Petitioner, an indigent, was convicted of traffic offenses and
fined a total of $425. Though Texas law provides only for fines for
such offenses, it requires that persons unable to pay must be
incarcerated for sufficient time to satisfy their fines, at the
rate of $5 per day, which, in petitioner's case, meant an 85-day
term. The state courts denied his petition for habeas corpus.
Held: It is a denial of equal protection to limit
punishment to payment of a fine for those who are able to pay it,
but to convert the fine to imprisonment for those who are unable to
pay it.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.
S. 235. Pp.
401 U. S.
397-401.
445
S.W.2d 210, reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN,
JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring statement,
post, p.
401 U. S. 401.
BLACK, J., concurred in the result. HARLAN, J., filed a statement
concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
401 U. S.
401.
Page 401 U. S. 396
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner accumulated fines of $425 on nine convictions in the
Corporation Court of Houston, Texas, for traffic offenses. He was
unable to pay the fines because of indigency, [
Footnote 1] and the Corporation Court, which
otherwise has no jurisdiction to impose prison sentences, [
Footnote 2] committed him to the
municipal prison farm according to the provisions of a state
statute and municipal ordinance, [
Footnote 3] which required that he remain there a
sufficient
Page 401 U. S. 397
time to satisfy the fines at the rate of five dollars for each
day; this required that he serve 85 days at the prison farm. After
21 days in custody, petitioner was released on bond when he applied
to the County Criminal Court of Harris County for a writ of habeas
corpus. He alleged that: "Because I am too poor, I am, therefore,
unable to pay the accumulated fine of $425." The county court held
that "legal cause has been shown for the imprisonment," and denied
the application. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed,
stating: "We overrule appellant's contention that, because he is
too poor to pay the fines, his imprisonment is unconstitutional."
445
S.W.2d 210 (1969). We granted certiorari, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
We reverse on the authority of our decision in
Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U. S. 235
(1970).
The Illinois statute involved in
Williams authorized
both a fine and imprisonment. Williams was given the maximum
sentence for petty theft of one year's imprisonment and a $500
fine, plus $5 in court costs. The judgment, as permitted by the
Illinois statute, provided that, if, when the one-year sentence
expired, Williams did not pay the fine and court costs, he was to
remain in jail a sufficient length of time to satisfy the total
amount at the rate of $5 per day. We held that the Illinois
statute, as applied to Williams, worked an invidious discrimination
solely because he was too poor to pay the fine, and therefore
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the instant case involves offenses punishable by fines
only, petitioner's imprisonment for nonpayment
Page 401 U. S. 398
constitutes precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination,
since, like Williams, petitioner was subjected to imprisonment
solely because of his indigency. [
Footnote 4] In
Morris v. Schoonfield,
399 U. S. 508,
399 U. S. 509
(1970), four members of the Court anticipated the problem of this
case and stated the view, which we now adopt, that
"the same constitutional defect condemned in
Williams
also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate
payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a
jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends
beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing and
able to pay a fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits the
State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically
converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent, and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full."
Our opinion in
Williams stated the premise of this
conclusion in saying that
"the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the statutory
Page 401 U. S. 399
ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be
the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic
status."
399 U.S. at
399 U. S. 244.
Since Texas has legislated a "fines only" policy for traffic
offenses, that statutory ceiling cannot, consistently with the
Equal Protection Clause, limit the punishment to payment of the
fine if one is able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison
term for an indigent defendant without the means to pay his fine.
Imprisonment in such a case is not imposed to further any penal
objective of the State. It is imposed to augment the State's
revenues, but obviously does not serve that purpose; the defendant
cannot pay, because he is indigent, and his imprisonment, rather
than aiding collection of the revenue, saddles the State with the
cost of feeding and housing him for the period of his
imprisonment.
There are, however, other alternatives to which the State may
constitutionally resort to serve its concededly valid interest in
enforcing payment of fines. We repeat our observation in
Williams in that regard, 399 U.S. at
399 U. S.
244-245 (footnotes omitted):
"The State is not powerless to enforce judgments against those
financially unable to pay a fine; indeed, a different result would
amount to inverse discrimination, since it would enable an indigent
to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment, whereas
other defendants must always suffer one or the other
conviction."
"It is unnecessary for us to canvass the numerous alternatives
to which the State by legislative enactment -- or judges within the
scope of their authority -- may resort in order to avoid
imprisoning an indigent beyond the statutory maximum for
involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court costs. Appellant has
suggested several plans, some of which are
Page 401 U. S. 400
already utilized in some States, while others resemble those
proposed by various studies. The State is free to choose from among
the variety of solutions already proposed and, of course, it may
devise new ones. [
Footnote
5]"
We emphasize that our holding today does not suggest any
constitutional infirmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the
means to pay a fine who refuses or neglects to do so. Nor is our
decision to be understood
Page 401 U. S. 401
as precluding imprisonment as an enforcement method when
alternative means are unsuccessful despite the defendant's
reasonable efforts to satisfy the fines by those means; the
determination of the constitutionality of imprisonment in that
circumstance must await the presentation of a concrete case.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the judgment of the Court on the
basis of the considerations set forth in his opinion concurring in
the result in
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.
