A three-judge District Court found that the Minnesota
Legislature was malapportioned, and reduced the number of
legislative districts from 67, the number established in 1913, to
35, thereby reducing the number of senators by almost 50%, and the
number of representatives by nearly 25%. The court declared the
entire 1966 apportionment act unconstitutional, and enjoined state
officials from conducting elections thereunder, later modifying
that injunction so as to enjoin any future elections under any plan
other than the one adopted by the court "or a constitutional plan
adopted after this date by the State of Minnesota." Appellant, the
Minnesota State Senate, intervened in the apportionment challenge
below.
Held:
1. The appellant had the right to intervene, as the District
Court's orders directly affected the senate, which is an
appropriate legal entity for the purpose of intervention.
Silver v. Jordan, 241 F.
Supp. 576,
aff'd, 381 U. S. 415.
2. The District Court's injunction with respect to the statutory
sections fixing the number of legislative districts and the number
of senators and representatives is sufficient to justify a direct
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
3. A federal reapportionment court should accommodate the relief
ordered to the appropriate provisions of state statutes relating to
the legislature's size as far as possible, and the action of the
District Court here in so drastically changing the number of
districts and the size of the houses of the state legislature is
not required by the Federal Constitution, and is not justified as
an exercise of federal power.
336 F.
Supp. 715, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
These two appeals are taken by the Minnesota State Senate from
orders of a three-judge Federal District Court
Page 406 U. S. 188
reapportioning the Minnesota Legislature. The appeals do not
challenge the District Court's conclusion that the legislature is
now malapportioned. And, at this point, they are not concerned with
population variances or with other issues of the type customarily
presented in reapportionment litigation. The controversy focuses,
instead, on (a) the District Court's refusal to honor the Minnesota
statute fixing the number of the State's legislative districts at
67 and (b) the court's proceeding, over the initial opposition of
all parties (but upon the suggestion of two
amici, the
Lieutenant Governor and a representative), to reduce the number of
legislative districts to 35, the number of senators by almost 50%,
and the number of representatives by nearly 25%. We conclude that
the District Court erred in its rulings. Accordingly, we summarily
vacate the court's orders and remand the cases for further
proceedings promptly to be pursued.
I
The Minnesota Bicameral Legislature was last effectively
apportioned in 1966. Ex.Sess.Laws 1966, c. 1. [
Footnote 1]
Page 406 U. S. 189
Section 2.021 of Minn.Stat. (1969), the very first section of
the 1966 Act, states that, "until a new apportionment shall have
been made," the State's senate shall consist of 67 members and its
house of representatives of 135 members. [
Footnote 2] Section 2.031, subd. 1, from the second
section of the 1966 Act, prescribes 67 legislative districts for
both the senate and the house. [
Footnote 3] Sections 2.041-2.711, inclusive, then
delineate these 67 districts. [
Footnote 4] The State's Constitution, Art. IV, § 2,
provides a legislator-population minimum ratio (one senator for
every 5,000 inhabitants and one representative for every 2,000
inhabitants) and states,
"The representation in both houses shall be apportioned equally
throughout the different sections of the state, in proportion to
the population thereof."
The 1970 federal census took place in due course. The Minnesota
Legislature did not produce a reapportionment act during its
regular session in 1971. One was passed on October 29, 1971, during
the reconvening of an extra session called that year. The lawmakers
adjourned
sine die on October 30. The governor, however,
vetoed the act on November 1, and
Page 406 U. S. 190
this 1971 reapportionment endeavor failed to become law.
[
Footnote 5] The Governor has
not called the legislature to another extra session for more work
on reapportionment, [
Footnote
6] and it is not scheduled to meet again in regular session
until January, 1973. Minn.Const., Art. IV, § 1; Minn.Stat. § 3.01
(1969). The 1972 primary and general elections will take place in
the interim. Minn.Stat. §§ 202.2 and 203.02 (1969). Thus, the 1966
statute remains as the State's last effective legislative
apportionment.
