The exceptions to the Special Master's Report in this action
brought by Nebraska for construction and enforcement of the
Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of 1943, entered into to establish a
permanent location of a boundary line made difficult by the
meanderings of the Missouri River, are generally overruled. Iowa's
exception to the Master's recommendation for an injunction
enjoining Iowa from further prosecution of certain pending cases is
sustained, as the Court is confident Iowa will abide by the
adoption of the Master's conclusion that, in any proceeding between
a private litigant and the State in which a claim of title good
under Nebraska law to land allegedly ceded to Iowa under the
Compact is proved, Iowa shall not invoke its common law doctrine of
state ownership as defeating such title. The States may submit a
proposed decree in accordance with this opinion, and, if they
cannot agree, the Master will prepare and submit a recommended
decree. Pp.
406 U. S.
117-127.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Both Iowa and Nebraska filed Exceptions to the Report submitted
by the Special Master in this original action brought by Nebraska
against Iowa for construction
Page 406 U. S. 118
and enforcement of the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of 1943.
[
Footnote 1]
The Missouri River is the boundary between the two States. In
1892, in another suit brought by Nebraska against Iowa, this Court
held that the boundary line in the river at Carter Lake, Iowa, was
to be located according to the principle that the boundary "is a
varying line" so far as affected by "changes of diminution and
accretion in the mere washing of the waters of the stream," but not
where the river is shifted by avulsion:
"By this selection of a new channel, the boundary was not
changed, and it remained as it was prior to the avulsion, the
centre line of the old channel; . . . unless the waters of the
river returned to their former bed, [such center line] became a
fixed and unvarying boundary, no matter what might be the changes
of the river in its new channel."
Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359,
143 U. S. 370
(1892); the decree is in
145 U. S. 145
U.S. 19 (1892). The Compact adopts this line at Carter Lake, and,
for the rest of the boundary, fixes the line in "the middle of the
main channel of the Missouri river," defined as the
"center line of the proposed stabilized channel of the Missouri
river as established
Page 406 U. S. 119
by the United States engineers' office, Omaha, Nebraska, and
shown on the alluvial plain maps of the Missouri river from Sioux
City, Iowa, to Rulo, Nebraska, and identified by file numbers AP-1
to 4 inclusive, dated January 30, 1940, and file numbers AP-5 to 10
inclusive, dated March 29, 1940, which maps are now on file in the
United States engineers' office at Omaha, Nebraska, and copies of
which maps are now on file with the secretary of state of the State
of Iowa and with the secretary of state of the State of
Nebraska."
The "proposed stabilized channel" refers to a project begun in
the early 1930's by the United States Army Corps of Engineers to
tame the river along its entire length by containing it within a
designed channel. The work had been partially completed by 1943,
but was suspended when World War II intervened. When work resumed
in 1948, the channel was partly redesigned, and, by 1959, the river
had been confined in the newly designed channel.
The States determined in 1943 to agree by compact upon a
permanent location of the boundary line when experience showed
that
"the fickle Missouri River . . . refused to be bound by the
Supreme Court decree [of 1892] . In the past thirty-five years, the
river has changed its course so often that it has proved impossible
to apply the court decision in all cases, since it is difficult to
determine whether the channel of the river has changed by 'the law
of accretion' or 'that of avulsion.'"
Eriksson, Boundaries of Iowa, 25 Iowa J. of Hist. and Pol. 163,
234 (1927). The Special Master found, on ample evidence, and we
adopt his findings, that, by 1943, the shifts of the river channel
had been so numerous and intricate, both in its natural state and
as a result of the work of the Corps of Engineers, that it would be
practically impossible to locate the original boundary line.
[
Footnote 2]
Page 406 U. S. 120
The fixing of the permanent boundary by Compact resulted in some
riparian lands formerly in each State being located within the
other State. This created the problem of the effect to be given by
the new State to titles, mortgages, and other liens that had arisen
under the laws of the other State. Sections 2 and 3 of the Compact
were designed to solve this problem. [
Footnote 3] Under § 2, each State "cedes" to the other
State "and relinquishes jurisdiction over" all such lands now
located within the Compact boundary of the other. Under § 3,
"[t]itles, mortgages, and other liens" affecting such lands "good
in" the ceding State "shall be good in" the other State.
