Kansas recoupment statute enabling State to recover in
subsequent civil proceedings legal defense fees for indigent
defendants, invalidated by District Court as an infringement on the
right to counsel, held to violate the Equal Protection Clause in
that, by virtue of the statute, indigent defendants are deprived of
the array of protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other
civil judgment debtors. Pp.
407 U. S.
129-142.
323
F. Supp. 1230, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a constitutional challenge to a Kansas
recoupment statute, whereby the State may recover in subsequent
civil proceedings counsel and other legal defense fees expended for
the benefit of indigent defendants. The three-judge court below
held the statute unconstitutional, finding it to be an
impermissible burden upon the right to counsel established in
Gideon
Page 407 U. S. 129
v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335
(1963). [
Footnote 1] The State
appealed, and we noted jurisdiction, 404 U.S. 982.
The relevant facts are not disputed. Appellee Strange was
arrested and charged with first-degree robbery under Kansas law. He
appeared before a magistrate, professed indigency, and accepted
appointed counsel under the Kansas Aid to Indigent Defendants Act.
[
Footnote 2] Appellee was then
tried in the Shawnee County District Court on the reduced charge of
pocket-picking. He pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence
and three years' probation.
Thereafter, appellee's counsel applied to the State for payment
for his services and received $500 from the Aid to Indigent
Defendants Fund. Pursuant to Kansas' recoupment statute, the Kansas
Judicial Administrator requested appellee to reimburse the State
within 60 days or a judgment for the $500 would be docketed against
him. Appellee contends this procedure violates his constitutional
rights.
I
It is necessary at the outset to explain the terms and operation
of the challenged statute. [
Footnote 3] When the State
Page 407 U. S. 130
provides an indigent defendant with counsel or other legal
services, the defendant becomes obligated to the State for the
amount expended in his behalf. Within 30 days
Page 407 U. S. 131
of the expenditure, the defendant is notified of his debt and
given 60 days to repay it. [
Footnote 4] If the sum remains unpaid after the 60-day
period, a judgment is docketed against defendant for the unpaid
amount. Six percent annual interest runs on the debt from the date
the expenditure was made. The debt becomes a lien on the real
estate of defendant, and may be executed by garnishment or in any
other manner provided by the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure. The
indigent defendant is not, however, accorded any of the exemptions
provided by that code for other judgment debtors except the
homestead exemption. If the judgment is not executed within five
years, it becomes dormant, and ceases to operate as a lien on the
debtor's real estate, but may be revived in the same manner as
other dormant judgments under the code of civil procedure.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 407 U. S. 132
Several features of this procedure merit mention. The entire
program is administered by the judicial administrator, a public
official, but appointed counsel are private practitioners. The
statute apparently leaves to administrative discretion whether, and
under what circumstances, enforcement of the judgment will be
sought. Recovered sums do, however, revert to the Aid to Indigent
Defendants Fund.
The Kansas statute is but one of many state recoupment laws
applicable to counsel fees and expenditures paid for indigent
defendants. [
Footnote 6] The
statutes vary widely in their terms. Under some statutes, the
indigent's liability is to the county in which he is tried, in
others, to the State. Alabama and Indiana make assessment and
recovery of an indigent's counsel fees discretionary with the
court. Florida's recoupment law has no statute of limitations, and
the State is deemed to have a perpetual lien against the
defendant's real and personal property and estate. [
Footnote 7] Idaho, on the other hand, has a
five-year statute of limitations on the recovery
Page 407 U. S. 133
of an "indigent's" concealed assets at the time of trial and a
three-year statute for the recovery of later acquired ones. In
Virginia and West Virginia, the amount paid to court-appointed
counsel is assessed only against convicted defendants as a part of
costs, although the majority of state recoupment laws apply whether
or not the defendant prevails. It is thus apparent that state
recoupment laws and procedures differ significantly in their
particulars. [
Footnote 8] Given
the wide differences in the features of these statutes, any
broadside pronouncement on their general validity would be
inappropriate.