II
The original plaintiffs, who are among the appellees here, are
three qualified voters of the State. By their complaint, filed in
April, 1971, and asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)
and (4) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, they sought (a) a
declaratory judgment that the 1966 Act apportioning the legislature
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
(b) an injunction restraining the Minnesota Secretary of State and
all county auditors from conducting future elections for
legislators pursuant to that Act, and (c) reapportionment of the
legislature by the federal court itself. The three-judge court was
convened. The appellant, the Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate,
intervened as a party defendant under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24(a).
The District Court, after hearings and with the assistance of
stipulations, issued three significant orders:
A. On November 15, 1971, it made appropriate findings, not
challenged here as to their basic provisions,
Page 406 U. S. 191
and declared the 1966 Act in its entirety, Minn.Stat. §§
2.021-2.712 (1969), inclusive, violative of the Federal
Constitution, enjoined the Secretary of State and the county
auditors from conducting future elections under the Act, and
appointed two Special Masters (a third was named later) to aid the
court in formulating a new apportionment plan.
See 336 F.
Supp. 715, 718-719.
B. On December 3, it found
"that it best can fulfill its duty of apportioning the Minnesota
Legislature in accordance with the Constitution of the United
States and with due regard for State policy"
by dividing the State into 35 senatorial districts and dividing
each senatorial district into three house districts, and ordered
that the parties, intervenors, and
amici could present
plans for apportioning the legislature accordingly. In an
accompanying memorandum, the court said, "The only serious
questions . . . are whether we have the authority to change the
size of the Legislature; and if so, to what extent." It answered
the first of these questions in the affirmative, quoting the
following sentence from
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U. S. 1
(1971):
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad,
for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies."
402 U.S. at
402 U. S. 15. The
court stated that the legislature could not be apportioned into 67
senate districts and 135 house districts without violating either
the Federal Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution; that the
existing practice of dividing one senate district into three house
districts and all others into two cannot be continued without
violating the requirements of equal protection; that the greater
the population of each district, the more closely
Page 406 U. S. 192
can the one-man, one-vote standard be met and still give effect
to the state policy of adhering to the boundaries of political
subdivisions; that state policy with respect to the legislature's
size "is difficult to discern"; that the Governor had recommended a
reduction in size; that there is merit in having an odd-numbered
senate and house where, as in Minnesota, the State has "two strong
and rather evenly divided political parties"; that federal
constitutional and state policy requirements can best be harmonized
by having 35 senate districts and by dividing each senate district
into three house districts; that there are persuasive arguments
that "positive benefits to the State will accrue by substantially
reducing the size of the Senate and moderately reducing the size of
the House"; and that "it is not our desire to fix for the future
the size of the Senate and the House in Minnesota," for the
legislature, if it wishes, may appropriately reapportion.
See 336 F. Supp. at 720-721.
C. On January 25, 1972, it entered its "Final Order and Plan of
Apportionment" by which it adopted a plan therein described. The
court also modified its injunction of November 15 so as to enjoin
the state secretary and county auditors from conducting any future
elections for the legislature under any plan other than the one
adopted by the court "or a constitutional plan adopted after this
date by the State of Minnesota." In accord with Minn.Const., Art.
IV, § 24, 1972 elections under the new plan for all position in the
senate and house were ordered.
336 F.
Supp. 715, 732.
The senate, as intervenor, first appealed from the orders of
November 15, 1971, and December 3, 1971 (case No. 71-1024), and
then from the order of January 25, 1972 (case No. 71-1145). Both
appeals are under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. We denied the senate's motion
to expedite the appeals, but granted its motion to consolidate
Page 406 U. S. 193
them. 405 U.S. 985 (1972). We then granted its application for a
temporary stay pending further order of the Court.
Post,
p. 905.
