Respondent taxpayer owned 44% of the stock of a closely held
construction corporation, with an original investment of 38,900,
and received an annual salary of $12,000 for serving as president
on a part-time basis. His total income was about $40,000 a year. He
advanced money to the corporation and signed an indemnity agreement
with a bonding company, which furnished bid and performance bonds
for the construction contracts. The corporation defaulted on
contracts in 1962, and the taxpayer advanced over $158,000 to the
corporation and indemnified the bonding company to the extent of
more than $162,000. The corporation went into receivership and he
obtained no reimbursement for thee sums. On his 1962 income tax
return, the taxpayer took his loss on direct loans to the
corporation as a nonbusiness bad debt, but he claimed the
indemnification loss as a business debt and deducted it against
ordinary income and asserted net loss carrybacks for the portion
unused in 1962, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 172. Treasury Regulations
provide that, if, at the time of worthlessness, the debt has a
"proximate" relationship to the taxpayer' business, the debt
qualifies as a business bad debt. In his suit for a tax refund, the
taxpayer testified that his sole motive for signing the
indemnification agreement was to protect his $12,000-a-year
employment with the corporation. The jury was asked to determine
whether signing the agreement "was proximately related to his trade
or business of being an employee" of the corporation. The court
refused the Government's request for an instruction that the
applicable standard was that of dominant motivation and charged the
jury that significant motivation satisfies the Regulations'
requirement of proximate relationship. The jury's verdict was for
the taxpayer
Page 405 U. S. 94
and the Court of Appeals affirmed, approving the significant
motivation standard.
Held:
1. In determining whether a bad debt has a "proximate" relation
to the taxpayer's trade or business, and thus qualifies as a
business bad debt, the proper standard is that of dominant
motivation, rather than significant motivation. Pp.
405 U. S.
103-105.
2. There is nothing in the record that would support a jury
verdict in the taxpayer's favor had the dominant motivation
standard been embodied in the instructions. Pp.
405 U. S.
106-107.
427 F.2d 279, reversed and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and MARSHALL, JJ., joined and in which
(as to Parts I, II, and III) BRENNAN and WHITE, JJ., joined.
MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
405 U. S. 107.
WHITE, J., filed a separate opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined;
post, p.
405 U. S. 112.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
405 U. S. 113.
POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
A debt a closely held corporation owed to an indemnifying
shareholder employee became worthless in 1962. The issue in this
federal income tax refund suit is whether, for the shareholder
employee, that worthless obligation was a business or a nonbusiness
bad debt within the meaning and reach of §§ 166(a) and (d) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26
Page 405 U. S. 95
U.S.C. §§ 166(a) and (d), [
Footnote 1] and of the implementing Regulations § 1.166-5.
[
Footnote 2]
The issue's resolution is important for the taxpayer. If the
obligation was a business debt, he may use it to
Page 405 U. S. 96
offset ordinary income and for carryback purposes under § 172 of
the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 172. On the other hand, if the obligation is
a nonbusiness debt, it is to be treated as a short-term capital
loss subject to the restrictions imposed on such losses by §
166(d)(1)(B) and §§ 1211 and 1212, and its use for carryback
purposes is restricted by § 172(d)(4). The debt is one or the other
in its entirety, for the Code does not provide for its allocation
in part to business and in part to nonbusiness.
In determining whether a bad debt is a business or a nonbusiness
obligation, the Regulations focus on the relation the loss bears to
the taxpayer's business. If, at the time of worthlessness, that
relation is a "proximate" one, the debt qualifies as a business bad
debt and the aforementioned desirable tax consequences then
ensue.
The present case turns on the proper measure of the required
proximate relation. Does this necessitate a "dominant" business
motivation on the part of the taxpayer, or is a "significant"
motivation sufficient?
Tax in an amount somewhat in excess of $40,000 is involved. The
taxpayer, Allen H. Generes, [
Footnote 3] prevailed in a jury trial in the District
Court.
See 67-2 U.S.T.C. 9754 (ED La.). On the
Government's appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed by a divided vote.
427 F.2d 279 (CA5 1970). Certiorari was granted, 401 U.S. 972
(1971), to resolve a conflict among the circuits. [
Footnote 4]
Page 405 U. S. 97
I
The taxpayer, as a young man in 1909, began work in the
construction business. His son-in law, William F. Kelly, later
engaged independently in similar work. During World War II, the two
men formed a partnership in which their participation was equal.
