Since neither party contends that the scope of Illinois
statutory immunity fall below the use and derivative use standard
held to be coextensive with the privilege against
self-incrimination in
Kastigar v. United States, ante, p.
406 U. S. 441, any
uncertainty regarding the scope of protection in excess of the
constitutional requirement should best be left to the Illinois
courts.
45 Ill. 2d
473,
259 N.E.2d
267, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners were ordered to testify before the Illinois Crime
Investigating Commission under a grant of immunity conferred
pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, ยง 203-14 (1969). The occasion for
granting the writ in this case was to consider whether Illinois
must demonstrate to petitioners, prior to an adjudication for
contempt for refusal to answer the Commission's questions, that
immunity as broad in scope as the protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination is available and applicable to them. 401
U.S. 935 (1971). The writ was granted in light of petitioners'
claim that the statute did not provide complete transactional
immunity. On the same day that the writ was granted, probable
jurisdiction was noted in
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State
Commission of Investigation, 401 U.S. 933 (1971), to resolve
the question
Page 406 U. S. 483
whether a State can compel testimony from an unwilling witness,
who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, by granting
immunity from use and derivative use of the compelled testimony, or
whether transactional immunity is required.
We held today in
Kastigar v. United States, ante, p.
406 U. S. 441, and
in
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation,
ante, p.
406 U. S. 472,
that testimony may be compelled from an unwilling witness over a
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination by a grant of use
and derivative use immunity. The premise of petitioners' arguments
is that transactional immunity is required. They say that Illinois
failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that transactional immunity
was provided, but they do not contend that the Illinois immunity
statute affords protection less comprehensive than use and
derivative use immunity. Respondent asserts that the statute
affords complete transactional immunity, reflecting a longstanding
Illinois policy of providing immunity greater than that required by
the United States Constitution. Since neither party contends that
the scope of the immunity provided by the Illinois statute falls
below the constitutional requirement set forth in
Kastigar, we conclude that any uncertainty regarding the
scope of protection in excess of the constitutional requirement
should best be left to the courts of Illinois. Accordingly, the
writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents for the reasons stated in his
dissenting opinion in
Kastigar v. United States, ante, p.
406 U. S.
462.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissents for the reasons stated in his
dissenting opinion in
Kastigar v. United States, ante, p.
406 U. S.
467.
Page 406 U. S. 484