III
The appellees have moved to dismiss. Two grounds are
asserted:
A. That the senate lacks authority and standing to prosecute the
appeals. It is said that the senate's authorizing resolution does
not entitle its counsel to take the appeals; that the resolution
relates only to legislative district boundaries and not to their
number; that the Office of Senate Counsel speaks only for certain
members of the senate, and not for the whole; that it is the
legislature, and not just the senate, that is the legal entity
concerned for purposes of the appeals; and that only the
legislature has standing.
The authorizing senate resolution, however, is in broad
terms:
"BE IT RESOLVED, by the Senate of the State of Minnesota, that
the Office of Senate Counsel be and it is hereby authorized and
directed to take such steps as may be necessary to represent the
interests and will of this body to the extent deemed necessary in
both state and federal court actions involving the prescription of
the bounds of senatorial and representative districts, the
apportionment of senators and representatives among those
districts, and the orderly process of elections therefrom. . .
."
Journal of the Minnesota Senate 1971, 39th Day, p. 460. The
resolution was adopted July 31, 1971, by a 56-to-0 vote. A motion
to reconsider made two and a half months later failed by a vote of
331.
Id., 40th day, at 492.
Page 406 U. S. 194
We are not inclined to read this authorizing resolution
restrictively, as the appellees suggest. Certainly the present
appeals are in a federal court action that concerns apportionment
"and the orderly process of elections therefrom." And certainly the
senate is directly affected by the District Court's orders. That
the senate is an appropriate legal entity for purpose of
intervention and, as a consequence, of an appeal in a case of this
kind is settled by our affirmance of
Silver v.
Jordan, 241 F.
Supp. 576 (SD Cal.1964),
aff'd, 381 U.
S. 415 (1965), where it was said:
"The California State Senate's motion to intervene as a
substantially interested party was granted because it would be
directly affected by the decree of this court."
241 F. Supp. at 579. A group of senators thus had the right to
intervene. The concurrence of the house was not necessary as it
would have been to enact legislation.
B. That the appeals are not from orders granting or denying
injunctive relief, within the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Although the orders of November 15, 1971, and January 25, 1972,
specifically enjoin state and county officers, the appellees assert
that the restraining portions of those orders are not now attacked,
and are conceded by the appellant. This, in our view, is too narrow
an analysis. The order of November 15 clearly enjoins the state and
county officers "from holding or conducting any future elections
under the present Apportionment Statutes." That of January 25 does
the same except with respect to the plan then adopted by the court
or one thereafter validly adopted by the State. The court's
injunctive holding applies to §§ 2.031 and 2.021, respectively
fixing the number of legislative districts and the number of
senators and representatives, as well as to the succeeding sections
determining the
Page 406 U. S. 195
boundaries of the 67 districts. The appellant's appeal relates
to §§ 2.031 and 2.021. The court's injunction with respect to those
sections is sufficient to justify a direct appeal under § 1253.
Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.
S. 383 (1970), cited by the appellees, is
inapposite.
IV
That the three-judge federal court possesses the power to
reapportion the State's legislature when the applicable state
statutes fall short of constitutional requirements is not
questioned.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533,
377 U.S.
586-587 (1964). The 1966 Minnesota apportionment
legislation, the court found, in the light of the 1970 census
figures, no longer provided a constitutionally acceptable
apportionment of either house. No one challenges that basic finding
here, and we have no reason to rule otherwise. The 1971 legislature
had endeavored to reapportion and, thus, to fulfill the requirement
imposed upon it by Art. IV, § 23, of the State's Constitution.
[
Footnote 7]
See Magraw v.
Donovan, 163 F.
Supp. 184, 187-188 (Minn.1958), and
Honsey v.
Donovan, 236 F. Supp.
8 (Minn.1964). The legislature's efforts in that direction,
however, were nullified by the Governor's veto of the Act it
passed, an action the executive had the power to take.
Duxbury
v. Donovan, 272 Minn. 424,
138 N.W.2d
692 (1965). The net result was the continuing applicability of
the 1966 act. Under these circumstances, judicial relief was
appropriate.