The enterprise proved successful. In 1954, Kelly Generes
Construction Co., Inc., was organized as the corporate successor to
the partnership. It engaged in the heavy-construction business,
primarily on public works projects.
The taxpayer and Kelly each owned 44% of the corporation's
outstanding capital stock. The taxpayer's original investment in
his shares was $38,900. The remaining 12% of the stock was owned by
a son of the taxpayer and by another son-in law. Mr. Generes was
president of the corporation, and received from it an annual salary
of $12,000. Mr. Kelly was executive vice-president, and received an
annual salary of $15,000.
The taxpayer and Mr. Kelly performed different services for the
corporation. Kelly worked full time in the field, and was in charge
of the day-to-day construction operations. Generes, on the other
hand, devoted no more than six to eight hours a week to the
enterprise. He reviewed bids and jobs, made cost estimates,
sought
Page 405 U. S. 98
and obtained bank financing, and assisted in securing the bid
and performance bonds that are an essential part of the public
project construction business. Mr. Generes, in addition to being
president of the corporation, held a full-time position as
president of a savings and loan association he had founded in 1937.
He received from the association an annual salary of $19,000. The
taxpayer also had other sources of income. His gross income
averaged about $40,000 a year during 1959-1962.
Taxpayer Generes from time to time advanced personal funds to
the corporation to enable it to complete construction jobs. He also
guaranteed loans made to the corporation by banks for the purchase
of construction machinery and other equipment. In addition, his
presence with respect to the bid and performance bonds is of
particular significance. Most of these were obtained from Maryland
Casualty Co. That underwriter required the taxpayer and Kelly to
sign an indemnity agreement for each bond it issued for the
corporation. In 1958, however, in order to eliminate the need for
individual indemnity contracts, taxpayer and Kelly signed a blanket
agreement with Maryland whereby they agreed to indemnify it, up to
a designated amount, for any loss it suffered as surety for the
corporation. Maryland then increased its line of surety credit to
$2,000,000. The corporation had over $14,000,000 gross business for
the period 1954 through 1962.
In 1962, the corporation seriously underbid two projects and
defaulted in its performance of the project contracts. It proved
necessary for Maryland to complete the work. Maryland then sought
indemnity from Generes and Kelly. The taxpayer indemnified Maryland
to the extent of $162,104.57. In the same year, he also loaned
$158,814.49 to the corporation to assist it in its financial
difficulties. The corporation subsequently went into
receivership
Page 405 U. S. 99
and the taxpayer was unable to obtain reimbursement from it.
In his federal income tax return for 1962 the taxpayer took his
loss on his direct loans to the corporation as a nonbusiness bad
debt. He claimed the indemnification loss as a business bad debt
and deducted it against ordinary income. [
Footnote 5] Later, he filed claims for refund for
1959-1961, asserting net operating loss carrybacks under § 172 to
those years for the portion, unused in 1962, of the claimed
business bad debt deduction.
In due course, the claims were made the subject of the jury
trial refund suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. At the trial, Mr. Generes testified
that his sole motive in signing the indemnity agreement was to
protect his $12,000-a-year employment with the corporation. The
jury, by special interrogatory, was asked to determine whether
taxpayer's signing of the indemnity agreement with Maryland "was
proximately related to his trade or business of being an employee"
of the corporation. The District Court charged the jury, over the
Government's objection, that
significant motivation
satisfies the Regulations' requirement of proximate relationship.
[
Footnote 6] The court refused
the Government's request for an instruction that the applicable
standard was that of
dominant, rather than significant,
motivation. [
Footnote 7]
Page 405 U. S. 100
After twice returning to the court for clarification of the
instruction given, the jury found that the taxpayer's signing of
the indemnity agreement was proximately related to his trade or
business of being an employee of the corporation. Judgment on this
verdict was then entered for the taxpayer.
The Fifth Circuit majority approved the significant motivation
standard so specified and agreed with a Second Circuit majority in
Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849, 851 (1963), in
finding comfort for so doing in the tort law's concept of proximate
cause. Judge Simpson dissented. 427 F.2d at 284. He agreed with the
holding of the Seventh Circuit in
Niblock v. Commissioner,
417 F.2d 1185 (1969), and with Chief Judge Lumbard, separately
concurring in
Weddle, 325 F.2d at 852, that dominant and
primary motivation is the standard to be applied.