We turn therefore to the Kansas statute, aware that our
reviewing function is a limited one. We do not inquire whether this
statute is wise or desirable, or "whether it is based on
assumptions scientifically substantiated."
Roth v. United
States, 354 U. S. 476,
354 U. S. 501
(1957) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). Misguided laws may
nonetheless be constitutional. It has been noted both in the briefs
and at argument that only $17,000 has been recovered under the
statute in its almost two years of operation, and that this amount
is negligible compared to the total expended. [
Footnote 9] Our task, however, is not to weigh
this statute's effectiveness, but its constitutionality.
Page 407 U. S. 134
Whether the returns under the statute justify the expense, time,
and efforts of state officials is for the ongoing supervision of
the legislative branch.
The court below invalidated this statute on the grounds that
it
"needlessly encourages indigents to do without counsel, and
consequently infringes on the right to counsel as explicated in
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra."
323
F. Supp. 1230, 1233. In
Gideon, counsel had been
denied an indigent defendant charged with a felony because his was
not a capital case. This Court often has voided state statutes and
practices which denied to accused indigents the means to present
effective defenses in courts of law.
Douglas v.
California, 372 U. S. 353
(1963);
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.
S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.
S. 477 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12
(1956). Here, however, Kansas has enacted laws both to provide and
compensate from public funds counsel for the indigent. [
Footnote 10] There is certainly no
denial of the right to counsel in the strictest sense. Whether the
statutory obligations for repayment impermissibly deter the
exercise of this right is a question we need not reach, for we find
the statute before us constitutionally infirm on other grounds.
II
Appellants have asserted in argument before this Court that the
statute "has attempted to treat them [indigent defendants] the same
as would any civil judgment debtor be treated in the State courts.
. . ." [
Footnote 11]
Again, in their brief, appellants assert that,
"[f]or all practical purposes, the methods available for
enforcement of the judgment are the same as those provided by the
Code of Civil
Page 407 U. S. 135
Procedures [
sic] or any other civil judgment. [
Footnote 12]"
The challenged portion of the statute thrice alludes to means of
debt recovery prescribed by the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure.
[
Footnote 13]
Yet the ostensibly equal treatment of indigent defendants with
other civil judgment debtors recedes sharply as one examines the
statute more closely. The statute stipulates that, save for the
homestead, "[n]one of the exemptions provided for in the code of
civil procedure shall apply to any such judgment. . . ." [
Footnote 14] This provision strips
from indigent defendants the array of protective exemptions Kansas
has erected for other civil judgment debtors, including
restrictions on the amount of disposable earnings subject to
garnishment, protection of the debtor from wage garnishment at
times of severe personal or family sickness, and exemption from
attachment and execution on a debtor's personal clothing, books,
and tools of trade. For the head of a family, the exemptions
afforded other judgment debtors become more extensive, and cover
furnishings, food, fuel, clothing, means of transportation, pension
funds, and even a family burial plot or crypt. [
Footnote 15]
Of the above exemptions, none is more important to a debtor than
the exemption of his wages from unrestricted garnishment. The
debtor's wages are his sustenance, with which he supports himself
and his family. The average low income wage earner spends nearly
nine-tenths of those wages for items of immediate consumption.
[
Footnote 16] This Court has
recognized the potential of
Page 407 U. S. 136
certain garnishment proceedings to "impose tremendous hardships
on wage earners with families to support."
Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337,
395 U. S. 340
(1969). [
Footnote 17] Kansas
has likewise perceived the burden to a debtor and his family when
wages may be subject to wholesale garnishment. Consequently, under
its code of civil procedure, the maximum which can be garnished is
the lesser of 25% of a debtor's weekly disposable earnings, or the
amount by which those earnings exceed 30 times the federal minimum
hourly wage. No one creditor may issue more than one garnishment
during any one month, and no employer may discharge an employee
because his earnings have been garnished for a single indebtedness.
[
Footnote 18] For Kansas to
deny protections such as these to the once criminally accused is to
risk denying him the means needed to keep himself and his family
afloat.