Page 406 U. S. 196
The three-judge court, however, was not content with devising
judicial apportionment within the framework of the existing and
otherwise valid statutory structure. Instead of recognizing the
provision in Minn.Stat. § 2.021 (1969), that the state senate "is
composed of 67 members and the house of representatives is composed
of 135 members," and the further provision in § 2.031 that the
senators and representatives "are apportioned throughout the state
in 67 legislative districts," the court declared those sections
invalid along with §§ 2.0412.711, the provisions that delineate the
boundaries of the specified 67 legislative districts.
We need not review at length the several pronouncements of this
Court relating to state legislative reapportionment. The pertinent
cases, particularly those of June 15, 1964, and the guidelines they
provide, are well known. It suffices to note that, in
Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, the
Court stated that apportionment
"is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and
determination, and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only
when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal
constitutional requisites. . . ."
377 U.S. at
377 U.S.
586. [
Footnote 8] But we
also stated,
"With respect to the operation of the Equal Protection Clause,
it makes no difference whether a State's apportionment scheme is
embodied in its constitution or in statutory provisions,"
and, then,
"Clearly, courts should attempt to accommodate the relief
ordered to the apportionment provisions of state constitutions
insofar as is possible."
377 U.S. at
377 U.S.
584. And the Minnesota Constitution, Art. IV, § 23, vests
the legislature with power to reapportion.
Page 406 U. S. 197
It follows from this that a federal reapportionment court should
accommodate the relief ordered to the appropriate provisions of
state statutes relating to the legislature's size insofar as is
possible. We do not have difficulty, as the District Court
professed to have, in discerning the State's policy as to the
legislature's size. That policy, long in effect in Minnesota and
restated no longer than six years ago in § 2.021, is for 67
senators and 135 representatives, and, in § 2.031, is for 67
legislative districts. These are figures that have been determined
by the legislature and approved by the Governor of the State. The
present Governor's contrary recommendation, although certainly
entitled to thoughtful consideration, represents only the
executive's proffered current policy, just as the reapportionment
plan he vetoed on November 1, 1971, represented only the
legislature's proffered current policy.
We note, in repetition, that the District Court invalidated the
entire 1966 Act, §§ 2.021-2.712, despite the fact that the details
of the legislative districts' configurations are included only in
§§ 2.041-2.711. Section 2.021 merely specifies the number of
senators and representatives; § 2.031 calls for the apportionment
of those legislators throughout the State in 67 districts; and §
2.712 provided the effective date of the 1966 act, the efficacy of
which, for the period prior to the 1970 census, is not at issue
here. In the light of the State's policy of statutory severability,
Minn.Stat. § 645.20 (1969), [
Footnote 9]
Page 406 U. S. 198
and recognizing that this specific number of legislative
districts has been in effect in Minnesota since 1913 and through
two succeeding reapportionments, we necessarily conclude that the
District Court's invalidation of the six-year-old reapportionment
law swept too broadly in nullifying statutory sections that are
capable of standing alone.
We know of no federal constitutional principle or requirement
that authorizes a federal reapportioning court to go as far as the
District Court did and, thus, to bypass the State's formal judgment
as to the proper size of its legislative bodies. No case decided by
this Court has gone that far, and we have found no district court
decision that has employed such radical surgery in reapportionment.
There are cases where judicial reapportionment has effectuated
minor changes in a legislature's size. Nearly all those cases
reflect an increase or decrease of only a few seats, [
Footnote 10] and most appear to have
been justified
Page 406 U. S. 199
by a state constitutional demand, agreement of the parties, the
observance of geographical boundaries, or mathematical convenience.
We do not disapprove a court-imposed minor variation from a State's
prescribed figure when that change is shown to be necessary to meet
constitutional requirements. And we would not oppose the District
Court's reducing, in this case, the number of representatives in
the Minnesota house from 135 to 134, as the parties apparently have
been willing to concede. That action would fit exactly the
67-district pattern. But to slash a state senate's size almost in
half and a state house's size by nearly one-fourth is to make more
than a mere minor variation. If a change of that extent were
acceptable, so, too, would be a federal court's cutting or
increasing size by 75% or 90% or, indeed, by prescribing a
unicameral legislature for a State.that has always followed the
bicameral precedent. We repeat what was said recently in another
legislative apportionment case: "The remedial powers of an equity
court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited."