II
A. The fact responsible for the litigation is the taxpayer's
dual status relative to the corporation. Generes was both a
shareholder and an employee. These interests are not the same, and
their differences occasion different tax consequences. In tax
jargon, Generes' status as a shareholder was a nonbusiness
interest. It was capital in nature, and it was composed initially
of tax-paid dollars. Its rewards were expectative, and would flow
not from personal effort, but from investment
Page 405 U. S. 101
earnings and appreciation. On the other hand, Generes' status as
an employee was a business interest. Its nature centered in
personal effort and labor, and salary for that endeavor would be
received. The salary would consist of pre-tax dollars.
Thus, for tax purposes, it becomes important and, indeed,
necessary to determine the character of the debt that went bad and
became uncollectible. Did the debt center on the taxpayer's
business interest in the corporation or on his nonbusiness
interest? If it was the former, the taxpayer deserves to prevail
here.
Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (CA2 1961);
Jaffe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo � 67,215;
Estate of
Saperstein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo � 70,209;
Faucher v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo � 70,217;
Rosati v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 70,343; Rev.Rul. 71-561, 1971-50
Int.Rev. Bull. 13.
B. Although arising in somewhat different contexts, two tax
cases decided by the Court in recent years merit initial mention.
In each of these cases, a major shareholder paid out money to or on
behalf of his corporation and then was unable to obtain
reimbursement from it. In each, he claimed a deduction assertable
against ordinary income. In each, he was unsuccessful in this
quest:
1. In
Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U. S.
82 (1956), the taxpayer was a practicing lawyer who had
guaranteed obligations of a labor newspaper corporation in which he
owned stock. He claimed his loss as fully deductible in 1948 under
§ 23(e)(2) of the 1939 Code. The standard prescribed by that
statute was incurrence of the loss "in any transaction entered into
for profit, though not connected with the trade or business." The
Court rejected this approach and held that the loss was a
nonbusiness bad debt subject to short-term capital loss treatment
under § 23(k)(4). The loss was deductible
Page 405 U. S. 102
as a bad debt or not at all.
See Rev.Rul. 60-48, 1961
Cum.Bull. 112.
2. In
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.
S. 193 (1963), the taxpayer had provided organizational,
promotional, and managerial services to a corporation in which he
owned approximately an 80% stock interest. He claimed that this
constituted a trade or business, and, hence, that debts owing him
by the corporation were business bad debts when they became
worthless in 1953. The Court also rejected that contention, and
held that Whipple's investing was not a trade or business, that is,
that
"[d]evoting one's time and energies to the affairs of a
corporation is not, of itself, and without more, a trade or
business of the person so engaged."
373 U.S. at
373 U. S. 202.
The rationale was that a contrary conclusion would be inconsistent
with the principle that a corporation has a personality separate
from its shareholders, and that its business is not necessarily
their business. The Court indicated its approval of the
Regulations' proximate relation test:
"Moreover, there is no proof (which might be difficult to
furnish where the taxpayer is the sole or dominant stockholder)
that the loan was necessary to keep his job or was otherwise
proximately related to maintaining his trade or business as an
employee.
Compare Trent v. Commissioner, [291 F.2d 669
(CA2 1961)]."
373 U.S. at
373 U. S. 204.
The Court also carefully noted the distinction between the business
and the nonbusiness bad debt for one who is both an employee and a
shareholder. [
Footnote 8]
Page 405 U. S. 103
These two cases approach, but do not govern, the present one.
They indicate, however, a cautious, and not a free-wheeling,
approach to the business bad debt. Obviously, taxpayer Generes
endeavored to frame his case to bring it within the area indicated
in the above quotation from
Whipple v. Commissioner.
III
We conclude that, in determining whether a bad debt has a
"proximate" relation to the taxpayer's trade or business, as the
Regulations specify, and thus qualifies as a business bad debt, the
proper measure is that of dominant motivation, and that only
significant motivation is not sufficient. We reach this conclusion
for a number of reasons:
A. The Code itself carefully distinguishes between business and
nonbusiness items. It does so, for example, in § 165 with respect
to losses, in § 166 with respect to bad debts, and in § 162 with
respect to expenses. It gives particular tax benefits to business
losses, business bad debts, and business expenses, and gives lesser
benefits, or none at all, to nonbusiness losses, nonbusiness bad
debts, and nonbusiness expenses. It does this despite the fact that
the latter are just as adverse in financial consequence to the
taxpayer as are the former. But this distinction has been a policy
of the income tax structure ever since the Revenue Act of 1916, §
5(a), 39 Stat. 759, provided differently for trade or business
losses than it did for losses sustained in another transaction
entered into for profit. And it has been the specific policy with
respect to bad debts since the Revenue Act of 1942 incorporated
into § 23(k) of the 1939 Code the distinction between business and
nonbusiness bad debts. 56 Stat. 820.