The indigent's predicament under this statute comes into sharper
focus when compared with that of one who has hired counsel in his
defense. Should the latter prove unable to pay and a judgment be
obtained against him, his obligation would become enforceable under
the relevant provisions of the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure.
Page 407 U. S. 137
But, unlike the indigent under the recoupment statute, the
code's exemptions would protect this judgment debtor.
It may be argued that an indigent accused, for whom the State
has provided counsel, is in a different class with respect to
collection of his indebtedness than a judgment creditor whose
obligation arose from a private transaction. But other Kansas
statutes providing for recoupment of public assistance to indigents
do not include the severe provisions imposed on indigent defendants
in this case. Kansas has enacted, as have many other States, laws
for state recovery of public welfare assistance when paid to an
ineligible recipient. [
Footnote
19] Yet
Page 407 U. S. 138
the Kansas welfare recipient, unlike the indigent defendant, is
not denied the customary exemptions. [
Footnote 20]
We recognize, of course, that the State's claim to reimbursement
may take precedence, under appropriate circumstances, over the
claims of private creditors, and that enforcement procedure with
respect to judgments need not be identical. [
Footnote 21] This does not mean, however, that a
State may impose unduly harsh or discriminatory terms merely
because the obligation is to the public treasury, rather than to a
private creditor. The State
Page 407 U. S. 139
itself in the statute before us analogizes the judgment lien
against the indigent defendant to other "judgments under the code
of civil procedure." But the statute then strips the indigent
defendant of the very exemptions designed primarily to benefit
debtors of low and marginal incomes.
The Kansas statute provides for recoupment whether the indigent
defendant is acquitted or found guilty. If acquitted, the indigent
finds himself obligated to repay the State for a service the need
for which resulted from the State's prosecution. It is difficult to
see why such a defendant, adjudged to be innocent of the State's
charge, should be denied basic exemptions accorded all other
judgment debtors. The indigent defendant who is found guilty is
uniquely disadvantaged in terms of the practical operation of the
statute. A criminal conviction usually limits employment
opportunities. This is especially true where a prison sentence has
been served. It is in the interest of society and the State that
such a defendant, upon satisfaction of the criminal penalties
imposed, be afforded a reasonable opportunity of employment,
rehabilitation and return to useful citizenship. There is limited
incentive to seek legitimate employment when, after serving a
sentence during which interest has accumulated on the indebtedness
for legal services, the indigent knows that his wages will be
garnished without the benefit of any of the customary
exemptions.
Appellee in this case has now married, works for a modest wage,
and has recently become a father. To deprive him of all protection
for his wages and intimate personalty discourages the search for
self-sufficiency which might make of the criminally accused a
contributing citizen. Not only does this treatment not accord with
the treatment of indigent recipients of public welfare
Page 407 U. S. 140
or with that of other civil judgment debtors, [
Footnote 22] but the Kansas statute also
appears to be alone among recoupment laws applicable to indigent
defendants in expressly denying them the benefit of basic debtor
exemptions. [
Footnote
23]
III
In
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305
(1966), the Court considered a situation comparable, in some
respects, to the case at hand.
Rinaldi involved a New
Jersey statute which required only those indigent defendants who
were sentenced to confinement in state institutions to reimburse
the State the costs of a transcript on appeal. In
Rinaldi,
as here, a broad ground of decision was urged, namely, that the
statute unduly burdened an indigent's right to appeal. The Court
found, however, a different basis for decision, holding that
"[t]o fasten a financial burden only upon those unsuccessful
appellants who are confined in state institutions . . . is to make
an invidious discrimination"
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at
384 U. S.
309.
Rinaldi affirmed that the Equal Protection Clause
"imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the
class singled out."
Id. at
384 U. S.
308-309. This requirement is lacking where, as in the
instant case, the State has subjected indigent defendants to such
discriminatory conditions of repayment. This case, to be sure,
differs from
Rinaldi in that here, all indigent defendants
are treated alike. But to impose these harsh conditions on a class
of debtors who were provided counsel as required
Page 407 U. S. 141
by the Constitution is to practice, no less than in
Rinaldi, a discrimination which the Equal Protection
Clause proscribes.
