinion are
undoubtedly important ones. They are either presented by the
proceedings below on this record, or they are not; this Court, in
exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, may wish to consider such
problems as are presented in this case at this time, or it may not.
While an opinion from the Court of Appeals fully explaining the
reason for its reversal of the District Court would undoubtedly be
of assistance to our exercise of certiorari jurisdiction here, it
is by no means essential. [
Footnote
2/1] I do not believe that the Court's vacation of the judgment
below with a virtually express directive to the Court of Appeals
that it write an opinion is an appropriate exercise of this Court's
authority.
The courts of appeals are statutory courts, having the power to
prescribe rules for the conduct of their own business so long as
those rules are consistent with applicable law and rules of
practice and procedure prescribed by this Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2071.
No existing statute or rule of procedure prohibits the Fifth
Circuit from issuing a short opinion and order, as it has done
here, or from deciding cases without any opinion at all.
Cf. Rule 21, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
courts of
Page 407 U. S. 196
appeals, and particularly the Fifth Circuit, which has
experienced the heaviest caseload of all the circuits, need the
maximum possible latitude to deal with the "flood tide" of appeals
that the "ever growing explosive increase" of federal judicial
business has produced.
See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen
Casualty Co., 431 F.2d 409 (CA5 1970);
NLRB v. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d 966 (CA5 1970). [
Footnote 2/2]
If there are important federal questions presented in this
record, this Court should address itself to them. Instead of doing
that, it calls upon the Fifth Circuit to write an
amicus
curiae opinion to aid us. I think decisions as to whether
opinions should accompany judgments of the courts of appeals, and
the desirable length and content of those opinions, are matters
best left to the judges of the courts of appeals. I therefore
dissent from the order of vacation and remand.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.
S. 477,
404 U. S. 482
n. 6 (1972).
[
Footnote 2/2]
In fiscal year 1971, 2,316 new matters were docketed in the
Fifth Circuit, 380 more than in any of the other circuits. This
represented a 120% increase in a 10-year period, although the
number of circuit judges was increased by only 60%. Annual Report
of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 106 (1971). The increase in the business of the courts of
appeals has been almost exponential. In 1961, the Fifth Circuit
carried over only 278 cases that were undisposed of. By 1970, there
were 1,181 cases put over to the succeeding year.
NLRB v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d 966, 968 n. 4 (CA5
1970).