The point, however, is that the tax statutes have made the
distinction, that the Congress therefore intended it
Page 405 U. S. 104
to be a meaningful one, and that the distinction is not to be
obliterated or blunted by an interpretation that tends to equate
the business bad debt with the nonbusiness bad debt. We think that
emphasis upon the significant rather, than upon the dominant, would
have a tendency to do just that.
B. Application of the significant motivation standard would also
tend to undermine and circumscribe the Court's holding in
Whipple, and the emphasis there that a shareholder's mere
activity in a corporation's affairs is not a trade or business. As
Chief Judge Lumbard pointed out in his separate and disagreeing
concurrence in
Weddle, supra, 325 F.2d at 852-853, both
motives -- that of protecting the investment and that of protecting
the salary -- are inevitably involved, and an inquiry whether
employee status provides a significant motivation will always
produce an affirmative answer and result in a judgment for the
taxpayer.
C. The dominant motivation standard has the attribute of
workability. It provides a guideline of certainty for the trier of
fact. The trier then may compare the risk against the potential
reward and give proper emphasis to the objective, rather than to
the subjective. As has just been noted, an employee-shareholder, in
making or guaranteeing a loan to his corporation, usually acts with
two motivations, the one to protect his investment and the other to
protect his employment. By making the dominant motivation the
measure, the logical tax consequence ensues and prevents the mere
presence of a business motive, however small and however
insignificant, from controlling the tax result at the taxpayer's
convenience. This is of particular importance in a tax system that
is so largely dependent on voluntary compliance.
D. The dominant motivation test strengthens, and is consistent
with, the mandate of § 262 of the Code, 26
Page 405 U. S. 105
U.S.C. § 262, that "no deduction shall be allowed for personal,
living, or family expenses" except as otherwise provided. It
prevents personal considerations from circumventing this
provision.
E. The dominant motivation approach to § 166(d) is consistent
with that given the loss provisions in § 165(c)(1),
see, for
example, Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640, 644 (CA3 1966),
and in § 165(c)(2),
see Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d
583, 584 (CA2 1962). In these related areas, consistency is
desirable.
See also Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U. S. 278,
363 U. S. 286
(1960).
F. We see no inconsistency, such as the taxpayer suggests,
between the Government's urging dominant motivation here and its
having urged only significant motivation as the appropriate
standard for the incurrence of liability for the accumulated
earnings tax under § 531 of the 1954 Code, 26 U.S.C. § 531, and for
includability in the gross estate, for federal estate tax purposes,
of a transfer made in contemplation of death under § 2035, 26
U.S.C. § 2035. Sections 531 and 2035 are Congress' answer to tax
avoidance activity.
United States v. Donruss Co.,
393 U. S. 297,
393 U. S. 303
(1969), and
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98
F.2d 794 (CA2 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 648
(1939).
G. The Regulations' use of the word "proximate" perhaps is not
the most fortunate, for it naturally tempts one to think in tort
terms. The temptation, however, is best rejected, and we reject it
here. In tort law, factors of duty, of foreseeability, of secondary
cause, and of plural liability are under consideration, and the
concept of proximate cause has been developed as an appropriate
application and measure of these factors. It has little place in
tax law, where plural aspects are not usual, where an item either
is or is not a deduction, or either is or is not a business bad
debt, and where certainty is desirable.
Page 405 U. S. 106
IV
The conclusion we have reached means that the District Court's
instructions, based on a standard of significant, rather than
dominant, motivation are erroneous, and that, at least, a new trial
is required. We have examined the record, however, and find nothing
that would support a jury verdict in this taxpayer's favor had the
dominant motivation standard been embodied in the instructions.
Judgment
n.o.v. for the United States, therefore, must be
ordered.
See Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.
S. 317 (1967).
As Judge Simpson pointed out in his dissent, 427 F.2d at
284-285, the only real evidence offered by the taxpayer bearing
upon motivation was his own testimony that he signed the indemnity
agreement "to protect my job," that "I figured, in three years'
time, I would get my money out," and that "I never once gave it
[his investment in the corporation] a thought." [
Footnote 9]
The statements obviously are self-serving. In addition, standing
alone, they do not bear the light of analysis. What the taxpayer
was purporting to say was that his $12,000 annual salary was his
sole motivation, and that his $38,900 original investment, the
actual value of which, prior to the misfortunes of 1962, we do not
know, plus his loans to the corporation, plus his personal interest
in the integrity of the corporation as a source of living for his
son-in law and as an investment for his son and his other son-in
law, were of no consequence whatever in his thinking. The
comparison is strained all the more by the fact that the salary is
pre-tax and the investment is tax-paid. With his total annual
income about $40,000, Mr. Generes may well have reached a federal
income tax bracket of 40% or more for a joint return in
1958-1962.