The Court assumed in
Rinaldi, arguendo,
"that a legislature could validly provide for replenishing a
county treasury from the pockets of those who have directly
benefited from county expenditures."
Id. at
384 U. S. 309.
We note here also that the state interests represented by
recoupment laws may prove important ones. Recoupment proceedings
may protect the State from fraudulent concealment of assets and
false assertions of indigency. Many States, moreover, face
expanding criminal dockets, and this Court has required appointed
counsel for indigents in widening classes of cases [
Footnote 24] and stages of prosecution.
[
Footnote 25] Such trends
have heightened the burden on public revenues, and recoupment laws
reflect legislative efforts to recover some of the added costs.
Finally, federal dominance of the Nation's major revenue sources
has encouraged state and local governments to seek new methods of
conserving public funds, not only through the recoupment of
indigents' counsel fees but of other forms of public assistance as
well.
We thus recognize that state recoupment statutes may betoken
legitimate state interests. But these interests are not thwarted by
requiring more even treatment of indigent criminal defendants with
other classes of debtors to whom the statute itself repeatedly
makes reference. State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state
interests they may serve, need not blight in such discriminatory
fashion the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency
Page 407 U. S. 142
and self-respect. The statute before us embodies elements of
punitiveness and discrimination which violate the rights of
citizens to equal treatment under the law.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The opinion of the three-judge court is reported in
323 F.
Supp. 1230 (Kan.1971)
[
Footnote 2]
Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 22-501 to 22515 (Supp 1971).
[
Footnote 3]
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 22-513 (Supp. 1971). The statute reads as
follows:
"(a) Whenever any expenditure has been made from the aid to
indigent defendants fund to provide counsel and other defense
services to any defendant, as authorized by section 10, . . . such
defendant shall be liable to the state of Kansas for a sum equal to
such expenditure, and such sum may be recovered from the defendant
by the state of Kansas for the benefit of the fund to aid indigent
defendants. Within thirty (30) days after such expenditure, the
judicial administrator shall send a notice by certified mail to the
person on whose behalf such expenditure was made, which notice
shall state the amount of the expenditure, and shall demand that
the defendant pay said sum to the state of Kansas for the benefit
of the fund to aid indigent defendants within sixty (60) days after
receipt of such notice. The notice shall state that such sum became
due on the date of the expenditure, and that the sum demanded will
bear interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the due date until
paid. Failure to receive any such notice shall not relieve the
person to whom it is addressed from the payment of the sum claimed
and any interest due thereon."
"Should the sum demanded remain unpaid at the expiration of
sixty (60) days after mailing the notice, the judicial
administrator shall certify an abstract of the total amount of the
unpaid demand and interest thereon to the clerk of the district
court of the county in which counsel was appointed or the
expenditure authorized by the court, and such clerk shall enter the
total amount thereof on his judgment docket and said total amount,
together with the interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum, from the date of the expenditure thereof until paid,
shall become a judgment in the same manner and to the same extent
as any other judgment under the code of civil procedure and shall
become a lien on real estate from and after the time of filing
thereof. A transcript of said judgment may be filed in another
county and become a lien upon real estate, located in such county,
in the same manner as is provided in case of other judgments.
Execution, garnishment, or other proceedings in aid of execution
may issue within the county, or to any other county, on said
judgment in like manner as on judgments under the code of civil
procedure. None of the exemptions provided for in the code of civil
procedure shall apply to any such judgment, but no such judgment
shall be levied against a homestead. If execution shall not be sued
out within five (5) years from the date of the entry of any such
judgment, or if five (5) years shall have intervened between the
date of the last execution issued on such judgment and the time of
suing out another writ of execution thereon, such judgment shall
become dormant and shall cease to operate as a lien on real estate
of the judgment debtor. Such dormant judgment may be revived in
like manner as dormant judgments under the code of civil
procedure."