S. 235,
399 U. S. 259
(1970).
[
Footnote 1]
At the habeas corpus hearing, the assistant district attorney
appearing for the State stipulated:
"We would stipulate he is poverty-stricken, and that his whole
family has been for all periods of time therein, and probably
always will be."
Petitioner's uncontradicted testimony at the hearing was that,
prior to his imprisonment, he earned between $25 and $60 a week in
casual employment. He also received a monthly Veterans
Administration check of $104. He has a wife and two children
dependent on him for support. We were advised on oral argument
that, under Texas law, his automobile was not subject to execution
to collect the fines.
[
Footnote 2]
Tex.Code Crim.Proc., Art. 4.14 (1966) provides:
"The corporation court in each incorporated city, town or
village of this State shall have jurisdiction within the corporate
limits in all criminal cases arising under the ordinances of such
city, town or village, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
any justice of the peace in any precinct in which said city, town
or village is situated in all criminal cases arising under the
criminal laws of this State, in which punishment is by fine only,
and where the maximum of such fine may not exceed two hundred
dollars, and arising within such corporate limits."
[
Footnote 3]
Tex.Code Crim.Proc., Art. 45.53 (1966), provides in pertinent
part:
"A defendant placed in jail on account of failure to pay the
fine and costs can be discharged on habeas corpus by showing: "
"1. That he is too poor to pay the fine and costs; and"
"2. That he has remained in jail a sufficient length of time to
satisfy the fine and costs, at the rate of $5 for each day."
Houston Code § 38 provides:
"Each person committed to the county jail or to the municipal
prison farm for nonpayment of their fine arising out of his
conviction of a misdemeanor in the corporation court shall receive
a credit against such fine of five dollars ($5.00) for each day or
fraction of a day that he has served."
[
Footnote 4]
Houston Code § 35-9 provides:
"[A]dditional credit against the fine of each prisoner may be
granted by the superintendent of the municipal prison farm for good
conduct, industry and obedience; provided, however, that such
additional credit shall not exceed in time more than one-half (1/2)
day credit on his fine for each day's work."
An implementing regulation of the Fines Bureau Division of the
Houston Corporation Court interprets this provision as follows:
"If a person appears in court and is found guilty and does not
have money to pay his fine, he is committed to jail to serve the
amount of the fine at the rate of $5.00 per day. In certain cases,
a person may be allowed $7.50 credit per day."
It does not appear that petitioner was granted the increased
credit for any of the 21 days he served before his release.
[
Footnote 5]
Several States have a procedure for paying fines in
installments.
E.g., Cal.Penal Code § 1205 (1970)
(misdemeanors); Del.Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4332(c) (Supp. 1968);
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 38, § 4(a)(2) (Supp. 1970); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann.,
c. 279, § 1A (1959); N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. § 470-d(1)(b) (Supp.
1970); Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit.19, § 953 (1964); Wash.Rev.Code §
9.92.070.
This procedure has been widely endorsed as effective not only to
collect the fine, but also to save the expense of maintaining a
prisoner and avoid the necessity of supporting his family under the
state welfare program while he is confined.
See, e.g.,
Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws, Proposed New Federal Criminal Code § 3302(2) (1971);
American Bar Association, Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 2.7(b), pp.
119-122 (Approved Draft 1968); President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The
Courts 18 (1967); ALI, Model Penal Code § 302.1(1) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
See also Comment, Equal Protection
and the Use of Fines as Penalties for Criminal Offenses, 1966
U.Ill.L.F. 460; Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment
of the Indigent for Nonpayment of Fines, 64 Mich.L.Rev. 938 (1966);
Note, Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at
the Law and the Constitution, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 611 (1969); Note,
Fines and Fining -- An Evaluation, 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1013 (1953); J.
Sellin, Recent Penal Legislation in Sweden 14 (1947); Cordes, Fines
and Their Enforcement, 2 J.Crim. Sci. 46 (1950); S. Rubin, H.
Weihofen, C. Edwards, & S. Rosenzweig, The Law of Criminal
Correction 253 and n. 154 (1963); E. Sutherland & D. Cressey,
Principles of Criminology 276 (6th ed.1960).
See also Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. at
399 U. S.
244-245, n. 21.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
The Court's opinion is couched in terms of being
constitutionally protective of the indigent defendant. I merely add
the observation that the reversal of this Texas judgment may well
encourage state and municipal legislatures to do away with the fine
and to have the jail term as the only punishment for a broad range
of traffic offenses. Eliminating the fine whenever it is prescribed
as alternative punishment avoids the equal protection issue that
indigency occasions, and leaves only possible Eighth Amendment
considerations. If, as a nation, we ever reach that happy point
where we are willing to set our personal convenience to one side
and we are really serious about resolving the problems of traffic
irresponsibility and the frightful carnage it spews upon our
highways, a development of that kind may not be at all
undesirable.