Page 405 U. S. 107
§§ 1 and 2 of the 1954 Code, 68A Stat. 5 and 8. The $12,000
salary thus would produce for him only about $7,000 net after
federal tax and before any state income tax. This is the figure,
and not $12,000, that has any possible significance for motivation
purposes, and it is less than 1/5 of the original stock investment.
[
Footnote 10]
We conclude on these facts that the taxpayer's explanation falls
of its own weight, and that reasonable minds could not ascribe, on
this record, a dominant motivation directed to the preservation of
the taxpayer's salary as president of Kelly Generes Construction
Co., Inc.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with
direction that judgment be entered for the United States.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
"§ 166. Bad debts."
"(a) General rule. --"
"(1) Wholly worthless debts. -- There shall be allowed as a
deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable
year."
"
* * * *"
"(d) Nonbusiness debts. --"
"(1) General rule. -- In the case of a taxpayer other than a
corporation --"
"(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness
debt; and"
"(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the
taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a
loss from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a
capital asset held for not more than 6 months."
"(2) Nonbusiness debt defined. -- For purposes of paragraph (1),
the term 'nonbusiness debt' means a debt other than --"
"(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in
connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or"
"(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred
in the taxpayer's trade or business."
[
Footnote 2]
Treas.Reg. on Income Tax:
"26 CFR § 1.166-5 Nonbusiness debts."
"
* * * *"
"(b) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes of section 166 and
this section, a nonbusiness debt is any debt other than --"
"
* * * *"
"(2) A debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred
in the taxpayer's trade or business. The question whether a debt is
a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in each particular case. .
. ."
"For purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the
character of the debt is to be determined by the relation which the
loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears to the
trade or business of the taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate
one in the conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer
is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt comes
within the exception provided by that subparagraph. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
Edna Generes, wife of Allen H. Generes, is a named party because
joint income tax returns were filed by Mr. and Mrs. Generes for
some of the tax years in question.
[
Footnote 4]
Compare the decision below
and Weddle v.
Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (CA2 1963),
with Niblock v.
Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (CA7 1969). In
Smith v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 260, 268-271 (1970), reviewed without
dissent, the Tax Court felt constrained, under the policy expressed
in
Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (CA10 1971), to apply the Fifth
Circuit test, but stated that it agreed with the Seventh Circuit.
Cases where the resolution of the issue was avoided include
Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (CA3 1970),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951;
Kelly v. Patterson,
331 F.2d 753, 757 (CA5 1964); and
Gillespie v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1025, 1032 (1970).
See also Millsap
v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420 (CA8 1968). For commentary on
the present case,
see 3 Sw.U.L.Rev. 135 (1971); 2
Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 318 (1971); and 28 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 161
(1971).
[
Footnote 5]
This difference in treatment between the loss on the direct loan
and that, on the indemnity is not explained.
See, however,
Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U. S. 193
(1963).
[
Footnote 6]
"A debt is proximately related to the taxpayer's trade or
business when its creation was significantly motivated by the
taxpayer's trade or business, and it is not rendered a non-business
debt merely because there was a non-qualifying motivation as well,
even though the non-qualifying motivation was the primary one."
[
Footnote 7]
"You must, in short, determine whether Mr. Generes' dominant
motivation in signing the indemnity agreement was to protect his
salary and status as an employee or was to protect his investment
in the Kelly Generes Construction Co."
"Mr. Generes is entitled to prevail in this case only if he
convinces you that the dominant motivating factor for his signing
the indemnity agreement was to insure the receiving of his salary
from the company. It is insufficient if the protection or insurance
of his salary was only a significant secondary motivation for his
signing the indemnity agreement. It must have been his dominant or
most important reason for signing the indemnity agreement."
[
Footnote 8]
"Even if the taxpayer demonstrates an independent trade or
business of his own, care must be taken to distinguish bad debt
losses arising from his own business and those actually arising
from activities peculiar to an investor concerned with, and
participating in, the conduct of the corporate business."
373 U.S. at
373 U. S.
202.
