Petitioner, an alien, agreed to give up his right to become an
American citizen in exchange for exemption from military service,
pursuant to § 4(a) of the Selective Service Act of 1948. After that
section was repealed, petitioner was subjected to the draft, but
was found to be physically unfit. His subsequent petition for
naturalization was denied on the ground that he was debarred from
citizenship. Section 315 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 provides that any alien who has applied for exemption from
military service on the ground of alienage "and is or was relieved
. . . from such training or service on such ground, shall be
permanently ineligible to become a citizen of the United
States."
Held: Under § 315, an alien who requests exemption from
military service is to be held to his agreement to relinquish all
claims to naturalization only when the Government completely and
permanently exempts him from service in the armed forces. Pp.
402 U. S.
511-514.
432 F.2d 438, reversed and remanded.
BLACK, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is exceedingly simple. By signing SSS
Form 130 -- Application by Alien for Relief from Training and
Service in the Armed Forces -- the petitioner,
Page 402 U. S. 510
Ib Otto Astrup, a native of Denmark, agreed to give up his right
to become an American citizen, and, in exchange, the United States,
pursuant to § 4(a) of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat.
605, 50 U.S.C.App. § 454(a) (1946 ed., Supp. III), agreed to give
up the right to induct Astrup into the United States armed forces.
Congress later repealed the law under which Astrup was exempted
from military service, reneging on its part of the bargain with
him. [
Footnote 1] Universal
Military Training and Service Act § 4(a), 65 Stat. 76, 50
U.S.C.App. § 454(a) (1952 ed.). Thereafter, the Selective Service
System attempted to draft Astrup, and would have succeeded in
putting him into uniform but for the fact that he was found to be
physically unfit for the draft. Later, when Astrup decided that he
would like to become an American citizen, the Government attempted
to enforce Astrup's promise even though it was unwilling to keep
its own promise. When Astrup petitioned for naturalization, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied his petition on the ground that he was debarred
from citizenship. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 432 F.2d 438 (1970). We granted Astrup's petition for
certiorari, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971), and now reverse.
Page 402 U. S. 511
In support of the decision below, the United States emphasizes
the fact that Astrup admitted having read a notice proclaiming
that:
"Any citizen of a foreign country . . . shall be relieved from
liability for training and service under this title if, prior to
his induction into the armed forces, he has made application to be
relieved from such liability . . . ; but any person who makes such
application shall thereafter be debarred from becoming a citizen of
the United States."
Form SSS 130, quoting Selective Service Act of 1948, § 4(a), 62
Stat. 606, 50 U.S.C.App. § 454(a) (1946 ed., Supp. III).
He further admitted having signed a statement saying, "I
understand that I will forever lose my rights to become a citizen
of the United States. . . ." Upon the basis of these statements and
§ 4(a) of the Selective Service Act of 1948, the United States
argues that the case is controlled by our decision in
Ceballos
v. Shaughnessy, 352 U. S. 599
(1957), in which we enforced similar citizenship debarment
provisions in a deportation case arising under the Immigration Act
of 1917, § 19(c), 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 54 Stat. 672, 62 Stat.
1206, 8 U.S.C. § 155(c) (1946 ed., Supp. V).
Ceballos,
however, does not govern this case. In
Ceballos, the Court
specifically held that § 315 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, 66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1426, was inapplicable because of
the effective date of the 1952 Act and because § 315 was expressly
inapplicable to deportation proceedings under the 1917 Act. 352
U.S. at
352 U. S. 606
n. 17.
Astrup, unlike Ceballos, is not involved in a deportation
proceeding under the Immigration Act of 1917, and, consequently,
the saving clause of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §
405, 66 Stat. 280, is inapplicable. [
Footnote 2]
Page 402 U. S. 512
See note following 8 U.S.C. § 1101. Moreover, Astrup
petitioned for naturalization under § 316 of the 1952 Act.
Therefore, § 315 of the 1952 Act, not § 4(a) of the Selective
Service Act of 1948, determines the effect to be given to Astrup's
1950 application for exemption from military service. Section 315
provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(b) of this Act,
any alien who applies or has applied for exemption or discharge
from training or service in the Armed Forces or in the National
Security Training Corps of the United States on the ground that he
is an alien,
and is or was relieved or discharged from such
training or service on such ground, shall be permanently
ineligible to become a citizen of the United States."
