Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which
provides that the motor vehicle registration and driver's license
of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended
unless he posts security for the amount of damages claimed by an
aggrieved party and which excludes any consideration of fault or
responsibility for the accident at a pre-suspension hearing
held violative of procedural due process. Before Georgia,
whose statutory scheme significantly involves the issue of
liability, may deprive an individual of his license and
registration, it must provide a procedure for determining the
question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment's
being rendered against him as a result of the accident. Pp.
402 U. S.
539-543.
121 Ga.App. 418,
174 S.E.2d
235, reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
DOUGLAS, HARLAN, STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BURGER,
C.J., and BLACK and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurred in the result.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provides that
the motor vehicle registration and driver's
Page 402 U. S. 536
license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall
be suspended unless he posts security to cover the amount of
damages claimed by aggrieved parties in reports of the accident.
[
Footnote 1] The administrative
hearing conducted prior to the suspension excludes consideration of
the motorist's fault or liability for the accident. The Georgia
Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that the State's
statutory scheme, in failing before suspending the licenses to
afford him a hearing on the question of his fault or liability,
denied him due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
the court
Page 402 U. S. 537
held that "
Fault' or `innocence' are completely irrelevant
factors." 121 Ga.App. 418, 420, 174 S.E.2d
235, 236 (1970). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. App.
27. We granted certiorari. 400 U.S. 963 (1970). We
reverse.
Petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires him to travel
by car to cover three rural Georgia communities. On Sunday
afternoon, November 24, 1968, petitioner was involved in an
accident when five-year-old Sherry Capes rode her bicycle into the
side of his automobile. The child's parents filed an accident
report with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety
indicating that their daughter had suffered substantial injuries
for which they claimed damages of $5,000. Petitioner was thereafter
informed by the Director that, unless he was covered by a liability
insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident, he must
file a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 or present a
notarized release from liability, plus proof of future financial
responsibility, [
Footnote 2] or
suffer the suspension of his driver's license and vehicle
registration. App. 9. Petitioner requested an administrative
hearing before the Director asserting that he was not liable as the
accident was unavoidable, and stating also that he would be
severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties
by a suspension of his licenses. A hearing was scheduled, but the
Director informed petitioner that
"[t]he only evidence that the Department can accept and consider
is: (a) was the petitioner or his vehicle involved in the accident;
(b) has petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as
provided; or (c) does petitioner come within
Page 402 U. S. 538
any of the exceptions of the Law."
App. 11. [
Footnote 3] At the
administrative hearing, the Director rejected petitioner's proffer
of evidence on liability, ascertained that petitioner was not
within any of the statutory exceptions, and gave petitioner 30 days
to comply with the security requirements or suffer suspension.
Petitioner then exercised his statutory right to an appeal
de
novo in the Superior Court. Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-602 (1958). At
that hearing, the court permitted petitioner to present his
evidence on liability, and, although the claimants were neither
parties nor witnesses, found petitioner free from fault. As a
result, the Superior Court ordered
"that the petitioner's driver's license not be suspended . . .
[until] suit is filed against petitioner for the purpose of
recovering damages for the injuries sustained by the child. . .
."
App. 15. This order was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals
in overruling petitioner's constitutional contention.
Page 402 U. S. 539
If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists
who did not carry liability insurance or who did not post security,
the statute would not, under our cases, violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S.
30 (1933);
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,
286 U. S. 352
(1932);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.
S. 352 (1927). It does not follow, however, that the
amendment also permits the Georgia statutory scheme where not all
motorists, but rather only motorists involved in accidents, are
required to post security under penalty of loss of the licenses.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618
(1969);
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
271 U. S. 583
(1926). Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a
livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In
such cases, the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.
S. 337 (1969);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254 (1970). This is but an application of the general
proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state
power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is
denominated a "right" or a "privilege."
Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U. S. 398
(1963) (disqualification for unemployment compensation);
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.