"(b) Whenever any expenditure has been made from the aid to
indigent defendants fund to provide counsel and other defense
services to any defendant, as authorized by section 10, . . . a sum
equal to such expenditure may be recovered by the state of Kansas
for the benefit of the aid to indigent defendants fund from any
person to whom the indigent defendant shall have transferred any of
his property without adequate monetary consideration after the
commission of the alleged crime, to the extent of the value of such
transfer, and such persons are hereby made liable to reimburse the
state of Kansas for such expenditures with interest at six percent
(6%) per annum. Any action to recover judgment for such
expenditures shall be prosecuted by the attorney general, who may
require the assistance of the county attorney of the county in
which the action is to be filed, and such action shall be governed
by the provisions of the code of civil procedure relating to
actions for the recovery of money. No action shall be brought
against any person under the provisions of this section to recover
for sums expended on behalf of an indigent defendant, unless such
action shall have been filed within two (2) years after the date of
the expenditure from the fund to aid indigent defendants."
[
Footnote 4]
Failure to receive notice, however, does not relieve the person
to whom it is addressed of the obligation.
[
Footnote 5]
A dormant judgment may be revived within two years of the date
on which the judgment became dormant. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-2404
(1964).
[
Footnote 6]
There is also a federal reimbursement provision, 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(f):
"Receipt of other payments. -- Whenever the United States
magistrate or the court finds that funds are available for payment
from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may
authorize or direct that such funds be paid to the appointed
attorney, to the bar association or legal aid agency or community
defender organization which provided the appointed attorney, to any
person or organization authorized pursuant to subsection (e) to
render investigative, expert, or other services, or to the court
for deposit in the Treasury as a reimbursement to the
appropriation, current at the time of payment, to carry out the
provisions of this section. Except as so authorized or directed, no
such person or organization may request or accept any payment or
promise of payment for representing a defendant."
[
Footnote 7]
The board of county commissioners has discretion to compromise
or release the lien, however. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 27.56 (Supp.
1972-1973).
[
Footnote 8]
State recoupment statutes, including those quoted above, are as
follows:
Ala.Code, Tit. 15, § 318(12) (Supp. 1969); Alaska Stat. §
12.55.020 (1962); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 27.56 (Supp. 1972-1973); Idaho
Code § 19-858 (Supp. 1971); Ind. Ann.Stat. § 9-3501 (Supp. 1970);
Iowa Code Ann. § 775.5 (Supp. 1972); Md.Ann.Code, Art. 26, § 12C
(Supp. 1971); N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41-22-7 (Supp. 1971); N.D.Cent.Code §
29-07-01.1 (Supp. 1971); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2941.51 (Supp. 1971);
S.C.Code Ann. § 17-283 (Supp. 1971); Tex.Code Crim.Proc., Art. 1018
(1966); Va.Code Ann. § 14.1-184 (Supp. 1971); W.Va.Code Ann. §
62-3-1 (Supp. 1971); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 256.66 (1971).
[
Footnote 9]
For fiscal 1971, $400,000 was appropriated to fund the
program.
[
Footnote 10]
See n 2,
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. The State concedes that exemptions for other
civil judgment debtors are broader than for indigent defendants,
id. at 10, a matter we will address forthwith.
[
Footnote 12]
Brief for Appellant 7.
[
Footnote 13]
See Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 60-701 to 60-724, 60-2401 to
60-2419 (1964 and Supp. 1971).
[
Footnote 14]
The exemptions in the civil code are set forth in Kan.Stat.Ann.
§§ 60-2301 to 60-2311 (1964 and Supp. 1971).
[
Footnote 15]
Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 60-2304 and 60-2308 (1964 and Supp. 1971).
[
Footnote 16]
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 281
(1968). Low-wage earners are defined as families with after-tax
income of less than $5,000.
[
Footnote 17]
The Court in
Sniadach held that Wisconsin's prejudgment
wage garnishment procedure, as a taking of property without notice
and prior hearing, violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 18]
Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 60-2310(b) and 60-2311 (Supp. 1971). Section
60-2310 also provides further debtor protection from wage
garnishment at a time of disabling personal sickness and from
professional collecting agencies.