[
Footnote 9]
App. 67 and 59.
[
Footnote 10]
Rather than, as the taxpayer in his testimony suggested, App.
59, overlooking the pre-tax character of his salaried earnings.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.
I agree with and join the opinion of the Court. In doing so, I
add a few additional words of legislative history in support of the
wording of the Internal Revenue Code itself.
It is now well established law that a corporate employee is
entitled to deduct as a business bad debt a bad debt incurred
because of his employee status --
e.g., a loan made to
protect his job which becomes unrecoverable.
See, e.g., Trent
v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (CA2 1961);
Lundgren v.
Commissioner, 376 F.2d 623 (CA9 1967);
Smith v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 260 (1970).
See also Whipple v.
Commissioner, 373 U. S. 193,
373 U. S. 201
(1963). The law is equally well established, however, that a
shareholder is not entitled to a business bad debt
Page 405 U. S. 108
deduction when a loan which he has made to enhance his stock
interest in a corporation goes bad.
The taxpayer in this case is both an employee and a shareholder
of a single corporation, and the question thus presented is how to
determine the proper tax treatment of loans made by him to the
corporation that became uncollectible.
The Internal Revenue Code itself does not offer any test for
determining when a bad debt is a business bad debt, but §
1.166-5(b) of the Treasury Regulations on Income Tax provides that
a loss from a worthless debt is deductible as a business bad debt
only if the relation between the loss and taxpayer's trade or
business is a proximate one. The Commissioner contends that the
taxpayer must demonstrate that the "primary and dominant"
motivation for the undertaking that gave rise to the bad debt was
attributable to his status as an employee, and not as a
shareholder, in order to comply with the regulation. It is the
taxpayer's position that the proximate relationship is sufficiently
demonstrated if the undertaking giving rise to the bad debt was
"significantly" motivated by his employee status. The District
Court and Court of Appeals agreed with the taxpayer.
The opinion of the Court properly concludes that acceptance of
the test advocated by the taxpayer would blunt somewhat the
distinction between business and nonbusiness expenses, and that the
Commissioner's test is slightly more consistent with the thrust of
various sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Were this all we had
to work with, however, I would be as torn between the two tests as
the lower courts have been.
Compare Weddle v.
Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (CA2 1963),
with Niblock v.
Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (CA7 1969),
and Smith v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 260 (1970). As the Court's opinion
points out, Congress did not
Page 405 U. S. 109
choose to apportion the tax treatment of bad debts according to
the strength of the various interests of the taxpayer that gave
rise to them. Left with an all-or-nothing approach and no
legislative history, one might well conclude that Congress did
intend to blunt the distinction between business and nonbusiness
bad debts, especially since neither the language of the Code nor
the regulations explicitly require one test or the other, and since
the burden on the taxpayer of both types of losses is identical.
Fortunately, there is a clear and compelling legislative history
that obviates any need for speculation as to Congress' intent in
enacting § 166 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 166. And only the
Commissioner's test is consistent with that intent.
Prior to 1942, the Internal Revenue Code treated business and
nonbusiness bad debts identically. But, in that year, Congress
amended § 23(k) of the 1939 Code in order to distinguish between
the two. A nonbusiness bad debt was defined as one "other than a
debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business," and business bad debts presumably
encompassed all others. The demarcation remains essentially the
same under § 166 of the 1954 Code, except that the definition of
business bad debts is expanded for the limited purpose of including
within it "a debt created or acquired . . . in connection with a
trade or business of the taxpayer" but not "incurred in" the
business --
e.g., a debt growing out of a trade or
business that becomes worthless under circumstances removed from
the trade or business.
See H.R.Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess., 21-22; S.Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 24;
Whipple v. Commissioner, supra, at
373 U. S. 194
n. 1;
Trent v. Commissioner, supra, at 674.
The major congressional purpose in distinguishing between
business and nonbusiness bad debts was to prevent taxpayers from
lending money to friends or relatives who
Page 405 U. S. 110
they knew would not repay it and then deducting against ordinary
income a loss in the amount of the loan. Prior to the 1942
amendment of the Code, it, was apparent that taxpayers could go a
long way toward escaping the Code's monetary limit on dependency
deductions and its prohibition against deductions for personal
expenses by casting support payments, gifts, and other expenditures
in the form of loans destined to become bad debts. H.R.Rep. No.
2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 45, 76-77; S.Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess., 90.
A related congressional purpose in enacting the predecessor to §
166 was "to put nonbusiness investments in the form of loans on a
footing with other nonbusiness investments."