S. 551 (1956) (discharge from public employment);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513
(1958) (denial of a tax exemption);
Goldberg v. Kelly,
supra (withdrawal of welfare benefits).
See also Londoner
v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373,
210 U. S.
385-386 (1908);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 270 U. S. 117
(1926);
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.
S. 126 (1941).
We turn then to the nature of the procedural due process which
must be afforded the licensee on the question
Page 402 U. S. 540
of his fault or liability for the accident. [
Footnote 4] A procedural rule that may satisfy due
process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due
process in every case. Thus, procedures adequate to determine a
welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge.
Compare
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S.
270-271,
with Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U. S. 335
(1963). Clearly, however, the inquiry into fault or liability
requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the form
of a full adjudication of the question of liability. That
adjudication can only be made in litigation between the parties
involved in the accident. Since the only purpose of the provision
before us is to obtain security from which to pay any judgments
against the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that
procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to
the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of
judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the
licensee.
The State argues that the licensee's interest in avoiding the
suspension of his licenses is outweighed by countervailing
governmental interests, and therefore that this procedural due
process need not be afforded him. We disagree. In cases where there
is no reasonable possibility of a judgment's being rendered against
a licensee, Georgia's interest in protecting a claimant from the
possibility of an unrecoverable judgment is not, within the context
of the State's fault-oriented scheme, a justification for denying
the process due its citizens. Nor is additional expense occasioned
by the expanded hearing sufficient to withstand the constitutional
requirement.
"'While the problem of additional expense must be kept
Page 402 U. S. 541
in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the
ordinary standards of due process.'"
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 261,
quoting
Kelly v. Wyman, 94 F. Supp. 893, 901 (SDNY
1968).
The main thrust of Georgia's argument is that it need not
provide a hearing on liability, because fault and liability are
irrelevant to the statutory scheme. We may assume that, were this
so, the prior administrative hearing presently provided by the
State would be "appropriate to the nature of the case."
Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.
S. 306,
339 U. S. 313
(1950). But,
"[i]n reviewing state action in this area . . . , we look to
substance, not to bare form, to determine whether constitutional
minimums have been honored."
Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S.
96,
373 U. S.
106-107 (1963) (concurring opinion). And looking to the
operation of the State's statutory scheme, it is clear that
liability, in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of
responsibility, plays a crucial role in the Safety Responsibility
Act. If, prior to suspension, there is a release from liability
executed by the injured party, no suspension is worked by the Act.
Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-606 (1958). The same is true if, prior to
suspension, there is an adjudication of nonliability.
Ibid. Even after suspension has been declared, a release
from liability or an adjudication of nonliability will lift the
suspension. Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-607 (Supp. 1970). Moreover, other of
the Act's exceptions are developed around liability-related
concepts. Thus, we are not dealing here with a no-fault scheme.
Since the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in
the State's determination to deprive an individual of his licenses,
the State may not, consistently with due process, eliminate
consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.
The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be
"meaningful,"
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.
S. 545,
Page 402 U. S. 542
380 U. S. 552
(1965), and "appropriate to the nature of the case."
Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, at
339 U. S. 313.
It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a
hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the
decision whether licenses of the nature here involved shall be
suspended does not meet this standard.
Finally, we reject Georgia's argument that, if it must afford
the licensee an inquiry into the question of liability, that
determination, unlike the determination of the matters presently
considered at the administrative hearing, need not be made prior to
the suspension of the licenses. While "[m]any controversies have
raged about . . . the Due Process Clause,"
ibid., it is
fundamental that, except in emergency situations (and this is not
one), [
Footnote 5] due process
requires that, when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as
that here involved, it must afford "notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before the
termination becomes effective.
Ibid. Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator, 312 U.S. at
312 U. S.
152-156;
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra;
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U. S. 433
(1971).