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124,
403 U. S. 161
(1971).
In summary, the number of a State's legislative districts or the
number of members in each house of its legislature raises no issue
of equal protection unless the
Page 406 U. S. 200
number so prescribed occasions significant and invalidating
population deviations.
"Determining the size of its legislative bodies is, of course, a
matter within the discretion of each individual State. Nothing in
this opinion should be read as indicating that there are any
federal constitutional maximums or minimums on the size of state
legislative bodies."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at
377 U.S. 581 n. 63.
See also Connor
v. Johnson, 330 F.
Supp. 506, 507 (SD Miss.),
order stayed on other
grounds, 402 U. S. 690,
opinion on remand, 330 F. Supp. 521 (SD Miss.1971);
Bannister v. Davis, 263 F.
Supp. 202, 208 (ED La.1966);
Dungan v.
Sawyer, 250 F.
Supp. 480, 489 (Nev.1965).
We conclude that the action of the three-judge court in so
drastically changing the number of legislative districts and the
size of the respective houses of the Minnesota Legislature is not
required by the Federal Constitution and is not justified as an
exercise of federal judicial power.
Our ruling here, of course, is no expression of opinion on our
part as to what is desirable by way of legislative size for the
State of Minnesota, or for any other State. It may well be that 67
senators and 135 representatives make a legislature of unwieldy
size. That is a matter of state policy. We certainly are not
equipped -- and it is not our function and task -- to effectuate
policy of that kind or to evaluate it once it has been determined
by the State. Neither is it the function and task of the Federal
District Court. Size is for the State to determine in the exercise
of its wisdom and in the light of it awareness of the needs and
desires of its people.
The orders of the District Court are vacated, and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings consistent
Page 406 U. S. 201
with this opinion. The District Court is instructed to give this
matter priority, and to act promptly and forthwith so that the
State's 1972 electoral process may get under way with assurance as
soon as possible. It is already late in the day, but the
maintenance of legislative districts long in effect provides a
minimum of disruption even now. [
Footnote 11]
The judgment in these cases shall issue forthwith.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 71-1145,
Sixty-seventh Minnesota State
Senate v. Beens et al., on appeal from the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
This was the ninth general reapportionment in Minnesota since
the adoption of the State's Constitution in 1857. Initially there
were 26 districts, 37 senators, and 80 representatives. Minn.Const.
1857, Schedule § 12 (both versions). The succeeding plans, and the
number of districts and legislators they specified, were
Districts Senators Representatives
Laws 1860, c. 73 21 21 42
Laws 1866, c. 4 22 22 47
Laws 1871, c. 20 41 41 106
Laws 1881, c. 128 47 47 103
Laws 1889, c. 2 54 54 114
Laws 1897, c. 120 63 63 119
Laws 1913, c. 91 67 67 130
Ex.Sess.Laws 1959, c. 45 67 67 135
By Laws 1917, c. 217, the number of representatives was
increased by one (the 65th district), but there was no accompanying
general reapportionment.
Throughout this entire period of more than a century, the
Minnesota Constitution, Art. IV, § 23, has called for
reapportionment at the first legislative session after each federal
census.
See also Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F.
Supp. 184 (Minn.1958), and
Honsey v.
Donovan, 236 F. Supp.
8 (Minn.1964).
[
Footnote 2]
"2.021 NUMBER OF MEMBERS. For each legislature, until a new
apportionment shall have been made, the senate is composed of 67
members and the house of representatives is composed of 135
members."
[
Footnote 3]
"2.031 APPORTIONMENT. Subdivision 1. The representatives in the
senate and house of representatives are apportioned throughout the
state in 67 legislative districts."
[
Footnote 4]
Sections 2.041-2.711 were §§ 3-70, inclusive, of the 1966
act.