The instant dispute between the States arose when Iowa, in 1963,
claimed state ownership of some 30 separate areas of land, water,
marsh, or mixture of the three wholly on the Iowa side of the
Compact boundary. The eighth and part of a ninth such areas were
formed before 1943. The 21st and part of a 22d were formed after
143. [
Footnote 4] Iowa's claim
was based on Iowa common
Page 406 U. S. 121
law that private titles to riparian lands run only to the
ordinary high-water mark on navigable streams, and that the State
is the owner of the beds of all navigable streams within the State,
and is also the owner of any islands that may form therein.
McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1 (1856);
Holman v.
Hodges, 112 Iowa 714, 84 N.W. 950 (1901). The areas formed
before 1943 lie south of Omaha, and those formed after 1943 lie
north of Omaha. Two of the pre-1943 areas are Nottleman Island and
Schemmel Island. Each is the subject of an action to quiet title
brought by Iowa in Iowa courts. [
Footnote 5] The defense in each case is that there exist
"titles . . . good in Nebraska" to the islands that, under § 3 of
the Compact, Iowa obligated itself to recognize to be "good in
Iowa" as against any claim of Iowa under its doctrine of state
ownership.
Thus, the controversy between the States in this case centers
around the proper construction of their Compact. The Special
Master's Findings and Conclusions generally favor Nebraska's
position on the merits of the controversy over the areas that
formed before July 12, 1943, and Iowa's exceptions are addressed to
them. On the other hand, the Findings and Conclusions favor Iowa's
position on the merits of the controversy over the areas that
formed after July 12, 1943, and Nebraska's exceptions are primarily
addressed to them. We overrule all exceptions,
Page 406 U. S. 122
save two, of Nebraska's addressed to printing errors in the
Report, [
Footnote 6] except as
we sustain,
infra, Iowa's Exceptions IV and V insofar as
the Special Master recommended that an injunction issue, and except
as mentioned in
n 8,
infra.
The Special Master construed the word "cedes" in § 2 as meant by
the States to describe all areas formed before July 12, 1943,
regardless of their location with reference to the original
boundary, whose "[t]itles, mortgages, and other liens" were, at the
date of the Compact, "good in" the ceding State, and ruled that,
under § 3, the other State is bound to recognize such "[t]itles,
mortgages, and other liens" to be "good in" its State, and not to
claim ownership in itself. Iowa urges, in its Exceptions II and
III, that this construction is erroneous, and that §§ 2 and 3
should be construed as relating only to areas formed before July
12, 1943, that can be proved by clear, satisfactory, and convincing
evidence to have been on the Nebraska side of the original boundary
before the Compact fixed the permanent boundary. We overrule Iowa's
Exceptions. Iowa's construction would require the claimant who
proves title "good in Nebraska" also to shoulder the burden of
proving the location of the original boundary before 1943, as well
as proving that the lands were on the Nebraska side of that
boundary. That, said the Special Master, and we agree,
"would be placing a burden upon the landowner which the states
themselves refused to undertake in 1943 and agreed would not be
necessary. The states would, in effect, be saying to the
landowners, 'we could not prove where the boundary was in 1943, but
now, after we have waited 27
Page 406 U. S. 123
years, we are going to make you prove where it was at your
expense, even though we know it is impossible.' [
Footnote 7]"
Iowa's Exceptions IV and V concern the Special Master's findings
that the State of Iowa does not own Nottleman Island and Schemmel
Island. The Special Master found that the proofs sufficed to
establish title "good in Nebraska" to Nottleman Island and Schemmel
Island, but did not suffice to prove title "good in Nebraska" to
the other areas claimed by Iowa that were formed before 1943.
[
Footnote 8] He found, and we
agree, that titles "good in Nebraska" include private titles to
riparian lands that, under Nebraska law, differing from Iowa law,
run to the thread of the contiguous stream.
Kinkead v.
Turgeon, 74 Neb. 573, 104 N.W. 1061 (1905), 74 Neb. 580, 109
N.W. 744 (1906). [
Footnote 9]
He found further that titles "good in Nebraska" embrace titles
obtained by 10 years' open, notorious, and adverse possession under
claim of right without any requirement of a record title; under
Iowa law, a claim must be under
Page 406 U. S. 124
"color of title," requiring some type of record title to
commence the period of adverse possession. [
Footnote 10]
The Special Master recommended that, as to areas formed before
July 12, 1943, §§ 2 and 3 should be construed as limiting the State
of Iowa to contesting with private litigants in state or federal
courts the question whether the private claimants can prove title
"good in Nebraska," and, when private litigants prove such title,
as obliging Iowa not to interpose Iowa's doctrine of state
ownership as defeating such title. [
Footnote 11] We agree, and to that extent overrule Iowa's
Exceptions IV and V. As to Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island,
however, the Special Master recommended that, in addition to a
judgment that titles "good in Nebraska" have been proved as to
those islands, so that Iowa is precluded from claiming title
thereto under its doctrine of state ownership, this Court should
enjoin the State of Iowa, its officers, agents, and servants from
further prosecution of the cases now pending in the Iowa courts.