Putnam v.
Commissioner, 352 U. S. 82,
352 U. S. 92
(1956). Congress recognized that there often is only a minor
difference, if any, between an investment in the form of a stock
purchase and one in the form of a loan to a corporation.
See,
e.g., Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.
S. 521 (1946);
Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v.
Commissioner, 172 F.2d 904 (CA10 1949).
It is apparent that Congress was especially concerned about the
possibility that closely held family businesses might exploit the
technical differences among the forms in which investments can be
cast in order to gain unwarranted deductions against ordinary
income.
This case is a perfect example of how the "significant"
motivation test undercuts the intended effect of the statute. The
taxpayer was drawing an annual salary of $12,000 from a family
corporation in which he had invested almost $200,000. As the
guarantor of the corporation's performance and payment construction
bonds, the taxpayer risked a potential liability of $2,000,000 and
ultimately incurred an actual liability of $162,000, which is the
amount that he sought to deduct as a business bad debt. The jury
found that the risk was incurred because the taxpayer was
"significantly" motivated by
Page 405 U. S. 111
his interests as a corporate employee and by his $12,000 salary.
In view of all the facts set forth in the opinion of the Court,
especially the fact that the taxpayer had a gross income of
approximately $40,000, I have no doubt whatever that the same jury
would have found that the taxpayer's "primary and dominant"
motivation was to protect his investment, not his salary.
If this taxpayer had simply lent his son-in-law $162,000 and
then sought to deduct that amount as a business bad debt when the
latter's business collapsed, he plainly could not have prevailed.
This was just the sort of intra-family loan that Congress intended
to bar from treatment as a business bad debt. The fact that a
corporation served as a conduit for the loan should make no
difference. If the taxpayer had received only interest on the loan,
rather than a salary, he could claim no business bad debt
deduction. The fact that he took a nominal salary for nominal
services does not, in my opinion, require a different result.
Moreover, if, instead of guaranteeing the construction bonds, the
taxpayer had invested $162,000 in the corporation to strengthen its
economic position, that investment would receive the same treatment
as the prior investment of $200,000, and any loss would not be
deductible against ordinary income. The fact that the intra-family
contribution was made in the form of a guarantee should be
irrelevant for income tax purposes.
In sum, I find that the "significant" motivation test produces
results that are totally at odds with the goals of the statute. The
conclusion that I draw from the legislative history is that
Congress wanted to permit deductions against ordinary income for
bad debt losses only when the losses bore the same relation to the
taxpayer's trade or business as did other losses that the Code
permits to be deducted against ordinary income. Under § 165(c)(1)
of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 165(c)(1), the primary motivation test has
always been used to determine
Page 405 U. S. 112
whether these other losses are incurred in a trade or business
or in some other capacity,
see, e.g., Imbesi v.
Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640 (CA3 1966),
United States v.
Gilmore, 372 U. S. 39
(1963). The same test should also be utilized with respect to bad
debts if Congress' will is to be done.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins.
While I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion and its
judgment of reversal, I would remand the case to the District Court
with directions to hold a hearing on the issue of whether a jury
question still exists as to whether taxpayer's motivation was
"dominantly" a business one in the relevant transactions under 26
U.S.C. §§ 166(a) and (d). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d)
provides that, when an appellate court considers a motion for
judgment
n.o.v., it may "determin[e] that the appellee is
entitled to a new trial, or . . . [direct] the trial court to
determine whether a new trial shall be granted." Because of the
drastic nature of a judgment
n.o.v., this Court has
emphasized that such motions should be granted only when the
procedural prerequisites of the Federal Rules have been strictly
complied with.
Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.,
330 U. S. 212,
330 U. S.
215-217 (1947). In the present case, this Court has the
power to reverse the judgment without the grant of a new trial,
since the Government properly moved for a judgment
n.o.v.
(or, in the alternative, for a new trial) in the District Court.
Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.
S. 317 (1967). The circumstances here are inappropriate
for such a decision, however, since taxpayer has never had an
opportunity to be heard, after it is determined that his verdict
cannot stand, as to whether factual issues remain on which he is
entitled to a new trial. A decision
Page 405 U. S. 113
that a verdict must be overturned because the trial judge
applied an erroneous evidentiary standard is unlike certain other
appellate rulings that an error of law was made because it
inevitably presents an accompanying factual question: is there
enough evidence to present a jury question under the proper
evidentiary standard?
