Petitioner challenges his 1944 robbery conviction, when he was
not represented by counsel, on the basis of
Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335
(1963). In his habeas corpus petition he stated that he was unable
to obtain counsel "because of his impoverished condition," and at
the hearing he said, "I didn't have any money and I didn't have a
lawyer." Respondent made no effort to show that petitioner was not
indigent at the time of his conviction. The Georgia courts denied
his petition.
Held: On this record, petitioner proved he was without
counsel due to indigency at the time of his conviction, and
accordingly he is entitled to relief, as
Gideon is fully
retroactive.
Certiorari granted; 226 Ga. 667, 177 S.E.2d 87, reversed and
remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to robbery in a Georgia state court in
1944. He was not represented by counsel at any time. While serving
his sentence, petitioner escaped, and did not return to Georgia
until 1969, when he was returned to finish the remainder of his
sentence. He then brought this habeas corpus action in county
court, alleging that his conviction was void under
Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335
(1963). The county court denied relief because
Gideon was
"recent law, and, under the law at the time of his sentence, the
sentence met the requirements of the law at that time." This was
error, since, as we have often noted,
Gideon is fully
retroactive.
See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.
S. 618,
381 U. S. 639
(1965);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.
S. 244,
394 U. S. 250
n. 15 (1969);
McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U. S.
2,
393 U. S. 3
(1968);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.
S. 293,
388 U. S.
297-298 (1967).
Page 401 U. S. 848
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
habeas corpus on different grounds, saying that petitioner did not
testify at the habeas corpus hearing that he "wanted a lawyer,
asked for one, or made any effort to get one," or that, "because of
his poverty, or for any other reason, he was unable to hire a
lawyer." 226 Ga. 667, 177 S.E.2d 87-88 (1970).
As this Court has said, however,
"[I]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a
constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does
not depend on a request."
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506,
369 U. S. 513
(1962). This applies to guilty pleas as well as to trials.
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437,
335 U. S. 441
(1948).
Of course, to establish his right to appointed counsel in 1944,
petitioner had the burden of proving his inability at that time to
hire an attorney. His petition for habeas corpus specifically
averred that he was unable to obtain counsel "because of his
impoverished condition" at that time. The respondent denied this
allegation, and thus put the matter in issue. At the hearing,
petitioner testified, "I was a lot younger, and
I didn't have
any money, and I didn't have a lawyer. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) The State made no effort whatever to contradict
petitioner's testimony that he was indigent; no part of its case
went to the issue of indigency. In this light, the Georgia Supreme
Court's finding that petitioner "did not testify . . . that because
of his poverty, or for any other reason, he was unable to hire a
lawyer" is explicable only under the most rigid rules of
testimonial construction. Though petitioner did not precisely
testify that his failure to obtain a lawyer was a result of his
indigency, this was the undeniable implication of his testimony,
especially in view of the habeas corpus petition's allegation that
petitioner was unable to hire an attorney "because of" his
indigency. The hearing below, as the transcript shows, was
conducted informally. Petitioner had
Page 401 U. S. 849
no lawyer, and introduced no evidence other than his own
testimony. He testified discursively; no objections were made by
the State, nor did it cross-examine petitioner on the issue of
indigency.
It is our view that, on this record, petitioner proved he was
without counsel due to indigency at the time of his conviction. The
petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Georgia
Supreme Court is reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.