[
Footnote 12] We see no
reason for an injunction at this stage. We are confident that the
State of Iowa will abide by our adoption of the Special Master's
conclusion that, in any proceeding between a private litigant and
the State of Iowa in which a claim of title good under the law of
Nebraska is proved, the State of Iowa will not invoke its common
law doctrine of state ownership as defeating such title. Iowa's
Exceptions IV and V are therefore sustained insofar as the Special
Master recommended that an injunction issue.
Nebraska's basic Exception is to the Findings and Conclusion of
the Special Master that ownership of areas that have formed since
July 12, 1943, should be determined
Page 406 U. S. 125
under the law of the State in which they formed, the boundary
fixed by the Compact being the line that determines in which State
they formed. [
Footnote 13]
This pertains to the 21 areas and part of a 22d that lie north of
Omaha.
See n 4,
supra.
Although the Special Master recommended, and we agree, that
claimants of title to these areas as against Iowa may also have the
opportunity to show title "good in Nebraska" on the Compact date,
July 12, 1943, [
Footnote 14]
Nebraska offered no proof to support such a claim as to any of the
areas. Nebraska does contend, however, that any accretions to
Nebraska riparian lands that cross the Compact boundary line into
Iowa, caused when the river moves gradually and imperceptibly,
should be declared to accrue to the Nebraska riparian owner under
Nebraska law, since, under Nebraska law, the boundary of the
Nebraska owner moves with the thalweg or main navigable channel,
regardless of which State the movement is in. The Special Master
rejected that contention. We agree that the contention is without
merit for the reasons stated in
Tyson v. State of Iowa,
283 F.2d 802 (CA8 1960). That was a condemnation action by the
United States in which the question was the ownership of an island
at Tyson Bend, one of the areas north of Omaha to which Iowa claims
ownership.
See n 4,
supra. The island had formed between the designed channel
and a main channel created when the river escaped from the designed
channel between 1943 and 1948. The island had then become connected
to the Nebraska shore when the designed channel filled with
sediment after a 1952 flood. The Corps of Engineers determined to
dredge a canal in the designed channel to place the river back in
the designed channel.
Page 406 U. S. 126
Condemnation of an easement on the island was necessary to carry
the project forward, and the question of ownership of the island
had to be settled to determine who was entitled to compensation.
The Tyson claimants claimed the land as an accretion to Nebraska
land or river beds belonging to them. The State of Iowa claimed it
as an island formed over the state-owned river bed in Iowa under
the Iowa doctrine of state ownership. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the ownership of the island should be
determined by the law of the State in which the land was situated,
that is, by the law of Iowa, since the island was on the Iowa side
of the Compact boundary. The Court of Appeals expressly rejected
the same contention urged upon us by Nebraska, holding, in
agreement with the District Court in the case, that "the Nebraska
law of accretion did not operate to create riparian rights within
the territorial limits of Iowa." 283 F.2d at 811. Hence, whether
the Nebraska riparian owner has title to the accretions that cross
the boundary into Iowa is determined by Iowa law. Nebraska argues
that
Tyson was wrongly decided. We do not agree.
Tyson is consistent with what the Court said in
Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158,
246 U. S.
175-176 (1918):
"How the land that emerges on either side of an interstate
boundary stream shall be disposed of as between public and private
ownership is a matter to be determined according to the law of each
State, under the familiar doctrine that it is for the States to
establish for themselves such rule of property as they deem
expedient with respect to the navigable waters within their borders
and the riparian land adjacent to them. . . .
But these
dispositions are, in each case, limited by the interstate boundary,
and cannot be permitted to press back the boundary
Page 406 U. S. 127
line from where otherwise it should be located."
(Emphasis added.)
The States may submit a proposed decree in accord with this
opinion. If the States cannot agree, the Special Master is
requested, after appropriate hearing, to prepare and submit a
recommended decree.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Iowa Code 1971, p. 1xiv; Iowa Acts 1943, c. 306; Nebraska Laws
1943, c. 130; Act of July 12, 1943, 57 Stat. 494.