66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1426. (Emphasis added.) This is a
two-pronged prerequisite for the loss of eligibility for United
States citizenship. The alien must be one who "applies or has
applied for exemption or discharge" from military service and "is
or was relieved or
Page 402 U. S. 513
discharged" from that service. There is no question that Astrup
applied for an exemption. The United States argues that he was
temporarily released from military service but recognizes that the
release was not permanent. And even the Government is forced to
concede that temporary release from military service is not by
itself sufficient to debar an alien from a later claim to
naturalized citizenship, because the Government recognizes the
correctness of the Second Circuit's decision in
United States
v. Hoellger, 273 F.2d 760 (1960), that, if an alien is once
relieved from service but is later compelled to perform military
service the bar to citizenship does not arise.
Other courts have distinguished the
Hoellger holding
from the situation where an alien is once relieved from military
service but later reclassified for service which he never performs
because of intervening circumstances such as physical unfitness.
See Lapenieks v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
389 F.2d 343 (1968);
United States v. Hoellger, supra, at
762 n. 2. However, there is nothing in the language of § 315 which
leads us to believe that Congress intended such harsh and bizarre
consequences to flow from an individual's failure to pass a
physical examination. [
Footnote
3] We think that Congress used the words "is or was relieved"
to provide that an alien who requests exemption from the military
service be
Page 402 U. S. 514
held to his agreement to relinquish all claims to naturalized
citizenship only when the Government abides by its part of the
agreement and completely exempts him from service in our armed
forces. [
Footnote 4]
Consequently, the United States District Court erred in denying
Astrup's petition for naturalization on the ground that he was
barred from citizenship because he had once claimed an exemption
from military service as an alien. The decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming the District Court is
reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings on Astrup's petition for naturalization.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Astrup was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence on February 20, 1950. On November 14, 1950, he executed
SSS Form 130, requesting an exemption from military service on the
ground of alienage. At that time the Selective Service Act of 1948,
§ 4(a), 62 Stat. 605, 50 U.S.C.App. § 454(a) (1946 ed., Supp. III),
provided such an exemption for any alien. The Universal Military
Training and Service Act § 4(a), 65 Stat. 76, 50 U.S.C.App. §
454(a) (1952 ed.), which became effective June 19, 1951, amended
the earlier provision relating to exemptions for aliens so that the
exemption was not available to aliens who were permanent residents
of this country.
[
Footnote 2]
The United States argues that the saving clause of the 1952 Act
is applicable, citing
United States v. Menasche,
348 U. S. 528
(1955), and
Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.
S. 540 (1955). In
Menasche the Court held that
an alien who had filed a declaration of intention to become an
American citizen had a "right in the process of acquisition"
preserved by the saving clause which provided:
"Nothing contained in [the 1952] Act, unless otherwise
specifically provided therein, shall be construed to affect the
validity of any declaration of intention. . . ."
The Court there found nothing in the 1952 Act that specifically
nullified Menasche's declaration. In
Shomberg, on the
other hand, the Court found in § 318 of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 244,
8 U.S.C. § 1429, a specific bar to final determination of a
naturalization petition by an alien against whom there was an
outstanding deportation proceeding. This case is more like
Shomberg than
Menasche in that § 315 is addressed
to events which may have occurred before the effective date of the
1952 Act and refers specifically to the saving clause as, at least
partially, inapplicable.
[
Footnote 3]
We find no merit in the Government's contention that Astrup was
effectively relieved from military service on account of alienage
merely because he was found to be medically qualified for the draft
on October 11, 1950, before he claimed an exemption, and was later
found to be medically unfit for the draft, after the Government
repudiated its part of the bargain. The quality of pre-induction
physical examinations varies widely, and the standards of medical
fitness are frequently revised. In any event, the examination is
primarily for the benefit of the United States, insuring that those
inducted are physically capable of performing adequately and that
the United States does not become legally obligated to provide
medical treatment for conditions not caused by military
service.
[
Footnote 4]
Cf. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tucarora Indian Nation,
362 U. S. 99,
362 U. S. 142
(1960) (BLACK, J., dissenting): "Great nations, like great men,
should keep their word."