[
Footnote 5]
A legislative reapportionment act is subject to executive veto
under Minn.Const., Art. IV, §§ 11 and 12, and Art. V, § 4.
Duxbury v. Donovan, 272 Minn. 424,
138 N.W.2d
692 (1965).
[
Footnote 6]
Power is vested in the Governor to convene both houses of the
legislature "on extraordinary occasions." Minn.Const., Art. V, § 4.
This power is also recognized by Art. IV, § 1, of the
Constitution.
[
Footnote 7]
Art. IV, § 23.
"The legislature shall have the power to provide by law for an
enumeration of the inhabitants of this State, and also have the
power at their first session after each enumeration of the
inhabitants of this state made by the authority of the United
States, to prescribe the bounds of congressional, senatorial and
representative districts, and to apportion anew the senators and
representatives among the several districts according to the
provisions of section second of this article."
[
Footnote 8]
In the companion case of
Maryland Committee v. Tawes,
377 U. S. 656,
377 U. S. 676,
the Court observed again that "primary responsibility for
legislative apportionment rests with the legislature itself."
[
Footnote 9]
"645.20 CONSTRUCTION OF SEVERABLE PROVISIONS. Unless there is a
provision in the law that the provisions shall not be severable,
the provisions of all laws shall be severable. If any provision of
a law is found to be unconstitutional and void, the remaining
provisions of the law shall remain valid, unless the court finds
the valid provisions of the law are so essentially and inseparably
connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the
court cannot presume the legislature would have enacted the
remaining valid provisions without the void one; or unless the
court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, are
incomplete, and are incapable of being executed in accordance with
the legislative intent."
The 1966 act did not state that its provisions shall not be
severable. In contrast, Minnesota's immediately preceding
apportionment act, Ex.Sess.Laws 1959, c. 45, did contain, in its §
72, an express nonseverability provision; that provision was
repealed by c. 1, § 71, of the 1966 act. The legislative intent in
1966 is thus apparent.
[
Footnote 10]
Sims v. Amos, 336 F.
Supp. 924, 936, 937 (MD Ala.1972) (house reduced from 106 to
105 so as to have three times the number of senate seats);
Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F.
Supp. 450 (Wyo.1965),
aff'd, 383 U.
S. 269 (1966) (senate increased from 25 to 30 on
agreement of the parties and in accord with the state
constitution);
Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F.
Supp. 537 (Ariz.1966) (senate reduced from 31 to 30 and house
from 80 to 60. The preservation of county lines, as prescribed by
the State's constitution, Art. 4, pt. 2, § 1, was an announced
consideration in this substantial house reduction which no one
opposed. No appeal was taken);
Herweg v. Thirty Ninth
Legislative Assembly, 246 F.
Supp. 454 (Mont.1965) (senate reduced from 56 to 55 and house
increased from 94 to 104. A constitutional provision, Art. VI, § 3,
prohibiting the division of counties, was thereby observed);
Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp.
36 (ND 1965) (senate reduced from 53 to 49 and house from 106
to 98. The State's constitution, Art. II, § 26, mandated a senate
of 49 members).
In other cases, federal courts have altered the size of existing
legislatures by approximating the number of legislators specified
in new plans that the courts were nullifying.
Swann v.
Adams, 263 F.
Supp. 225 (SD Fla.1967);
WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 238 F.
Supp. 916 (SDNY 1965),
aff'd, 382 U. S.
4 (1965). The state policy thus has been effectuated
despite the invalidity of the legislature's proposed plan.
[
Footnote 11]
The 1972 general election in Minnesota will take place November
7. The primaries are scheduled for September 12. Candidates may
file between July 5 and July 18. A legislative candidate must
establish residence in his district by May 7. Minn.Stat. §§ 20302,
202.02, 202.04; Minn.Const., Art. IV, § 25. Inasmuch as the
Minnesota Legislature is nonpartisan, Minn.Stat. § 202.03, subd. 1,
the earlier dates for political party precinct caucuses and party
conventions have no relevance in these cases. If time presses too
seriously, the District Court has the power appropriately to extend
the time limitations imposed by state law.
See Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S.
1,
402 U. S. 15
(1971).
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting.
It is undisputed here that the apportionment of the Minnesota
State Legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, it was incumbent upon the three-judge
federal court to devise a constitutional reapportionment unless and
until the Minnesota Legislature and Governor could agree upon and
enact a new and constitutional reapportionment of their own. The
only question presented by these appeals is whether the three-judge
court abused its equitable discretion by devising the
reapportionment plan that it did -- a plan that called for a
reduction in the size of both houses of the state legislature.
There is no doubt that,
"[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad,
for breadth and
Page 406 U. S. 202
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U. S. 1,
402 U. S. 15. At
the same time "[t]he remedial powers of an equity court . . . are
not unlimited."
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.
S. 124,
403 U. S. 161.
In the reapportionment context, it is the duty of a court seeking
to remedy an unconstitutional apportionment to right the
constitutional wrong while minimizing disturbance of legitimate
state policies.
In these cases, the three-judge court appears conscientiously to
have undertaken this task. It clearly recognized that the size of
the houses of the Minnesota Legislature set by state statute was a
state policy deserving respect. But it also recognized that there
were several other legitimate state policies at stake for one, the
conformance of legislative district boundaries to political
jurisdictional boundaries. The three-judge court also found that
these policies were, unfortunately, in conflict. It stated:
"The larger the population of each Senate and House District,
the more closely can the equal protection (one man-one vote)
requirements be met and still give effect to the State policy of
adhering to the boundaries of political subdivisions. Conversely,
the smaller the population of each district, the greater the
likelihood that the deviations will be higher than are acceptable
or that artificial boundaries will result."
Faced with this perceived conflict among legitimate state
policies, the three-judge court weighed those policies and decided
that preservation of political jurisdictional boundaries should
take precedence over preservation of the present size of the senate
and the house. [
Footnote 2/1]
Page 406 U. S. 203
Perhaps the three-judge court's assessment of the relative
weights of what it saw as competing state policies was mistaken.
Perhaps its accommodation of those policies was also mistaken. But
those judgments by the three-judge court were based on long and
careful study of the distribution of population in Minnesota, and
of the possible alternative apportionments of the legislature.
This Court chooses to act on these appeals summarily. Yet we do
not have before us all the population statistics and jurisdictional
and district maps that were before the three-judge court. We do not
have the benefit of the reports of the Special Masters that were
available to the three-judge court. We do not even have briefs on
the merits of these cases. And, of course, we have not heard oral
arguments. For these and other reasons, we are simply not able at
this point even to begin to evaluate the three-judge court's
exercise of its remedial power in equity.
Surely, if state policies are in real conflict, and if, as the
three-judge court found, equal protection requirements cannot be
met without sacrificing one of these policies, then the cases are
very difficult. I certainly cannot say, on the basis of the
information before us, that the three-judge court clearly
overstepped its equitable discretion in its resolution of the
problem. As the Court recognizes today, there is no rigid and
absolute limit on a court's equitable discretion to order changes
in the size of legislative bodies in order to remedy an
unconstitutional apportionment. Every case is different, and these
questions are inevitably questions of degree.
I have disagreed with the Court's Procrustean view of the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive requirement of "one man, one
vote." [
Footnote 2/2] But until and
unless those established
Page 406 U. S. 204
requirements are modified, the federal courts are often going to
be faced with hard remedial problems such as those presented here.
Difficult problems produce solutions that are difficult to review,
even after full briefing and oral argument. I cannot believe that
summary action here is either wise or appropriate, and I therefore
respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The court also was careful to recognize another state policy --
that there should be an odd number of legislators in each house, so
as to minimize the risk of tie votes.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See, e.g., Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly,
377 U. S. 713,
377 U. S. 744;
Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440,
385 U. S. 447.
See also Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.
S. 542,
394 U. S.
549.