Leave to file the action was granted in 1965. 379 U.S. 876
(1964); 379 U.S. 996 (1965). There have been successive Special
Masters
See 380 U.S. 968 (1965); 392 U.S. 918 (1968); 393 U.S.
910 (1968). Senior Judge Joseph P. Willson completed the case after
extensive hearings, and filed his Report on November 9, 1971. 404
U.S. 933 (1971). The Exceptions of the States were orally argued
before this Court on March 29, 1972.
Iowa's Exception I renews the objection to the Court's
jurisdiction that was overruled when leave to file was granted. We
overrule the Exception.
"Just as this Court has power to settle disputes between States
where there is no compact, it must have final power to pass upon
the meaning and validity of compacts."
West Virginiai ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S.
22,
341 U. S. 28
(1951); Const. Art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C.§ 1251.
[
Footnote 2]
Report 63, 65, 67, 68, 80.
[
Footnote 3]
Each State Legislature adopted a statute to evidence its
agreement to the Compact. Sections 2 and 3 of each statute create
obligations reciprocated by the other State in §§ 2 and 3 of its
statute. In the Iowa statute the sections are:
"SEC. 2. The State of Iowa hereby cedes to the State of Nebraska
and relinquishes jurisdiction over all lands now in Iowa but lying
westerly of said boundary line and contiguous to lands in
Nebraska."
"SEC. 3. Titles, mortgages, and other liens good in Nebraska
shall be good in Iowa as to any lands Nebraska may cede to Iowa and
any pending suits or actions concerning said lands may be
prosecuted to final judgment in Nebraska and such judgments shall
be accorded full force and effect in Iowa."
[
Footnote 4]
The areas formed before 1943 are Nottleman Island, Schemmel
Island, St. Mary's Bend, Auldon Bar, Copeland Bend, State Line
Island, Wilson Island, Deer Island, and a portion of Winnebago
Bend. Report 106, 165.
The areas formed since 1943 are Dakota Bend, Omadi Bend, Between
Omadi and Browers Bends, Snyder Bend, Glover's Point Bend, Rabbit
Island, Upper Monona Bend, Monona Bend, Blackbird Bend, Tieville
Bend, Upper Decatur Bend, Middle Decatur Bend, Lower Decatur Bend,
Louisville Bend, Blencoe Bend, Little Sioux Bend, Bullard Bend,
Soldier Bend, Sandy Point Bend, Tyson Bend, and California Bend.
Id. at 107.
[
Footnote 5]
On March 18, 1963, Iowa filed, in the District Court for Mills
County,
State of Iowa v. Darwin Merrit Babbit et al.,
Equity No. 17433, to quiet title to Nottleman Island. On March 26,
1963, Iowa filed, in the District Court of Fremont County,
State of Iowa v. Henry E. Schemmel et al., Equity
No.19765, to quiet title to Schemmel Island. Proceedings in the
actions have been suspended pending our decision.
[
Footnote 6]
Exceptions of the State of Nebraska, No. 6, p. 8, and No. 12, p.
11. Iowa concedes that the Exceptions are well taken. Iowa Reply 5,
7. The errors will be deemed corrected as suggested by the
Exceptions.
[
Footnote 7]
Report 88-89.
[
Footnote 8]
Id. at 174. The Special Master found, alternatively,
that, if his construction of §§ 2 and 3 was not accepted,
nevertheless the landowners met the burden of proving that
Nottleman and Schemmel Islands were actually on the Nebraska side
of the original boundary. Since we agree with the Special Master's
construction, we consider no Exceptions addressed to those
findings.
[
Footnote 9]
In Iowa's Reply, filed January 19, 1972, Iowa for the first tmle
in this protracted litigation retracts its concession, made often
and throughout the proceedings, that Kinkead established this
principle of Nebraska law. In its Reply, at 116, Iowa contends
that
"the common law of the State of Nebraska did not in fact, give
the Nebraska riparian owners along the Missouri River title or
ownership of the bed of the navigable channel of the river, and
they acquired no property right to such bed until it was abandoned
by the river."
Our reading of the Nebraska cases satisfies us that the argument
is frivolous.
[
Footnote 10]
Report 669. Claimants to titles to areas of Nottleman Island
rested at least in part on the Nebraska law of adverse possession.
Report 121-126.
[
Footnote 11]
Id. at 174-175.
[
Footnote 12]
Id. at 201;
see n 5,
supra.
[
Footnote 13]
Id. at 193.
[
Footnote 14]
Id. at 192