See Kan.Stat.Ann. §§
60-2310(c) and (d) (Supp. 1971).
See also Bennett, the
1970 Kansas Legislature in Review, 39 J.B.A.K. 107, 178 (1970),
which points out that the State's restrictions on garnishments have
been made to conform to Tit. III of the federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 82 Stat. 163. Kansas, however, provided significant
wage exemptions from garnishment long before the federal Act was
passed.
[
Footnote 19]
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 39-719b (1964); § 59-2006 (Supp. 1971). Section
39-719b deals mainly with the recovery of assistance from an
ineligible recipient. Yet even when the welfare recipient is deemed
to have defrauded the State, he still escapes the immediate
interest accumulations and denial of exemptions imposed on indigent
defendants:
"§ 39-719b. Duty of recipient to report changes; action by
board; recovery of assistance obtained by ineligible recipient. If
at any time during the continuance of assistance to any person, the
recipient thereof becomes possessed of any property or income in
excess of the amount ascertained at the time of granting
assistance, it shall be the duty of the recipient to notify the
county board of social welfare immediately of the receipt or
possession of such property or income and said county board may,
after investigation, cancel the assistance in accordance with the
circumstances."
"Any assistance paid shall be recoverable by the county board as
a debt due to the state and the county in proportion to the amount
of the assistance paid by each, respectively: if, during the life
or on the death of any person receiving assistance, it is found
that the recipient was possessed of income or property in excess of
the amount reported or ascertained at the time of granting
assistance, and if it be shown that such assistance was obtained by
an ineligible recipient, the total amount of the assistance may be
recovered by the state department of social welfare as a fourth
class claim from the estate of the recipient or in an action
brought against the recipient while living."
[
Footnote 20]
There appears to be a further discrimination against the
indigent defendant, as contrasted with the delinquent welfare
recipient. The recoupment statute applicable to indigent defendants
provides for the accumulation of 6% annual interest from the date
expenditures are made for counsel or other legal defense costs.
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 22-4513 (Supp. 1971). The interest build-up for the
indigent defendant would not be insubstantial. In the five years
before the judgment became dormant, interest accumulations could
lift appellee's $500 debt to almost $670. If the dormant judgment
is revived within the statutorily prescribed two years, the
principal and interest might total over $750. (The interest
presumably would run while the judgment was dormant, since "[a]
dormant judgment may be revived, and have the same force and effect
as if it had not become dormant. . . ." Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-2404
(Supp. 1971)).
Kansas also has a statute providing that all judgments shall
bear 8% interest from the day on which they are rendered.
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 16-204 (Supp. 1971) (recently amended from 6%).
Presumably this statute would cover the "debts" of welfare
recipients once they are reduced to judgment. The debt of the
indigent defendant, however, runs from the date the assistance is
granted, while any interest on the debt of a welfare recipient
would presumably run from the date of judgment.
[
Footnote 21]
For example, Kansas does not extend its exemptions with respect
to wage garnishment to any debt due for any state or federal tax,
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-2310(e)(3) (Supp. 1971). This type of public
debt, however, differs from the instant case in representing a
wrongful withholding from the State of a tax on assets in the
actual possession of the taxpayer, and not, as here, a debt
contracted under circumstances of indigency.
[
Footnote 22]
The statutes of various other States,
e.g., Alaska,
South Carolina, and West Virginia, provide, as does Kansas, for
recovery against indigent defendants in the same manner as on other
judgments. Unlike Kansas, however, these States do not expressly
subject indigent to conditions to which other civil judgment
debtors are not liable.
See n 8,
supra, for citations.
[
Footnote 23]
See n 8,
supra, for citations.
[
Footnote 24]
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335
(1963);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.
S. 353 (1963);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, ante, p.
407 U. S. 25.
[
Footnote 25]
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970);
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128
(1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.
S. 218 (1967);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966).