Neely v. Eby Construction Co.,
supra, at
386 U. S. 327.
This Court has often repeated that a trial court is the most
appropriate tribunal to determine such factual questions,
Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.
S. 474,
287 U. S.
481-482 (1933);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Duncan, 311 U. S. 243,
311 U. S. 253
(1940), since appellate courts are awkwardly equipped to resolve
such issues, particularly in the absence of adversary argument, and
since the trial judge has an extensive and intimate knowledge of
the evidence and issues "in a perspective peculiarly available to
him alone."
Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.,
supra, at
330 U. S. 216.
I would therefore allow the trial court to decide whether a new
trial is merited in this case.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The Treasury Regulations 1.166-5(b)(2), which govern this case,
provide that
"the character of the debt is to be determined by the relation
which the loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears
to the trade or business of the taxpayer."
The Regulations do not use the words "primary and dominant."
They state:
"If that relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade
or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt
becomes worthless,"
the debt is deductible.
Ibid.
The jury was instructed in the words of the Regulations:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
signing of the blanket indemnity agreement by Mr. Generes was
proximately related to his trade or business
Page 405 U. S. 114
of being an employee of the Kelly Generes Construction
Company?"
The jury unanimously answered "Yes."
There was evidence to support the finding. Generes was an
officer of the company, and received a salary of $12,000 a year.
His job as officer was to obtain the bonding credit needed by the
company to perform the jobs on which it bid. To get the bond,
Generes, the president, and Kelly, the vice-president, were
required to sign personally an indemnity agreement.
The bond was essential if the company was to operate. Without
the bond, the company could not obtain business and, if that
happened, he, as an officer, would lose his job. It therefore seems
to me that signing the bond had a "proximate" relation to his
business as a salaried officer in the sense that it was directly
related to the hoped-for success of that business.
Whether it was a prudent act is not our concern. Nor is it our
concern whether, with the benefit of hindsight, we can now say that
signing the bond entailed risks wholly disproportionate to the
stake Generes had in maintaining a job with a $12,000-a-year
salary.
Obtaining a bond was essential to the corporation, and it was
only by keeping the business going that the salaried position of
Generes could be made secure. If the Regulations do not meet the
desires of the Treasury Department, they can be rewritten.
See
Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S.
90,
308 U. S.
100-102.
I protest now what I have repeatedly protested, and that is the
use of this Court to iron out ambiguities in the Regulations or in
the Act, when the responsible remedy is either a recasting of the
Regulations by Treasury or presentation of the problem to the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, which is a standing
committee
Page 405 U. S. 115
of the Congress [
Footnote 2/1]
that regularly rewrites the Act and is much abler than are we to
forecast revenue needs and spot loopholes where abuses thrive.
As I said in
Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.
S. 299,
366 U. S.
307,
"Resort to litigation, rather than to Congress, for a change in
the law is too often the temptation of government, which has a
longer purse and more endurance than any taxpayer."
(Concurring opinion.)
And see Knetsch v. United States,
364 U. S. 361,
364 U. S. 371
(dissenting opinion).
Had I voted to grant this petition, I would be in a position to
vote to dismiss it as improvidently granted. But to give integrity
to the "rule of four" by which certiorari is granted [
Footnote 2/2] the objectors must
participate in a
Page 405 U. S. 116
decision, as stated at length by the late Mr. Justice Harlan in
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.
S. 521,
352 U. S.
559-562.
In that view, I cannot say that, on the facts of this case, the
loss did not have a "proximate" relation to this corporate
officer's business of keeping the enterprise afloat. I would affirm
the Court of Appeals, 427 F.2d 279.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.
S. 678,
394 U. S.
690-691 (dissenting opinion).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The "rule of four" is not in the statute. But in the hearings on
the bill that became the 1925 Act, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who
headed the committee of the Court sponsoring the Act before the
Congress, said:
"For instance, if there were five votes against granting the
petition and four in favor of granting it, it would be granted,
because we proceed upon the theory that, when as many as four
members of the court, and even three in some instances, are
impressed with the propriety of our taking the case, the petition
should be granted. This is the uniform way in which petitions for
writs of certiorari are considered."
Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 29
(1924). And the Congress acted in reliance on that representation.
See H.R.Rep. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., 3.
The bill was originally drafted in 1922 by Chief Justice Taft
with the assistance of Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Van Devanter,
and Mr. Justice McReynolds. Hearings on Jurisdiction of Circuit
Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922). The
Committee representing the Court in the 1924 Hearings were Mr.
Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, and Mr. Justice
Sutherland. Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061,
supra, at
1.