We hold, then, that under Georgia's present statutory scheme,
before the State may deprive petitioner of his driver's license and
vehicle registration, it must provide a forum for the determination
of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a
judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident. We
deem it inappropriate in this case to do more than lay down this
requirement. The alternative methods of compliance are several.
Georgia may decide merely to include consideration of the question
at the administrative
Page 402 U. S. 543
hearing now provided, or it may elect to postpone such a
consideration to the
de novo judicial proceedings in the
Superior Court. Georgia may decide to withhold suspension until
adjudication of an action for damages brought by the injured party.
Indeed, Georgia may elect to abandon its present scheme completely
and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other
States. [
Footnote 6] Finally,
Georgia may reject all of the above and devise an entirely new
regulatory scheme. The area of choice is wide: we hold only that
the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner
a prior hearing on liability of the nature we have defined denied
him procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN
concur in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-601
et seq. (1958). In pertinent part, the Act provides that
anyone involved in an accident must submit a report to the Director
of Public Safety. Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-604 (Supp. 1970). Within 30
days of the receipt of the report, the Director
"shall suspend the license and all registration certificates and
all registration plates of the operator and owner of any motor
vehicle in any manner involved in the accident unless or until the
operator or owner has previously furnished or immediately furnishes
security, sufficient . . . to satisfy any judgments for damages or
injuries resulting . . . and unless such operator or owner shall
give proof of financial responsibility for the future as is
required in section 92A-615.1. . . ."
Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-605(a) (Supp. 1970). Section 92A-615.1 (Supp.
1970) requires that "such proof must be maintained for a one-year
period." Section 92A-605(a) works no suspension, however, (1) if
the owner or operator had in effect at the time of the accident a
liability insurance policy or other bond, Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-605(c)
(Supp. 1970); (2) if the owner or operator qualifies as a
self-insurer,
ibid.; (3) if only the owner or operator was
injured, Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-606 (1958); (4) if the automobile was
legally parked at the time of the accident,
ibid.; (5) if,
as to an owner, the automobile was being operated without
permission,
ibid.; or (6)
"[i]f, prior to the date that the Director would otherwise
suspend license and registration . . . there shall be filed with
the Director evidence satisfactory to him that the person who would
otherwise have to file security has been released from liability or
been finally adjudicated not to be liable or has executed a duly
acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an
agreed amount in installments. . . ."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2]
Questions concerning the requirement of proof of future
financial responsibility are not before us. The State's brief, at
4, states:
"The one-year period for proof of financial responsibility has
now expired, so [petitioner] would not be required to file such
proof, even if the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed."
[
Footnote 3]
Ga.Code Ann. § 92A-602 (1958) provides:
"The Director shall administer and enforce the provisions of
this Chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its
administration and shall provide for hearings upon request of
persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the Director under the
provisions of this Chapter. Such hearing need not be a matter of
record and the decision as rendered by the Director shall be final
unless the aggrieved person shall desire an appeal, in which case
he shall have the right to enter an appeal to the superior court of
the county of his residence, by notice to the Director, in the same
manner as appeals are entered from the court of ordinary, except
that the appellant shall not be required to post any bond nor pay
the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person desires, the appeal
may be heard by the judge at term or in chambers or before a jury
at the first term. The hearing on the appeal shall be de novo,
however, such appeal shall not act as a supersedeas of any orders
or acts of the Director, nor shall the appellant be allowed to
operate or permit a motor vehicle to be operated in violation of
any suspension or revocation by the Director, while such appeal is
pending. A notice sent by registered mail shall be sufficient
service on the Director that such appeal has been entered."
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioner stated at oral argument that, while "it would be
possible to raise [an equal protection argument] . . . , we don't
raise this point here." Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.
S. 245 (1947);
Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, 339 U. S. 594
(1950).
[
Footnote 6]
The various alternatives include compulsory insurance plans,
public or joint public-private unsatisfied judgment funds, and
assigned claims plans.
See R. Keeton & J. O'Connell,
After Cars Crash (1967).